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PREFACE 
The issue of Taiwan's status has long been disputed. Since 1949, more than half 
a century ago, a civil war divided a Chinese nation into two governments within the 
Chinese territories. One is the People's Republic of China on the mainland(China), the 
other is the Republic of China on Taiwan(Taiwan). Since then, China has long 
embraced the position of annexing Taiwan as its essential goal based on the political 
fiction of the one-China principle, assuming that "there is only one China 
internationally, Taiwan is a part of China, and the People's Republic of China is the 
sole government to represent the whole China," despite the fact that Taiwan's views 
of one-China concept is quite different from Mainland China's. Seemingly, however, 
the view that "Taiwan is a part of China" has been accepted worldwide. This situation 
leads the status of Taiwan to become confusing in most people's minds. If Taiwan is a 
part of China, who should govern Taiwan, the Republic of China or the People's 
Republic of China. 
After enjoying years of prosperity and democracy, the people of Taiwan have 
gone a long way toward realizing their dream of self-governance politically and 
economically. Currently Taiwan is the world's 19th largest economy, the 15th largest 
trading country, and even one of the world's most competitive economies. Thus, the 
Taiwan's issue is typically one of the global problems to be considered under 
international law. Despite the dispute on the Taiwan sovereignty issue politically, both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait share common interests economically. The result of the 
increased economic interdependence should not come as a surprise. This evolution 
poses risks and, at the same time, presents opportunities to both Taiwan and China. 
While studying Taiwan's legal status and its related issues, the functional views of 
international law on political integration and economic globalization should not be put 
aside. Although China's threat to use force against Taiwan's separatist movement is 
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the source of regional instability in the Asia-Pacific area, as a matter of legal concern, 
,. 
it does not imply that there is no room for Taiwan to receive international respect for 
regaining its political status as a sovereign independent state. In other words, to 
internationalize the Taiwan issue is one thing, to settle the existing dispute between 
Taiwan and China is another. By this logic, China's views of "peaceful unification" 
• 
and "one country two systems" may not be the only option to resolve the long 
outstanding sovereignty dispute of the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan issue itself lies not in 
whether Taiwan is an independent state, but rather whether or not to unite with China 
and that this is accepted by the people of Taiwan. 
As a Taiwanese, I feel it is very meaningful to be able to focus my S.J.D. 
dissertation on this issue. I hope my work on this issue will create a new approach to 
help clarify Taiwan's ambiguous status and benefit the future of Taiwan. To complete 
this dissertation, I am very grateful to my S.J.D. Committee Panel, Prof. Dr. Sompong 
Sucharitkul, Prof. Dr. Christian N. Okeke, and Prof. Dr. Van Walt Van Praag for their 
thoughtful support. They made me more knowledgeable of international legal studies. 
I also immensely appreciate the help of Mrs. Ruth C. Traver, Ms. Penelope A. Hedges, 
Dr. Emeka Duruigbo, and my lovely wife, Vicky Lin, in editing the earlier draft of 
this dissertation. In addition, I am profoundly thankful to Prof. Chris Pagano, Prof. 
Warren E. Small, Prof. Michael S. Daw, Mr. Christopher Jones, Mr. Harvey Tsai, Mrs. 
Kuei-yin Wu, Ms. Huguette Lo, and my dear friends for their considerate 
encouragement. Finally, thanks to my beloved family for their constant support that 
allowed me to devote so much time to my studies in the USA. 
Eric, Ting-Iun Huang, in San Francisco. 1212512002 
*L.B.(l990), Soo-chow University School of Law, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.c. 
*LL.M.(1998), & S.J.D.(2003), Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, USA. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE TAIWAN ISSUE 
12 
§. 1-1 Geography & People 
Taiwan is an island on the Pacific Rim, sitting in the middle of a chain of islands 
in the Western Pacific and separated from the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan Strait. 
The total area of Taiwanl is nearly 36,000 square miles,2 that is, slightly smaller 
than the Netherlands. Currently, the government of Taiwan is officially known as 
Republic of China, or Republic of China on Taiwan. Informally, people call it 
Nationalist China, Formosa3, Taiwan, or simply Taipei. 
There are over twenty-two million inhabitants4 on Taiwan making it one of the 
most densely populated places in the world. Taiwan is comprised of four major groups 
namely the Aborigines, the Fukien Taiwanese, the Hakka Taiwanese, and the 
Mainland Chinese(Mainlanders). The Fukien and Hakkas Taiwanese were Chinese 
1 The area including Taiwan proper, Penghu(Pescadores), Kinmen, Matsu, Orchid Island, Green Island, 
and the Tiaoyutai Islets, which is currently under effective control of the Republic of China. For details 
on Taiwan's geography and territorial composition, see THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 
2001, Government Information Office of the ROC. In 1991, the ROC declared its effective control over 
the above mentioned areas by recognizing Beijing's legal sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. 
However, the ROC constitution still defines its territory to include the Chinese mainland and the 
Taiwan area. This issue will be further discussed in the following chapters. The names "Taiwan," 
"Taipei", "Republic of China," "Republic of China on Taiwan,""Government of Taiwan," and 
"Nationalist China" are used interchangeably in this paper in order to introduce and analyze the 
legislation and judicial practice of the Republic of China. All these terms refer to the ROC government 
that was established in 1912 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and that has been governing effectively over Taiwan 
since 1949, rather than the PRC government. The names "Beijing," "People's Republic of China," 
"Mainland China," and "Communist China" refer to the separate geographical regions of mainland 
China that was established in 1949 by Mao Ze-dong. Taiwan consists of the island of Formosa, the 
Penghu Islands (the Pescadores), Jinmen Island, and Matsu Island. 
2 See THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 2001, the ROC Government Information 
Office( www.gio.gov.tw). 
3 In 16th century, a Portuguese captain on a vessel sailing through the Taiwan Strait who was so deeply 
attracted to the beautiful island used the word, Ilha Formosa, to name the island of Taiwan. After that, 
Taiwan has also come to be known as Formosa. 
4 According to undated statistics released by the Ministry of the Interior, ROC, the population of 
Taiwan was 22.44 million as of May, 2001. See information released by the ROC Government 
Information Office( www.gio.gov.tw). 
13 
immigrants who moved to Taiwan during the 14th and 1 ih centuries for the purpose of 
procuring a better life. The reason that Mailanders moved to Taiwan was totally 
different from that of the Fukien and Hakka Taiwanese. The majority of mainlanders5 
were either soldiers or government officials who came to Taiwan because Nationalist 
China was defeated by Chinese communists in 19496 resulting in the birth of the 
People's Republic of China on the Chinese mainland and the relocation of the 
Republic of China to Taiwan. Since the Fukien Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese came 
to Taiwan before the Mainlanders, they also called themselves indigenous Taiwanese.7 
Due to the economic boom as well as social and cultural changes, a very large 
proportion of the people of Taiwan no longer distinguish themselves from these ethnic 
groups strictly. Rather, they simply regard themselves as Taiwanese, or indigenous 
Taiwanese. 
§ 1-2 Unfinished Business 
The status of Taiwan has been a very sensitive and controversial issue since the 
founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing by Mao Zedong and the escape 
of Chiang Kai-shek regime to Taiwan in 1949. The Chinese state - the Republic of 
5 See Christopher Hughes, TAIWAN AND CHINESE NATIONALISM, Routledge, 2000, p. 27. 
(Noting that when the KMT(Chinag Kai-shek regime) retreated to Taiwan, it had brought with it some 
2.5 million people, swelling the island's(Taiwan) population of just under six million to just over eight 
million). 
6 Resulting from US general lack of awareness of the Chinese situation due to miscaculation that the 
Nationalists were not able to defeat the Communists, the Nationalists faced defeat on the Chinese 
mainland and fled to Taiwan in 1949. For details about the Chinese civil war, see John King Fairbank, 
THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION: 1800-1895,Harper & Row, 1987, pp.240-69. 
7 For details on Taiwan's ethnic groups, see John F. Copper, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR 
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China - has been divided into two parts, ruled by separate governments for more than 
half a century. Setting the stage for extremely confrontational relations, both sides 
refused to recognize the other as a legitimate government politically, but firmly 
asserted that there was only one China and that Taiwan was at the same time part of 
China. Interestingly, it was one of the few things on which the two sides could agree 
politically. At the same time, both sides have always differed in their definition of 
"one-China" and on who should govern the State. While Beijing referred to China as 
the People's Republic of China, Taipei referred to China as the Republic of China. 
Notwithstanding the division, neither government has ever ignored the common ideal 
of achieving reunification. The political differences and hostility between Beijing and 
Taipei have raised military tension in the Taiwan Strait attracting serious attention 
worldwide. During the Cold War, and especially before 1971, as the ROC on Taiwan 
was a front-line anti-communist state in the capitalist camp, the ideological rivalry 
with the PRC did not preclude the ROC on Taiwan from representing all the Chinese 
people internationally. This was the case despite Beijing's claim that Taiwan was its 
renegade province that must be reunified on its terms. 
In the 1970s, the switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing as the sole 
legitimate government of China by the majority of the members of international 
PROVINCE, SMC, 1994, pp.l0-13, 54-59. 
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community has wobbled the political status of Taiwan tremendously. As the PRC has 
continuously claimed its sovereignty over Taiwan and the ROC has never denied that 
Taiwan is part of China, the status of Taiwan has become very ambiguous and 
confusing for both the international community and the people of Taiwan. Chiang 
Kai-shek's death, in 1975, led to the realization that he and his regime would never 
recover the Chinese mainland, nor would his successors. Despite the political reform 
that led Taiwan to drop its claim to represent all of China as a sole legitimate 
government in 1988, the emotional and ideological dream of achieving reunification 
remains an ideal deeply embedded in Taiwan's official policy.8 
Is Taiwan an independent state or something less than an independent state? 
Actually, the problem involves not only the legal concept of statehood but also 
borders on the practice of recognition of governments and the exercise of sovereign 
power politically. In light of the evolution of cross-strait relations and Taiwan's 
international relations, the Issue of Taiwan's status becomes a special case in 
international law and it is difficult to find suitable precedents which can be applied to 
Taiwan. Politically, there was a settled principle to "return" Taiwan to China at the 
1943 Cairo Conference and in the 1945 Potsdam Declaration.9 However, legally, 
8 Taipei officially sets up its goal to reunify with Beijing by pursuing the future unification of China 
under democracy, freedom, and equitable prosperity. This issue will be discussed later in detail in 
fhapter IV. 
At the Cairo Conference of December 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Republic 
of China reached an agreement on the return of Taiwan and Pescadores to China from Japan after the 
16 
neither the ROC nor the PRC was authorized to control Taiwan while Japan formally 
gave up its authority over Taiwan in the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. lO This 
gives rise to a controversy as to whether the status of Taiwan is still unsettled. Too 
many resources have been wasted by Taipei and Beijing on this issue. Without any 
common solution by both sides of the Taiwan Strait, opposing views of the Taiwan 
status have been developed lucidly, which are "Taiwan as an independent state" vs. 
"Taiwan as a local government of China." In order to tackle this controversy, it is 
necessary to examine what is the meaningful mission of maintaining the one China 
policy. 
The return of Hong Kong H and Macau 12 to China III 1997 and 1999, 
respectively, has aroused the following curiosity: "after Macau, will Taiwan be next?" 
Currently, no one can predict what the exact answer is, but most people have sensed 
that based on evolution, the Taiwan issue will not be dragged on for too long. That is 
war. Two years later, this conclusion was reaffirmed in Section 3-b(8) of AnnexII of the Potsdam 
Declaration of July 1945 stating that "[t]he terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and 
Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such 
minor islands as we determine." Accordingly, Taiwan was handed to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists 
when Japanese empire surrendered in 1945. Further discussions on this issue will be in Chapter III. 
10 Neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to join the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, 
more significantly, neither government concluded "the Treaty of Peace with Japan" which entered into 
force on April 8, 1952. 
1] On July 1, 1997, the United Kingdom returned Hong Kong to Beijing after 156 years of British 
colonial rule. The British had forcibly taken control of Hong Kong from the Chinese Manchu Dynasty 
on January 26, 1841. For details, see "A GREAT MOMENT," Beijing Review, Vo1.40 No.29, Beijing, 
July21, 1997. 
12 . In 1887, the Portugese agreed to rule over Macao from Chinese Manchu Dynasty under the 
Sino-Portugese Treaty of Reconciliation and Trade. In April 1987, China and Portugal signed the 
Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration concluding that Macao is Chinese territory and the Chinese 
government would resume the exercise of sovereignty over it from Dec. 20, 1999. For details, see He 
Qing, DENG XIAOPING AND THE RETURN OF MACAO, also see Ren Min, MACAO IS 
HISTORICALLY CHINESE TERRITORY, Beijing Review, Vol.42 No.51, Beijing, Dec.20, 1999. 
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to say, Taiwan is likely to play with a limited time regarding its future. Taiwan's 
President Lee's two-states statement13 renewed high tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
militarily and was considered a dangerous move internationally.14 It has become 
clear that Taiwan does not have much room to deal with its own political status. 
Judging by the fact that the ROC was not able to assert its own stance on Taiwan in 
the international political arena, people in the world began to doubt whether Taiwan is 
an independent state. As enshrined in the doctrine of sovereignty, at the very least the 
government of a state IS entitled to claim its external attitude, without outside 
intervention, in handling its own relations with other states. In this sense, since the 
government of Taiwan was not completely free to do so, it certainly reflects that the 
status of Taiwan remains uncertain. Otherwise, why was Taiwan not permitted to 
define its relationship with China on the basis of state-to-state? Why did the 
international community criticize Taiwan's two-states definition as a dangerous move 
affecting regional peace? 
If the government of Taiwan intends to convince its people and the international 
13 
In response to a question during an interview with a German radio, Deutche Welle radio station, on 
July 9 of 1999 that "the Beijing government views Taiwan as a renegade province," President Lee 
remarked: "the cross-strait relationship is a "special state-to-state relationship." See THE POSTION 
PAPER TO ELABORATE ON THE CONTROVERSIAL STATE-TO-STATE REMARKS MADE BY 
PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HVI TO DEFINE RELATIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND MAINLAND 
SHINA, the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC, on Aug. 1 of 1999. 
Regarding the new tension over the Taiwan Strait caused by Taiwan President Lee's two-states 
statement, ASEAN reaffirmed the "one China" policy and criticized the statement which could affect 
regional peace and stability and prospects for economic recovery. See Dan Sloan, ASEAN EYES 
TAIWAN STRAIT, TO REAFFIRM ONE CHINA, Reuters, July 23, 1999. 
(http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reuters-ASEANEyesTaiwanStraitToReaffirmOneChina.htrn). 
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community that Taiwan is not a local government of China, the best approach would 
be through a close theoretical analysis of the legal basis of statehood. It is hardly 
useful to assess the diplomatic isolation by Beijing effectively because whatever legal 
arguments may be settled in favor of Taiwan to stand as a sovereign state, there 
remains the common objection from Beijing which realistically leads most countries 
in the world not to support an independent status of Taiwan. However, at least it is a 
step in the right direction to clarify people's increased confusion as to whether or not 
Taiwan is an independent state, especially those people currently living in Taiwan. In 
order to do that, it would be useful to take an excursion into the history of Taiwan's 
entrance into the world stage. 
§ 1-3 Taiwan's Emergence as a Territorial Entity 
Taiwan's formal appearance in world history was in the 1 i h century, when it was 
colonized by the Dutch, the first Western power to be involved on the island. Without 
serious interest in the value of Taiwan, the Chinese Ming Dynasty easily paved the 
way for the Dutch to occupy Taiwan in exchange for the control of the Pescadores in 
1624. After 1661, Taiwan was taken from the Dutch by Cheng Ch'eng-kung for a 
brief period of time. Ch'eng was a royal general of the Chinese Ming Dynasty who 
was defeated by the Manchu Ching Dynasty15 in the mainland and sailed with his 
15 
In 1644, the Manchus destroyed the Chinese Ming Dynasty and established the Manchu Ching 
Dynasty in Beijing. Since then, the Manhu Ching Dynasty ruled China for 268 years until 1912 when 
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troopS across the Taiwan Strait to expel the Dutch from Taiwan. After Ch'eng's retreat 
to Taiwan, the Cheng regime never gave up the hope to recover the mainland by 
overthrowing the Manchu Ching Dynasty in order to restore the Chinese Ming 
Dynasty. However, twenty-three years later, his regime was crushed by the Manchu 
Ching Dynasty in 1683. This island was then formally governed by the Manchu Ching 
Dynasty for about two hundred years. 
Under the Shimonoseki Treaty, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Manchu Ching 
Dynasty in perpetuity following its defeat in the war with Japan in 1895. Seventeen 
years later, the Manchu Ching Dynasty was succeeded by the Republic of China in 
1912. Before it was deprived of its sovereignty over Taiwan in 1945, Japan had 
colonized Taiwan for half a century. During the fifty years of separation from China 
as a colony of Japan, the inhabitants of Taiwan were forced to embrace Japanization, 
and the traffic between Taiwan and China was restricted. After its recovery by the 
Chiang Kai-shek regime of Nationalist China, Taiwan was swiftly annexed as one of 
China's provinces under the authority of Nationalist China. Under the propaganda of 
"happy to return to the motherland," the inhabitants of Taiwan were compelled to cut 
off their links to Japanese identity in order to implement China-ization. Their national 
identity was at first Japanese, then Chinese, while now it seems to become more 
its regime was replaced by the Republic of China, led by Sun Yat-sen. 
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ambiguous between Chinese and Taiwanese. 16 All of this tells us that, the indigenous 
population of Taiwan were not allowed to decide their own destiny by themselves and 
their nationality has been imposed by outside rulers. 
§ 1-4 Self-Determination ofthe People of Taiwan 
As enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, self-determination itself is not 
only part of human rights, but is also deemed to be a key contribution to the 
prevention and resolution of internal and international conflicts. 17 Despite the fact 
that the very concept of peoples' right was recognized by many international 
instruments, the issue of who is entitled to exercise self-determination remains very 
disputed under international law. This is because there are few well-defined principles 
of the people's right to self-determination in terms of the internal aspect, such as a 
universal standard to regulate the implementation of the right of a people to 
self-determination. 
Going by the narrow interpretation that self-determination is an instrument of 
decolonization, it appears that the inhabitants of Taiwan are not very qualified to 
16 For details about Taiwan's history, see John King Fairback, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY, Harvard 
University Press, 1992. Also see Walter Chen, HISTORY OF TAIWAN, 
(http://www.leksu.comlleksu-e.htm) . 
17 The International Conference of Experts held by UNESCO in 1998 reached and adopted a 
conclusion to affirm the principle of self-determination by saying that "the principle and fundamental 
right to self-determination of all peoples is fIrmly established in intematonal law, including human 
rights law, and must be applied equally and universally. The peaceful implementation of the right to 
self-determination in its broad sense is a key contribution to the prevention and solution of conflicts, 
especially those which involve contending interests of exsiting state and peoples, including indigenous 
peoples, and minority communities." See REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
EXPERTS HELD IN BARCRLONAFOR 21 TO 27 NOVEMBER 1998, Centre UNESCO, 1999, p.2l. 
(Hereinafter: 1998 REPORT OF CONFERENCE IN BARCELONA) 
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exercise the right to self-determination on the ground that Taiwan is not currently 
dominated by foreign rulers. However, witnessing the increased movements in the 
name of self-determination outside the colonial context such as the cases of Mongolia, 
Palestine, East Timor, Western Sahara, Eritrea as well as observing the development 
of indigenous people's right18 to self-determination being recognized by the world 
community m the changing world,19 it is foreseeable that the right to 
self-determination can be implemented m its broadest sense to include the 
non-colonial aspect of the right to attain independent existence by pragmatically 
redefining the principle of disclaiming separatism and upholding the right of every 
people to independence as guaranteed by the UN Charter and other various 
international instruments. 
In the modem history of Taiwan, the people of Taiwan have been seeking 
self-determination at least more than once. All attempts were so far unsuccessful. The 
first time was in 1895 when the inhabitants of Taiwan became aware of the fact that 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Manchu Ching Dynasty, Taiwan residents fell into 
deep despair and indignation. The elite and some inhabitants of Taiwan led by 
18 The term "indigenous people" was defined by the UN Working Group in 1983 as following: a group 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies, which consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories.(See Russel Lawrence 
Barsh, INDIENOUS PEOPLES: AN EMERGING OBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, American 
Journal ofInternational Law, US, April, 1986). 
19 The international Non-Governmental Organizations Conference was held at Geneva in 1977, which 
set forth a draft declaration of principles to call for the recognition of indigenous peoples as subject of 
international law. The report of the conference was reprinted in THE ISSUE OF THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN JOURNAL, November 1977. 
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Ching-sun Tang decided to move for Taiwan's independence. They felt that Taiwan 
had already been abandoned by the Manchu Ching Dynasty, and therefore, the people 
of Taiwan had nothing to rely on in China, but to defend themselves to the last. 
Consequently, a Taiwan Independence Ceremony was held publicly, proclaiming the 
establishment of the Taiwan Democratic Republic. At the same time, Ching-sun Tang 
was nominated the President of the Republic. This attempt by the people of Taiwan to 
plan a political destiny for themselves was not only the first time that the Taiwanese 
would do so, but it was also the first attempt by any country in Asia to seek political 
independence. However, without formal recognition by foreign states, the life of the 
Taiwan Democratic Republic just ended like a flash. Two weeks after, it completely 
collapsed after the Japanese troops landed on Taiwan. 
§ 1-5 The February 28 Incident 
The second time that the indigenous Taiwanese intended to establish a political 
identity was at the time when Nationalist China sent troops to take over Taiwan after 
Japan's surrender in World War II.20 The inhabitants of Taiwan were disappointed 
with the official personnel and soldiers dispatched to Taiwan by the Chiang Kai-shek 
20 Politically, Taiwan was to revert to China as was agreed at the Cairo Conference by few major 
powers - the US, the UK and the Nationalist China - in 1943. Two years later, Nationalist China 
occupied Taiwan on behalf of the Allied Power after Japan's surrender in 1945. However, Japan did not 
formally renounce its sovereignty over Taiwan until 1951 when it concluded the San Francisco Treaty 
with Allied Powers. It made clear at this point that before 1951 Taiwan was still an occupied territory 
of Japan legally and thus, its status was unsettled yet. Hence, this gave rise to the strong tendency 
among the people of Taiwan to struggle for their future. 
23 
regime of Nationalist China, following Japanese evacuation. Persuaded that those 
Mainlanders were arrogant, repressive, and corrupt, the indigenous Taiwanese felt that 
Nationalist China was no better than its predecessor, even worse in many ways.21 
The Taiwanese elite began criticizing the government and demanding political reform, 
but none of the demands was accepted. The ill feeling gradually alienated the native 
Taiwanese from Mainlanders and gave rise to a distinct self-identity to set them apart 
from the ruling government. A widespread uprising burst out on February 28th, 1947, 
triggered by a conflict after a Taiwanese woman had been severely injured by 
Mainlanders in Taipei. Within days, angry indigenous Taiwanese took over various 
municipalities and clashed with Mainlanders. As a result, more troops were sent to 
Taiwan from the Chinese mainland cruelly to suppress the riots by systematically 
killing and arresting not only those directly involved in the widespread uprising, but 
also numerous leading figures in the society such as lawyers, doctors, professors and 
councilmen.22 
According to the information released officially, about 18,000 to 28,000 people 
lost their lives in "the 2-28 incident." Almost a whole generation of Taiwanese 
intellectuals and community leaders were purged. From then on, the Taiwanese were 
21 See 1. K. Fairbank, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1800-1985, Harper & Row Publishers, 
1987, p.266. 
22 As the anti-Mainlander incident was blazed since the day of February 28th, people thus call this 
bloody incident "the 2-28 incident". For details about "the 2-28 incident", see generally Allan 1. 
Shackleton, FORMOSA CALLING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN TAIWAN 
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compelled to keep silent politically under the enforcement of martial law. The Chiang 
Kai-shek regime of Nationalist China did not tolerate any demand for political 
reforms and Taiwanization by the indigenous Taiwanese, but regarded the claims as 
separatism against the government. There was also deep ideological repugnance 
against any serious study of Taiwanese history and culture in Taiwan. In subsequent 
years, an ethnic cleavage between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders grew until the 
ruling government led by Chiang Ching-Kuo, a son of Chinag Kai-shek, decided to 
conduct the political reform and adopt the policy of Taiwanization in the late 1970s. 
In truth, to this day, this painful history of "the 2-28 incident" still haunts the 
sociopolitical climate of Taiwan23 and sharpens people's minds to seek their own 
destiny in Taiwan. 
Because of the bloody incident, a petition was submitted by Dr. Liao Bun-gee4 
to the United Nations in 1948, appealing that Taiwan should be placed under the 
trusteeship of the United Nations and that the status of Taiwan should be decided by 
the people of Taiwan under the principle of self-determination.25 However, the 
following year, III 1949, the Chiang Kai-shek regIme of Nationalist China lost 
DURING THE FEBRUARY 28TH 1947 INCIDENT, Taiwan Publishing Co., 1998. 
23 In 1995 the very first monument was erected in Taipei in memory of the victims of the 2-28 incident, 
and the ROC President Lee Teng-hui publicly apologized for the cruelty by the Chiang Kai-shek 
regime of Nationalist China. 
24 
Dr. Liao was one of the hundreds of Taiwanese intellectuals who fled Taiwan seeking refuge from 
the arrests and killings by Chiang Kai-shek regime. In 1950, he organized "Taiwan Democratic 
Independence Party" in Japan and became the president of the party. (See Walter Chen, HISOTRY OF 
TAIWAN, supra Note 16, at Chapter 9) 
5 See id. Walter Chen, HISTORY OF TAIWAN, at Chapter 9. 
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Chinese mainland as a result of its defeat by Chinese communists and fled to Taiwan. 
Soon after, the Korean War broke out in 1950, and Nationalist China in Taiwan was 
put under US protection and became a part of the free world otherwise known as the 
Western bloc in the Cold War confrontation. Accordingly, without support from the 
international community, the petition for self-determination turned into a dead dream 
for the people of Taiwan. 
Due to the continuation of Taiwanization, and the steady development of 
democratization smce the late 1980s and 1990s, political matters are no longer 
controlled by the elite of the Mainlanders but more by the indigenous Taiwanese. On 
the other hand, the dynamic economic growth in Taiwan has led to social and political 
pluralism; the expansion of private wealth enables the people of Taiwan to exert 
greater autonomy over their own lives and feel dignified. As a result, a style of 
Taiwanese value is growing and a form of new Taiwanese with all people of Taiwan is 
emerging. The evolution of seeking the recovery of their own identity has made the 
people of Taiwan not to identify themselves much with China that remains a 
communist dictatorship. Evidently, the social, cultural and political differences 
resulting from half a century of separate rule explain why the people of Taiwan have 
strong self-identity to treat themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese. Observing this 
26 
point, some opposition political parties26 have begun to raise the issue of national 
identity and question the official ideal of reunification with China from time to time. 
They intend to redefine their own identity through challenging the assumption of 
Chinese nationalism imposed on them by the political elite who carne from mainland 
China in 1940s, and they try to seek their own destiny by advocating the right of the 
indigenous population of Taiwan to self-determination. 
§ 1-6 The "People" for Purposes of Self-Determination 
On the issue of who should be eligible to determine the future of Taiwan, we 
must clarify the people's right in terms of self-determination, and make it more 
acceptable to fit the Taiwan model. Otherwise, it IS inconceivable that the 
international community will be obliged to respect or recognize any decision made by 
the people of Taiwan regarding Taiwan's political status. Recently, in 2000, US 
President Bill Clinton27 criticized a threat by China forcibly to reunify Taiwan with 
the Chinese mainland if there are any further delays by Taiwan on the reunification 
negotiations.28 Mr. Clinton said that the Taiwan issue must be resolved peacefully 
and "with the assent of the people of Taiwan." This indicates that the right of the 
26 Currently, in Taiwan, there are two major political parties favoring Taiwan's independence rather 
than reunification with China. One is the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP), the other is the Taiwan 
Independence Party(TAIP). 
27 See CNA, Washington, Feb 25, 2000. 
28 On Feb 21, 2000, the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office released a white paper, entitled "THE ONE 
CHINA PRINCIPLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE," noting that further delays by Taiwan on the 
question of reunification could lead to war. For details of the white paper, see The New York Times 
(http://www.nytimes.comllibrary/worldlasial022200china-taiwan-text.html). 
27 
people of Taiwan to self-determination is foreseeable. In this regard, assuming that the 
population of Taiwan really proceeds with the exercise of self-determination and their 
decision is to favor permanent independence as a sovereign state by adopting the "one 
China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" policy, the consequences deserve our 
consideration. If China takes military action against Taiwan due to the 
self-determination movement, what will be the impact on regional security and what 
will the nature of this conflict be? Is it an international affair, or only a Chinese 
domestic affair? Can Taiwan file a complaint to the United Nations to seek a 
resolution and restoration of peace? These Issues are indeed really worthy of 
thoughtful consideration. 
§ 1-7 The Prospect ofthe Use of Force 
In spite of the required principle that a state IS deemed to have violated 
international law by the use of force, or the threat of force, to settle international 
issues including territorial disputes/9 Beijing has constantly threatened to use 
military force against any separatist movement In Taiwan In order to fulfill its 
so-called "eventual reunification goal." The threat of force by China has not only 
29 See DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING 
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, G A. Res. 2625(XXV), Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. 
(No.28), UN Doc. Al5217(1970), at 121. Further discussion will be covered later in Chapter II. 
(http://www.tufis.edulfietcher/pens12625.htm). 
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made Taiwan a major weapons buyer30 internationally, but has also brought the 
Taiwan issue into the lime-light. It is listed with the North Korean and Kashmiri 
issues as the three destabilizing factors that might suddenly burst into full-fledged 
crises in Asia.3! The symbolic events of Taiwan President Lee's visit to the United 
States III June 199532 and the presidential election in March 199633 provoked 
Beijing to increase military threats by conducting missile tests34 around Taiwan in 
early 1996. The tense Missile Crisis not only was at its peak in the Taiwan Strait in the 
past three decades but also captured headlines with international attention focused on 
it. Using the Taiwan Relations Act35 as the basis, the United States deployed two 
30 According to new statistics, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 
1998, released by the Bureau of Arms Control of the US State Department, the total value of Arms 
Transfer Deliveries of Taiwan, from 1995 to 1997, was US$ 12,455 million, making Taiwan the second 
biggest recipient country in the world, just after Saudi Arabia. 
31 For details, see Robert A, HERE COMES THE ASIAN CENTURY, China Post, Taiwan, Dec. 29, 
1999. (Noting that the locus of the world's most dangerous flash points for armed conflict in Asia are 
the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pakistani border). 
32 In response to the question, "Will China make a further reaction toward Lee Teng-hui's visit to the 
United States?" a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Shen Guofang stated that "the US 
administration allowed Lee Tung-hui to visit the United States has seriously damaged the foundation of 
Sino-US relations ... We have expressed strong dissatisfaction over this willful action on the part of the 
US government ... " See NEW BRIEFINGS BY CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY, Beijing Review, 
p20, Beijing, June 26, 1995. 
33 It was the very fIrst time, both in Chinese and Taiwanese history, that the people of Taiwan had 
really and directly elected their leader. For details, see Richard Hornik, TAIWAN'S SECOND 
MIRACLE, Times, p.45, April 1, 1996. 
34 For views on this missile crisis see NEW YORK TIMES (March 11, 1996), which indicated that 
"acknowledging that it was trying to intimidate Taiwan and affect that March 23 vote in which Lee is 
running for reelection, China says it has fIred three M-9 ballistic missiles, carrying dummy warheads, 
into target zones 20 to 30 nautical miles outside of Taiwan's port of Keelung and Kaohsiung. Beijing 
also says it plans to begin "live ammunition" war games in a 6,000-square-mile zone whose closure 
will obstruct much of the shipping and air traffic in the southern portion of the Taiwan Strait." 
(Hereinafter Missile Crisis). (http://www.nando.netinewsroomlntl0311usescy.htrnl). 
35 In January 1979, the government of US President Carter switched its diplomatic recognition from 
Taipei to Beijing. Following the termination of the US-ROC defense treaty a year later, in July 1980, 
the congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act(TRA) to maintain the relations between Washington and 
Taipei and provide Taiwan a security guarantee under some circumstances. This is the very fIrst time 
that the US would adopt a law to guide its relations with another state. The issues relating to TRA will 
be further discussed in Chapter V. 
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aircraft carrier battle groups to the region to cool Beijing's ardor and calm Taipei's 
anxiety.36 Nevertheless, it appears that the military intimidation in the Taiwan Strait 
and the inherent rivalry would continue until Taipei accepts Beijing's offer of the 
reunification model, "one country, two systems," which is currently being 
implemented in Hong Kong as well as in Macau. Hence, the security issue of Taiwan 
and its neighboring states is becoming a very potential problem while tackling the 
issue of the Taiwan status. 
§ 1-8 The United States Position 
During the Missile Crisis in 1996, two carrier battle groups that the United States 
dispatched around the Taiwan Strait in a bid to maintain stability in the region, 
constituted the largest task force by the US in East Asia since the Vietnam War. The 
US clearly presented its policy as one of keeping a peaceful Taiwan Strait which is 
necessary for protecting its national interests. More significantly, it also indicated that 
the US probably was the only outside power that could back Taiwan with military 
mighe7 against any aggression from China. In reality, the US is the most deeply 
involved country in the world on the Taiwan issue with the exception of China and 
36See Patrick Tyler, A GREAT WALL: SIX PRESIDENTS AND CHINA, PublicAffairs, 1999, pp. 
21-46. Concerning the deployment of two aircraft carriers, the author notes that America had declared 
its intention to use force in the defense of Taiwan if Taiwan is threatened militarily by Beijing. 
37 According to a report related to the reflections on the Missile Crisis by some states, the reporter 
notes that "Asian countries, unwilling to risk the wrath of Beijing, aren't flocking to Taiwan's side in its 
standoff with powerful China. Only the United States has backed Taiwan with military might, while 
mighty neighbors like Japan try to stay clear of the dispute." See ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 12, 
1996. (http://www.nando.netinewsroomlntl0312astens.htrnl). 
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Taiwan. In responding to the one-China principle, the US has adopted the strategic 
ambiguity tactic38 to acknowledge that governments on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait hold that there is only one China rather than recognize China's sovereignty over 
Taiwan. Moreover, in view ofthe fact that stability in the Taiwan Strait would directly 
affect peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, the US continuously reminds 
China of its position that the Taiwan issue should be resolved by peaceful means. As 
such, the Taiwan issue is indeed a very important topic in relations between the US 
and the PRe. Any further definition of the one-China policy in favor of Beijing by 
Washington would tremendously affect the future of Taiwan because of Washington's 
influential role in Taiwan's policymaking process. Observing this point, in an effort to 
achieve a tacit commitment from Washington to absorb Taiwan, Beijing has not only 
tried to build up a good relationship with Washington, but has also taken the Taiwan 
policy from the US more seriously than before. 
Since China, together with Japan and Russia, are seen by Washington to be of 
vital interest to the political, economic, and security concerns of the US39, and China 
is one of the major powers in Asia, it is questionable whether the two outsiders - the 
PRC and the US - will eventually collaborate against Taipei by settling the Taiwan 
38 See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, THE US AND CORSS STRAIT RIVALRY: STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIP AND STARTEGIC AMBIGUITY, Taiwan Security Research Further discussions will 
be covered later in Chapter V. 
(http://tai wan security. org/IS/IS-Hickey-2 .htrn). 
39 See a survey, entitled "AMERICAN LOOK AT ASIA", released by the Henry Luce Foundation, US, 
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issue without Taipei's participation as was the case in the 1895 Shimonoseki treaty 
and the 1943 Cairo Conference. The issue is always on people's minds in Taiwan. 
Therefore, the Taipei-Washington-Beijing triangular relationships is a vital factor in 
determining not only regional security but also Taiwan's future. For that reason, does 
it imply that the solution to the Taiwan issue lies with the United States? In fact, the 
issue has a complicated history behind it, which is political. In order to have a close 
look at it, it is essential to examine Taiwan's policies among the three governments, 
the Republic of China, the Peoples' Republic of China, and the United States. Without 
analytical frameworks to study the prospects for the triangular relations, it is difficult 
to establish a perspective for this kind of evolution or how the Taiwan issue would 
tum out. 
§ 1-9 The Question of Chinese Representation in the UN 
At the inception of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, the Republic of 
China was a founding member and one of the five penn anent members of the UN 
Security Counci1.40 After the Chinese civil war resulting in the emergence of two 
governments in the Chinese nation, the issue of who should sit in the United Nations 
to represent China - whether the ROC or the PRC - came up and became disputable. 
In January 1950, a draft resolution that would have denied the credentials of the ROC 
in Oct. 1999.(http://www.hluce.orgisurvey.htmI). 
40 In Article 23 of the UN Charter, the Republic of China was named among the five permanent 
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representatives was first raised by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Without 
support by the majority of members, the draft resolution was defeated. That led to the 
boycott of the UN Security Council by the Soviet Union for a few months in 1950 as 
a way of protesting the continued sitting of the ROC representatives.41 Coincidentally, 
the Korean armed conflict broke out at the same time, hence, without the presence of 
the Soviet Union, a series of UN resolutions42 relating to the Korean crisis (including 
the offer of necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack by 
North Korea as well as the recommendation that all Members provide military forces 
to a unified command under the United States to restore international peace and 
security in the area due to the increase of intervention by Chinese Communist military 
units in Korea) were adopted in the Security Council. 
As a matter of fact, the question of Chinese representation was regarded as a 
unique case in the history of the United Nations since it involved a revolutionary 
change of government and the first time the two rival governments coexisted. Before 
1960, for ten years, the proposal for calling the seat of representatives of the PRC in 
place of those from the ROC was avoided in the UN General Assembly agenda by 
adopting a resolution to postpone considering the matter in the UN General Assembly. 
members of the UN Security Council. 
41 th See UN ANNUAL REPORT: 1 JULY 1949-30 JUNE 1950, 5 Sess. Supp. 1 (AlI287), pp. 31-3. 
42 See the 1950 UN Security Council Resolution 82, 83, 84, and 85. RESOLUTIONS AND 
STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 1946-1992, edited by Karel C. 
Wellens, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1993, pp.323-27) 
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After 1960, due to the expansion of UN membership by the admission of newly 
independent states, the Western powers no longer dominated the UN as before. Thus, 
more and more member states began to contemplate the Chinese representation 
question. In 1961, for the first time, the issue was put before the UN General 
Assembly. In the meantime, a proposal, sponsored by the US, was adopted in the UN 
General Assembly to decide that any issue to change the representation of China must 
be considered as an important question, meaning it should be made by a two-thirds 
majority of the members present and voting.43 From then on, any attempt to change 
the Chinese representation could not succeed until 1971. 
Because of its commitment to the Chiang Kai-shek regime of the ROC,44 the US 
for more than two decades led the fight to save the ROC by using procedural tactics. 
However, it could not ignore the fact that the PRC was the regime effectively in 
control of the Chinese mainland. In this regard, it became more difficult for the US to 
fight for the ROC on the issue of Chinese representation45 on the ground that more 
and more member states were convinced that the PRC was the government exercising 
effective authority within the territory of China and thus, should represent the State in 
43 See Art. 18 of the UN Charter. 
44 See A. LeRoy Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES, 
Prentice Hall, 1995, p.86. 
45 In order to hold a seat in the UN for Taiwan, the US proposed a compromise by favoring a Security 
Council seat for the PRC so that both Chinas can sit at the UN at the same time. But the proposal was 
defeated by both Chinese regimes because of the assertion of one China policy. See Frederic L. Kirgis, 
Jr., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING, West Publishing Co., US, 
1993, p.180.(Hereinafter: Kirgis, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS). 
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the United Nations. As a result, in 1971, the issue of Chinese representation took an 
about tum and was no longer characterized as an important question under Article 18 
of the UN Charter by the majority of the members present and voting in the UN 
General Assembly. At this point, the ROC Delegation left the General Assembly Hall. 
Realizing the imminence of the PRC's entry to assume China's seat in the UN at the 
next subsequent ballot on substantive "unimportant" question, the ROC 
representatives announced its gracIOus withdrawal from the United Nations. 
Resolution 2758,46 no longer requmng a two-thirds majority and without any 
recommendation from the Security Council, was adopted within minutes by a simple 
majority with the immediate effect to admit the PRC to take China's seat and "expel" 
the Chiang Kai-shek representatives from the United Nations. 
§ 1-10 The Question of Taiwan's Status 
Many arguments were raised after the adoption of UN GA Resolution 2758, 
because the resolution only resolved the representation issue for the people of 
mainland China but not for the people of Taiwan. In short, it could only affirm the 
right of the PRC to represent the people who were under its effective control. 
Admittedly, part of the rationale enabled the PRC to take over China's seat in the UN 
46 The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 was passed in the 26th session of the UN General 
Assembly to admit Beijing to replace Taipei to sit in the Untied Nations and its Security Council. For 
details about the resolution, see GA. Res. 2758, 26 GAOR Supp. 29 (A/8429), at 2, United Nations 
General Assembly, Oct. 25, 1971. 
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since the ROC no longer effectively controlled the Chinese mainland. Conversely, the 
people of Taiwan have never been under the control of the PRC for any single day but 
have been ruled by the ROC since 1945. A fortiorissime, the same rationale should 
equally apply to the case of Taiwan with a population of over twenty-two million to 
be represented at the United Nations. 
Since 1993, Taipei has continually sought to enter the UN by arguing that "the 
UN needs to examine the exceptional international situation pertaining to the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, to ensure that the fundamental right of its twenty-three 
million people to participate in the work and activities of the United Nations is fully 
respected.,,47 However, without gaining acceptance in the UN General Assembly 
Steering Committee, the perennial proposal has been excluded from the UN General 
Assembly agenda because Beijing was able to rally its allies to voice their opposition 
against Taipei. 
In light of Article 4 of the UN Charter, the procedure concerning the admission 
of new members to the United Nations includes not only that a state wishing to 
become a member of the UN should be a peace-loving State, accepting the obligations 
contained in the UN Charter and is able and willing to carry out these obligations, but 
also a decision of the General Assembly should be based upon "the recommendation 
47 
See LETTER WRITIEN TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, released by the ROC Foreign 
Ministry, 1999.(htlpllwww.mofa.gov.tw/unlunlet99.htm). 
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of the Security Council." In short, without the recommendation from the UN Security 
Council, an applicant cannot qualify to become a member state in the United 
Nations.48 At this point, pressure from the PRC as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council with its double veto power to impede Taiwan's entry into the UN has 
significantly aroused this curiosity: "how can Taiwan become a member state in the 
United Nations? Is it possible?" This is worthy of further discussion because it is not 
just a highly political issue between China and Taiwan. After all, the Taiwan issue 
itself with its potential for an armed conflict with China needs to be viewed as a 
serious threat to international peace and security. In other words, the maintenance of a 
peaceful Taiwan Strait should be regarded as a common desire of the international 
community. Hence, only when Taiwan joins the Untied Nations, which is recognized 
as a paramount organization in the world and a comprehensive forum for collective 
security and world dialogue, can the stable community playa key role by providing 
every assistance to settle the existing disputes before they degenerate into serious 
conflicts. 
After the ROC lost its seat in the UN, it consequently failed to retain its seats in 
numerous other international organizations. Currently Taipei only enjoys membership 
III very few intergovernmental organizations(such as the Asian Development Bank, 
48 
See Kirgis, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, p.148. 
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the International Cotton Advisory Committee, the Asian Productivity Organization, 
the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization, and the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration).49 Significantly the US decision to switch its diplomatic 
relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China in 1979 
provided an incentive precedent for other hesitant countries to follow. This realistic 
trend gave rise to another round of trouble in Taipei's foreign policy. Suffering from 
this consequence, Taipei currently maintains official relations with only twenty-seven 
states.SOMost are Latin American and Caribbean countries, and several are tiny and 
poor island nations located in the South Pacific and Oceania region. This reality 
places Taiwan in a very strange position in the world. On the one hand, the people of 
Taiwan have learned how to live together with one another, to respect each other, and 
to work with each other for the future of their community economically. On the other 
hand, they seem to be isolated in the global context politically. Although the economic 
achievement has propelled Taiwan into something akin to an "economic giant"Sl 
internationally, the evolution still cannot change the fact that Taiwan is also acting 
49 See THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1999, the ROC Government Information Office. 
50 See THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 2002, released by the ROC Government 
Information Office(Noting that Taiwan currently has diplomatic ties with 29 countries. Four countries 
in South Pacific and Oceania region: Palau, Solomon Island, Marshall Island, and Tuvalu; eight 
countries in Africa: Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Liberia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
as well as Swaziland; one West European countries: Holy See; fourteen countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean area: Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, as well as 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). 51 
See THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1999(Noting that, in 1998, Taiwan's Per capita 
GNP was the 25th highest worldwide and at the end of the same year, the accumulative sums of foreign 
exchange reserves was the third highest in the world. Currently, Taiwan is the world's 14th largest trade 
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like a "political orphan" in the world. This is regardless of the fact that there is little 
dispute that Taiwan meets the accepted criteria for statehood, namely, a permanent 
population, a defined territory, an effective government, induding a capacity to enter 
into international relations with other states, III accordance with the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 52 
Beijing has never committed itself to abandoning military action if Taiwan 
moves toward independence and has repeatedly warned Taiwan against using the term 
"state" to describe itself, regarding it as a move toward independence from China. As 
such, most of the people of Taiwan favor the status quo of Taiwan's current position, 
that is, to remain vague in reference with a leaning toward independence and 
reunification. Probably, maintaining a status quo 53 by going beyond the 
independence-reunification dichotomy was a good strategy for Taiwan to avoid China 
absorbing Taiwan on its terms in the past. Yet, contemplating that Taiwan is gradually 
losing its political position in global affairs, it is doubtful at this point whether this 
strategy will continue to serve Taiwan in the future because currently Taiwan is 
already seriously overshadowed by China. 
Recently, in September 1999, Taiwan experienced a terrible earthquake that 
partner). 
52 
See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Art.l, Dec.26 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 
25. 
53 
From various studies and opinion polls showing the majority of people of Taiwan prefer to keep the 
status quo regarding relations with Beijing. The related issues will be covered in the last chapter. 
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killed over twenty-three hundred people and caused losses and injuries estimated at 
US$3.1 billion.54 In spite of a severe disaster, regrettably, without membership of the 
UN and its specialized agencies, Taiwan was not able to benefit directly from any 
formal financial aid provided by certain intergovernmental organizations like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This is in sharp contrast to the case 
of Turkey. In order to express sympathy with the people of Turkey following the 
devastating earthquake that hit the Marmara region in August 1999, the two economic 
international organizations provided a series of financial emergency assistance to help 
Turkey recover from the effects of the earthquake. 55 The lesson therefore is that 
Taiwan must blend its political status into its economic position. Taiwan's economic 
achievement has reshaped its role on the global economic stage, but it did not help 
strengthening its political position in the global context. In this regard, it is clear that 
Taiwan's political status is left far behind its economic status. Therefore, to break out 
from the current international isolation and playa valuable role in the United Nations 
system will be highly meaningful in the enhancement of the legal status of Taiwan 
and the maintenance of the national security of Taiwan politically and economically. 
54 
See SPECIAL REPORTS ON TAIWAN'S SEFT. 21 EARTHQUAKE, the ROC Government 
Infonnation Office, 1999. (http://publish.gio.gov.tw/iisnetJ921e.htm). 
55 See PRESS RELEASE: IMF APPROVES US$ 501 MILLION IN EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 
FOR TURKEY, News of the International Monetary Fund, 1999(Noting that, on Oct. 13, 1999, the 
IMF approved an emergency assistance of SDR 361.5 million(about US$501 million) to support 
Turkey's recovering project),see also see WORLD BANK PROVIDES EARTHQUAKE 
ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, News Release of the World Bank Group, 1999(Noting that, on 
November 16, 1999, two loans, one was Emergency Earthquake Recovery Loan and the other was 
Mannara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project, totaling US$ 757.53 million, were authorized 
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§ 1-11 Taiwan-China Cross-Strait Relations 
Regardless of the political hostility, the increasing economIC exchange 56 
between both sides of the Taiwan Straits has turned Taiwan into China's second 
largest source of investment capital,57 giving an added reason to the suggestion that 
both sides do have some common interests with each other. A quasi-official 
institutionalized system -- the Taipei-based Strait Exchange Foundation(SEF) and the 
Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait(ARATS) -- for 
cross-strait consultations was set up by the two sides in 1992 and 1993 respectively. 
However, without mutual trust and a common ground on the Issue of Taiwan's 
sovereignty, the institutionalized communication and dialogue between the 
Taipei-based SEF and Beijing-based ARATS did not proceed smoothly. Due to its 
presumptive "one-China" principle and "one country, two systems" formulas, Beijing 
has refused recognition to the Republic of China, considering Taiwan as a local 
government. It is in this sense that an on-going economic interaction of the two sides 
increasingly presents a dramatic divergence between economICS and politics. The 
complexity of developments between Taipei and Beijing signals us to the fact that 
~l World Bank for the purpose of assisting Turkey's recovery from the effects of the earthquake). 
In order to achieve its economic and political goal, China has been successful in attracting investors 
from Taiwan by regulating a series of policies to provide some preferential treatments. Due to the 
similar customs and common language as well as kinship ties, those investors found it easy to set up 
?usiness there. Gradually Chinese mainland became the most favorite place of Taiwan's outbound 
~vestment. Further discussions on this will be covered in Chapter V. 
According the survey released in 1998, Taiwan was China's second largest source of investment 
capital, after Hong Kong. China is also one of Taiwan's biggest exporting market. See John F. Copper, 
TAIWAN: NATIONS-STATE OR PROVINCE, SMC Publishing Inc., 1994, p.167. 
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Taiwan is playing a strategy gamble between economic interest and security interest. 
The evolution of the independence-reunification dichotomy would directly influence 
the consequence of the strategy gamble, judging from the reality that Beijing is 
becoming stronger and its international position is rising. Thus, Taipei is weakening 
its bargaining chip demanding that China should relate with Taiwan on an equal 
footing in negotiations over their future relations. More significantly, politically and 
economically, most states in the world tend to take sides on favoring Beijing's 
"THREE NO'S" policl8 which successfully isolates Taiwan from global politics. 
Hence, to develop a pragmatic policy by meeting the balance between promoting 
international recognition and retaining stable cross-strait relations with Beijing would 
be an insuperable tactic for Taipei in handling the Taiwan issue. In short, only when 
there is a constructive mechanism for peaceful cross-strait relations accepted by China, 
can we see the status of Taiwan substantially enhanced in the world political arena. 
To maintain peace in the international community is a fundamental purpose of 
international law. In order to retain and preserve world peace and security, the 
methods and procedures for the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts are very 
important in international law. 59 Although states are not obliged to proceed with the 
58 
The "THREE NO'S" refers to: 1) no support for Taiwan's independence, 2) no support for "two 
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and 3) no support for Taiwan's membership in international 
~:ganizations in which statehood is required. The related issue will be mentioned in Chapter V. 
See generally, Malcom N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
Chapter 18(Hereinafter: Malcom, INTERNATIONAL LAW); L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schacher & H. 
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prescribed methods and procedures of peaceful settlement of their disputes and 
conflicts, they are always available for use by the disputed states in addition to any 
other means of their choice. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter provides that all members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice are not endangered. Accordingly, the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States60 further defines this principle, stating that under Article 
33 of the UN Charter, states shall seek early and just settlement of their international 
disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of 
their choice. 
As mentioned above, Taiwan's status is a typical issue that is both legal and 
political in nature. Judged by the refusal of the PRC to recognize Taiwan as an 
independent state and to regard the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, it seems hard to 
directly apply all the mechanisms adopted by the 1970 Declaration to a dispute on the 
Taiwan issue between Taiwan and China. Yet, part of the dispute settlement principle 
Smit, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, West Publishing Co., 1993, 
ChapterlO(Hereinafter: Henkin, INTERNATIONAL LAW); United Nations, HANDBOOK ON THE 
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES, New York, 1992(Hereinafter: 
UN, HANDBOOK ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT); Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oxford University Press Inc., 1998, Chapter 12(Hereinafter: Brownlie, 
~TERNATIONAL LAW). 
See supra note 30 on Resolution 2625. 
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can be compared to the case of the Taiwan issue such as negotiation, good offices, and 
mediation. In fact, one example of the good offices was the so-called Koo-Wang 
meeting in 1993 in which it was arranged for the top leaders of the Taipei-based SEF 
and the Beijing-based ARATS to have a direct dialogue in Singapore with the good 
office and assistance of the government of Singapore. Hence, how to proceed with a 
satisfactory mechanism to reconcile divergent opinions between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait through the peaceful dispute settlement principle in international law 
would be an essential tactic for Taiwan to develop technically. 
§ 1-12 Modem Aspect of State Sovereignty 
With the collapse of the communist regimes in central and Eastern Europe, 
leading to the end of the Cold War, the rise of a new world order has begun. The 
traditional and ideological confrontation in politics has turned into the global politic 
as well as economic cooperation. Every country wants economic and social progress. 
Evidently the economic integration in the European Community renders boundaries 
less significant. The relationship between state sovereignty and membership of the 
fifteen states in the European Community illustrates a comprehensive and persuasive 
example that states can accept major limitations of national power politically without 
at the same time losing their state sovereign identity legally. Accordingly, each state 
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can still retain its dignity as a sovereign state in international law. 61 Also this type of 
cooperation among nations, by working closely together in a shared enterprise, would 
benefit the regional security as a whole.62 The prospective emergence of a new 
regional society in European Community is likely to expose a future possibility that 
globalization will bring a contemporary concept in defining state sovereignty within 
the modem world in general. Unfortunately, it seems to remain unclear whether 
Taiwan can benefit from this kind of evolution particularly so long as Beijing's desire 
to prevent Taiwan from playing a positive role in the global politics is still visible. Yet, 
in any study of the future of the Taiwan issue, the functional views of globalization 
cannot be ignored on the ground that the Taiwan issue is typically one of the global 
problems under international law. Especially, the present dynamics of international 
relations and the socio-economic field make it clear that Taiwan has been playing an 
important role on the global stage. Hence, a foreseeable future for Taiwan concerns 
not only the people of Taiwan but also international security and prosperity. 
Although, by reviewing Taiwan's factual situations in legal and political reality 
lucidly, many issues on the question of Taiwan's status are more deeply involved in 
political consideration and policy imperative than the legal aspects. This is not the 
61 
See Eli Lauterpacht, SOVEREIGNTY: MYTH OR REALITY, International Affairs, Vo1.73 No.1, 
~ambridge Unversity Press, 1997, pp.137-150. 
See Douglas Hurd, DEVELOPING THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, Vo1.70 
No.3, Cambridge Unversity Press, 1994, pp.421-428 (Noting that the European Union was founded on 
the premise that nations cooperating so closely together in a shared enterprise would not contemplate 
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equivalent of conceding that the status of Taiwan is not an issue in international law, if 
one is mindful of the fact that law and politics represent two sides of the same coin. In 
truth, the two go hand in hand. Undoubtedly, international law plays an influential 
role in the global society which seems to suggest that international law is a product of 
social processes. Regardless of its lack of strong legislative, judicial and enforcement 
organs, international law has developed, through prevailing notions of international 
relations and harmony with the realities, to grapple with new issues that cannot be 
ignored. As Taiwan is the 19th largest economy and the 15th largest trading country 
worldwide, the issue of Taiwan's status is one that cannot be put aside from 
intemationallaw, particularly, as the people of Taiwan have gone a long way toward 
realizing their dream politically and economically, and keep renewing effective and 
strong claims to the international community as to their wants and needs. As Professor 
Malcolm N. Shaw suggested in his book: 
"The scope of international law today is immense. From 
the regulation of space expeditions to the question of the 
division of the ocean floor, and from the protection of 
human rights to management of the international 
financial system, its involvement has spread out from 
going to war with each other again). 
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the primary concern with the preservation of peace, to 
embrace all the interests of contemporary international 
l ir; ,,63 lJe. 
In view of these developments in the international legal system, especially at the 
beginning of a new millennium, I feel optimistic that the time has come to create a 
comprehensive mechanism to resolve the Taiwan issue under the international legal 
system because it deeply relates to the preservation of peace as well as the 
intemationallife of the twenty-three million inhabitants of Taiwan. 
In an attempt to have a better understanding of the legal status of Taiwan and 
with a strong tendency, through the analytical framework on various fundamental 
issues, to present a comprehensive preview of Taiwan's prospects, I will start with the 
topic of self-determination and analyze whether the people of Taiwan are qualified to 
exercise this principle under the contemporary legal concept. After that, I will proceed 
with examining the current status of Taiwan based on the legal and modem aspect of 
sovereignty, statehood and recognition. Before the conclusion, the next stage will 
future a discussion on the salient issue of Taiwan's status in the UN system, and its 
related topics will be focused on. In order to picture the future of the Taiwan position, 
the issue of Taiwan question by focusing on the triangular relations between Taiwan, 
63 
See Malcolm, INTERNATIONAL LAW, pp. 36-37. 
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China and the US as well as the impact of the independence-reunification dichotomy 
between economic interests and security interests across the Taiwan Strait will be 
covered in the part of the conclusion. 
Accordingly, a total of five chapters are organized in this dissertation, which are: 
Chapter One -Introduction: Understanding the Taiwan Issue; Chapter Two - The 
Evolution of the Concept of Self-Determination and the Right of the People of Taiwan 
to Self-determination; Chapter Three - The Modem Concept of State Sovereignty, 
Statehood and Recognition: A Case Study of Taiwan; Chapter Four - Taiwan's Status 
in the United Nations in a Changing World: Taiwan's Case in the Questions of 
Representation and Membership; and Chapter Five - Conclusion: A Vision with Hope 
for the Future of Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Evolution of the Concept of 
Self-Determination and the Right of the People of Taiwan to 
Self-Determination 
49 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter "UN") calls for the respect of "the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 64 In similar language, 
the principle of self-determination to all peoples is formally affirmed in other legal 
documents such as, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter 
''VDHR''),65 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter 
"ICCPR"), 66 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter "ICESCR"), 67 various UN General Assembly resolutions, and 
International Court of Justice decision and advisory opinions.68 As a crucial principle 
of collective human rights, the international legal instruments have elevated the 
64 See UN CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2(stating the purpose of the Untied Nations is to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace); cf. Minasse Haile, Legality of 
Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 479, 501 (1994)(stating that although the Charter 
refers to self-determination as a right pertaining to "peoples," it contains no definition of the term); See, 
eg., Goler Teal Butcher, THE IMMEDIACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HAWARD 
UNIVSERSITY, 31 How. L. 1. 435, 443(1988)(asserting that political leaders adopted the UN 
CHARTER based on the principles of equal rights and self-determination in order to achieve 
international peace and security, as a reaction to Nazism). 
65 See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UN GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. 
Al6316(1948)(containing core human rights principles that are widely recognized by the international 
community). 
66 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21 sl Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. Al6316(1966)(spelling out, in greater detail, the broad principles enunciated in 
theUDHR). 
67 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA. Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 
~81 sl Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 48, UN Doc. Al6316(1966). 
See Laurel Remers Pardee, THE DILEMMA OF DOWRY DEATHS: DOMESTIC DISGRACE OR 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CATASTROPHE, 13 Ariz. 1. Int'l & Compo L. 491, 
509(1996)(noting that the UN later codified the right of self-determination as a human right in Article 
one of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR); see also Bereket Habte Selassie, SELF-DETERMINATION 
IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE: THE ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN EXPERIENCE, 29 Colum. Human 
Right L. Rev. 91, 94(1997)(stating that the link between human rights and self-determination was 
clearly established by the ICESCR and ICCPR); see also Prudence E. Taylor, FROM ENVIRONMENT 
TO ECOLOGICAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A NEW DYNAMIC IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10 Geo. 
Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 309, 330(1998)(noting that Part I of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR begin by 
declaring that "all peoples have the right of self-determination"). 
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principle of self-detennination to a nonn of customary international law which has a 
legally binding effect on the international community.69 
§..2-1 The Principle ofSelf-Detennination as Customary International Law 
In today's world, self-detennination itself is an extremely controversial issue in 
relation to the qualifications of the group of persons entitled to exercise the right of 
se1f-detennination. 7o No one doubts that self-detennination is a fundamental 
principle of human rights law, but full consensus on defining the holder of the right to 
self-detennination has not yet been reached.71 
69 See Richard N. Kiwanuka, THE MEANING OF "PEOPLE" IN THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 80, 88-9(1988)(noting that under current 
international law, political self-determination is generally equated with freedom from colonial-type 
rule);also see Eric Kolodner, THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 10 Conn. 
J. Int'l L. 153, 155(1994)(stating that the principles of international order became more developed after 
the formation of the UN as respect for self-determination became a necessary precondition for a 
government's international legitirnacy);also see Halirn Moris, SELF-DETERMINATION: AN 
AFFIRMATIVE RIGHT OF MERE RHETORIC?, 4 Ilsa J. Int'l & Cornp. L. 201, 202-3(1997)(noting 
that President Woodrow Wilson was responsible for elevating the principle of self-determination to an 
international level when, in 1916, he included it in his fourteen points); see also Hurst Hannum, 
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (1990)(stating that no 
contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the 
right of all peoples to self-determination). 
70 See Deborah Z. Cass, RE-THINKING SELF-DETERMINATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES, 18 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Compo 21, 
21(1992)(noting the uncertainty in the application of self-determination in international law); see also 
Amen Tarnzarian, NAGORNO-KARABAGH'S RIGHT TO POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, 
24 Sw. U. L. Rev. 183, 195-6(1994)(noting that, while it has been generally accepted that people under 
colonial domination have a right to self-determination, the application of self-determination to 
"peoples" within an existing state has been much more controversial). See also Gerry J. Simpson, 
JUDGING THE EAST TIMOR DISPUTE: SELF-DETERMINATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE, 17 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 323, 340(1994)(noting that state practice, 
especially since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, has supported the right 
~? self-determination for non-colonial peoples). 
See Lee C. Buchheit, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION, at 9-11, 
(1978)(arguing that in addition to a group's "subjective perception of distinctness," objective 
characteristics, such as linguistic, racial, religious, and historic differences between the group seeking 
self-determination and other groups must be analyzed in order to determine whether the group is an 
appropriate candidate for self-determination); see also Antonio Cassese, THE 
SELF-DETERMINATIONOF PEOPLES, IN THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, at 92-4 
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981)(arguing that "peoples" have a right to self-determination if they are a distinct 
ethnic group within a multinational state and have "a distinct legal status within the consitutional 
framework"); see also Dietrich Murswiek, THE ISSUE OF A RIGHT OF SECESSION 
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Observing the proliferation of self-detennination claims after the Cold War, the 
concept of self-detennination has been widely acknowledged yet used differently on 
various occasions.72 In general, however, it is inherent in the democratic process to 
allow the wishes of a people to detennine their own political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social, and cultural development. 73 
§ 2-2 Two Types ofSelf-Detennination 
There is no universally accepted definition of self-detennination. There are, 
however, two types of distinctions for self-detennination which are often mentioned.74 
RECONSIDERED, IN MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION, at 21-37 (Christian Tomuschat 
ed., 1993)(arguing that state practice supports the rule that territorial units, rather than ethnic or 
religious groups, may exercise self-determination). 
72 See Yehuda Z. Blum, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 3 (1965)(noting that 
under orthodox doctrine, title turned on classic forms of acquistion, occupation, accretion, cession, 
conquest and prescription); see also Steven R. Ratner, DRAWING A BETTER LINE: UTI 
POSSIDETIS AND THE BORDERS OF NEW STATES, 90 Am. 1. Int'l L. 590, 14-5(1996)(discussing 
that, alongside the postwar and post-Cold War era, developments regarding self-determination, there 
has been a change in the law governing the title of a state, or a people to a land); see also Jainming 
Shen, SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN, 
15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1144(2000)(discussing that in the post-Cold War era, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, or cultural groups within nations reemerge demanding devolution or secession in pursuit of 
limited or full sovereignty). 
73 See Franz Xaver Perrez, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY" 
AND THE OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, 
26 Envtl. L. 1187, 1192(1996)(noting that it is generally accepted that permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources is a prerequisite for economic development and, therefore, is a fundamental principle 
of contemporary international law); see also G.A. Res. 1803, UN GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, 
UN Doc. Al5217(1962); cited in 9 United Nations Resolutions: General Assembly 107-8(Dusan J. 
Djonovich ed., 1974)(declaring "the right of peoples and nations to the permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources" and that "violation of the rights of peoples and nations to 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirits and principles of the UN 
Charter"). But see David A. Ring, SUSTAINABILITY DYNAMICS: LAND-BASED MARINE 
POLLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES IN THE ISLAND STATES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN, 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 65, 122(1997)(noting that a general caveat 
has evolved that states owe a duty to ensure that activities or pollution arising within their territories or 
~40ntrol do not cause harm to other states and their environment). 
See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., THE DEGREE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS ERA, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 304, 304(1994)(stating that the drafters of the UN Charter did not 
bother to defme self-determination or to identify who the "peoples" were, but the Soviet Foreign 
Minister referred to the idea as "equality and the self-determination of nations"); see also Jeffrey 
Wutzke, DEPENDENT INDEPENDENCE: APPLICATION OF THE NUNAVUT MODEL TO 
NATIVE HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS, 22 Am. Indian L. 
Rev. 509, 556-7(1998)(noting that ex-colonial sovereignty was based on a notion of a universal 
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The first distinction between anti-colonial self-determination (meaning the right of 
peoples to create an independent state by liberating themselves from existing colonial 
Of alien rule) and non-colonial self-determination (meaning the right of a people to 
secede or to form a new representative government or to achieve a higher degree of 
autonomy within an existing state).75 The other distinction is between external 
self-determination (meaning the right of a people to decide their own status within the 
international community) and internal self-determination (meaning the right of a 
people freely to decide the form of government they want to pursue within an existing 
state).76 
doctrine of self-determination for colonial peoples, which did not presuppose underlying nationhood 
but only subject colonial status); see also Dean B. Suagee, HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES: WILL THE UNITED STATES RISE TO THE OCCASION?, 21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 365, 
381(1997)(discussing Professor Anaya's distinction between the "substantive" and the "remedial" 
aspects of self-determination). 
75 See Edward T. Canuel, NATIONALISM, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND NATIONALIST 
MOVEMENTS: EXPLORING THE PALESTINIAN AND QUEBEC DRIVES FOR 
INDEPENDENCE, 20 B.c. Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 85, 86-7(1997)(noting that while theorists and 
international law justify the right of former colonized peoples to seek self-determination, political 
expedience is a major consideration in allowing self-determination movements to secede in 
non-colonial states). But see Luke P. Bellocchi, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF 
CHECHNYA, 2 Buff. J. Int'l L. 183, 184(1995)(questioning when, where, and how, in a non-colonial 
context, can a people utilize their inherent and UN Chartered right to self-determination and secede 
into an independent nation-state); see also Gerry J. Simpson, THE DIFFUSION OF SOVEREIGNTY: 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE POST-COLONIAL AGE, 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 255, 
269(1996)( discussing that the question of secession and its relationship to the right to 
self-determination for non-colonial peoples was raised but then dismissed either as a separate problem 
~I as a misuse of the right to self-determination). 
See Kiwanuka, supra note 69, at 93 (noting the international Covenants not only endorse the right of 
external self-determination, but also the right of internal self-determination: the right of a people to 
establish its own political institutions, to develop its own economic resources, and to direct its own 
social and cultural evolution); see also Aaron P. Micheau, THE 1991 TRANSITIONAL CHARTER OF 
ETHIOPIA: A NEW APPLICATION OF THE SELF-DETERMIANTION PRINCIPLE?, 28 Case W. 
Res. J. Int'l L. 367, 390(1996)(noting that external self-determination focuses on the independence of 
the state apparatus, while internal emphasizes the independence of the population and is only assured 
?y a representative form of government); see also generally Kolodner, supra note 6 (arguing that the 
International community should attempt to resolve conflicts under principles of internal 
self-determination before supporting a people's right to external self-determination as it encompasses 
Potentially disruptive consequences). 
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As a result of a Civil War in 1949, the Republic of China (hereinafter "ROC") 
was divided into two governments: the ROC in Taiwan and the Peoples' Republic of 
China (hereinafter "PRC") located in the Chinese mainland.77 Since 1949, the status 
of Taiwan has become a central issue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.78 In 
spite of the political confrontation between the ROC and the PRC, Taiwan has, for 
decades, been thought of as part of China by the two governments under the 
mythology of one-China principle. 79 This makes the independence of Taiwan 
ambiguous.80 Does it imply that the indigenous natives of Taiwan are not eligible to 
77 See Su Wei, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 
1169, 1170(2000)(noting that in October 1949, the Chinese people won their New Democratic 
Revolution and established a new central government called the People's Republic of China); see also 
Tzu-wen Lee, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF TAIWAN: THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, I UCLA J. Int'l L. & Aff. 351, 
353(1996)( discussing that the forces of the Republic of China finally retreated to Taiwan on December 
8, 1949, leaving Mao Zedong and the People's Republic in control of the mainland); see also Shen, 
supra 72, at 1117 (discussing the civil war how it caused the regime of the Republic of China to be 
overthrown by the People's Republic of China). 
78 See Lung-chu Chen, TAIWAN'S CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS, 32 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 675, 680(1998)(discussing the PRC's refusal to renounce threat or use of force in settling disputes 
with Taiwan has been a continuing source of insecurity, instability and anxiety in the Taiwan Strait 
area); see also Anne Hsiu-an Hsiao, IS CHINA'S POLICY TO USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN A 
VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNAITONAL LAW?, 
32 New Eng. L. Rev. 715, 715-6(1998)(stating that the PRC has repeatedly reiterated that it reserves 
the right to take over Taiwan by force, and has taken action to demonstrate its determination to do so); 
see generally Christopher C. Joyner, THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: WHAT ROLE FOR 
NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN?, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 819, 
838(1998)(noting that the PRC's conduct of combat naval maneuvers and missile firings in the Taiwan 
Strait in 1996 seriously aggravated political relations and diminished trust between the two). 
79 See White Paper: The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (visited September 29, 
2000)(http://www.china-embassy.org/papers/taiwanOO.htm)(stating that " ... settlement of the Taiwan 
issue and realization of the complete reunification of China embody the fundamental interest of the 
Chinese nation. The Chinese government has worked persistently toward this goal in the past 50 
years."); see also Shen, supra note 72, at 1117 (noting the authorities in Taiwan, until necessary, also 
upheld the "One China" principle, although they maintained that they represented China as a whole, a 
claim that was false both in fact and in law).But see Lee, supra note 14, at 378 (discussing that the 
policy has apparently been implemented in order to prevent the PRC from resorting to the use of force 
~g~inst Taiwan and although the ROC repeatedly announces the "One China" policy, in the absence of 
:~s mtention to be bound, such declarations create no intemationallegal obligations). 
See Glenn R. Butterton, SIGNALS, THREATS, AND DETERRENCE: ALIVE AND WELL IN 
mE TAIWAN STRAIT, 47 Cath. D.L. Rev. 51, 66 (1997)(noting that the ambiguous of Taiwan comes 
from the questions of whether Taiwan is a state or a non-state); see also Jiunn-rong Yeh, 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY-BUILDING TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
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determine their own future? 
§. 2-3 The Issue of Taiwan's Possible Entitlement to Self-Determination 
Taiwan's status and the right of its people to self-determination IS relevant 
because the size of its population of over twenty-two million is relatively large in 
comparison to that of other independent states in the world.8 ! The evolution of 
self-determination makes it clear that the right to collectively present the will of a 
people or a particular indigenous population regarding the chosen way of life should 
be deemed a universal value.82 Does the political separation between Taiwan and the 
Chinese mainland provide the Taiwanese people any qualification to apply the 
principle of self-determination as described above? This issue and related ones will be 
focused on and analyzed in this chapter. 
TAIWAN'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE CLIMATE OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, 6 Duke 1. Compo & Int'l L. 229, 
257(1996)(stating that Taiwan's ambiguous diplomatic status has made participation in international 
environmental organizations difficult because it lacks standing as a nation); see also Joyner, supra note 
78, at 838 (asserting that Taiwan's ambiguous international status undercuts it bargaining power 
because Taiwan has no legal standing in the dispute without any legal standing in international law). 
81 See Alex Y. Seita, GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONVERGENCE OF VALUES, 30 Cornell Int'l 
L. 1. 429, 472(1997)(noting that in 1995, Taiwan's population of 21.3 million was larger than 
Australia's population); see also THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1996, at 822 
(Robert Famighetti ed., 1995)(citing Taiwan's population statistics); see generally Jonathan I. Charney 
& J. R. V. Prescott, RESOLVING CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN, 
94 Am. 1. Int'l L. 453, 471(2000)(arguing that Taiwan's population should be given the option of 
~hether or not to choose some form of association with China). 
See S. James Anaya, THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: TOWARD A REMEDY FOR PAST AND CONTINUING WRONGS, 28 GA. L. Rev. 
~09, 326(1994)(noting the core values of freedom and equality translate into a requirement that 
mstitutions of government be created according to the will of the people governed); see also Benedict 
Kingsbury, "INDIGENOUS PEOPLES" IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONSTRUCTIVIST 
~PROACH TO THE ASIAN CONTROVERSY, 92 Am. 1. Int'l L. 414, 453(1998)(asserting the 
mtemational concept of indigenous people connotes emphasis on self-determination and the role of 
groups in decisions affecting them). But see Michael Holley, RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF 
INDEGENOUS PEOPLE OF THEIR TRADITIONAL LANDS: A CASE STUDY OF AN 
INTERNALLY-DIAPLACED COMMUNITY IN GUATEMALA, 15Berek. J. Int'l L. 119, 
148(1997)(discussing the current international consensus on indigenous peoples' right to 
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This chapter is divided into eight parts. Part II deals with the traditional concept 
of anti-colonial self-determination during the Cold War. Part III discusses the 
evolution of self-determination from the non-colonial aspect in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. Part IV examines the evolution of self-determination in Taiwan after the 
Second World War, while part V focuses on the potential of an armed conflict in the 
self-determination movement of Taiwan. In part VI, the issue of the forcible 
integration and the entitlement of the people of Taiwan to external self-determination 
will be covered. Part VII incorporates an additional commentary and the conclusion 
follows in part VIII. 
II. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF ANTI-COLONIAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
DURING THE COLD WAR 
§ 2-4 US President Woodrow Wilson & the 1941 Atlantic Charter 
The term "self-determination" was first formally addressed by the United States 
President Woodrow Wilson after World War I. 83 Woodrow Wilson was an advocate of 
self-determination and promoted the concept of democracy in an attempt to establish 
~~lf-determination compromises between a strictly individualist and collectivist approach). 
See Moris, supra note 75 (noting that President Woodrow Wilson was responsible for elevating the 
Principle of self-determination to an international level when, in 1916, he included it in his Fourteen 
Points); see also Jon Hinck, THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU AND THE UNITED STATES: 
SELF-DETERMINATION BECOMES THE PRICE OF FREE ASSOCIATION, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 
947(1990)(noting that Woodrow Wilson made self-determination one of his major foreign policy 
?bjectives); see also Kirgis, supra note 74 (noting the term, "self-determination" was first publicly used 
m 1918 by Woodrow Wilson). 
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self-determination as "the guiding principle for reconstructing the European 
society.,,84 Because the principle was applied selectively to the defeated states and 
the authority of colonial rule was not seriously challenged, self-determination did not 
become a valuable principle for state creation until World War II.85 In 1941, the 
principle was written into the Atlantic Charter, which later evolved into the United 
Nations Charter, establishing self-determination as a fundamental right of mankind. 86 
It is logical to conclude that the UN members intended to establish the right of 
self-determination for the peoples under colonial or alien domination only.87 The UN 
84 See Canuel, supra note 75, at 92 (noting Woodrow Wilson felt that the realization of such 
aspirations by treating such peoples as credible, rather than merely considering them "property," would 
be achieved through a restructuring of Europe and would create a lasting peace); see also Kirgis, supra 
11 (noting the idea of self-determination is closely identified with Woodrow Wilson, who first used the 
term publicly in 1918, but it did not emerge as a principle of positive international law until the Soviet 
Union insisted on using it at the 1945 San Francisco Conference on the United Nations); see also 
Michla Pomerance, THE UNITED STATES AND SELF-DETERMIANTION: PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE WILSONIAN CONCEPTION, 70 Am. J. L. 1, 2(1976)(quoting Woodrow Wilson stating that 
"every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live," and "no peace can last, 
or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just 
powers from the consent of the governed."). 
8S See Thomas M. Franck,LEGITlMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 
705, 744(1988)(noting that after World War II the self- determination principle came to be applied even 
more generally as the UN Charter expressed a general obligation of states to help enable inhabitants of 
all dependent non-self-governing territories for the first time); Suagee, supra note 74, at 382 
(discussing that in the period following World War II, the international community came to recognize 
that people living under the rule of colonial regimes had been deprived of the right of 
self-determination in both its constitutive and ongoing aspect); see also Michael C. Davis, THE 
CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD AND THE STATUS OF Taiwan, 4 J. Chinese L. 135, 148(1990)("[S] 
elf-determination" is traceable in part to Woodrow Wilson and notions of anti- colonialism."). 
86 See UN CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (enunciating the purpose of the Charter to establish friendly 
relations and economic cooperation between nations based on principles of equal rights and 
self-determination); Catherine J. lorns, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: 
CHALLENGING STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 24 Case W. Rev. J. Int'l L. 199, 244(1992)(discussing the 
Atlantic Charter, signed by both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, 
which affirmed the principle of self- determination and, which was accepted in the Declaration of the 
United Nations in 1942); Louis B. Sohn, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROTECTION OF 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN STATES, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 48(1982)(noting 
that the Atlantic Charter promised to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live," and to have "sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who 
~ave been forcibly deprived of them"). 
See Hector Gros Espiell, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, at 13 (1980) (explaining the rule that excludes a right of 
secession for people not under colonial and alien domination); see also Taryn Ranae Tomasa, 
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members limited this right because secessionism was considered a tactic used to 
violate territorial integrity guaranteed by the UN Charter.88 As such, the principle of 
self-determination in intemationallaw evolved into an enforceable right to freedom 
from colonial rule under Resolution 1514 entitled "Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples"(hereinafter "Resolution 1514,,).89 
Resolution 1514 states "[T} he continued existence of colonialism prevents the 
development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and 
economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations 
ideal of universal peace," ... "[A}ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. ,,90 
HO'OLAHUI: THE REBIRTH OF A NATION, 5 Asian L. J. 247, 262(1998)(noting that the people 
entitled to self-determination under the Declaration are those who at the time of the claim are under 
alien domination). 
88 See UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (prohibiting the United Nations from intervening in the mere 
internal affairs of any state); see also The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, GA. Res. 1514, para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, UN 
Doc. Al4684 (1960) (requiring states to respect the integrity of the national territory of dependent 
peoples); also see Wutzke, supra note 74, at 558 (stating that the UN General Assembly embraced this 
categorical distinction between colonies and noncolonial groups). 
89 See The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA. Res. 
1514, para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66,67, UN Doc. Al4684 (1960) (prohibiting the 
partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country); see also Franck, 
Supra note 85, at 746 (the resolution noted "that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete 
freedom" and demanded immediate implementation of this right "without any conditions or 
reservations in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire" and regardless of "political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness"); see also Thomas D. Grant, BETWEEN DIVERSITY 
AND DISORDER: A REVIEW OF JORRI C. DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES: SELF-DETERMINATION AND 
STATEHOOD, 12 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 629, 634(1997) (noting that the UN moderated its 
statement in the Declaration that subjects of self-determination included potentially any peoples under 
" r a len SUbjugation, domination, or exploitation," whether or not of a colonial origin to include any 
foeoples lacking representative government). 
See The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA. Res. 
1514, para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, UN Doc. Al4684 (1960) (discussing the 
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§ 2-5 UN Resolution 1514: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples 
Since the passage of Resolution 1514, self-detennination has greatly developed 
in the context of anti-colonialism. Through support of such a principle, numerous 
colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America established their own sovereign states in 
the 1960s, 91 and the universal recognition of the right to anti-colonial 
self-detennination has led to its acceptance as a nonn of customary international 
law.92 Peoples subjected to colonial oppressIOn were entitled to seek and receive 
right to self- determination and how colonialism impedes the rights of people and the goal of peace); 
see also Laurence S. Hanauer, THE IRRELEVANCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION LAW TO 
ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT: A NEW LOOK AT THE WESTERN SAHARA CASE, 9 Emory 
Int'l L. Rev. 133, 146(1995) (noting that by placing the right to self- determination firmly in the 
context of colonialism, the resolution defines self-determination as a right to decolonization, therefore 
linking the law of self-determination to the process of decolonization); also see Caroline S. Palmer, 
WAITING FOR DEMOCRACY: CONGRESS, CONTROL BOARDS AND PURSUIT OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 19 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 339, 
379(1997) (noting that the covenant protects the right of all citizens to take part in formulating policy 
on all levels of government, either directly or through their elected representatives). 
91 See Moris, supra note 69, at 206 (stating that while the external right to self-determination was 
extremely popular during the 1960s and 1970s in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, claims of a right to 
external self- determination in the colonial context are virtually nonexistent today); also see Simpson, 
supra note 75, at 257 (claiming that the post-independence nation- building in parts of Africa and Asia 
has been achieved at the cost of abandoning democracy and suppressing postcolonial claims to national 
or cultural self-determination). But see id., Hanauer, at 176 (noting that the law of self-determination 
inadequately addresses the ethnic and national crises that erupted in Yugoslavia, Central Asia, India, Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan, and many other non-colonial and self-governing territories). 
92 See Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th 
Sess., Supp. 28, at 121, UN Doc. Al8028 (1970) (explicitly expanding the right of self-determination 
beyond its anti-colonial implications); see also Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing the principle of anti- colonial 
self-determination customary law that cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the 
formation of a subsequent customary rule of like character and contrary effect); see also Jacques 
deLisle, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISQUIET 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT: LIBERAL AGENDAS, DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS, AND THE 
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER THE COLD WAR AND AMID RESURGENT 
CULTURAL IDENTITIES, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1725, 1729(1995) (noting anti-colonial and 
separatist assaults on existing arrangements typically invoked the norms of the existing system, seeking 
recognition of a new sovereign state within colonial boundaries or coincident with areas inhabited by a 
particular people). 
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support in their struggle.93 In this sense, any failure by a responsible state to meet its 
obligation to support self-determination of this kind would give rise to responsibility 
. . 11 1 94 at the IlltematIona eve. 
The preference for territorial integrity over social classification III political 
sovereignty was premised on the fear of the dangers of separatism.95 Moreover, in an 
effort to minimize any potential hostility between the capitalist and the communist 
blocs during the Cold War era, the world community resisted any non-colonial 
self-determination by viewing it as a secessionist movement threatening the territorial 
93 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2160, UN GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 4, UN Doc. Al6316 (1966) (stating that any forcible action, direct or 
indirect, which deprives peoples under foreign domination of their right to self-determination, freedom, 
independence and of their right to determine freely their political status and pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations); see also 
Kolodner, supra note 69, at 157-58 (noting that while the era of decolonization might have formally 
ended, many peoples still suffer under neo-colonial oppression and only if the international community 
supports movements for self-determination can it guarantee the protection of the rights of peoples 
throughout the world). See generally Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 475 (noting that simplistic 
conceptions of the international legal system of the past regarding territory which was either under the 
complete sovereignty of a state or was not, are not valid today). 
94 See Suagee, supra note 74, at 368 (noting that Convention No. 169 is criticized for leaving in too 
much residual state authority and for its failure to recognize the right of indigenous "peoples" to 
self-determination); see also Sohn, supra note 86, at 50 (noting that every state has an obligation to 
respect every other state's right of self-determination and to refrain from interference in the internal 
affairs of a state). But see H. Kelsen, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at 29 (1951) 
(commenting that the language of the UN Charter does not adequately describe any human rights or 
desire to make the obligations binding on states). 
95 
See Ravi Mahalingam, THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION 
WITH THE RIGHT OF HUMANATARlAN INTERVENTION, 1 UCLA 1. In!'l L. & Foreign Aff. 221, 
234 (1996) (noting that nonintervention is an important principle because it preserves the sanctity of a 
State's rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity and is further necessary for the principle of 
self-determination to take root without the corrupting interference of foreign powers); see also Guyora 
Binder, THE KAPLAN LECTURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR 
~ELF-DETERMINATION, 29 Stan. 1. Int'l L. 223, 225 (1993) (stating that group separatism must be 
unmoral, except as a remedy of last resort against discrimination, and irrational because it is premised 
on the mistaken belief that group identity is natural or immutable); see also Leslie E. Schafer, 
IMMIGRATION PROJECT:LEARNING FROM RWANDA: ADDRESSING THE GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE IN REFUGEE CRISES, 6 Ind. 1. Global Legal Sud. 315, 337(1998) 
(noting that although the United Nations has supported the use of force to overcome colonial control, 
many member States do not encourage separatism). 
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integrity of the existing state.96 In this respect, Resolution 1514 laid out its support 
for the preservation of territorial integrity by indicating that "any attempt aimed at the 
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
7I.T. ,,97 lvatlOns. 
§ 2-6 Secessionist Movements in the Congo & Nigeria 
In order to avoid setting a precedent of encouraging secessionist movements, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 169 in 1961 to maintain the territorial 
integrity which supported the existing political status of the Republic of the Congo.98 
96 See generally Trent N. Tappe, CHECHENYA AND THE STATE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
A BREAKAWAY REGION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: EVALUATING THE 
LEGITIMACY OF SECESSIONIST CLAIMS, 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 255, 261(1995) (noting that 
any right which is to be of any practical use in evaluating secessionist claims must include limitations 
that will address the concerns preventing states from recognizing other secessionist movements in the 
past). But see Thomas M. Franck, THE EMERGING RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, 86 
Am. J. Int'l L. 46, 55(1992) (presenting the idea that self-determination has evolved into a more 
general notion of internationally validated political consultation beginning to be applied even to 
independent states without implying the community's right to validate secessionist movements within 
sovereign states); see also Canuel, supra note 12, at 95 (noting that while none of the signatories of the 
Helsinki Accord are current colonial states, the acceptance of non-colonial self-determination 
movements as legally recognizable secessionist movements has thus gained momentum). 
97 See Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 
para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66,67, UN Doc. Al4684 (1960) (discussing the United 
Nations ideal of universal peace); see also Shen, supra note 9, at 1154 (noting that both the 
Decolonization and 1970 Declarations establish self-determination explicitly with the caveat that its 
exercise should not disrupt territorial integrity); see also Wutzke, supra note 11, at 558 (noting that 
academics, politicians and the UN General Assembly embrace the categorical distinction between 
~?lonies and noncolonial groups). 
See S.C. Res. 169, UN SCOR, 16th Sess., 982nd mtg., UN Doc S/5002 (1961); See also Lawrence S. 
Eastwood, Jr., SECESSION: STATE PRACTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER THE 
DISSOLUTION OF SOVIET UNION AND YUGOSLAVIA, 3 Duke J. Compo & Int'l L. 299, 
305-6(1993) (stating that on November 24, 1961, the Security Council adopted a resolution which 
~tated that one purpose of the involvement of the United Nations was to maintain the territorial 
mtegrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo); see also Kenneth D. Heath, 
COULD WE HAVE ARMED THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY? THE NEW NORMS 
GOVERNING INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WAR, 4 UCLA J. Int'! L. & Foreign Aff. 251, 297 (1999) 
(noting the obligation of all States to respect the territorial integrity, political independence and national 
SOvereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations); see, e.g., S.c. Res. 199, UN SCOR, 19th Sess., 1189th mtg. at 328-29, UN Doc. S/6129 
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Resolution 169 provided that "[ dJ eploring all armed action in opposition to the 
authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specially secessionist 
activities and armed action now being carried on by the provincial administration of 
Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely 
rejecting the claim that Katanga is a sovereign independent nation. ,,99 The council 
thus rejected Katanga's Declaration of Independence from the Congo. IOO 
In a similar move, the UN supported the position of the Nigerian federal 
government against the Ibos who wanted to opt out of Nigeria in 1967.101 The UN 
refused to recognize the resolve of the Ibos to create an independent Republic of 
Biafra within the territory of Nigeria despite the fact that the African states of Gabon, 
(1964) (reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and requesting "all states to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo. "). 
99 See S.C. Res. 169, UN SCOR, 16th Sess., 982nd mtg., UN Doc. S/5002, at 3 (1961) (following the 
attempted secession of the province of Katanga from the newly independent Republic of the Congo in 
1960, the Security Council of the United Nations stated the policies and purposes of the United Nations 
with respect to the Congo); see also Louis Henkin Et AI., INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 779-80 (2d ed. 
1987) (noting that the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary General "to 
provide the Government of the Republic of the Congo with such military assistance as may be 
necessary to fully meet their task); see also Thomas D. Grant, EAST TIMOR, THE UN SYSTEM, 
AND ENFORCING NON-RECOGNITION IN INTERNAITONAL LAW, 33 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 
273, 282(2000) (stating that the affirmation of the territorial integrity of the Congo was contained in 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions). 
100 See S.c. Res. 169, UN SCOR, 16th Sess., 982nd mtg., UN Doc. S/5002 (1961) (stating that the 
United Nations completely rejected the claim that Katanga was a sovereign independent nation); see 
also Eastwood, supra note 98 (stating that although Katanga declared its independence from the Congo 
and a constitution had been approved by the Katanga Assembly establishing Katanga as an independent 
sovereign state, Katanga was never formally recognized by any country); see also Grant, supra note 99 
(noting that the rejection of the claim by Katanga to constitute an independent state was contained in 
~~cUrity Council and General Assembly resolutions). 
See Dr. Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A MODEL DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT OF 
SECESSION, 11 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 1, 23(1998) (providing that the UN was slow to intervene during 
the massacre of 10,000 to 30,000 Ibos and when it did, the UN supported the Nigerian government); 
see also Thomas D. Grant, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: AFGHANISTAN RECOGNIZE 
CHECHNYA, 15 Am. U. Int'! L. Rev. 869, 887(2000) (stating that the friction between the Ibos and the 
federal government of Nigeria became great which resulted in secession by the Ibos); see also Joel E. 
Starr, "WHAT DO YOU HAVE FOR ME TODAY?": OBSERVING THE 1999 NIGERIAN 
ELECTIONS, 35 Stan. J. Int'! L. 389, 391(1999) (stating that the Ibos tried to secede from Nigeria to 
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the Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia had already done SO.102 
The provision in the relevant international legal instruments holding that the 
right to self-determination belongs to peoples under colonial rule has been narrowly 
applied to colonial conditions by international law.103 In 1970, the UN Secretary 
General U Thant affirmed this point when stating: 
"! AJ s far as the question of secession of a particular section of a 
Member State is concerned, the United Nations' attitude is 
unequivocable. As an international organization, the United Nations 
has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will 
ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member 
State. ,,104 
This view reiterates the idea that the world community was greatly skeptical 
about self-determination claims. lOS As a result, any secessionist movement from an 
form the Republic ofBiafra). 
102 See M. H. Halperin, D. J. Scheffer, & P. L. Small, SELF- DETERMINATION IN THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER, at 14 (1992); see also Franck, supra note 85, at 759 n.175 (stating that only five 
nations recognized Biafra's claim to independence while the UN never even considered recognizing it); 
also see id., Grant (declaring that no state recognized Biafra). 
103 . See Jerome WIlson, ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 11 
Conn. J. Int'l L. 433, 482( 1996) (liThe statist bias of the current understanding of self-determination is 
not inherent in the doctrine, but rather the result of a successful attempt on the part of states to restrict 
in practice the recognition of sub-state peoples to the colonial context."); see also Dr. Sam Blay, 
SELF-DETERMINATION: A REASSESSMENT IN THE POST COMMUNIST ERA, 22 Denv. J. 
Int'l L. & Pol'y 275,275(1994) (stating that although self-determination is an accepted legal nonn, it is 
Usually narrowly confmed in cases of people under colonial rule); Kolodner, supra note 6, at 157 
(Providing that the international community has not agreed as to whether self-determination applies 
outside the colonial context) 104 • 
UN MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1970, at 36. See Haile, supra note 1, at 502 (stating that the United 
Nations will never accept the principle of secession); UN Secretary-General U. Thant, Remarks at a 
ro~ess Conference in Dakar, Senegal (Jan. 4, 1970), UN MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1970, at 34,36. 
See Anaya, supra note 82, at 329-30 (asserting that self- determination has been approached with 
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existing state found it difficult in gaining international recognition unless the relevant 
parties consented to change the territorial boundaries (as was the case in Singapore's 
separation from Malaysia).106 For example, it is a clear fact that the world 
community did not recognize any secessionist claim during the Cold War period (the 
only exception was East Pakistan's secession from Pakistan).lo7 
§ 2-7 UN's Granting of Bangladesh Membership 
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 352 recommending that the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh be admitted to membership in the UN in 1947.108 
Indeed, the inhabitants of East Pakistan were ethnically and culturally distinct from 
West Pakistan,109 however, the United Nations' ultimate recognition of East Pakistan 
skepticism with the exception of control exercised by the colonial power); see also Angela M. Lloyd, 
NOTE THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: A COMPELLING CASE FOR SECESSION, 32 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 419, 424-5(1994) ("Implicit in international accession to the right in documents like the 
UN CHARTER was the understanding that secessionist self- determination was not to be a general 
legal norm available to any group or territory that claimed it."). See generally Edward A. Laing, THE 
NORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION: 1941-1991, 22 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 209, 250(1992) (discussing 
that the General Assembly accepted self-determination in terms of colonial ruling situations). 
106 See Lawrence M. Frankel, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SECESSION: NEW RULES FOR A 
NEW REA, 14 Hous. J. Int'l L. 521, 534(1992) (discussing the theory of premature recognition which 
demonstrates the balance between recognizing a secessionist movement and questioning whether it 
controls its territory); see also Douglas L. Tookey, SINGAPORE'S ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: STRENGTHS AND WEAKENESSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR YEAR AHEAD, 23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 169, 170(1998) (stating that Singapore 
separated from Malaysia in 1965). See generally Gregory H. Fox, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA: A NEW INTERNAL FOCUS, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 733, 736-7(1995) 
(providing that decolonization does not present the clash between self- determination and territorial 
~egrity that secessionist claims present). 
See id., at 562 (stating that since the end of the Cold War, the United States and the former Soviet 
Union are more likely to recognize secessionist claims); see also Tappe, supra note 96, at 295 (stating 
that secessionist efforts were met with disapproval by the international community during the Cold 
War). But see Kate Greene, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS, 90 
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 296, 297(1996) (stating that secessionist claims are not related to the end of 
~e Cold War and are not a phenomenon of the last ten years). 
See Yehuda Z. Blum, MEMBERSHIP OF THE NEW YUGOSLAVIA: CONTINUITY OR 
BREAK?, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 830, 832(1992) ("Bangladesh applied for membership as a new state and 
~:s admitted in 1974."). 
See Brian K. McCalmon, STATES, REFUGEES, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 10 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 
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(Bangladesh) did not imply a general acceptance of the right of secession in the name 
of se1f-determination.!!O The UN's decision was rather influenced by the fact that 
India sided with East Pakistan by recogmzmg East Pakistan's right to 
self-determination.!!! This led to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, 
constituting an immediate threat to international peace and security.!!2 At the same 
time, Pakistan had strong support from Communist China.!13 The UN inevitably 
recognized East Pakistan (Bangladesh) as an independent state for fear of causing a 
215, 223(1996) (stating that there were cultural, linguistic and political differences between East 
Pakistan and West Pakistan); see also Barry M. Benjamin, UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION:LEGALIZING THE USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES, 16 Fordham Int'l L. 1. 120, 131(1992) (stating that Pakistan was separated not only by 
hundreds of miles, but by cultural and linguistic differences). See generally Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, 
RULE OF THE LAND, 59 Or. St. B. Bull. 9, 10(1999) (stating that there were different languages 
spoken in East Pakistan and West Pakistan). 
110 See Eastwood, supra note 98, at 310 (discussing whether the recognition of East Pakistan implied 
acceptance of secession); M. Rafiqual Islam, SECESSION CRISIS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: THE 
PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC OF BOUGAINVILLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 13 U. Haw. L. Rev. 
453, 458(1991) ( "Secession is a form of self-determination. "). See generally Tappe, supra note 96 
(stating that prior to 1970, there were no UN documents suggesting a recognized right to secession 
because of self-determination). 
111 See Eastwood, supra note 98, at 312-13 ("It appears that the distinguishing feature explaining the 
Success of the Bangladesh secession was Indian intervention. "); see also C. Lloyd Brown-John, 
SELF-DETERMINATION, AUTONOMY AND STATE SECESSION IN FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 567, 589(1999) (asserting 
that the Indian Army's support of the Bangladesh secession caused the success of its secession). See 
generally Tauhidul Anwar Khan, MANAGEMENT AND SHARING OF THE GANGES, 36 Nat. 
Resources J. 455,462(1996) (providing that in 1972, India and Bangladesh worked together to set up a 
joint rivers commission). 
112 See Michael L. Feeley, APOCALYPSE NOW? RESOLVING INDIA'S AND PAKISTAN'S 
TESTING CRISIS, 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. REV. 777, 780 (2000) (stating that Pakistan and India 
fought over the Kashmir region between 1947 & 1948); see also Richard W. Aldrich & Deborah 
Charron Pollard, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM: LEGAL AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESSLER AMENDMENT, 5 U.S.A.F. Acad .. 1. Legal Stud. 103, 103 
(1994) (discussing the ongoing rivalry between Pakistan and India which resulted in war and division 
of the two); see also Adam Packer, NOTE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA, 38 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 631, 634-5(2000) (liThe polarization ofIndo-Pakistani relations resulting from 
~e politics of partition led to three wars, in 1947- 48, 1965 and 1971."). 
See Mitchell A. Silk & Lester Ross, TRANSNATIONAL DEPOSITS, GOVERNMENT 
SUCCESSION, FROZEN ASSETS AND THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: NATIONAL BANK OF 
PAKISTAN V. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA, 8 Int'l Tax & Bus. L. 1, 
30 n.69(1990) ("Nevertheless, China did have an interest in maintaining friendly ties with Pakistan. "); 
see, e.g., Packer, supra note 49 (noting China's sharing of nuclear technology with Pakistan). See 
generally Kathleen M. Caruso, WE NEED TO KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON BEIJING, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, July 16,2000, at 5J (noting China's sale of weapons to Pakistan). 
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d d fl·· h 114 widesprea anne con lct In t e area. 
This non-colonial fonn of self-detennination was likely to be defined only as a 
democratic concept due to it's lack of fonnal recognition under international law. ll5 
In this sense, a population group within an independent state intends to achieve a truly 
representative government by democratic means such as the freedom of expression, 
assembly, and association. I 16 In view of the deference that states give to the principle 
of sovereignty, this kind of claim for self-detennination was considered a domestic 
affair, a matter within the jurisdiction of a state. 117 Thus, other members of the 
114 See Grant, supra note 101, at 889 (providing that the recognition of East Pakistan did not arise from 
humanitarian concerns); see also Anthony Wanis St. John, THE MEDIATING ROLE IN THE 
KASMIR DISPUTE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, 21 Fletcher Foreign World Aff. 173, 186 
(1997) (stating that the UN engaged in many peacemaking efforts to prevent any additional conflict 
between India and Pakistan). See generally Gregory L. Naarden, UN INTERVENTION AFTER THE 
COLD WAR: POLITICAL WARS AND THE UNIED STATES, 29 Tex. Int'l L. J. 231, 233(1994) 
(discussing how an observation team was established in order to discourage possible hostilities 
resulting from the India/Pakistan conflict). 
115 See Iorns, supra note 86, at 304 ("[T]he view was expressed that self-determination is a corollary of 
the democratic principle of consent of the governed."); see also Dr. Yussuf N. Kly, Discussion Paper, 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 17 Hamline L. Rev. 1, 
42-3(1993) ("A democratic right to self-determination is now seeing the light of day and tends to 
confIrm the universality of the right of non-colonial peoples to self- determination."). But see J. 
Oloka-Onyango, HERETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: 
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS FOR A DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL FUTURE IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 151, 208(1999) (noting that no right of self-determination 
exists within the context of a "democratic" state and representative government). 
116 See Haile, supra note 64, at 479 ("The spread of democratic ideology and the demise of the Cold 
War have enabled some minority groups in independent states to express their discontent openly and 
with varying degrees of impunity. "). But see Anatoly Konstantinovich Kotov, APPROACHING THE 
MILLENIUM: ARE PENNSYLVANIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDURE STATUTES STILL 
DOING THE JOB?: THE PARLIMENTARY PROCESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAHKISTAN, 8 
Widener J. Pub. L. 457, 466, n.50(1994) (stating that representative governments as a collective are not 
necessarily all democratic). See generally Moris, supra note 6, at 210 (discussing the possibility of 
~ving a representative government by democratic means). 
. See Haile, supra note 64, at 486 (noting that Eritrea will maintain some control over its government 
m all matters not left to the federal government); see also Eric Kolodner, NOTE POPULATION 
TRANSFER: THE EFFECTS OF SETTLE INFUSION POLICIES ON A HOST POPULATION'S 
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 27 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 159, 192 (noting the 
unwillingness of the international community to infringe on state sovereignty). See generally 
ClaUde-Armand Sheppard, THE CREE INTERVENTION IN THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT 
REFERENCE ON QUEBEC SECESSION: A SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT, 23 vt. L. Rev. 845, 
858(1999) (noting that the right to self-determination is vested in the people and not outsiders). 
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international community were hesitant to involve themselves with an Issue, 
considered internal to another state. I 18 
§ 2-8 Non-Colonial Form of Self-Determination 
The adoption of the ICESCR and ICCPR in 1966119 however, gave rise to the 
discussion that international law would provide support beyond the form of 
anti-colonial self-determination. 120 Article I of both the ICESCR and the ICCPR 
stresses that "all peoples have the right of self-determination, by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, 
and cultural development. ,,121 
118 See, e.g., Peter Daniel DiPaola, A NOBLE SACRIFICE? Jus Ad BELLUM AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S GAMBLE IN CHECHENYA, 4 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 435, 
467(1997) (stating that the international community might be hesitant to get involved in areas which 
resemble the Balkans). See generally Kolodner, supra note 54 ("[T]he international community, 
historically hesitant to infringe on state sovereignty."); also see Sheppard, supra note 54 (discussing 
that people have the right to self-determination as opposed to outsiders). 
119 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA. Res. 2200A, UN GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 48, UN Doc. Al6316 (1966) (noting that the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family" are derived from "the inherent dignity of the human person"); see 
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200A, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 59, UN Doc. Al6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302. (stating "[T]he equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family" are derived from "the inherent dignity of the human 
person."); see also Kitty Arambulo, DRAFTING AN OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: CAN 
AN IDEAL BECOME REALITY?, 2 u.c. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 111, 111(1996) (calling the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the "main international treaty setting 
forth economic, social, and cultural rights"). 
120 See Kirgis, supra note 74, at 305 (stating that the UN expanded the ideas of self-determination past 
anti-colonialism); see also Oloka-Onyango, supra note 115, at 164 (ascertaining acceptance of 
self-determination by degree with "the recognition that the right had arguably expanded to be assertable 
against a government that is umepresentative of people who are defmed by characteristics not limited 
to race, creed or color."); see also Johan D. van der Vyver, SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 321, 402(1991) 
(Providing that self-determination was expanded past anti-colonialism to people subject to racist 
regimes) 
121 . 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. 
No. 16, at 368, UN Doc. Al6316 (1966); see also Malvina Halberstam, Remark, NATIONALISM AND 
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 26 NYU. J. Int'l L. 
& Pol'y 573, 573(1994) (stating that many General Assembly resolutions affirm the right to 
self-determination and often supersedes the provisions of the UN Charter); Richard Wilner, 
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Moreover, the 1948 UDHR states that "the will of the people shall be the basis of 
the authority of government," implying that the right of anti-colonial 
self-determination was broadened to include a political right of non-colonial 
self-determination. 122 This prompted argument that the non-colonial aspect of 
self-determination should be honored in the same way as its external counterpart 
because a claim for self-determination within an existing state always arose while a 
central government engaged in internal colonization. 123 Unlike the right to 
anti-colonial self-determination, which III the external sense has been firmly 
established under international law, claims based on other forms of self-determination 
were not able to gather much international support as expected. 124 This is because 
the international community still believed that such claims might encompass the 
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: EXERCISES IN 
SELF-DETERMINATION, 1 u.e. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 297, 306(1995) (providing that the 
principle of self-detennination was turned into a necessary condition for individual human rights). 
122 See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. 
A/6316 (1948); see also James A.R. Nafziger, SELF-DETERMINATION & HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION IN A COMMUNITY OF POWER, 20 Denv. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 9, 12(1991) 
(discussing Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also Oloka-Onyango, 
supra note 115, at 170 ("Although absent from the Universal Declaration, several statements in the 
preamble can be taken to constitute a reference to an underlying belief in the exercise of the right of 
self-detennination. "). 
123 See Lung-Chu Chen, SELF-DETERMINATION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 66 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1287, 1294(1991) ("[T]he basis for either granting or rejecting the demands of a group should 
not be whether a given situation is colonial or non-colonial, but whether the decision would move the 
situation closer to goal values of human dignity. "); see also Laing, supra note 42, at 248 (discussing 
two writers who agree that self-detennination should be accepted without limitations as to colonial or 
non-colonial status). See generally Simpson, supra note 12, at 271-75 (discussing various methods of 
non- colonial self-detennination including: national self-detennination, democratic self-detennination, 
~~volutionary self-detennination, and secession). 
See Moris, supra note 69, at 204-05 (stating that some nation states believe only in a right to 
colonial self-determination and do not recognize other forms); see also David R. Penna, ARE 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS DOING THEIR JOB? CULTURAL DOMINANCE, 90 Am. 
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 193,221(1996) (noting the lack of recognition given by international law to a right 
to secession outside the declonization context). But see Lloyd, supra note 105, at 420 (providing that 
the recent rise of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union indicate that some form of 
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conflict of secession and threaten the territorial integrity of an existing state. 125 
§.)-9 UN Resolution 2625: Declaration on Principles oflnternational Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the UN 
When the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2625, known as the 
"Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" 
(hereinafter "Resolution 2625"), 126 there was no doubt that self-determination might 
extend beyond the traditional notion of de co Ionization. 127 Resolution 2625 expanded 
the preVIOUS definition of self-determination with a strong intent to authorize a 
collective right to cover the concept of non-colonial self-determination by specifying 
self-determination outside of the colonial sense has been accepted). 
125 See Tappe, supra note 96, at 295 n.39 ("Secession has typically been disfavored in the past by the 
international community because articulation of a secession right would threaten the territorial integrity 
of the states which themselves make international law. It); see also Schwartz & Waywood, supra note 
101, at 14 (stating that the territorial integrity of states in existence would be threatened by successful 
claims). See generally Holly A. Osterland, Note, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND 
SECESSION: THE SLOVAK MODEL, 25 Case W. Rev. J. Int'! L. 655, 669(1993) ("Perhaps the most 
important legal limitation on international recognition of a right to secede is the principle of territorial 
integrity. It). 
126 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 6th 
Corum., 25th Sess., Supp. No.28, UN Doc Al8082 (1970) (supporting the rights of all people to 
determine their political status). See generally Canuel, supra note 75, at 93-94 (discussing Resolution 
2625). 
127 
See Paul H. Brietzke, SELF-DETERMINATION OR JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFUSION: 
EXACERBATING POLITICAL CONFLICT, 14 Wis. Int'! L. J. 69, 102(1995) (stating that it is agreed 
that self-determination could extend beyond established beliefs about decolonization); see also Thomas 
D. Grant, EXTENDING DECOLONIZATION: HOW THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE 
ADDRESSED KOSOVO, 28 Ga. J. Int'l & Compo L. 9, 37(1999) ("In at least one General Assembly 
Third Committee session, a state representative suggested that the ambit of self-determination might be 
extended beyond those situations dealt with so far by decolonization."); Kirgis, supra note 74 (stating 
that self determination extends past anticolonialism). But see Thomas D. Grant, PANEL OF EXPERTS 
FOR CHECHENYA: PURPOSES AND PROSPECTS IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 40 Va. 
J. Int'l115, 179(1999) (stating that although the principle of self-determination has extended in breadth, 
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that a state should have a government representing all belonging to the territory 
d·· . d I 128 h . h h without IstinctlOn as to race, cree ,or co or. T ere IS no consensus as to w et er 
Resolution 2625 has legalized other forms of self-determination beyond the colonial 
context, III an attempt to resolve any apparent conflict between the right to 
self-determination and the right of nations to their territorial integrity.129 Resolution 
2625, however, has clearly legalized the effect of people's domestic political 
collective rightS. 130 The Resolution states that the right of self-determination is a 
right to which a "people" IS entitled to determine its "political status," that may 
include establishing "a sovereIgn and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State, or the emergence into any other political status 
the applications are still narrow). 
128 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at para. E(4), UN Doc. Al8028 
(1970); see also Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, CPNSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OR 
INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION? SELF-DETERMINATION, GROUP ACCOMODATION, 
AND THE BELFAST AGREEMENT, 22Fordham Int'l L. J. 1345, 1347(1999) (stating that the word 
"peoples" as used in Resolution 2625 is not defmed and as such can be extended to include 
ethno-nationalist groups in their claim to self-determination); see also Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, 
THE REQUIREMENT OF PLEBISCITE IN TERRITORIAL RAPPROCHEMENT, 12 Hous. J. Int'l L. 
23,40(1989) (stating that Resolution 2625 does not distinguish between race, color or creed). 
129 See Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128, at 1349 (stating Resolution 2625 established 
self-determination while providing that it should not upset the principles of territorial integrity); see 
also Julie M. Sforza, NOTE THE TIMOR GAP DISPUTE: THE VALIDITY OF THE TIMOR GAP 
TREATY, SELF-DETERINATION, AND DECOLONIZATION, 22 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 481, 
494 (1999) ("The UN cautiously warns, however, that the concepts enshrined in Resolution 2625 shall 
in no way encroach upon the territorial sovereignty of a State."). See generally Peter Ruffatto, 
COMMENT, US ACTION IN MICRONESIA AS A NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONA 
LAW: THE EFFECTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR GUAM AND OTHER 
NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES, 2 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 377, 383 (1993) (stating that 
~;solution 2625 enlarges the right of self-determination to include all peoples). 
See Shen, supra note 72, at 1149 (stating that the people still retain a domestic right to decide their 
political status); see also Rudolph C. Ryser, BETWEEN INDIGENOUS NATIONS AND STATES: 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE BALANCE, 7 Tulsa J. Compo & Int'! L. 129, 156(1999) 
("[N]on-self-governing peoples obtain an internal political status of their own choosing."); 
REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, 23 Vt. L. Rev. 721, 760(1999) (noting that people's 
domestic political rights are unquestionably legal). 
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I dt . d" 131 free y e ermme . 
With the end of the colonalization era and further claims for freedom from 
colonial or foreign domination, the external aspect of anti-colonial self-determination 
has ceased to be functional in the international legal context. 132 Yet, as typical 
collective human rights, self-determination needed to retain a valuable function under 
intemationallaw. Especially as this post-Cold War era has been witnessing increasing 
claims to self-determination by peoples who are seeking a greater recognition of their 
cultural and political identity within their existing states. 133 Indeed, there was a 
comprehensive imperative that international law should playa formative role in the 
legalization and development of non-colonial self-determination. 134 In this respect, 
131 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 124, UN Doc. 
AJ8028 (1970) (noting that Resolution 2625 does not defme the word "peoples"); see also Shen, supra 
note 9, at 1147 (liThe Covenant similarly contains no definition of peoples. "); see also Suzan Dionne 
Balz, COUNTRY WITHIN A COUNTRY: REDRAWING BORDERS ON THE POST-COLONIAL 
SOVEREIGN STATE, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 537, 563(1997) (stating that Resolution 2625 does not 
give a definition for peoples). 
132 See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 115, at 151 (discussing perceptions and presumptions about 
self-determination as it relates to international law); see also Osterland, supra note 125, at 655 (stating 
national self-determination enjoyed a brief period of acceptance in international law after World War I 
and remains a powerful emotional and political principle despite the refusal of the international 
community to recognize its validity). But see Ruth Gordon, SAVING FAILED STATES: SOMETIMES 
A NEOCOLONIALIST NATION, 12 Am. U. 1. Int'! L. & Pol'y 903, 955(1997) (stating that since 
self-determination has emerged in the UN era, it has forced international law to address these issues in 
order to remain relevant). 
133 
See Ved P. Nanda, REVISITING SELF-DETERMINATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CONCEPT: A MAJOR CHALLENGE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA, 3 Ilsa. J. Int'l & Compo L. 
443, 444(1997) ("Now, in the post-Cold War era, we are witnessing the unfolding of the explosive 
quality of self-determination to which he referred, as the international community confronts the 
challenge of ever-increasing ethnic-national self-determination claims. "); see also Mahalingam, supra 
note 95, at 252 ("[T]he post-Cold war era has witnessed tremendous turmoil internal to States caused 
by movements for ethnic self- determination that have resulted in tragic humanitarian consequences."). 
See generally Kolodner, supra note 69, at 154 (stating that the concept of self- determination must be 
~~4evaluated following the Cold War). 
. See Tamzarian, supra note 70, at 198 (stating that while the principles of self-determination arising 
In non-colonial group situations have not yet been resolved by international law, there have been many 
proposals to do so). See generally Canuel, supra note 75, at 91 (stating that legal scholars have tried to 
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the world community began to consider ways of managmg other fonns of 
self-detennination in spite of the traditional rejection of such claims by international 
I 135 aw. 
In recent times, the international recognition of the non-colonial component of 
self-detennination can be traced to the collapse of the fonner Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter "fonner Yugoslavia") and the fonner Soviet 
Union. 136 These two events pushed the world community to re-examine the 
traditional principle of self-detennination by extending it past the traditional 
. I . I 137 antI -co oma concept. Any claim for non-colonial self-detennination could not be 
create a set of criteria to detennine self-detenninist movements under international law); see also 
Gregory 1. Ewald, THE KURD'S RIGHT TO SECEDE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
SELF-DETERMINATION PREVAILS OVER POLITICAL MANIPULATION, 22 Denv. 1. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y 375, 376(1994) (discussing the need to continue formulating international law in the area of 
non-colonial self-detennination). 
135 See Hanauer, supra note 90, at 134 ("Despite the political nature of the conflict, the severe 
limitations on the S.A.D.R.'s political viability, and the extremely brief history of Sahrawi national 
consciousness, the international community has recognized the Western Sahara's legal right to 
decolonization and to detennine its status freely."); see also John W. Head, SELLING HONG KONG 
TO CHINA: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION?, 46 Kan. L. Rev. 
283, 287 (1998) ("[T]he UN CHARTER placed obligations on the remaining colonial powers to 
develop self-government within their colonial territories. "). But see Simpson, supra note 75, at 255 
(discussing the failure of the UN to address secession properly). 
136 See Thomas M. Franck, FRIEND MANN AWARD ADDRESS, 38 Colum. 1. Transnat'l L. 1, 
6(1999) (discussing the UN's willingness to admit seceding states such as Bangladesh and three Baltic 
Republics); see also Diba B. Majzub, DOES SECESSION MEAN SUCCESSION? THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TREATY SUCCESSION AND AN INDEPENDENT QUEBEC, 24 
Queen's L. J. 411, 420(1999) (discussing the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); see also Canuel, supra note 75, at 95 ("[W]hile none of the signatories 
of the Helsinki Accord are current colonial states, the broadening to accept non-colonial 
self-determination movements as legally recognizable secessionist movements has thus gained 
~~mentum since 1975."). 
See Ved P. Nanda, THE NEW DYNAMICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION: REVISITING 
SELF-DETERMINATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPT: A MAJOR CHALLENGE 
IN THE POST COLD WOR ERA, 3 Ilsa. J. Int'l & Compo L. 443, 451(1997)("[T]he General 
Assembly in 1970 unanimously adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
~riendly Relations under which all peoples have the right freely to detennine, without external 
mterference, their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and 
every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."); see also 
MOris, supra note 69, at 210 (providing examples of places where the viability of an internal right to 
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admitted because it would damage the territorial integrity of the state due to the 
modem non-colonial aspect of self-detennination.138 This new approach presents a 
strong proof that the right to non-colonial self-detennination cannot be ignored in 
today's world. 139 It is my opinion that the above cases were not about de-colonization, 
but deeply related to the protection of humanitarian imperatives and the maintenance 
of international peace and security.140 There are numerous territories in the world 
where there are disputes and demands for non-colonial self-detennination. 141 
Therefore, it is inevitable for the international community to manage these various 
self-determination has clearly been enhanced); see also generally Cass, supra note 70, at 31 (stating that 
the right of self-determination extends beyond the colonial context). 
138 See Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128, at 1349 (arguing that self- determination should not disrupt 
territorial integrity); see also Amy E. Eckert, FREE DETERMINATION OR THE DETERMINATION 
TO BE FREE? SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT, 4 UCLA J. 
Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 55, 78 (1999) ( "Ironically, an assertive pro-democratic position, which seeks to 
promote the protection of human rights, may undermine one of the most cherished rights, the right of a 
people to determine their political future through self- determination. "); see also Roya M. Hanna, 
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN IN RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, 23 Md. J. Int'l L. & 
Trade 213, 216(1999) (discussing the Canadian Court's determination that Quebec does not have the 
right to unilaterally secede). 
139 See Richard Falk, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE KURDISH STRUGGLE FOR 
SELF-DETERMINATION AFTER THE END OF THE GULF AND COLD WARS, 15 Mich. 1. Int'l 
L.591, 598(1994) ("[A]s expressed in the famous Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, the scope of the right of self-determination is broader than the explicit 
circumstances of colonial subjugation. "); see also Simpson, supra note 75, at 257 (asserting that the 
concept of secession was consistently ignored at the official level until it caused the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union); see also Oloka- Onyango, supra note 115, at 151 (noting how 
self-determination gained the most acceptance under the framework of the UN in the aftermath of the 
Second World War). 
140 See Jost Delbruck, A FRESH LOOK AT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 67 Ind. L. J. 887, 887(1992) (discussing the UN's 
intervention in the attack of Kuwait by Iraq in order to protect human rights); see also Hanauer, supra 
note 90, at 138, ([S]elf-determination was not, however, originally conceived as a method through 
which the colonies of Germany and the Sublime Porte would gain independence, but rather as a means 
of attaining peace and security by preventing a recurrence of the nationalistic outbursts that precipitated 
World War L)See also Ratner, supra note 72, at 591 ("[R]eliance on uti possidetis during the post-Cold 
War breakups reduces the prospects of armed conflict by providing the only clear outcome in such 
~ituations. Absent such a policy, all borders would be open to dispute, and new states would fall prey to 
~edentist neighbors or internal secessionist claimants. "). 
See Grant, supra note 127, at 28 (mentioning the struggle in Kosovo); Tamzarian, supra note 70, at 
~96 (discussing the right of Karabagh to self- determination versus the right of Azerbaijan to maintain 
Its territorial integrity); see also Majzub, supra note 136, at 413 (discussing the requirements Quebec 
needs to fulfill in order to become independent). 
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forms of self-determination in this changing political world. 142 
§ 2-10 The 1993 UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
A strong march toward a broad view of self-determination has developed since 
the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. 143 A new 
acceptable type of self-determination (not based on colonialism) has become the 
modem approach used by the world community and has challenged the traditional 
concept of defined boundaries. 144 The United Nations World Conference on Human 
Rights, drawing participation from all members of the UN, reaffirmed the right to 
self-determination of all peoples in 1993.145 Although these participants unanimously 
142 See Will Kymlicka, THEORIZING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, 49 U. Toronto L. J. 281, 286(1999) 
(claiming that, although the UN Draft extends self- determination to include indigenous people, it 
focuses on internal autonomy rather than independent statehood); see also Leslie E. Schafer, 
LEARNING FROM REWANDA: ADDRESSING THE GLOVAL INSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 
IN REFUGEE CRISES, 6 Ind. 1. Global Legal Stud. 315, 338(1998) ("[D]ue to this failure of the 
institution of the State in developing countries, perhaps some form of self-determination should be 
supported to remedy ethnic conflicts and their attendant refugee problems. One approach will involve 
promoting "ethnic self-determination" and/or "regional integration" to seek better ethnic relations. "); 
see also Kolodner, supra note 69, at 157 (discussing the need for the international community to 
continue to support self-determination in order to protect human rights and to prevent internal conflict). 
143 See Eastwood, supra note 98, at 299 ("[T]he international community's broad support for the 
secessions of the Baltic states from the Soviet Union and the speedy recognition of several seceding 
former Yugoslav republics may mark the beginning of a pattern of state practice that could, in time, 
reveal a right of secession under international law. "); see also Igor Grazin, THE INTERNATIONAL 
RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL RIGHTS: THE BALTIC STATES' CASE, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1385, 1410(1991) (discussing the Baltic States' struggle for independence). But see Hurst Hannum, 
RETHINKING SELF-DETERMINATION, 34 Va. 1. In1'l L. 1, 38(1993) (discussing how most 
governments have refused to recognize demands for self-determination by ethnic groups and nations 
within the new states of the former Soviet Union). 
144 See Cass, supra note 70, at 33 ("[C]ertain minorities have either achieved self-determination, or are 
in the process of seeking it, often with international sanction and recognition, in spite of the 
conventional view."); Simpson, supra note 75, at 271 (suggesting that use of the world "peoples" in the 
UN CHARTER was intended to mean "communities that live under (but not share in) alien 
sovereignty"); see also Oloka-Onyango, supra note 115, at 204 (arguing for the need for a different 
f?5rm of self-determination other than in the colonial context). 
See Janet E. Lord, THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, 17 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L. 1. 329, 329(1995) ("[T]he 
United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 48/141 to create the post of High Commissioner 
for the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights. "); see also Elsa Stamatopoulou, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OFUNIED NATIONS MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND 
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adopted "the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ,,146 choosing a similar 
language as was used m Resolution 1514, it undoubtedly shows that the world 
community IS movmg toward legalizing the right to non-colonial 
self-determination. 147 In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union for 
example, the seceSSIOn in the name of self-determination may not have granted a 
clearly enforceable right under international law, but among the vanous possible 
forms of self-determination movements, the international community began to 
broaden its understanding of self-determination and its relations to sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.148 That IS, the concept of self-determination on non-colonial 
PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 687, 692(1998) (presenting the main 
points of consensus at the World Conference that promoted human rights); see also Christina M. Cerna, 
A SMALL STEP FORWARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CREATION OF THE POST OF UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 Am. U. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1265, 
1267(1995) ("[A]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated."). 
146 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the UN World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993, UN Department of Public Information, US, 1995, para. 2 (discussing the right 
of people within the minority to enjoy their own culture and to practice their own religion); see also id., 
Cerna, at 1266 (discussing the fact that the Vienna Conference lead to the creation of the High 
Commissioner position); see also id., Lord("[S]uch breadth suggests that the High Commissioner will 
have the necessary latitude to decide the focus of his or her office without the constraints of 
hierarchical prescriptions as to the importance of one human right over another. "). 
147 See Andrew M. Beato, NEWLY INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATING STATES' SUCCESSION 
TO TREATIES: CONSIDERATIONS ON THE HYBRID DEPENDENCY OF REPUBLICS OF THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION, 9 Am. U. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 525,541(1994) (discussing the notion that a 
state should not be held answerable to treaties that it neither helped create nor ratified is inherent in the 
principle of self-determination); see also Tamzarian, supra note 70, at 198 ("[T]he principle of 
territorial integrity is recognized by the UN CHARTER and is considered by most scholars and jurists 
as a well-established norm of international law, vital to the stability and peace of the world 
community."); see also Franck, supra note 136("Contemporary practice recognizes that groups do 
sUcceed in seceding, for example by the UN General Assembly's willingness to admit to the UN such 
seceding entities as Bangladesh, the three Baltic Republics, the successor states of the former Soviet 
H~ion and of the former Yugoslavia. "). 
See David M. Kresock, "ETHNIC CLEANING" IN THE BALKANS: THE LEGAL 
~OUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION, 27 Cornell Int'! L. 1. 203, 239(1994) (noting how 
llltemational law can protect this valid interest by permitting humanitarian intervention only when 
necessary to protect human rights as the desire for self-determination spreads across the globe); see 
also Haile, supra note 64, at 479 (using France and the United States as examples of countries with 
d.emocratic ideologies whose revolutions gave rise to self- determination, but who do not recognize a 
nght of secession). But see Elliot Stanton Berke, RECENT DEVELOPMENT: THE CHECHNYA 
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aspect is not only relating to international law, but might also be operative within 
. 1 149 domestIc aw. 
III. EVOLUTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION ON NON-COLONIAL 
ASPECT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR 
§ 2-11 Dissolution of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
The collapse of the communist regime in central and Eastern Europe both led to 
the end of the Cold War yet also gave rise to numerous claims by people seeking 
self-determination.150 These claims were, in the non-colonial context and almost all 
were denied by the responsible state due to the protection of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity under international law. 151 As a matter of fact, the denial of 
INQUIRY: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT OR ABANDONMENT?, 10 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 
879, 905(1996) (stating that Russia will refuse to recognize self-determination if it potentially will 
deprive Russia of natural or industrial resources, and justifies its behavior under its right to territorial 
integrity). 
149 See U.S.S.R. Const., Art. 72 (endorsing the inherent right of secession for member states of the 
Soviet Union). (visited October 25,2000). (httpll:www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/rlOOOOO_.htrnl); see also 
Jon M. Van Dyke, Carmen Di Amore-Siah, Gerald W. Berkley-Coats, SELF-DETERMINATION FOR 
NONSELF-GOVERNING PEOPLES AND FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE CASES OF GUAM 
AND HAWAII, 18 Haw. L. Rev. 623, 623 (1996) (discussing the rights of self- determination and 
self-governance given to indigenous people under international (and domestic) law that are different 
from those given to colonialized people); see also Hanna, supra note 138, at 222 ("[T]he Court 
determined that since Quebec's secession would be contrary to the constitution and laws of Canada, the 
international law is likely to accept the Court's conclusion unless it is contrary to the right of 
self-determination ") 150 • • 
See Osterland, supra note 125, at 657 ("[T]he most recent evidence of the continuing political force 
of national self-determination has occurred since the last months of 1989, when Communist regimes 
across Eastern and Central Europe crumbled. "); see also Tappe, supra note 96, at 255 (discussing 
secession movements during the cold war). But see Ethan A. Klingsberg, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF MINORITIES IN POST-WORLD WAR I EASTERN 
EUROPE AND TODAY: PLACEBO, POISON, OR PANACEA?, 1993 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 
11(1993) ("[T]he physical features of the post-communist region dictate against the validation of an 
~1Fic group's right to national self- determination. "). 
See Osterland, supra note 125, at 668 ("[A]s a matter of international law, recognition of a claim to 
secede, prior to the separatist's group achieving de facto status as an independent state, would 
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self-determination and its implementation were always sources of conflict. 152 After 
the Cold War, the Western liberal bloc led by the United States played an influential 
role in managing such non-colonial claims to self-determination.153 The international 
community, including the UN, various UN bodies and regional organizations began to 
limit the central government of the responsible state through the use of "inhuman 
repression" to block a claim for self-determination within its territory.154 This kind of 
repression, however, was deemed to be a "breach ofpeace.,,155 
§ 2-12 Commitment to Humanitarian Imperatives & Maintenance of International 
improperly interfere with essential domestic matters of states in violation of the United Nations 
Charter."); see also Hercules Booysen, SOUTH AFRICA: IN NEED OF A FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION FOR ITS MINORITY PEOPLES, 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L. J. 789, 799(1997) 
(questioning the significance of Principle XXXIV and suggesting that Parliament may amend the 
Constitution to include "territorial self- determination for any cultural community"). But see Tappe, 
supra note 96, at 255 (discussing the recognition by the Soviet Union of self-determination for 
Chechnya). 
152 See Osterland, supra note 125, at 668 ("[A]s a matter of international law, recognition of a claim to 
secede, prior to the separatist's group achieving de facto status as an independent state, would 
improperly interfere with essential domestic matters of states in violation of the United Nations 
Charter."). But see Tappe, supra note 96(discussing Russia's recognition of self-determination for 
Chechnya). 
153 See Tarnzarian, supra note 70, at 211 ("[T]he Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States that the declaratory approach to recognition (i.e., recognition is unnecessary if an 
entity meets the traditional criteria for statehood) is the better rule."); see also Canuel, supra note 75, at 
85 (stating that international law protects the sovereign rights of the legitimate government of the 
occupied territory and protects the inhabitants from being exploited."); Hannum, supra note 143, at 51 
(discussing the supportive position of the United States and European Community for Yugoslav unity, 
before and after declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia). 
154 See Booysen, supra note 151 (discussing the uncertainty of significance for Principle XXXIV and 
the reasoning behind it); see also Wilson, supra note 103, at 433 ("[I]n short, the well-being of states 
required not only that they be protected from external interference, but also, paradoxically, that some 
internal popUlations be granted rights as against them."); see also Hannum, supra note 143, at 1 (1993) 
(discussing the range of recognized remedies available within the realm of international law as put 
forth though notion of "remedial secession") 155 . 
. See UN CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 (concluding that the main reasons for the UN is to maintain 
mtemational peace and security); see also Ruth Gordon, UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNAL CONFLICTS: IRAQ, SOMALIA, AND BEYOND, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 519, 519(1994) 
("[T]hreat to the peace is a flexible concept that may cover anything from intra-State situations to inter-
State confrontation; it was originally viewed as a precursor to a finding of a "breach" of the peace. "); 
see also Julie Mertus, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND KOSOVO, 41 Wm. & Mary 1. Rev. ! 743, 1770(2000) ("[I]ndeed, international peace and security must mean more than the absence of an 
mtemationally recognized war; human rights violations short of all-out war also constitute major 
breaches of peace and security."). 
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Peace and Security 
Internal military conflicts, caused by the quest for self-determination, have led to 
massive loss of lives, grave deprivation of human rights, mass migrations, and even 
cross-border combat (which also threatened international peace and security at the 
same time).156 Therefore, the growing global commitment to the humanitarian 
imperatives and the maintenance of international peace and security is the major 
consideration as to whether the international community should lend its full 
support. 157 Accordingly, the international communities provided numerous forums 
through diplomatic intervention, III an effort to reach peaceful settlement of such 
conflicts so that disputes between the responsible state and the self-determination 
party could be addressed through negotiation, mediation or conciliation.158 The 
156 See Heath, supra note 98, at 276 (stating that the UN Charter "[A] rtic1e 2(4) does not speak 
directly to intervention, either in times of peace or civil war, nor does it speak to the use of force in 
internal conflicts."); see also Kresock, supra note 148, at 203 (discussing the internal strife in Bosnia); 
see also Satvinder S. Juss, Book Note, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 371(1998) (reviewing David 
Wippman, INTERNATIONAL LAW & ETHNIC CONFLICT) ("The twentieth century is littered with 
examples of this, with grave threats to peace arising from partitions of previously peaceful societies 
along ethnic or religious distinctions."). 
157 See UN CHARTER, arts. 39-51 (Chapter VII) (noting the Security Council possesses the authority 
to find that an internal conflict, as in Rwanda, rises to a level threatening international peace and 
security and to take measures accordingly); see also Reginald Ezetah, THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY: 
A QUALITATIVE INQUIRY, 22 Brook. J. Int'l L. 495, 531(1997) ("[A]ll States have the right and the 
~uty to take collective measures to protect the democratic character of any State, provided such action 
!~8taken under the aegis ofthe United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. "). 
See C. M. Chinkin, THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 495, 501(1986) (recognizing the international judicial arena as a 
fundamental norm in the settlement of disputes); Richard E. Rupp, COOPERATION, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BALKANS, SOMALIA, AND 
~AMBODIA, 3 UCLA J. Int'! L. & Foreign Aff. 183, 191 (1998) ("[A]n effectively functioning 
mternational organization or regime can promote cooperation and peaceful relations by serving as a 
forum where member states exchange information."). But see Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther, Jr. & 
~my E. Eckert, TRAGEDIES IN SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HAITI, RWANDA AND 
IBERIA-REVISITING THE VALIDITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW-PART II, 26 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 827, 854(1998) (discussing the failed 
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international community has even proceeded with other suitable mechanisms, such as 
economic sanctions and military intervention to compel the government to engage in a 
reasonable dialogue with a self-determination party. 159 
Many conflicts that took place within states were attributable to the great 
aspiration of a people seeking recognition of their cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic 
and political identity.16o What is so clear in this connection is that the non-colonial 
claim for self-determination itself is not limited to secessionist movements. 161 The 
non-colonial aspect of self-determination has actually been interpreted broadly to 
include the incorporation into a state, or some measure of autonomy within a state, a 
attempts to resolve the conflict in West Africa). 
159 See Lt. Col. Susan S. Gibson, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, 13Emory Int'l L. Rev. 161, 161(1999) ("[T]he 
great advantage of economic sanctions is that on the one hand they can be very potent, while on the 
other hand they do not involve that resort to force which is repugnant to our objective of peace. "); see 
also Patricia Stirling, THE USE OF TRADE SANCTIONS AS AN ENFOREMENT MECHANISAM 
FOR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS: A PROPOSAL FOR ADDITION TO THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, 11 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1, 25(1996) (discussing the preference of the U.S. for 
economic sanctions); see also David Wippman, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AMERICAS: 
RETHINKING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
ARTICLE & ESSAYS: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY THROUGH FOREIGN INTERVENTION, 19 
Rous. J. Int'l L. 659, 659(1997) (giving examples of recent authorizations, by the Security Council, of 
military intervention). 
160 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, MINORITY PROTECTIONS AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: AN 
EFFECTIVE MECHANISM, 22 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 291, 291 (1999) (discussing the ethnic 
violence in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia); see also Hurst Hannum, CONTEMPORARY 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES, 
66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1431, 1431(1991) (discussing how the proposed European Convention for the 
Protection of Minorities draft concerns only ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities); see also Jani 
Pumawanty, RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN EAST TIMOR: VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN 
UNDERSTANDING THE EAST TIMOR CRISIS, 14 Temp. Int'l & Compo L. J. 61, 66-73(2000) 
~~/scussing the recent crisis in East Timor). 
See Canuel, supra note 75, at 95 (" [I]nternational law regarding occupied territories allows the 
occupant, or occupying state, to wield certain powers while limiting other powers, in order to ensure 
that the occupied peoples are treated with humanity throughout the occupation. "); see also Simpson, 
supra note 75, at 263 (stating that the international community does not support secession as a form of 
self-determination); also see Tappe, supra note 96, at 267 (asserting that the international community's 
reaction to the Katangan and Biafran movements was grounded in the belief that recognition of a 
secession right threatens territorial integrity of states). 
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larger degree of freedom m a federation, or even complete independence. 162 The 
failure to set up a universal standard of managing these kinds of conflicts caused by 
non-colonial self-determination movements, pre-supposes that the world community 
can only consider each condition on a case-by-case basis to determine if a conflict is 
serious enough to warrant international involvement. 163 
§ 2-13 Self-Determination Movements in Western Sahara & East Timor 
As a result, some peoples have been fortunate to receive international support in 
settling their problems, such as is the case in Western Sahara and East Timor. 164 On 
the other hand, some other peoples have not been so fortunate to gam full 
international support. 165 A striking example is the case of Chechnya, which is still 
facing horrific violence, and even large-scale warfare in Russia. 166 It is therefore 
162 See Canuel, supra note 75, at 95; see also Moris, supra note 69, at 201 (discussing the recognition 
of a secessionist movement in Yugoslavia); Tamzarian, supra note 7 (discussing the struggle for 
freedom of Artsakh). 
163 See Tamzarian, supra note 70 ("[T]he debate over the right of Karabagh to self-determination 
versus the right of Azerbaijan to mainatin its territorial itegrity must be analyzed in view of the de facto 
independence Karabagh has attained. "); Tappe, supra note 96(discussing the legitimacy of the Chechen 
claim to secession). But see Johan D. Van der Vyver, UNIVERSALITY AND RELATIVITY OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICAN RELATIVISM, 4 Buff. Hum. Rgh. L. Rev. 43,54 (1998) (discussing 
two standards of when secession can take place). 
164 See UN Security Council Res. 384, Dec. 22, 1975 & Res. 389, April 22, 1976 (visited October 25, 
2000) <http://www.etan.org/etunigenasRes.htm> (discussing the extent of UN involvement and 
proposals regarding the conflicts in Western Sahara and East Timor); see also Yahia H. Zoubir, THE 
WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY IN FAILURE OF PRENEGOTIATION AND 
PROLONGATION OF CONFLICT, 26 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 173, 175(1996) (analyzing the Western 
~~hara dispute); see also Purnawanty, supra note 160, at 62-65 (discussing the history of East Timor). 
. See Eastwood, supra note 98, at 304 ("[D]uring the attempted secession of Katanga from the newly 
mdependent Congo in the early 1960s, the response of the international community to the dispute 
evolved from initial efforts to maintain neutrality into outright opposition to secession. "); see also 
Kevin MaCMillan, SECESSION PERSPECTIVES AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF QUEBEC, 7 Tul. 
J. Int'l & Compo L. 333, 335(1999) (discussing how many nations do not take the independence 
movements in Lithuania and Chechnya seriously); see also Tappe, supra note 96, at 255 (discussing the 
~~ionale behind the international reaction to this invasion). 
See Tappe, supra note 96, at 255 (discussing Russia's invasion of Chechnya because it will not 
allow Chechnya to remain independent); Wendy Turnoff Atrokhov, THE KHASAVYURT ACCORDS: 
80 
quite important to clarify what "people" are qualified or entitled to the right of 
self-determination. 167 For the purposes of self-determination, a final report by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter 
"UNESCO"),168 defined "peoplehood" as: 
"[A] group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following 
common features: (a) a cornmon historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) 
cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) 
territorial connection; (g) common economic life." The group as a whole must have 
the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people. The 
UNESCO experts further emphasized that the group should have a certain size and 
must be more than a mere association of individuals within a state. It also considered 
the existence of representative institutions as a possible additional criterion for the 
exercise of self-determination. 169 
MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION AMIDST THE CHECHEN CRISIS, 32 Cornell Int'l L. J. 367, 372(1999) (discussing 
the post-Soviet Chechnya struggle for independence); see also Hanna, supra note 138 (discussing the 
Canadian Court's determination that Quebec does not have the right to unilaterally secede). 
167 See Booysen, supra note 151, at 804 (suggesting that minority groups should be "concentrated in a 
well demarcated territory, in which its members constitute the majority. "); Grant, supra norte 64, at 32 
(discussing the requirements a territory must take in seeking its independence); see also Wilner, supra 
note 121, at 303 (discussing the four principles of self- determination). 
168 See Olivia Q. Goldman, THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL 
MECHANISM TO PROTECT GROUP RIGHTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE KURDS, 2 Tulsa J. 
Compo & Int'l L. 45, 48(1994) (discussing the shared characteristics of groups); EI-Obaid Ahmed 
EI-Obaid & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA-A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
LINKING THE PAST TO THE PRESENT, 41 Mcgill L. J. 819, 840(1994) (providing examples of 
what some of the shared characteristics are within a group); see also Grant, supra note 127, at 22 
{~oting the confusion over which groups of people actually have a self-determination claim). 
See Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128, at 1351 (asserting that nationalists believe that Catholics 
have been discriminated against); Hannum, supra note 160, at 1145 (discussing the importance of 
language for minorities); see also id., EI-Obaid Ahmed EI-Obaid & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua(1994) 
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§. 2-14 Definition of People hood 
There is no difficulty to identify a distinct "people" in most cases, but the issue 
arises over whether a particular group also constitutes a minority.170 If it is held that 
only the term "peoples" are qualified to self-determination, it becomes important to 
distinguish the term "peoples" from "minority population."l7l However, as Professor 
Dr. Michael C. van Walt van Praag has indicated: 
"[T]he existence of cases where the identification of distinct peoples 
by means of objectively identifiable criteria gives rise to problems, 
should not be caused by an ideological refusal to implement the 
right to self-determination based on an alleged inability to 
adequately define the term people. ,,172 
Indeed, the issue of defining a particular group in terms of "whether it satisfies 
(noting the size requirement for a group). 
\70 See Brietzke, supra note 127, at 82-83 (noting that there is a large number of minorities claiming 
rights against entities which have just claimed self-determination); see also Cass, supra note 70, at 39 
(recognizing particular groups which have made certain claims against groups that have successfully 
claimed self-determination); see, e.g., Walter Laqueur, INDEPENDENCE MAY ENSLAVE 
MILLIONS: THE RUSH TOWARD NATIONAL SEPARATISM IS AN INVIATION TO ECONOMIC 
RUIN AND TO UNDEMOCRATIC RULERS, L.A. TIMES, September 8, 1991, at M5 (citing 
examples of groups that have made claims against others who have claimed self-determination). 
17\ 
See Y. Frank Chiang, STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TAIWAN, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 959, 
1002-3(2000) (questioning whether or not minority groups are entitled to self-determination); see also 
OIDar M. Dajani, STALLED BETWEEN SEASONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF 
PALESTINE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, 26 Denv. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 27,32-3(1997) (noting 
that self-determination is only a right to be exercised by groups who have been recognized as a people). 
See generally Jill Allison Weiner, ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND THE OSLA ACCORDS, 23 Fordham 
Int'l L. 1. 230, 261-2(1999) (noting that self determination can only be irlvoked by those recognized as 
a "people") 172 . 
See Michael V Van Walt Van Praag, SELF-DETERMINATION IN A WORLD OF CONFLICT: A 
SOURCE OF INSTABILITY OR INSTRUMENT OF PEACE IN THE REPORT OF THE UNESCO 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS, HELD IN BARCELONA FROM NOV 21-27, 
199863 (van Walt van Praag, ed., 1999). 
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the criteria of a people" IS politically sUbjective. 173 Not only IS the effort to 
distinguish between a people and a minority population questionable, these categories 
are simply too broad to have much meaning. 174 In today's world, the legal basis for 
authorizing a particular group to possess the right of self-determination considers the 
protection of humanitarian imperatives and the maintenance of international peace 
and security.175 The wish for self-determination in the context of de-colonization is 
not only affected by the definition oflegal scholars or the UN, but also by the political 
will of states. 176 Once the political principle is "ripe" enough to allow the 
international community to render its assistance to the distress, the international 
community will recognIze a particular group as a "people" and their right to 
self-determination even though the group might only be a minority. 177 
173 See Brietzke, supra note 127, at 83 (1995) (stating that the "lives of people must surely transcend 
the integrity of the territories"); see also Cass, supra note 70, at 23-24 (1992) (noting that there are 
problems that exist because of a reliance by indigenous people and minorities on the concept of self-
determination). See generally John A. Collins, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THE PALESTINIANS, 12 Case W. Res. 1. Int'l L. 137, 153 (1980) (arguing that the principle of 
self-determination should not be considered solely as a territorial right). 
174 See Dajani, supra note 171, at 30 (noting that the word "peoples" can be defined broadly); see also 
Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128 (discussing the definition of "peoples"). See generally Cass, supra 
note 70, at 29 (noting that there is a "critical uncertainty" as to whom the right attaches). 
175 See Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128, at 1347-48 (discussing the distinction between 
self-determination as a right of "peoples" versus that of minorities); Christopher Wall, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, 22 Fordham Int'l L. J. 577, 604(1998) (noting that 
self-determination should only be allowed when human rights are ensured); see also Michla Pomerance, 
SELF DETERMINATION IN LAW & PRACTICE, at 41(1982) ("[S]elf determination is the 
imperative basis for all human rights. It). 
176 See UN CHARTER, Art. 73 (defining which territories are entitled to self-determination); see also 
Antony Anghie, FINDING THE PERIPHERIES: SOVEREIGNTY AND COLONIALISM IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 40 Harv. Int'l L. 1. 74,74-5(1999) (noting that 
the process of decolonization is formulating doctrines of self- determination as opposed to annexation); 
see also Dajani, supra note 171, at 32 (noting the United Nation's definition of which territories qualify 
as entitled to self-determination) 177 • 
See Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128, at 1347-48 (noting the blurred distinction between "people" 
and "minorities"); see, e.g., Stephen Kinzer, EUROPE, BAKING GERMANS, ACCEPTS 
YUGOSLAV BREAKUP, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at AlO (discussing the recognition by the 
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For example, the people of East Timor successfully exercised their right to 
self-determination of their own future under international process regardless of being 
the same ethnic group as the people of West Timor, I 78 while the people of Tibet are 
distinct from other ethnic groups of China and have not benefited from the principle 
of self-determination. 179 This is true notwithstanding the fact that the size of the 
Tibetan population is quite large in comparison to that of East Timor. 180 Moreover, 
the right of the Tibetan people to preserve their cultural and religious life was 
affirmed by the UN under the principle of human rights and fundamental freedom in 
1959,1961 and 1965. 181 Based on the foregoing, it appears that it is unnecessary to 
make a distinction between "peoples" and "minority population" III terms of 
European Union of the independence of Yugoslavia). See generally Cass, supra note 70, at 31 (noting 
that there are certain circumstances where minorities should be allowed to exercise the right of 
self-determination and cites examples of when this "controversial" approach has been allowed). 
178 See Chiang, supra note 171, at 973 (mentioning that East Timor held a referendum in 1999 in order 
to express the common will of the people); see also Indonesian Institute of Science, EMBARGO AND 
LESSONS FROM HISTORY, THE JAKARTA POST, Sept. 30, 2000 (discussing the successful 
referendum in East Timor in August 1999). See generally Andrea Hopkins, Australia Allowed Invasion 
Of East Timor: Records Show Canberra Had 3 Days' Warning But Did Nothing, THE GUARDIAN 
(LONDON), Sept. 13,2000, at 16 (noting East Timor's successful referendum). 
179 See John Billington, LETTER, PLEA FOR TIBET, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Oct. 7, 
2000, at 2 (noting that nothing has happened by way of establishing a right of self-determination for the 
Tibetans); see also Lobsang Sangay, UN'S SHODDY TREATMENT OF TIBET, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 2, 2000, at F7 (discussing the need for public support of the establishment of self-
determination in Tibet). See generally Terence Tan, WHY CHINA'S LEADERS FEAR FULL 
DEMOCRACY, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Sept. 17, 2000, at 23 (discussing China's fear 
of a democracy and the fact that it could cause them to lose control over Tibet). 
180 
See Frederick J. Petersen, THE FA<;ADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A COMMUNITY OF SOVEREIGN NATIONS, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Compo L. 
871,898-900 (1998) (estimating that the population of East Timor is six hundred thousand, while the 
~~betan population is comprised of nearly eight million Chinese and six million native Tibetans). 
See Question of Tibet, GA. Res. 1353, UN GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. AlL.264 
(1959) (condenming Chinese invasion of Tibet and human rights abuses that took place); GA. Res. 
1723, UN GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, vol. 1, UN Doc. Al5100 (1961) (affirming Tibetans right to 
self- determination); GA. Res. 2079, UN GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, UN Doc. AIL. 473 (1965) 
(discussing that the basic human rights of fundamental freedom are not only encouraged, but will be 
e~orced by the UN by whatever means necessary). See generally id., Petersen, at 900 (noting the 
TIbetan population is at 6 million). 
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entitlement to the right of self-detennination.182 This is perhaps the reason why there 
is hardly any indication that many states are prepared to adopt the generally 
applicable criteria. 
Another notable case IS the self-detennination movement in Palestine, which 
presents a typical claim for self-detennination within an existing state.183 In this case, 
the UN has repeatedly affinned that the Palestinians have the inalienable right to 
self-detennination. 184 The UN has established a special committee, in spite of US 
opposition and hostile threats from Israel, to help the Palestinians in proceeding to 
build their own state. 185 
182 See Cass, supra note 70, at 31 (discussing the fact that there has been a change in the international 
community's perception of when self- determination can arise); see also Kiwanuka, supra note 69, at 90 
(concluding that the right of people to assert the right of self-determination extends to all people 
"within the boundaries of a country or a geographical entity"); Sohn, supra note 86, at 50 (discussing 
the distinction between allowing minorities the right of self-determination and allowing it only within 
the colonial borders). See generally Kinzer, supra note 177 (showing a shift in the international attitude 
toward recognizing the rights of minorities). 
183 See Justus R. Weiner, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES' "RIGHT TO RETURN" AND THE 
PEACE PROCESS, 20 B.c. Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 1, 1(1997) (noting that ifIsrael accepts Palestine's 
national identity, then the concept of self-determination should be guaranteed); see also Canuel, supra 
note 75, at 100 (discussing the movement towards self-determination and the resistance of Israeli 
occupation of Palestine); see also Shlomo Alvineri, A PALESTINIAN TRAGEDY, THE JERUSALEM 
POST, july 28, 2000, at 8A (discussing the situation in Palestine and their claim for self-determination 
and poor leadership). 
184 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th 
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 123, UN Doc. Al8028 (1970) (supporting the rights of all people to determine 
their political status); see also Resolutions and Decisions of the UN General Assembly and the UN 
Security Council Relating to the Question of Palestine, GA. Doc. AlAC.183/L.2 (1947-1975), GA. 
Coco AlAC.83/L.2/Add.1 (1976-1979) (noting the importance of the right to freely determine one's own 
political future). See generally Canuel, supra note 75, at 93-94 (1997) (noting that the United Nations 
~s repeatedly recognized the rights of all people to "freely determine their political status"). 
See Allegra Pacheco, A FORM OF APARTHEID BEING FORCED ON PALESTINIANS, THE 
HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 6. 2000, at A45 (noting that President Clinton was a proponent of the Middle 
East Peace Agreement, but failed to let the Palestinians know that the agreement did not include a 
guarantee of self- determination); see also Dajani, supra note 171, at 41-42 (arguing that United States 
and Israel still refrain from acknowledging Palestinians' claimed right to self-determination); see also 
Weiner, supra note 171, at 241-42 (noting United States' refusal to recognize the Palestinians as a 
self-determined people). 
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§.. 2-15 Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
There are also some other persuasive precedents visible in Europe. Concerned 
with increased claims for non-colonial self-determination in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s,186 the Member states of the European Community 
adopted the Guidelines on Recognition of New States m Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union (hereinafter "Guidelines,,).187 The Guidelines constitute a general 
criteria on the process of recognizing such new states based specifically on the 
principle of non-colonial self-determination.188 As a result, numerous new states 
emergmg from the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union have gained 
recognition from the European Community and other states. 189 
186 See Svetozar Stojanovic, THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, 19 Fordham Int'l L. 1. 337, 
358(1995) (discussing that the secessions from Yugoslavia was viewed as self determination 
movements); see also Gideon A. Moor, Note, THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND 
ARTICLE 51: INHERENT RIGHTS AND UNEMT RESPONSIBILITIES, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 870, 
873-4(1995) (discussing the fall of communism in 1989, the changing face of Eastern Europe in the 
early 1990s and the nationalist self-determination movement). See generally John Tagliabue, 
CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at A6 (describing political successors in 
Yugoslavia as former communists who evoke old national aspirations as a way of casting off that which 
originally gave rise to communism). 
187 See Guideline on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, E.C. 
BULLETIN 12-1991, at 119 (laying the foundation for self-determination with respect to former 
Communist Bloc countries who sought independence); see also Ruth Wedgwood, NATO'S KOSOVO 
INTERVENTION: NATO'S CAMPAIGN IN YUGOSLAVIA, 93 Am. 1. Int'l L. 828, 833 (1999) 
(discussing how the "Guidelines" make clear that political membership in the European- Atlantic 
community requires minimum guarantees for the rights of minority populations); see, e.g., Political 
Cooperation: EEC Moves to Recognize Georgia, EUROPEAN REPORT, March 25, 1992, at 13 
(stating that Georgia has met the stated requirements in the Guideline on Recognition of New States in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and proceeded with recognition). 
188 See Chiang, supra note 171, at 1003 (discussing the fact that many new states were created out of 
former Soviet Union and United States' colonies in the "name of self-determination"); see also Sohn, 
Supra note 86, at 50 (discussing that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have been deprived of their right to 
independence). See generally Kinzer, supra note 177 (showing a shift in the international attitude 
toward recognizing the rights of minorities based on self-determination). 
189 
See Patrick R. Hugg, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN EUROPE: RECONSIDERING THE 
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Another prominent progress relating to non-colonial self-determination has been 
the development of indigenous people's right to self-determination over the past two 
decades. 190 For instance, the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(hereinafter "Working Group") was established in 1982 to deal with the Issue of 
indigenous populations. l9l The Working Group adopted the Draft Declaration of 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples at its 11th session which was also later adopted by 
UNESCO III 1993 (hereinafter "1993 Declaration,,).l92 Article 31 of the 1993 
Declaration provides that "Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their 
right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
LUXEMBOURG EXCLUSION, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 606, 611-2(2000) (discussing the changing 
map of Europe, the newly emerging states from the old Soviet powers and the European Union's offer 
of membership to some emerging democracies); see also Kinzer, supra note 177 (discussing the 
recognition of the independence of Yugoslavia); see e.g., Political Cooperation: EEC Moves to 
Recognize Georgia, supra note 184 (stating that Georgia has met the stated requirements in the 
Guideline on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and proceeded with 
recognition). 
190 See Cass, supra note 70, at 23-24 (noting problems that exist because of a reliance by indigenous 
persons and minorities on the concept of self-determination); see also Patrick Macklem, 
ABORIGNIAL RIGHTS AND STATE OBLIGATIONS, 35 Alta. L. Rev. 97, 113 (1997) ("Indigenous 
peoples have the right to self-determination in accordance with international law"); Chair- Rapporteur 
of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26 (released 8 June 1993) (addressing fact that indigenous peoples have 
the right to self-determination). 
191 See Rick Sarre, SEEKING JUSTICE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF NATIVE PEOPLE: THE 
IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS: DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR 
POLICYMAKERS, 4 Geo. Pub. Pol'y Rev. 165, 167 n. 5(1999) (discussing the United Nation's 
creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations); see also Penelope Andrews, 
CONCEPTUALIZING VIOLENCE: PRESENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PANEL III: SEX AND SEXUALITY: VIOLENCE AND CULTURE IN 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: VIOLENCE AGAINST ABORIGINAL WOMEN IN 
AUSTRALIA: POSSIBILITIES FOR REDRESS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 917, 932(1997) (analyzing the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations impact on international relations); Suagee, supra note 74, at 369-70 (noting the 
~~ties of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations). 
See Draft Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29; see also 
~acklem, supra note 190 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination in accordance with 
m~ernationallaw, subject to the same criteria and limitations as applied to other peoples in accordance 
WIth the Charter of the United Nations."); see also id., Sarre(discussing the Draft Declaration which 
provides in part that indigenous peoples have the right to have their specific characteristics respected). 
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§..2-16 Indigenous People's Right to Self-Determination 
As noted above, it may be hard to see the right of non-colonial self-determination 
being interpreted in its broadest sense in the near future. However, giving "indigenous 
peoples" a high degree of control over their own destiny and settling 
self-determination claims by guaranteeing democratic entitlement to these claimants 
under international processes have become more acceptable at the international 
leve1. 194 After the Cold War, the growing worldwide pressure for democracy 
promoted a progressIve development toward self-determination by encouragmg 
respect for human rights as a universal value (which is protected under international 
law). 195 Watching the development of the right to self-determination from an 
anti-colonial concept to a non-colonial concept, observers are likely to be convinced 
193 See Alexandra Kersey, THE NUNAVUT AGREEMENT: A MODEL FOR PRESERVING 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Compo L. 429, 453 n.210(1994) ("Indigenous peoples, as a 
specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs"); see also Angela R. Hoeft, 
COMING FULL CIRCLE: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY LITIGATION FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, 14 L. & Ineq. J. 203, 227 (commenting on 
Article 31 of the Draft Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples); Wilson, supra note 103, at 470 
(discussing Article 31 of the Draft Declaration of Rights of Indigenous People). 
194 See Bell & Cavanaugh, supra note 128, at 1347-48 (discussing how indigent peoples have blurred 
the distinction between peoples and minorities, thus expanding the right of self-determination); see also 
Stojanovic, supra note 186(asserting that the secessions from Yugoslavia were viewed as self-
determination movements); Kinzer, supra note 179(stating that the European Union recognized the 
independence of Yugoslavia). 
195 See Stephen R. Ratner, DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTER IN PREVENTING ETHNIC 
CONFLICT?, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'! L. & Pol'y 591, 592-93 (2000) (noting that there has been "modest 
progress" made toward a more worldly recognition of human rights since the end of the Cold War). See 
generally Chiang, supra note 171, at 1003 (stating that many new states were created out of the the 
former Soviet Union and United States' colonies in the "name of self-determination"); see also Suagee, 
SUpra note 74, at 389-90 (explaining the United States will have to take the moral high ground in order 
to insure that self-determination for indigenous peoples continues to become a reality). 
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that, regardless of the form of self-determination contemplated, the issue of choice is 
an underlying factor. 196 In essence, people have the right to choose who governs 
them and what kind of government they should practice.197 
With regard to the political choices, the UN adopted Resolution 2625 198 on the 
principle of democratic entitlement. Relations 2625 states that "the establishment of a 
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an 
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that 
people.,,199 Yet, as a matter of international law, there exist relatively few procedures 
to implement the right of self-determination.2oo 
196 See Kingsbury, supra note 82, at 440 (recognizing existing doctrine of choice in some international 
institutions regarding self-determination); see also Tomasa, supra note 87, at 248-49 (listing countries 
that have colonized in the past define self-determination as a choice of right to freely choose a status). 
See generally Marc Weller, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE 
SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, 86 Am. J. Int'l 1. 569, 592(1992) 
(discussing the 1966 Human Rights Covenants and their allowance for individuals to make a choice 
regarding ethnicity, religion and language). 
197 See Suagee, supra note 74, at 380 (stating that "under international law indigenous peoples have 
been treated as not having one particular right that other peoples have--the right to choose to become a 
nation-state"). 
198 See Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 9th 
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. 8/8028 (1970) (Resolution 2625); see also Hurst Hannum, 1999 
SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES, 93 Am. J. Int'l 1. 274, 275(1999) 
(discussing Resolution 2625); see also Claus Arndt, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN 
EASTERN TREATIES, 74 Am. J. Int'l 1. 122, 130 (1980) (explaining specific sections of Resolution 
2625). 
199 See Major James Francis Gravelle, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ISSUES-THE FALKLAND(MALVINAS) ISLANDS: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF 
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 107 Mil. 1. Rve. 5,40(1985) 
(discussing Resolution 2625); see also Tarnzarian, supra note 70, at 192 (explaining the substantive 
legal issues pertaining to the Karabagh conflict); see also Brian D. Vaughan, Note & Comment, WILL 
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN? SHARE AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND AND THE CASE FOR CROSS-BORDER BODIES, 18 Wis. Int'l 1. J. 511, 524(2000) 
~regarding the forms that self-determination may take) . 
• 00 See Wall, supra note 175, at 603-04 (asserting there is no international procedure to insure the 
Implementation of self-determination); see also cf. Selassie, supra note 68, at 98 (stating the UN 
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§. 2-17 Procedures to Implement the Right of Self-Determination 
To commence a direct, secret and universal ballot is a comprehensive way to 
assess the will of the people.201 In order to prevent electoral fraud or any other 
violation of the electoral process, the international community often conducts 
international election observer missions to ensure that the following Issues are III 
place: 1) whether those people entitled to vote are properly registered and that the 
electoral rolls are not tampered with; 2) whether all those registered people are able to 
vote freely and that their ballots are properly and fairly counted; and 3) whether, 
during the electoral campaign and the election itself, information flowed freely to and 
from the people so as to ensure that they are able to vote under the best possible 
conditions.202 Thus, democratic entitlement itself can serve as an imperative to 
conflict resolution because it helps to present a real outcome of the will of the 
people.203 Through this democratic procedure, however, the responsible state can 
CHARTER provides for procedures which give the concept of self-determination concrete form). 
201 See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of 
the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 1.L.\1. 1305. 1308 (1990) 
(diSCussing the "inalienable rights of all human beings" inherent in having an election by secret ballot 
to ensure that free opinion of the electors is expressed); see also Franck, supra note 96, at 66 (noting 
that elections by secret ballot are important in protecting the rights of those voting); see also Joy 
Gordon, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF ITS 
POLITICIZATION, 23 Brook. J. Int'L L. 689, 759(1998) (noting that the election of a particular 
individual is the "will of the people"). 
202 See Yves Beigbeder, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 37-38 (1994) (discussing what is done in order to ensure that electoral 
issues are in place). See generally Tan Lian Choo, GOOD, CAPABLE OFFICERS PICKED TO ACT 
AS REPUBLIC'S ENVOYS, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), October 24, 1994, at 4 (stating that 
~~lection monitors" were sent to observe the fIrst non-racial elections in South Africa). 
See Brietzke, supra note 127, at 130 (noting that it is important for the international community to 
defme self-determination in democratic terms in order to ensure that the people get what they want); 
see also Hannum, supra note 143, at 66 (viewing self-determination as a means to a democratic end 
lends validity to the proposition because it serves to protect the interests of the people). See generally 
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satisfy the burden of proof to eliminate any legal justification for intervention by 
another state or international community and thus, the conflicts ansmg from the 
self-determination movement can be resolved smoothly by the possibility of certain 
.c 204 degrees of prelerence. 
The case of Eritrea, which broke away from Ethiopia, serves as a remarkable 
model for such a point.205 The Eritrean's launched a long-term armed struggle against 
the Ethiopian regime despite the fact that the UN paved the way for the Ethiopian 
Empire to absorb Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopian territory without respecting 
the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination.206 The conflict remained 
Adeno Addis, INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITARIANISM, AND THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC 
MINORITIES, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 615, 616(19920 (noting that a right of self-determination is 
generally taken to mean a declaration of independence of a territorial unit). 
204 See Brietzke, supra note 127, at 0118-19 (discussing how the democratization of the burdens of 
proof would eliminate any legal justification for intervention by another state or international 
community). See generally Thomas Carothers, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: POLICY 
ALLIES OR RIVALS?, Wash. Q., Summer 1994, at 106 ("In their view, U.S. government pressure on a 
foreign government to improve its human rights behavior is a form of entirely legitimate intervention in 
the internal affairs of that country because human rights norms are binding under international law on 
all states. "). 
205 See The Nations Speak; UN General Assembly General Debate, September 27 to October 13, 1993, 
UN CHRON., March 1994, at 8 ("Eritrea has not only secured peace and stability; it has made the rare 
achievement of establishing warm relations of cooperations with its former enemy, Ethiopia. "). See 
generally Africa Policy Information Center, United States and Africa; Africa Policy: Report from the 
American Assembly, AFRICA NEWS, May 6, 1997 (providing examples of many countries that have 
made significant progress toward democracies). 
206 See Chris Landsberg, AFRICA'S RENAISANCE IS BEING HELD HOSTAGE BY 
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICT: OPTIMISM IS DELAYED, NEWS & RECORD (North Carolina), 
july 15, 1998, at All (concluding that surprise victory over the Ethiopian Army initiated the UN 
sanctioned referendum on Eritrean self-determination, where 98% of Eritreans voted for independence). 
See generally Henry J. Richardson, RECENT STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY UNDER 
PROTOCOLS I AND II TO THE GENVA CONVENTIONS, 6 Temp. Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 13, 16 
(1992) (recognizing combat that arises out of popular uprisings, within state boundaries, during the 
Pursuit of self-determination); see also Michael A. Hiltzik, ARMY COLLAPSE REPORTEDLY 
CRIPPLES ETHIOPIAN REGIME, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1989, at AI, col. 5 (noting that Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front was the dominant guerilla warfare organization); see also War Brings 
Ethiopia to Verge of Fall: Rebellion: In an Impassioned Speech, President Mengistu Says the Mother 
Land Is in Collapse, L.A. TIMES, June 23,1990, at All (stating that the president of Ethiopia accused 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front of being involved in a conspiracy to divide the country). 
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uncontrollable for thirty years until the Eritrean People were permitted to hold a 
democratic referendum under international monitoring for determining the status of 
. . 1993 207 Entream . 
§ 2-18 Democratic Referendum in Eritrea 
In revIewmg the process that the Eritrean people took m their struggle for 
self-determination, it is clear that self-determination itself is a right to choose one's 
destiny by full democratic participation?08 It also appears that oppressed people do 
not compromIse on their right of self-determination.209 After the Cold War, a 
democratic vitality has been growmg around the world. 210 More significantly, 
207 See Tom Killion, BOTH SIDES IN AFRICA'S LONGEST WAR LOOK FOR PEACEFUL 
SOLUTION IN ATLANTA, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 3, 1989, at page 2 (noting that the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front worked for several years to obtain an internationally supervised referendum on 
Eritrea's political future); see also Robert E. Lutz, II, PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD COURT, 
THE UNITED STATES, AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A CHANGING 
WORLD, 25 Int'! L. 675 (1991) (speculating that international peace talks were held in Atlanta, 
Georgia with the hope of settling the civil war between the Ethiopian Government and Eritrean rebels); 
see also PEACE TALKS IN ATLANTA, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1989, at Al (noting that President 
Carter would oversee international peace talks between the government of Ethiopia and the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front). See generally Halperin, Scheffeer & Small, supra note 102, at 125-26 
(discussing the UN's General Assembly adoption of-Resolution 390(V) that proposed Eritrea be 
federated within the Ethiopian Empire). 
208 See Kolodner, supra note 69, at 158 (noting that the exercise of self-determination is a prerequisite 
to the exercise of human rights and freedoms). See generally Henry J. Richardson, A CRITICAL 
TOUGHT ON SELF-DETERMINATION FOR EAST TIMOR AND KOSOVO, 14 Temp. InrI & 
Compo L. J. 101, 101(2000) (stating that international community has a duty to uphold self-
determination as a fundamental right); see also Henry J. Richard III & Goler T. Butcher, RIGHTS OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES IN ESTABLISHED STATES: SOUTHERN AFRICA AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST, 85 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 541, 546(1991) (noting that in established states, 
this right is defined as each person's power to participate in decisions which affect the political future 
~f the state). 
09 See generally Brown-John, supra note 111, at 573 (noting that the self-determination and 
independence movement can be linked in situations where peoples have been oppressed); see also 
Mitchell A. Hill, WHAT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION MEANS TODAY, 1 Ilsa. 
Inn & Compo L. 119, 131(1995) (under the 1970 Declaration of the United Nations, when a 
government is not representative of its people, oppressed groups within the state may be afforded the 
right to self-determination). But see Hanauer, supra note 90, at 133 (stating that the right of every 
?ppressed ethnic or religious group to claim independence and freedom from domination is a very 
Idealistic political and moral view). 
210 
See Richardson, supra note 208, at 102 (noting that in the post- Cold War Era, the right to 
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democratic values have become acceptable in many regions ofthe world.211 Hence, a 
responsible state is guaranteed its status quo "territorial integrity and political unity" 
against the right of self-determination only when its government has satisfied the 
obligation to the people to engage in "good governance.,,212 Using this approach, 
democracy will become a universal value irrespective of differing racial, religious and 
cultural characteristics.213 By acting together through the democratic frameworks,214 
both the state and its people can effectuate mutual trust and minimize the conflicts 
se1f-detennination has been "intensely claimed and invoked"); see also Clarence Davis, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE RIGHT TO 
SELF-DETERMINATION, 17 Hamline L. Rev. 1, 6(1993) ("With the ending of the Cold War, there 
has been an international expansion in the desire for democracy. "); see also Kolodner, supra note 69, at 
153 (asserting that self-detennination has gained growing acceptance in the international community in 
the post-Cold War era); see also Nafziger, supra note 122, at 28 (noting that in the post-Cold War Era, 
the United Nations has been able to facilitate self-determination more readily). 
2ll See Kolodner, supra note 69, at 153 (stating that democratic freedoms have become more widely 
accepted and promulgated since the Cold War). See generally Muna Ndulo, THE DEMOCRATIC 
STATE IN AFRICA: THE CHALLENGES FOR INSTITION BUILDING, 16 Nat'l Black L. 1. 70, 
84(1998) (noting that in many regions of the world, providing political power to local communities has 
become one of the comer stones of democracy); see also Karen Ann Widess, IMPLEMENTING 
DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?, 91 Am. Soc'y 
Int'l L. Proc. 356, 357(1997) (discussing the fact that there has been increased support support for 
democratic transitions within international organizations in the post-Cold War Era). 
212 See Henry J. Richardson, "FAILED STATES," SELF-DETERMINATION AND PREVENTIVE 
DIPLOMACY: COLONIALIST NOSTALIGIA AND DEMOCRATIC EXPECTATIONS, 10 Temp. 
Int'l & Compo L. J. 1,21(1996) (placing burden on every political state to protect the human rights of 
all its citizens); see also Hanna, supra note 138, at 224 (di~cussing protection of people within specific 
territories under international law of its territorial integrity). See generally Canuel, supra note 75, at 91 
(stating that the international standard for determining whether self-determination is legitimate depends 
Upon, in part, the degree of deprivation of basic human rights within the state). 
213 See United Nations And Businesses Find Common Ground; UN Chief Says Agency Creates The 
Conditions Necessary For Business Success, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 20, 1998, at 3D 
("Freedom and the peaceful resolution of disputes; social progress and better standards of living, 
equality, tolerance and dignity; these are the universal values"); see also Panafrican News Agency, 
Africa-at-Large; Conference on Globalisation Ends in Maputo, AFRICA NEWS July 5, 1998 
(emphasizing the need for universal values based on Democracy but it cannot be forced). See generally 
Daniel J. Vargas, PRIEST'S CRY FOR INDEPENDENCE REMEBERED, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, September 15, 1998, at El ("[A]utonomy, self- determination, fairness, justice and 
~emocracy--universal values "). 
14 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., 
SuPp. No. 16, art. 25, UN Doc. Al6316 (1966). Article 25 provides: every citizen shall have the right 
and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2, and without umeasonable 
restrictions: a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
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that may arise between them.215 In other words, democracy is deeply linked to peace 
and security because it can effectively resolve conflicts caused by self-determination 
216 
movements. 
As mentioned above, what the international community can do to contribute is to 
promote the creation of democratic institutions (which constitute an essential and 
indispensable stage in the economIC and social development of nations).217 In his 
"An Agenda for Peace," UN Secretary-General B. Boutros-Ghali stated: 
There is a new requirement for technical assistance, which the 
United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when 
requested: support for the transformation of deficient national 
structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new 
democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system 
to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as 
electors; c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. 
215 See generally Patti Waldmeir, THE SYSTEM TAKES THE BLAME, NOT THE WHITES, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), April 23, 1994, at 10 (emphasizing the need to minimize conflict and 
misunderstanding in an effort to create a government with national unity) 
216 See Rudrakumaran, supra note 128, at 35 (noting that democratic principles may be useful in 
conflicts involving self-determination because democracy promotes deliberations, mediations, and 
compromises). Compare Nafziger, supra note 122, at 20 (discussing the fact that self-determination has 
done little to promote democracy). See generally Brown-John, supra note 111, at 595 (stating that 
democracy is part of the "natural order of human political evolution"). 
217 See Dianne Otto, CHALLENGING THE "NEW WORLD ORDER": INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR WOMEN, 3 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. 
Prob. 371, 374(1993) (noting that in the international community, there are movements "seeking 
decolonization and self-determination, the liberation of women, freedom from racial discrimination, 
indigenous peoples' rights, environmental democracy, and emancipation from economic domination 
and political repression); see also William P. Alford, EXPORTING "THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPINESS," 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1677, 1680(2000) (discussing the fact that the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace promotes the furtherance of democratic systems abroad). 
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important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious 
connection between democratic practices such as the rule of law 
and transparency in decision-making and the achievement of true 
peace and security in any new and stable political order. These 
elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of 
international and national political communities. 218 
§ 2-19 Another Mission of the UN Trusteeship System 
There is a need for the United Nations to set up a permanent body to engineer the 
creation of these democratic institutions and handle the issue of self-determination.219 
It is known that the UN trusteeship system was created to succeed the Mandate 
system of the League of Nations for the purpose of ensunng "well-being and 
development" of the non-self-governing peoples and their eventual self-government 
or independence under the UN Charter.22o After the last trust territory in the island of 
218 See General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peace-Keeping--Report of the Secretary- General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the 
Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31,1992, UN Doc. A!47/277-S12411l, (1992) (for 
a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on January 31, 1992); 31 ILM 956, 960:'3(1992). See also Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. 
Yamamoto, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, HISTORY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1747, 
1787(2000) (noting the United Nations' potential role as protector of human rights on an international 
level). 
219 See Kolodner, supra note 69, at 158 ("Only if the international community supports movements for 
self-determination can it guarantee the protection of the rights of peoples throughout the world."); 
Robert B. Porter, PROPOSAL TO THE HANODAGANYAS TO DECOLONIZE FEDERAL INDIAN 
CONTROL LAW, 31 U. Mich. J. L. Rev. 899,946(1998) (recognizing the UN's considerable progress 
~ securingyrotection of basic human rights under international law). 
See MIchael Mandelbaum, THE RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE; IN FOREIGN COUNTRY 
PROBLEMS, INFORMATION ACESS COMPANY, June 22, 1994 at 3 ("After the two world wars, 
~fforts were made to use the state-building skills of the major powers under the auspices of an 
mtemational organization, first with the League of Nations mandate system, then as UN trusteeships."); 
see also William Pfaff, WWI-ERA MANDATE SYATEM MIGHT SAVE PLACES LIKE SOMOLIA, 
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Palau achieved its independence from the United States in 1999, the UN trusteeship 
system has successfully fulfilled its traditional function.221 In fact, all functions of the 
UN trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters 
in trust territories were based on the well-being and development of the inhabitants of 
such territories. In order to approach their maximum well-being and development, the 
inhabitants of such trust territories were entitled to exerCIse their right to 
self-determination III approving their respective new status by democratic means 
(which were observed by visiting missions of the Trusteeship Council).222 
Likewise, the recognition of the principle of non-colonial self-determination by 
the international community is also due to a similar general purpose under the UN 
trusteeship system to promote "well-being and development" of such peoples.223 As 
CHI. TRIB., November 29, 1992 at 3C (noting the institution of mandated territories after World War I). 
See generally Walter de Gruyter, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN RETROSPECT: PROCEEDING S 
OF THE SYMPOSIUM, 80 Am. J. Int'! L. 200, 200-5(1986) (discussing historical information on the 
League of Nations). . 
221 See Richard D. Lyons, WORK ENDED, TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL RESISTS UN AX FOR NOW, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 6, 1994 at 11 ("[T]he United States, which had administered the 
Palau island chain since 1947 at the behest of the United Nations, formally notified the Trusteeship 
Council that Palau's 16,000 people had officially voted to become a sovereign nation."). See generally 
Hinck, supra note 73, at 916 (noting the interest in the UN CHARTER has in protecting the rights of 
people in non-self-governing territories and promoting their well-being). 
222 See Franck, supra note 86, at 58-59 ("The Covenant clearly intends to make the right of 
self-determination applicable to the citizens of all nations, entitling them to determine their collective 
political status through democratic means."); see, e.g., Marian Nash (Leich), U.S. Practice: 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 89 AJ.I.L. 96, 97(1995) (noting that the people of Palau had freely exercised their right to 
self-determination). See generally Hurst Hannum & Richard B. Lillich, THE CONCEPT OF 
AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 74 AJ.I.L. 858, 885- 86 (1980) (concluding that the key 
to achieving self-determination is the "freely and democratically expressed wishes" of those individuals 
concerned) 
223 See H~ck, supra note 73, at 916 (noting the UN CHARTER'S interest in protection the rights of 
those people in non-self-governing systems); see also Kolodner, supra note 54 ("[T]he international 
COmmunity, historically hesitant to infringe on state sovereignty."). See generally Kolodner, supra note 
69, at 158 (stating the rights of peoples throughout the world will be protected only if the international 
community recognizes a right to self- determination). 
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of 2000, all of the trust territories had achieved independence or "self-government" 
within another state. 224 It is the right time for the UN to modernize the function of the 
trusteeship system, specifically in order to manage other forms of non-colonial 
self-determination movements. 225 By so doing, the UN cannot only avoid 
humanitarian cnses from horrific armed conflicts In particular, but also ensure 
international peace and security in general. 226 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN TAIWAN AFTER THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR: FROM EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATOIN TO 
INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATON 
§ 2-20 Japanese Colonialism on Taiwan 
224 See Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana, PROPTER HONORIS RESPECTRUM: HUMAN RIGHTS 
TALK AND SELF-DETERMINATION TOO!, 117 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1391, 1411(1998) (stating that 
all trust territories have allegedly achieved independence or self-government within another state); see 
also Fox, supra note 106, at 736 (discussing the non-self-governing and trust territories that achieved 
independence in the post-war era retained their colonial-era boundaries). See generally Robert N. Wells, 
UNITED NATIONS IS IN NEED OF REFORMS AND RESTRUCTURING, NEW STRAITS TIMES 
(MALAYSIA), November 15, 1995, at 13 (stating that all the UN trust territories have achieved 
independence). 
225 See Lyons, supra note 211 (stating that Palau is the last of the 11 territories in the United Nations 
trusteeship system to gain self- determination); see also William Pfaff, A NEW COLONIALISM? 
EUROPE MUST GO BACK INTO AFRICA, Foreign Affairs, January, 1995 / February, 1995 at 2 
(stating that leaders want the old League of Nations trusteeship system reestablished, with African and 
Asian nations among those appointed by the United Nations to govern certain countries). See generally 
World Politics and Current Affairs, THE ECONOMIST, November 22, 1997, at 49 (discussing the new 
trusteeship system under which the UN would put collapsed countries together again). 
226 See UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 6 (providing that the UN shall ensure the compliance of 
non-member states for the maintenance of international peace and security); see also Evan T. Bloom, 
PROTECTING PEACEKEEPERS, THE CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF UNITED NATIONS 
AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 621, 621(1995) (noting member states' 
realization that there was an urgent need for an international agreement that would deter and ensure 
punishment of such armed conflicts). But see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, HOW TO REFORM THE 
UNITED NATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW REVOLUTION, 
2 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 185, 188 (1998) (questioning whether the UN Charter can ensure the 
rule of international law or achieve the goal of peaceful settlement disputes without compulsory 
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During the period of Japanese colonialism from 1895 to 1945, Japan proceeded 
with exclusionist and racially discriminatory policies against the inhabitants of 
Taiwan.227 The inhabitants of Taiwan did not enJoy equal rights with Japanese 
citizens.228 The unequal status between the Taiwanese and the Japanese gave rise to 
anti-Japanese resistance from the inhabitants of Taiwan in the hope of building an 
independent state rather than reverting to Chinese rule. 229 In an effort to approach 
this ideal, some anti-Japanese organizations started operating in China.230 There is no 
international adjudication). 
227 See Yu-Ming Shaw, MODERN HISTORY OF TAIWAN: AN INTERPRETATIVE ACCOUNT, IN 
CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE 21-24 (Hungdah Chiu ed., 1979) (criticizing Japan's use of 
economic growth as an excuse to impose harsh exploitive rule over Tawain); see also Tay-Sheng Wang, 
LEGAL REFORM IN TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE (1895-1945): THE 
RECEPTION OF WESTERN LAW 26-83 (1992) (discussing how the legal system in Taiwan has been 
influenced by Japanese civil law traditions); see also Shen, supra note 72, at 11 08 (explaining how the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 began a history of fifty years of Japanese colonial reign of Taiwan 
against the will of the Chinese people). 
228 See Edgar Snow, RED STAR OVER CHINA, N.Y. TIMES, February 9, 1968, at 106-113. 
(discussing how Taiwanese people had to conform to Japanese ways); see e.g., Parris Chana and 
Koh-Uibim, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED 
NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 467 (1997) (noting that the 
Japanese made Taiwanese people use the Japanese language exclusively and duplicate its educational 
and legal system). See generally Angeline G. Chen, TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: 
CROSS THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES, 20 Loy. L. A. Int'l & Compo L. J. 223,230(1998) 
(stating that Taiwan changed hands without being consulted, after Japan defeated China in the 
Sino-Japanese War). 
229 See Christopher J. Carolan, THE REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN: A LEGAL HISTORICAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR A TAIWANESE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
429, 433-4(2000) (lithe Cairo Declaration of 1943 that challenged Japanese possession of Taiwan 
resulted in Taiwan becoming China's colony); see also Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 464-65 
(discussing how Taiwan satisfies the criteria for statehood because it is a territory under its control, it 
has the capacity to enter into international relations independently of any other government, and it has a 
strong economy). But see Nii Lante Wallace, TAIWAN AND SOMALIA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
CURIOSITIES, 22 Queens L. J. 453, 461-2(1997) (discussing the ongoing struggle for Taiwan's 
independence) . 
230 See id., Carolan, at 448 (noting that Taiwan's resistance to Japanese control did not mean that 
Taiwan wanted to be a part of China, rather it fostered the goal of establishing an independent 
Taiwanese government); see also Yeh, supra note 80, at 237-38 (stating that, directly after 
decolonialization, Taiwanese nationalists failed to establish significant institutions for Taiwanese 
independence). See generally Colin P.A. Jones, UNTIED STATES ARMS EXPORTS TO TAIWAN 
UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: THE FAILED ROLE OF LAW IN UNITED STATES 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 9 Conn. J. Int'l L. 51, 52, n. 5(1993) (discussing the conflict between 
Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalists after Taiwan was returned to China after Japanese rule, and the 
Possible initiation of a trusteeship over Taiwan by the United States. 
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evidence, however, that China argued for its nationalist credentials over Taiwan 
during that period.231 In an interview by an American Journalist in 1936 regarding 
the question: "Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regam all the 
territories lost to Japanese imperialism, or only to drive Japan from North China, and 
all Chinese territories beyond the Great Wall?" the top leader of Chinese Communist 
Party(hereinafter "CCP"), Mao Zedong, indicated: 
It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, 
not merely to defend our sovereignty south of the Great Wall. This 
means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, 
include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have 
re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and 
if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese 
imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help zn their 
struggle for independence. The same thing applies for 
Taiwan[Formosaj. As for Inner Mongolia, which is populated by 
both Chinese and Mongolians, we will struggle to drive Japan from 
231 See Carolan, supra note 229, at 433 (noting that prior to World War II, China did not challenge 
Japan's possession of Taiwan); see also Parris Chang & Kok-Ui Lim, TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED 
NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 407-08 (1997) (questiong whether 
the signing of the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, which established the Allied 
Powers' intent to return Taiwan to China, served as conclusive evidence that China asserted control 
Over Taiwan during that period). Compare Shen, supra note 72, at 1108 (noting that during the period 
of Japanese colonization of Taiwan, the Chinese never ceased in their efforts to return Taiwan to 
China). 
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there and help Inner Mongolia to establish an autonomous state. 232 
Since Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Manchu Ching Dynasty in the 19th 
century, there was no strong sense of Chinese identity to consider Taiwan a part of 
China.233 On the contrary, because of Taiwan's ceSSlOn from China in perpetuity 
under the Shimonoseki Treaty, there was no further cultural and historical linkage 
between Taiwan and China.234 Although the 1943 Cairo Conference concluded that 
Taiwan should return to China, this outcome was more a result of political 
compromise than an expression of an emotional belonging that the people of Taiwan 
were Chinese culturally and historically.235 
§ 2-21 The 1943 Cairo Conference & the 1945 Potsdam Declaration 
232 See Christopher K. Costa, Comment, ONE COUNTRY-TWO FOREIGN POLICIES: UNITED 
STATES RELATIONS WITH HONG KONG AFTER JULY 1, 1997,38 ViII. L. Rev. 825, 834(1993) 
(discussing China's eighty year quest to regain all of its lost territories). See generally James L. 
Wescoat, Jr., MAIN CURRENTS IN EARLY MULTILATERAL WATER TREATIES: A 
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, 1648- 1948, 7 Colo. J. Int'l EnvtI. L. & Pol'y 39, 68 
(1996) (stating Japan conquered Manchuria from China in 1931). 
233 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 456 (stating that Taiwan ceded to Japan in 1895); see 
also Chang & Lim, supra note 181, at 429 (asserting that while there may be civility between the two, 
there is no strong pull to consider Taiwan as a part of China). See generally Piero Tozzi, NOTE, 
CONATITUTIONAL REFORM ON TAIWAN: FULFILLING A CHINESE NOTION OF 
DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1193, 1251 n.245(1995) (discussing the 
difficulty offorrning strong identity in the middle of their "hodgepodge" history). 
234 See Kwan Weng Kin, DESERTED ISLES AROUSED INTEREST ONLY AFTER REPORT OF 
OIL RESERVES, THE STRAITS TIMES, September 21, 1996, at 36 ("Taiwan [was] ceded to Japan as 
spoils of war through the Treaty of Shimonoseki after China's defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese 
War."); see also Yoshio Nakagawa & Yomiuri Shimbun, TAIWAN'S COLONIAL LEGACY 
REVISITED, The Daily Yomiuri, May 7, 1995, at 5 (stating that, with the signing of the treaty, Japan 
acquired Taiwan from China with the signing at the end of the Sino-Japanese War); Xiao-huang Yin 
and Tsung Chi, IS US PLAYING THE TAIWAN CARD BY GRANTING ITS PRESIDENT A VISA?, 
Los Angeles TIMES, June 4, 1995, at M2 (stating that since the since signing of the Shimonoseki 
Jreaty, Taiwan has been "lost" from China). 
35 See A Brief Retrospect, The British Broadcasting Corporation, July 14, 1982 (stating that Taiwan 
was returned to China as a result of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation); see also 
TAIWAN IS INALIENABLE PART OF CHINA, Says White Paper, The Xinhua General Overseas 
~ews Service, AUGUST 31, 1993 (noting that Taiwan and the Penghu archipelago had been 
mcorporated into the territory of China and that the people of those territories were subject to the 
Sovereigny of China). 
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The 1943 Cairo Conference and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration served as a basis 
for Nationalist China to take over Taiwan after Japan's surrender in World War 11.236 
In fact, the occupation of Taiwan by China was only on behalf of the Allied Powers 
because Japan had not formally and legally renounced its authority over Taiwan until 
1951.237 From 1945 to 1951, the Chiang Kai-shek regime of Nationalist China was 
only an Occupying Power III Taiwan, forced to abide by "The 1907 Hague 
Regulations on Land Warfare" (hereinafter "Hague Regulations") and "The 1949 
Geneva Conventions on Protection of Civilians" (hereinafter "Geneva Conventions") 
to maintain public order and safety of Taiwan without any change in the status of the 
territory. 238 Taiwan was typically qualified as a non self-governance territory at that 
time and the inhabitants of Taiwan were qualified as a non self-governing people, 
236 See Paik Choong-hyun, JAPAN RENEWS SPURIOUS CLAIM TO TOKTO ISLETS, Feb. 16, 
1996;(visited Oct. 21, 2000) 
(http://korea.emb.washington.dc.uslKoislNewslBackgrounderlbg140.htm1#Concern) (pointing to 1943 
Cairo Declaration with pledge that Japan would forfeit all islands it seized, occupied, or took by force); 
see also Benjamin K. Sibbett, TOKDO OR TAKESHIMA? THE TERRlTOROAL DISPUTE 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 2 I Fordham Int'l L. J. 1606, 1637-8(1998) 
(stating that Japan returned Liancourt and ended Japanese rule over Korea, as a result of the 1943 Cairo 
Declaration and 1945 Potsdam Proclamation). 
237 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 457 (quoting Treaty of Peace, signed at Taipei on April 
28, 1952, providing: "It is recognized that under Article 2 of the multilateral Peace Treaty of 1951, 
Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well 
as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands."); see also Shen, supra note 72, at 1114 (arguing that the 
1951 Peace Treaty superceded the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and problematically did not identify 
2
to whom Taiwan should be returned). 
38 See William A. Schabas, CONCEPTUALIZING VIOLENCE: PRESENT AND FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PANEL II: ADJUDICATING VILOENCE: 
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY ON WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 733, 764(1997) ("In 
·the United Kingdom, under the 1969 Genocide Act, genocide is punishable in the same manner as 
'grave breaches' of the '1949 Geneva Conventions."'). See generally Theodor Meron, THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES: THE MARTENS CLAUSE, PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITY, AND 
DICTATES OF PUBLIC CONSCIENCE, 94 A. J. 1. L. 78, 82(2000) (discussing the bases of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the ways it could be breached). 
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meamng that they were entitled to the opportunity of enjoying the advantage of 
promoting their progressive development toward self-government or independence.239 
Although Nationalist China had a strong tendency to annex Taiwan as part of 
China, it did not take necessary steps to give effect to the Hague Regulations or the 
Geneva Conventions in such an occupied territory, but rather exercised its sovereign 
power.240 Soon after Nationalist China occupied Taiwan, the indigenous population 
of Taiwan were forced to switch their national identity from Japanese to Chinese, 
which led to ethnic friction in the Taiwanese society.241 In other words, there began 
to arise an identity crisis concerning the relationship between being Chinese and being 
Taiwanese.242 As a result, the growing ethnic differences between Taiwan and China 
caused a widespread uprising known as "the 2-28 Incident.,,243 The 2-28 Incident 
239 See Keith Highet, George Kahale, and Antony Anghie, INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS, 87 
AJ.I.L. 282, 283(1993) (discussing the promotion of the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of Nauru towards self- government or independence). 
240 See Joakim E. Parker, CULTURAL AUTONOMY: A PRIME DIRECTIVE FOR THE BLUE 
HELMETS, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 207, 213-4(1993) (stating that "the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 are accepted as authoritative statements of customary international 
law, and as such have no exceptions to their applicability. "). 
241 See Sean Cooney, WHY TAIWAN IS NOT HONG KONG: A REVIEW OF THE PRC'S "ONE 
COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS" MODEL FOR REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN, 6 Pac. Rim L. & 
Pol'y 497, 498 (1997) (stating Beijing's remaining obstacle to national reunification as the "Taiwan 
question"); see also Chang & Lim, supra note 231, at 415 (accussing certain policies of intending to 
suppress sentiment for independence and eradicate any sense of Taiwan identity). See generally 
Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 472 (stating that Taiwan, and the ethnic and cultural identities of 
their populations, substantially differs from those of the metropolitan state). 
242 See C. HUGHES, TAIWAN AND CHINESE NATIONALISM, at 12 (Routledge 2000); see also 
Margaret Chon, CHON ON CHEN ON CHANG, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1535, 1551(1996) (describing 
self-identification as a representation of a complicated type of national identification with four different 
views of interpretation); see also Tozzi, supra note 233. The author articulated the "Five Threats" as the 
following: (i) the Democratic Progressive Party's advocacy of Taiwanese independence; (ii) the 
disappearance of the "one China" policy; (iii) conflict between native Taiwanese and those of mainland 
extraction; (iv) lack of devotion to the Three Principles of the People; and (v) abandonment of the five 
b2 ranch division of governmental power in favor of a presidential autocracy. 43 
See John F. Copper, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE?, at 35 (1996) (discussing the 
CUlmination of the "2-28 Incident" through the developing feelings of rebellion and resistance to KMT 
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cost about 18,000 to 28,000 lives due to inhuman repression by Nationalist China 
including almost the whole generation of Taiwanese intellectuals and society 
leaders?44 After the 2-28 Incident, a strong sense of self-identity began to grow 
among the people of Taiwan to seek their own destiny.245 
The lack of an international awareness and condemnation of such an inhuman 
repression by Chinese troops prevented the popUlation of Taiwan from seizing the 
opportunity to successfully express their wish to secede from Japan or China and 
achieve their own political destiny through the exercise of external self-determination 
(as was the case in Western Sahara)?46 In response to the request for an Advisory 
Opinion on Western Sahara from the UN General Assembly as to the following 
questions: "Was Western Sahara at the time of colonization by Spain a territory 
belonging to no one (terra nullius)7 If not, what were the legal ties between this 
rule); see also Chen, supra note 228, at 233 (describing the "2-28 Incident"). 
244 See COPPER, supra note 233, at 35 (stating that the "2-28 Incident" was ingored for 48 years until 
President Lee Teng-hui (hirnselfTaiwanese) issued a formal apology on behalf of the government); see 
also Chen, supra note 228, at 233 (noting the atrocities that took place as a result of 5,000 anned troops 
coming in from the mainland to "quell the disturbance.") 
245 See Chen, supra note 78, at 679-80 (discussing how the common efforts of Taiwanese people have 
helped to develop a distinctive economic, social and cultural system of their own); see also Charney & 
Prescott, supra note 81, at 473 (considering Taiwanese as a separate "people" having the right of 
self-determination); see also Mark S. Zaid, TAIWAN: IT LOOKS LIKE IT, IT ACTS LIKE IT, BUT IS 
IT A STATE?, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 805, 808-10(1998) (scrutinizing Taiwan's moves and suggesting 
the entitlement of Taiwan to its own statehood and sovereignty strengthen its claim to 
self-determination as an independent entity despite the assertions of China). 
246 See Chen, supra note 228, at 240-243 (stating that, in 1947, Japan had not yet given up its 
Sovereignty over Taiwan, showing that Taiwan was still an occupied territory of Japan legally, despite 
the fact that at the same time China had already annexed Taiwan as its own political territory); see also 
Franck, supra note 96, at 54 (explaining that the concept of self-determination has its inception in a 
moral mandate directed at decolonizing European and Japanese colonies during the period following 
World War II); see, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, G.A. Res 1514, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 138-39, UN Doc. Al4684 (1960) 
(pointing to "self-determination" as the one of the purposes behind the United Nations and as one of the 
general objectives within the areas of social and economic development and human rights). 
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territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?" The International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ") laid down the need to pay regard to the freely 
expressed will of peoples by suggesting that: 
Whenever there are territories inhabited by indigenous populations 
that are collectively organized (although not in such a manner as to 
constitute a state proper) and the state wielding sovereign authority 
over such territories decides to withdraw, it does not follow that the 
territories automatically become terra nullius, and hence open to 
appropriation by any state. Even if the indigenous populations may 
not come to be regarded as organized in the form of a state, they 
must be enabled freely to express their wish to associate or integrate 
into an existing sovereign state, or acquire some sort of 
international status gradually leading to independent statehood. 247 
In this regard, it IS obvious that the indigenous popUlation of Taiwan were 
deprived of the opportunity to Jom the great wave of global anti-colonial 
self-determination following World War 11.248 
247 
248 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.1. 4, 66-68. 
See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 460 (examining post-World War II peace treaties 
determinative of the disposition of Taiwan); see also Jianming Shen, INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES 
AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCES SUPPORTING CHINA'S TITLE TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
ISLANDS, 21 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 1, 50(1997) (discussing the effects of the absence of 
Chinese participation in 1951 multilateral peace conference); Shen, supra note 72, at 1158-59 
(questioning the possibility for Taiwan to attain independence through self- determination or unilateral 
secession). 
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i2-22 Two Rival Governments Across the Taiwan Strait 
In 1949, Nationalist China lost control of the Chinese mainland to Communist 
China and the government retreated to Taiwan.249 A situation was created whereby 
there existed two rival governments: the PRC and the ROC, in Beijing and Taipei 
respective1y.250 Taiwan has SInce then become the only effective territory of 
Nationalist China.251 Hence, any growing nationalism to be distinct from Chinese 
would be a direct challenge to the existence of the Nationalist China.252 The ruling 
government therefore would not tolerate any movement toward Taiwanization.253 On 
249 See Cheri Attix, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE DEA: ARE TAIWAN'S 
TRADING PARTNERS IMPLYING RECOGNITION OF TAIWANESE STATEHOOD?, 25 Cal. W. 
Int'I L. J. 357, 361(1995) (stating that, following defeat by the Communists in 1949, President Chiang 
Kai-shek and the KMT government fled to Taiwan and established the "temporary" capital of China in 
Taipei); see also Lee, supra note 77 (noting that the forces of the ROC retreated to Taiwan on 
December 8, 1949, leaving Mao Tse Tung and the People's Republic in control on the mainland); see 
also Scott A. McKenzie, GLOBAL PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A COMPARISON OF INFRINGEMENT AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN CHINA 
VERSUS THE EUROPEAN UNION, 34 Gonz. L. Rev. 529, 549(1999) (noting that many Western 
nations, including the United States, refused to recognize the People's Republic as the government of 
mainland China). 
250 See Chen, supra note 228, at 224 (noting that, until 1991, the government of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan insisted that it was the sole representative government of Taiwan and China); see also Joyner, 
supra note 78, at 823 (comparing the differing views between the ROC and PRC with respect to which 
legal authority should govern both Beijing and Tapei). Compare, Chiang, supra note 171, at 981 
(stating that, by 1996, Taiwan was part of the China state, as well as represented by the PRC 
government there and subjected to exercises of China's sovereign power). 
251 See Lee, supra note 77, at 352 (noting that the names the "Republic of China," the "Republic of 
China on Taiwan," "Taiwan," "ROC" and "Nationalist China" are used interchangeably, depending 
upon the context referring to the territory under the effective control of the ROC government, rather 
than the Chinese mainland); see also McKenzie, supra note 249 (quoting E.D. Hirsch, Jr. et aI., 
DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 299-300 (1988)) (concluding that the government of 
Nationalist China was forced to exile on Taiwan because People's Republic of China ruled the 
mainland) 2 . 
52 See Lee, supra note 77, at 390 (1997) (describing how in the PRC terminology, the creation of 
"Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan" is a violation of "the basic justice or righteousness of 
Chinese nationalism"); see also Chen, supra note 78, at 697 (arguing that the new course of action, led 
by Lee Tenghui since the early 1990s, has diminshed Beijing's hope that a peaceful reunification could 
be achieved by relying on traditional Chinese nationalism); see also James W. Soong, PERSPECTIVE: 
TAIWAN AND MAINLAND CHINA: UNFINISHED BUSINESS, 1 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 
361, 365(1995) (noting that Taiwan independence is dependent upon mainland China and Chinese 
~~tionalism acquiescence). 
See Hung-Mao Tien, TAIWAN'S EVOLUTION TOWARD DEMOCRACY: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, IN TAIWAN: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE, at 3,9 (Denis F. Simon & 
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the other hand, the population of Taiwan learned that there was no room for them to 
develop their own nationalism under such a sociopolitical climate through the bitter 
memory of the 2-28 incident. 254 Accordingly, the desire for external 
self-determination to seek a self-destiny became a "dead dream" in the Taiwanese 
people's minds.255 Instead, the population of Taiwan could only hope that the regime 
of Nationalist China would grow into a more representative government.256 
Prior to the 1970s and during the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, the whole society 
of Taiwan was dominated by the Chinese mainlanders, who embodied the myth of 
recovenng the Chinese mainland but did not interact with Taiwan's society 
smoothly.257 It was assumed that Taiwan should be an anti-communism base for 
Michael Y. M. Kau ed., 1992); see also Chen, supra note 78, at 675-76 (stating that the demise of the 
Chiangs' reign of "white terror" in 1988 introduced a decade of profound transformation toward 
democratization and "Taiwanization"); see also TOZZI, supra note 233, at 1239 (1995) (describing 
Chiang Ching-kuo's anti-Communist "Taiwanization" efforts in the 1970s). 
254 See Attix, supra note 249 (discussing the institution of martial law throughout China after the local 
population rebelled against the imposition of Chinese rule); see also Lee, supra note 77, at 391 
(describing the political ramifications of the military actions taken to stop rebellion after the "2-28 
Incident" and the growing hatred of mainland Chinese people); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, THE 
HORROR OF 2-28: TAIWAN RIPS OPEN THE PAST, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at A4 (detailing 
human rights violations of the subsequent years). 
255 See Attix, supra note 249 (stating that martial law, under the KMT, continued on Taiwan for the 
next forty years and support for Taiwanese independence was criminalized); see also Charney & 
Prescott, supra note 81, at 460 (asserting that the peace treaties that placed the island's population under 
Beijing's control would violate the doctrine of self-determination, at it later came to be understood); 
Shen, supra note 72, at 1160 (claiming that there is neither a legal basis, nor practical possibility for 
Ts~iwan to attain independence through self-determination). 
o See SUN YAT-SEN, SAN MIN CHU I: THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE 111 (Frank 
W. Price trans., China Publ'g 1927) (1925) (stressing the importance of China having a representative 
government, but criticizing China's failure to learn from Western democratic systems); see also Lee, 
supra note 77, at 379 (1997) (asserting that the only way for the people of Taiwan to have their voices 
heard is at the local level, instead of attempting to overthrow the central government); see also David 
M. Morris, FROM WAR TO PEACE: A STUDY OF CEASE FIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE 
EVOLVING ROLE OF THE INTED NATIONS, 36 Va. J. Int'l L. 801, 876(1996) (noting that the UN 
Security Council has refused to give Nationalist China her permanent-member seat to the People's 
Republic of China, thereby acknowledging it as not being the legitimate representative of the Chinese 
people). 
257 S 
ee Omar Saleem, THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: CHINA DEFINES THE NEW 
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recovenng the Chinese mainland so the people of Taiwan were impelled to 
"China-ization," with a greater emphasis on the cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, 
common historical tradition, and ethnic identity.258 This held true despite the fact that 
the Chinese government had lost its effective control over the Chinese mainland, 
showing that there was no territorial connection or common economic life between 
Taiwan and China. 259 The implementation of "China-ization" by the government of 
Nationalist China compelled the people of Taiwan to therefore accept Chinese 
. l' 260 natlOna Ism. 
§ 2-23 Taiwan's China-ization & Dictatorship Regime 
MILLENNIUM, 15 Am. U. Int'! L. Rev. 527, 535(2000) (recognizing the tension between Taipei and 
Beijing after the 1949 civil war when Chiang Kai- Shek fled the mainland to Taiwan); Shen, supra note 
72, at 1118 (noting the change in government, name, form and system of the state when the PRC 
Government replaced the ROC Government in 1949). 
258 See Thomas B. Gold, TAIWAN'S QUEST FOR IDENTITY IN THE SHADOW OF CHINA, IN IN 
THE SHADOW OF CHINA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN SINCE 1949, at 169 
(Steve Tsang ed., 1993) (discussing Tawain's efforts to create a common identity with China); see also 
Yeh, supra note 80, at 238 (explaining why, despite their shared ethnic identity, the Taiwanese received 
the new "external" regime with a level of caution and distrust); see, e.g., Duan Aline DeVore, LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN ASIA: INTRODUCTION: THROUGH THE 
LOOKING GLASS-CULTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PERCEPTION OF THE EAST 
ASIAN BUSNIESS PARTNER, 8 Transnat'l L.55, 55(1995) (discussing how the cultural mores, 
collective orientation and homogeneity of the region render its outlook particularly predominant in the 
thinking and views of its inhabitants). 
259 See Chen, supra note 78, at 676 (describing the different political, economic, social and cultural 
systems found in Taiwan and China); see also Zhengyuan Fu, THE INTNERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STATUS OF TAIWAN: CHINA'S PERCEPTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & 
Foreign Aff. 321, 327 (1997) (describing China's policy towards Taiwan as the idea of "one country, 
two systems," whereby CCP leaders have expressed their willingness to tolerate Taiwan's maintenance 
of independent political and economic systems); Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations on Policy 
Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Unification, BEIJING REV., Oct. 5,1981, at 
10 (proposing a way for a peaceful resolution). 
260 See Chiang, supra note 171, at 1002 (describing the doctrine of self-determination has as an 
Important issue, after World War II, in the context of Taiwanese nationalism); Jacques DeLisle, 
POLITICAL ALCHEMY, THE LONG TRANSITION, AND LAW'S PROMISED EMPIRE: HOW 
JULY 1, 1997 MATTERS-AND DOESN'T MATTER-IN HONG KONG'S RETURN TO CHINA, 18 
D. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 69, 131(1997) (noting China is resorting to a more aggressive nationalism); Lee, 
supra note 77, at 390 (explaining how Chinese nationalism shifted from being used as a defense against 
foreign aggression to a defense against mainland Chinese nationalism). 
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After the central government of Nationalist China moved to Taiwan in 1949, the 
Chiang Kai-shek regime of Nationalist China represented all of China by retaining the 
ROC Constitution.261 As a result of applying the ROC Constitution, Taiwan became a 
tiny part of the territories of the Republic of China.262 The government re-established 
the full array of central political bodies which had existed on the mainland in order to 
retain the credibility of ROC's claim as the sole legitimate government of China, 
rather than simply the government of Taiwan.263 
The failure to exercise effective control over the Chinese mainland made it 
impossible for the government of the ROC on Taiwan to abide by the ROC 
Constitution m holding regular elections to re-elect parliamentarians in the two 
parliamentary institutions, called the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.264 
261 See Cooney, supra note 241, at 513-19 (discussing the intricacies of the ROC Constitution during 
the martial law period); see also Yeh, supra note 80, at 250 (discussing how the nationalist authorities 
used Taiwan as their base for the mission to recover the mainland, centering policy around power 
consolidation for the ruling political party, national security and social stability); see, e.g., 
Congressman Donald M. Fraser, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN "FREE CHINA," 116 Congo Rec. 
E7953-56 (1970) (describing political dictatorship in Taiwan before 1971). 
262 See THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA INFORMATION OFFICE, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
YEARBOOK 43 (2000) (noting that under the definition of the ROC Constitution, a total territorial 
area of the ROC is about 11.4 million sq. kIn (including Mongolia), while the total area of Taiwan is 
only near 36,000 sq. km.); see also Hans Kelsen & Robert Tucker, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 328-33 (2d ed. 1966) (stating that, although the PRC claimed sovereignty 
over Taiwan and Taiwan claimed sovereignty over the ROC, this dispute does not disqualify Taiwan 
from sovereign status); Lee, supra note 77, at 387 (noting that Taiwan's population of 21.3 million, 
most of whom are of Chinese ethnicity, speak the same official language or dialects as are spoken on 
the Chinese mainland, and share the same cultural heritage as most residents of the PRC). 
263 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 461 (noting the disagreement among the Allied Powers 
with respect to whether the PRC or ROC represented the legitimate government of China); see also 
McKenzie, supra note 249 (stating that United States did not recognize the People's Republic as the 
representative government of China); Shen, supra note 248 (discussing the bi- lateral peace treaty 
b2 etween Japan and either the ROC or PRe). 64 
See Sean Cooney, THE NEW TAIWAN AND ITS OLD LABOUR LAW: AUTHORITARIAN 
LEGISLATION IN A DEMOCRATIZED SOCIETY, 18 Compo Lab. L. 1,4(1996) (listing additional 
powers of Legislative Yuan beyond original legislative functions); see also Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EMERGING CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE UNEASY CASE FOR THE 
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The National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were elected to represent Mainland 
areas.265 In order to show its legitimacy by retaining these seats for representing 
constituencies of the Chinese mainland, the ROC Constitution was amended by the 
"Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion"(hereinafter "Temporary Provisions,,),z66 
Consequently, these parliamentarians who followed the Chiang Kai-shek regime and 
fled to Taiwan after 1949 were permitted to hold their seats without periodic 
re-elections until such time as the unification between Taiwan and mainland China 
could occur.267 Without a right to fully and directly re-elect these parliamentarians, 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, 39 Am. 1. Compo L. 509,523-34 (1991) (noting that the judicial 
body charged with interpreting the ROC Constitution rarely acted to protect constitutional freedoms); 
see also Yeh, supra note 80, at 240 (concluding that constitutional interpretations by the Council of 
Grand Justices (the constitutional court in Taiwan), congressional seats were give to, and continuously 
occupied by, the same group of representatives). 
265 See Cooney, supra note 241, at 515 (listing some main functions of the Legislative Yuan, in 
addition to legislative power); see also Dennis Te- Chung Tang, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
ENVIROMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN TAIWAN, 6 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol'y 245, 252 (1997) 
(describing that main functions of the National Assembly were to elect the president and vice president, 
amend the ROC Constitution and approve appointments made by the President); see also Tozzi, supra 
note 233, at 1233 (describing the branches of government created by the ROC Constitution and their 
functions in 1946). 
266 See Cooney, supra note 241, at 519-20 (noting that in April 1991, the National Assembly abolished 
the Temporary Provisions, restoring normal constitutional order and amended the ROC Constitution so 
that its operation was for electoral purposes confmed to the Taiwan area); see also Yeh, supra note 80, 
at 240 (noting that the temporary Provisions were promulgated in May 1948 to give the Executive 
branch more power than was granted under the ROC Constitution and was enacted in light of Article 
174(1) of the ROC Constitution and remained effective until 1991 when President Lee Ten-huei 
terminated them); see, e.g., ROC Const. art. 47 (Republic of China) (noting that Article 47 of the 
Constitution specifies a two term limit for presidency, but Provision 3 of the "Temporary Provisions in 
the Period of Mobilization against Communist Rebellion" froze the constitutional mandate in order to 
~!~ow Chiang Kai-shek to remain in power longer). 
See Tak-wing Ngo, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL LIBERATION IN TAIWAN, 25 Bull. 
Concerned Scholars, 5 (l993) (noting that by repressing political identities, and by denying freedom of 
speech, association, and other civil and political rights, the ruling party tried to destroy self- organized 
and autonomously defined political spaces, substituting for them a state-controlled public arena); see 
also Yeh, supra note 80, at 240 (explaining why same group of representatives were insulated from 
fe-election); see, e.g., Chang & Lim, supra note 231, at 416-21 (discussing China's territorial claim to 
Taiwan, its legal title, domestic jurisdiction, and de facto independence). 
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the indigenous population of Taiwan was indeed not self-governing. 268 In the 
meantime, the government of Nationalist China promulgated a martial law in 1949, 
limiting the people's rights to freedom of speech, belief, publication, assembly and 
association.269 The authorities in Taiwan always justified the need for martial law on 
national security considerations, regardless of whether these reasons were 
well-grounded or not. 270 Consequently, peaceful opposition efforts toward 
democratic reform were blocked by the martial law, even bringing tragedy upon 
innocent individuals who had no desire to engage in politics.271 This made the 
268 See Chang & Lim, supra note 231, at 411 (noting that the Nationalist government's treatment of the 
Taiwanese people and its institution of a one-party dictatorship was witnessed by American officials, 
some of whom lost confidence in the KMT, whereby all government positions were the exclusive 
domain of ethnic Chinese mainlanders); Walter J. Kendall, III, A PEACE PERSECTIVE ON THE 
TAIWN UNTIED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP QUESTION, 28 J Marshall L. Rev. 259, 260(1994) 
(questioning whether the indigenous people, who represent a large majority or the current government 
of Taiwan should make decisions regarding Taiwan's future); see also Wallace-Bruce, supra note 229, at 
459 (describing the growth in population when President Chiang Kai-Shek and his followers arrived in 
Taiwan in 1949, who became known as wai sheng jen (meaning outside province people)). 
269 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 462 (arguing that human rights violations can be made 
against the ROC, as a result of the question period of martial law between 1949 and 1987). Compare 
Winston Hsiao, THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPPUBLIC OF CHINA ON 
TAIWAN,5 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol'y 161, 178, 180-3(1995) (reporting limited progress by the PRC in that 
area); Sean D. Murphy, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 93 Am. J. Int'l. L. 879, 895 (1999) (comparing the martial law system to the 
present system in Taiwan, which allows for a vibrant democracy characterized by free elections, a free 
press, and dynamic political campaigns). 
270 See Attix, supra note 249 (claiming that KMT declared martial law throughout China in 1948 in 
response to the growing success of CCP forces on the mainland); see also Cooney, supra note 264 
(discussing how substantial amendment of the "frozen" laws ideologically was unacceptable as it 
would have compromised the KMT's claim that it was the legitimate government of China); Yeh, supra 
note 80, at 234 (characterizing the present government in Taiwan as a political regime in which 
presidential and congressional national elections are routinely held, partisan politics is thriving, and 
restrictions on constitutional rights are substantially removed). 
271 See Chang & Lim, supra note 231, at 412-13 (providing examples of numerous human rights 
Violations that took place as a result of instituting martial law); see also Chen, supra note 228, at 232 
(stating that during the first fifteen months of the KMT's rule, Taiwan's intellectual elite were targeted, 
arrested, and often beaten, along with anyone suspected of conspiring or befriending the Japanese); see 
also Clement Cheng, A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO REGULATING MONEY POLITICS IN 
TAIWAN: LEARNING FROM THE MISTAKES OF OTHERS, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L. J. 535, 
540(1998) (noting that the KMT maintained control through martial law and through selling favors to 
local factions in exchange for political support). 
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Chiang Kai-shek regime of Nationalist China in Taiwan a typical dictatorship.272 
When the Chiang Kai-shek regime was succeeded by his son Chiang Ching-kuo 
m the middle 1970s, when there was an increasing political conSCiOusness of 
self-governance, the indigenous population of Taiwan became concerned with 
democracy and open debate on the issue of constitutional reforms so that the ideal of 
self-governance could be substantially carried out in Taiwan. 273 Numerous 
campaigns were commenced by political opposition groups calling for an end to the 
martial law and the emergence of political pluralism.274 In the meantime, the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the US Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(hereinafter "Committee") of the US House of Representatives introduced various 
resolutions expressmg their concerns about Taiwan's political human rights 
condition.275 The Committee urged the Chiang Ching-Kuo regIme to commence 
272 See Chen, supra note 78, at 675-76 (noting that Taiwan was subject to military occupation by 
Chinese authorities, known as "white terror"); see also Soong, supra note 252, at 363 (referring to an 
antagonistic gesture toward the KMT after the period of martial law ended whereby the new mayor 
ordered municipal government offices to remove all pictures of Taiwan's former KMT dictator and 
President Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo); Tozzi, supra note 233, at 1230 (stating that 
the Communist theory of a single class dictatorship and Chiang Kai-shek's de facto personal 
dictatorship is the most ruinous element oftoday's political systems). . 
273 See Yeh, supra note 80, at 244 (describing the "Ten Major Constructions" as the transition period 
after Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father as nationa11eader); see also Cooney, supra note 241, at 
519 (discussing the reforms which resulted in civilians being no longer subject to military trials, and 
eased restrictions on assembly, association, publication and speech); Tozzi, supra note 233, at 1239 
(describing Chiang Ching-kuo as a "true reformer"). 
274 See John Fei, The Taiwan Economy in the Seventies, in CHIANG CHING- KUO'S LEADERSHIP 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, at 63 (Shao Chuan Leng 
ed., 1993) (assessing the role of Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan's economic development); see also 
Cooney, supra note 241, at 519 (discussing the political liberalization which resulted in new political 
parties being formed legally and the commencement of a process of Constitutional reform); Yeh, supra 
note 80, at 245-48 (noting that farmers, veterans, students, indigent people, workers, and 
environmentalists took their cases to the streets, demanding regulatory reforms in their respective 
areas). 
275 
See CHINA-TAIWAN: UNITED STATES POLICY: HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 
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democratic reforms.276 Because of the growing domestic and international pressure 
. :t for the Chiang Ching-Kuo regime to commit to democratization, the regime adopted 
the Taiwanization policy and began to implement political reforms by the middle 
1980s.277 As a result, martial law was abolished in 1987 and the people of Taiwan 
were able to regain their rights guaranteed by the ROC Constitution, including the 
right of assembly and association.278 
§ 2-24 Taiwanization & Democratization 
Since the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (hereinafter "DPP") in 
1986, the DPP has presented a strong desire to push the government toward 
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. 34-37 (1982) 
(providing letters from President Ronald Reagan to China); see also W. Gary Vause, CHINESE 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1575, 1591-2(1989) 
(discussing the unanimous condemnation of China by the Senate, led by a coalition of Democrats 
promoting human rights); see also Pamela Constable, U.S. SNEATE MULLS STIFF TRADE TERMS 
FOR CHINA, Boston Globe, July 23, 1991, at 3 (discussing condemnation of China for human rights 
abuses). 
276 See Frank Gibney, THE PACIFIC CENTURY: AMERICA AND ASIA IN A CHANGING WORLD 
358 (1992) (noting that political and legal reform was aided by former President Chiang Ching-Kuo's 
decision to end thirty-five years of martial law); see also Cooney, supra note 241, at 519 (recognizing 
the role of political liberalization in the the lifting of martial law by Chiang Ching- Kuo); see also 
Andrew Nathan & Helen Ho, CHIANG CHING-KUO'S DECISION FOR POLITICAL REFORM, in 
CHIANG CHING-KUO'S LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA ON TAIWAN, at 31 (Shao Chuan Leng ed., 1993) (noting that by the end of Chiang 
Ching-Kuo's presidency, political reform was in action). 
277 See Andrew B. Brick, FOR AMERICA, TAIPEI OFFERS AN EXAMPLE OF CHINESE 
DEMOCRACY, The Heritage Foundation, April 12, 1990, at 1 (discussing political domination of 
mainland Chinese that had retreated to Taiwan); see also Maria Shao & Bill Javetski, WHY TAIPEI 
PLANS TO LET A HUMDRED FLOWERS BLOOM, Business Week, November 17, 1986, at 85 
("Pressure on the KMT to liberalize increased in September, when opponents set up the new 
Democratic Progress Party (DDP) in de finance of martial law."); Sofia Wu, DPP CHAIRMAN ON 
CHIANG'S ROLE IN TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION, Central News Agency, January 12, 1998 
(recognizing President Chiang Ching-kuo's greatest contribution to Taiwan's democratization as his 
~~mination of Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, as vice president under his presidency). 
See id., Brick( discussing the first time Taiwanese people were allowed to cast ballots for an 
organized political opposition, the Democratic Party (DPP)); see also Ross A. Snel & Pierro Tozzi, 
TAIWAN GOES TO THE POLLS: NURTURING DEMOCRACY, The New Leader, October 10, 1994 
at 9 (liOn July 15, 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the martial law imposed by his father. Among other 
far- reaching consequences, the move effectively ended the ban on the formation of opposition 
parties"). 
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Taiwanization III a democratic manner. 279 In order to fulfill its political ideal of 
self-governance, the DPP proposed that all members of the parliamentary institutions 
and the ROC President should be elected directly by the indigenous population of 
Taiwan.28o This move gathered wide support from Taiwan's society and has resulted 
in electoral support for the DPP.281 Significantly, in 1995, the DPP gathered thirty-six 
percent of the popular vote, making it the biggest opposition party with powerful 
influence in Taiwan's sociopolitics.282 
Based on the increased trend towards Taiwanization since the late 1980s, the 
279 See Betsy Henderson, TAIWAN ELECTION SCARE CHINA, The Dayton Daily News, March 18, 
1996, at 5A (stating that evidence of "Taiwanization" was found in the election of Kuomintang, the first 
native born Taiwanese person to take office following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo); see also Confab 
On Taipei's International Role Opens In Washington, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, February 27, 1993 
("In the opinion of Auw, the increasing trend toward "Taiwanization" within the Taipei government and 
the KMT will also reinforce the argument for "one China, one Taiwan" advocated by the DPP and some 
factions within the KMT, thus creating new tensions in domestic politics."). see also c.f. Keith B. 
Richburg, Taiwan Candidates Muffle Freedom Call to Calm Voters Fearful of China Backlash, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, NOVEMBER 07, 1995, at A19 (criticizing the DPP's emphasis on 
"Taiwanization" in the election). 
280 See Former Taiwan Opposition Head Chooses To Serve Jail Term, AGENCE FRANCE PRE SSE, 
April 01, 1997 (discussing the protest march taken as a call for direct elections for president, in 1991 
by Shih and DPP supporters); see also Ian Johnson, Taiwan Votes In China's Shadow; Beijing Missile 
Rattling Fails To Scare Voters; 70% Turnout Expected, THE BALTIMORE SUN, March 23, 1996, at 
1A ("Under Taiwan's new democratic system, the president is elected directly by the people. He in tum 
appoints a prime minister with the consent of a parliament. Taiwan has already held direct elections for 
Parliament and local leaders.");see also Janet Matthews, Information Services, Taiwan, ASIA & 
PACIFIC REVIEW WORLD OF INFORMATION, January 1996 at 1 (discussing approval of 
constitutional reforms which allow for various elections). 
281 See Grassroots Races Confirm Democracy Vibrant In Taiwan, FREE CHINA JOURNAL February 
6, 1998 (giving examples of elections where the DPP saw its numbers rise); see also Taiwan Tightens 
Security In Election Run-Up, ASIAN POLITICAL NEWS, December 5, 1994 (discussing the 
incentives used by the the Democratic People's Party in an effort to gather support for declaring their 
independence from China). But see Grassroots Races Vital For Democratic Process, FREE CHINA 
JOURNAL January 23, 1998 (speculating that the KMT's poor showing in the elections was more a 
Iesult of internal conflict, rather than the uprising of support for the DPP's party). 
82 See Annie Thomas, Taiwan, AGENCE FRANCE PRE SSE, December 2, 1995 ("Taiwan's ruling 
Kuomintang maintained its majority in parliament following elections. The DPP took 33 percent of the 
popular vote. "); see also Lawrence Chung, Taiwan's Ruling Kuomintang Wins Frail Majority In 
Parliament, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, December 02, 1995 (providing specific election results); 
Zaid, supra note 245, at 810 (discussing that Taiwan's recent local elections at the end of 1997 as 
demonstrating the DPP's growing presence when it emerged with the greatest number of votes). 
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legislative Yuan passed "the Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior 
Parliamentarians" to persuade older members of the two parliamentary bodies to step 
down III 1989.283 The following year, the Council of Grand Justices reached a 
constitutional decision to limit the term of those senior parliamentarians to 1991.284 
As a result of the abolition of the Temporary Provisions and the amending of the ROC 
Constitution (to end the representation of Chinese mainland in the two parliamentary 
institutions in 1991), all the members of the two parliamentary bodies became subject 
to democratic elections.285 This has regularly been done by the people of Taiwan in 
the following years. Significantly, III 1994, the National Assembly passed an 
amendment to the Constitution to implement direct election of the president and vice 
president every four years since 1996.286 
283 See Ann Scott Tyson, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, December 23, 1987, at 7 
(discussing the establishment of a voluntary retirement plan for members of aging parliamentarians); 
see also Taiwan's 1989 Election Milestone Of Roc's Democratization, Ccnaa Says, PR NEWSWIRE, 
November 29, 1989 ("[A] law was passed by the Legislative Yuan on January 26 of this year, 
establishing the procedure for voluntary retirement for aging parliamentarians."). See generally ROC 
To Join Mainland People In Toppling Communist Tyranny: Lee, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, August 
10, 1989 (suggesting two ways to rejuvinate the parliament). 
284 See S. Dept. of State Dispatch, February 1, 1991, 1990 Human Rights Report (discussing the 
mandated retirement planfot all senior parliamentarians and resistance voiced from some of the elders 
who rejected the ruling as unconstitutional); see also TIEN, supra note 192 (noting that in early 1990, 
632 of the 2961 members of the National Assembly and 144 of 760 Legislators originally elected were 
still alive and attending to their political duties); see also Tozzi, supra note 233, at 1241 (discussing the 
Council of Grand Justices order that the gerontocrats retire by the end of the year to solve the problem 
of aging parliamentarians who had not faced a competitive election since the late 1940s). 
285 See Hung-mao Tien & Yun-han Chu, BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN, 148 China Q. 
1141, 1163-64 (1996) (noting that in the March 1996 elections for the fIrst time the parliament was 
entirely elected by the people which resulted in the former one-party authoritarian regime yielding to 
coalition politics); see also Goh Sui Noi, Father Of Taiwan Or History's Sinner? THE STRAITS 
TIMES (SINGAPORE), May 29, 2000, at 48 (stating that the parliament and National Assembly 
opened up to full democratic election); see also Chen, supra note 78, at 679 (noting that with the 
democratic elections of all members of the National Assembly in 1991 and in 1996 and of all members 
of the Legislative Yuan in 1992 and in 1995, Taiwan fInally has had an equivalent of a parliament 
~;fresents the present.population and reflects the political realities of Taiwan). 
See Lee Teng-Hm's "Democracy" Ploy Further Refuted, THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, March 
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Thanks to the efforts of impelling political reforms, the people of Taiwan have 
achieved profound self-governance through the processes of democratization and 
Taiwanization.287 This continuing process of Taiwanization and democratization 
created a new milestone in 1996 when the people of Taiwan directly elected their 
President for the first time in their history. 288 In March 2000, an opposition politician 
from DPP, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, was elected as president and ended more than half a 
century of rule by the Nationalist Party.289 This singular act has propelled Taiwan's 
democracy into a new era. Since a people's domestic right to self-governance IS 
regarded as an universal principle in the context of internal self-determination, the 
fact that Taiwan has evolved into full-fledged democratic governance by 
13, 1996 ("[I]n 1994 the third "amendment to the constitution" was passed in Taipei, which made clear 
a system of "direct election for president. "); see also Taiwan: Review 1997, ASIA & PACIFIC 
REVIEW WORLD OF INFORMATION, May 1997, at 232 (discussing approval of constitutional 
reforms to include provisions for the direct election of the president and vice-president). See generally 
Successes And Sorrow, NEW STRAITS TIMES (MALAYSIA), December 31,1996, at 12 (stating that 
the election of Lee Teng Hui was Taiwan's fIrst direct presidential elections and the fIrst ever direct 
election of a leader in the 5,000-year history of Chinese civilization). 
287 See ROC Seen To Earn A Place In World Community As A Democracy, CENTRAL NEWS 
AGENCY, APRIL 30, 1991 (stating that ROC may earn a place in the world community as a 
democracy, as a result of its ongoing reform). See generally Brick, supra note 274 (recognizing 
continued political reform on Taiwan). 
288 See Huang Kwang-chun, Democracy Is Taiwan's Guarantee For Survive, CENTRAL NEWS 
AGENCY, September 22, 1998 ("Taipei has spared no effort to promote democratic reform and 
multi-party politics, which culminated in the fIrst direct election of the president on March 23, 1996, 
setting a milestone in Taiwan's democratization. "). See generally Chen, supra note 78, at 676 (noting 
that in March 1996 while Taiwan was peacefully holding its fIrst ever direct election of its President, 
China responded by taking provocative and blatant acts of military threat and aggression against 
Taiwan); see also Moving Toward Sovereignty, ASIA WEEK September 29, 2000, at 56 (noting the 
close margin in favor of Chen Shui-bian that decided the election). 
289 See Henry Chu, Taiwan President Appoints New Premier, The Second Since May, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES October 4,2000, Wednesday at 4 (stating that Chen was the first president in Taiwan's history 
that was not a Nationalist Party member); see also Susanne Ganz, Taiwan Appoints New Premier, 
Cabinet To Be Reshuffled, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, October 4, 2000 ("[W]hen President 
Chen Shui-bian's DPP-Ied administration took power in May. The DPP ousted the KMT, which ruled 
Taiwan for more than half a century. "); see also Taiwan: Country ProfIle, ASIA & PACIFIC REVIEW 
WORLD OF INFORMATION, September 6, 2000, at 1 (liChen Shui-bian of the opposition DPP won 
the second direct presidential election on 18 March with 39 per cent of the vote. "). 
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Taiwanization and Democratization,29o therefore makes it clear that the people of 
Taiwan have successfully exercised their right of internal self-determination and 
transformed Taiwan from a dictatorial regIme to a representative government of 
. I d' d d I . 291 mterna an III ee externa sovereIgnty. 
v. THE POTENTIAL OF AN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 
SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENT OF TAIWAN 
§ 2-25 China's Threat of Use of Force 
Taiwan fulfils the traditional requirements of a legal state, as its government has 
substantial relation with numerous countries and regIOns and controls a defined 
290 See Ambassador Harvey Feldman, The Master Stroke Of Taiwan's New President, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION REPORTS, June 22, 2000 ("It is still the early days of the Chen administration, but the 
new administration has had an excellent beginning. The United States should celebrate not only the 
growth of a young democracy, but also the fortuitous ascension of someone whose master strokes may 
lead a region defined by misunderstanding into a new era of cooperation and peace. "); see also 
Perspectives of Mainichi Shimbun reporters, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, June 28, 2000, at 2 
(discussing the symbolism behind President Chen bowing in front of the statue of Chiang Kai-shek, a 
man who had repressed the growth of democracy, as signifying the arrival of a new era); see also Asian 
Editorial Excerpts: Is China Equal To New Challenge?, ASIAN POLITICAL NEWS, May 29, 2000 
("The inauguration on Saturday of the latest Taiwanese government, led by Chen Shui-bian and his 
deputy Annette Lu, marks the beginning of a new era for the island. "). 
291 See Alan M. Wachman, TAIWAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION, at 
78-9( M. E. SHARP,1994) (noting that "[F]rom the perspective of Taiwanese nationalism, the 
continued dominance of Taiwan politics by Mainlanders has become unacceptable. Taiwanese have a 
sufficiently intense view of themselves as a distinct national group-- regardless of how valid their 
claims for distinction may be--that they can no longer abide by a government that is dominated by a 
group they perceive to be different. This is not a matter of policy preference; it is not a matter of 
demanding autonomy from a power on which the island is currently dependent. It is simply a matter of 
a Community demanding the right of self- determination so that it may govern itself'). See also Stephen 
J. Yates, Promoting Freedom And Security In U.S.-Taiwan Policy, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
REPORTS, October 13, 1998, at 1 (discussing the Taiwan debate about whethe to allow its people to 
exercise their right to self- determination); see also Ryser, supra note 130, at 129 ("[T]he principle of 
self- determination asserts that it is the right of all peoples to freely choose their social, economic, 
Political and cultural future without external interference. "). 
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territory.292 However, the PRC has repeatedly asserted that Taiwan IS a political 
subdivision of China, and not an independent state.293 The PRC even threatens to use 
force against any separatist movement in the name of self-determination in Taiwan.294 
The government of Taiwan IS currently an independent regIme with effective 
self-governance in accordance of the will of its peop1e.295 
Since Taiwan was controlled by the Chiang Kai-shek regime of Nationalist China 
after Japan's surrender in 1945, Communist China has never exercised its sovereignty 
over Taiwan.296 Taiwan has created an exclusive community with its own values and 
292 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1,49 Stat. 3097, 165 L. N. T. S. 25. Under 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention, the traditional four criteria for statehood are: (1) a defined territory; 
(2) a pennanent population; (3) an effective government; and (4) the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states. See also Alexander K. Young, End The 'One China' Fiction, THE JAPAN TIMES, 
August 15, 1999 ("Taiwan has satisfied the conditions for recognition as an independent country (a 
territory larger than 40 percent of the countries of the world; 22 million residents; a government that 
exercises control; the ability to forge treaties and fulfill all international obligations. "). But see Jorge 
Castaneda, valeur juridique des resolutions des nations unies, in RECUEIL DES COURS DE 
L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 206,316 (1970) ("[N]on conventional norms do not 
have any exterior formal sign which indicates in an indubitable manner at which moment, in which 
conditions and to what extent one leaps from a pre-legal state to a legal one.") (author's translation). 
293 See China Warns Taiwan Of Independence "Disaster," BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, 
February 21, 2000 ("From 1979, the Chinese government has striven for the peaceful reunification of 
China in the form of "one country, two systems" with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort."); see 
also Excerpts of White Paper on Taiwan Issue, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, February 21, 
2000 (reiterating China's insistance that there is only one China in the world and one legal, 
representative government); see also Taiwan President Lee Teng-Hui Urges China To Open Dialogue, 
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, December 31, 1999 (noting that China recognizes Taiwan only as 
its province and bars foreign nations from recognizing it otherwise). 
294 See James R. Lilley, Face-off over Taiwan; Uncle Sam is the Middle as the Two Chinas Escalate 
Their War of Words and Threats, THE SAN DIEGO UNION- TRIBUNE, March 19, 2000, at Gl 
(comparing the ways that American and Chinese leadership view democracy, self-determination and 
sovereignty); see also id., China Warns Taiwan OfIndependence "Disaster," ("China would "do its best 
to achieve peaceful reunification" but would not rule out the use of force. "); see also Yates, supra note 
291 (noting China's method of imposing its will through force or intimidation). 
295 See China Warns Taiwan Of Independence "Disaster," supra note 293 ("[S]ince the early 1990s, 
Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from the one- China principle, trumpeting "two governments", 
"tw o reciprocal political entities," [and] "Taiwan is already a state with independent sovereignty. "); see 
also Noi, supra note 285 (crediting the President with turning Taiwan from an authoritarian state into a 
functiOning democracy); see also Moving Toward Sovereignty, supra note 288 ("After elections for the 
national legislature a year hence, it is likely that the DPP will take the majority and Chen will be poised 
~~6 move forward in asserting Taiwan's sovereignty, backed by solid public support. "). 
See Maubo Chang, VP Lu: Taiwan Belongs To Its People, Not To ROC Or PRC, CENTRAL 
NEWS AGENCY May 28,2000 ("Beijing's claims over the island--which it has never ruled before--are 
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there IS no doubt that the PRC IS considered an outside power to the people of 
Taiwan.297 The people of Taiwan have the profound desire to live in enduring peace 
and security and in freedom from fear and want.298 At this point, it is clear that any 
outside political power(including the PRC), which engages in incitement to conflicts 
or acts of aggression tending to isolate the people of Taiwan from the outside World, 
would be condemned by the international community.299 
§ 2-26 The Principle of Non-Threat or Non-Use of Force 
The principle of non-threat or non-use of force affirmed by Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter is deemed to be a part of customary international law and obliges the 
international community to respect it as a norm.300 Some scholars even consider the 
totally baseless under international law, and fail to account for the Taiwan people's sovereignty over 
their island."); see also China Warns Taiwan OfIndependence "Disaster," supra note 293 (claiming that, 
since neither territories on either side of the straits recognized the jurisdiction of the other, the 
government of the PRC has never ruled Taiwan); see also Young, supra note 289 ("Taiwan has had a 
separate existence from China for the past several hundred years, especially the last 100 years (50 years 
under Japanese rule, 50 years under the Kuomintang government--the PRC has never ruled Taiwan"». 
297 See id., Chang, ("Lee and the overwhelming majority of the people he represents want "a separate 
existence" from China. They resent China's continuing hostile policy of isolating and containing 
Taiwan internationally and bullying it militarily."); see also China 'Must Learn From [My] Election', 
BUSINESS WEEK, August 14, 2000, at 26 ("[The President] spoke boldly of Taiwan as 'a sovereign 
and independent country' and said China does not understand the island's democracy or its people--or 
him."). 
298 See id., China 'Must Learn From [My] Election,' ("We must promote peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait."). But see Chinese Defense Minister Warns Taiwan On PLA Anniversary, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, August 1, 2000 (asserting that "hegemonism" and "power politics" continue to 
exist and even develop and threaten global peace and security). 
299 
See Chang, supra note 296 ("Lee's statement has caused a big headache for the United States, 
because the Taiwan Relations Act requires the president and the Congress to take "appropriate action" 
when Taiwan is threatened-- an action that could lead to a deadly war with China."). But see Romana 
Sadurska, THREATS OF FORCE, 82 A.J.I.L. 239,249(1988) ("[I]t seems unnecessary for all practical 
Purposes and theoretically dubious to characterize the prohibition of the threat of force as a rule of 
Customary international law."). See generally Kirsty Scott, The Two Faces of China's Rage, THE 
HERALD (GLASGOW), May 20, 1999, at 10 (stating that the West has an existing alliance system in 
East Asia, strong support for the sovereignty of Taiwan, and continuing condemnation of alleged 
~~man-rights abuses in China). 
See Danna Harman, Clinton to Decide on Summit Today, Barak Leads to London, Paris, THE 
JERUSALEM POST, July 5, 2000, at 1 (stating that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 
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prohibition of the use of force with the law of genocide, the principle of racial 
non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade in slaves 
and piracy as the least controversial examples of jus cogens (meaning that it is a rule 
of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or mutual acquiescence). 301 
Moreover, the UN ensures that the principle of non-threat or non-use of force is also 
applied to non member states of the UN in the necessary maintenance of international 
peace and security.302 That is, all states of the world are obliged to abide by this 
principle. Significantly, regarding the self-determination movement, the principle of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter was reaffirmed by Resolution 2625 which emphasizes 
that states must not use force to deprive a people of their right to self-determination 
and independence.303 
Accordingly, the "Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
prohibits the use of armed force not only against the territorial integrity of a state, but also in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations). See generally John A. Perkins, THE 
CHANGING FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM STATE CONSENT TO STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY, 15 B.D. Int'l L. J. 433, 465(1997) (stating UN CHARTER Article 2 §§ 4 and 51, 
were also binding customary international law). 
301 See Hsiao, supra note 78, at 719 (discussing the established non- use of force principle, its role in 
international law and the consequences of any violation). See also Cf. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, 
PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS, at ch. 8, 323- 56 (1988). 
302 See Hsiao, supra note 78, at 719 (discussing the provision); see also Sadurska, supra note 299 
(Article 2(6) of the Charter provides that "[t]he Organization shall ensure that States which are not 
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so Ear as may be necessary for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. "). But see China's UN Envoy Reiterates 
One-China Principle, supra note 296 (stating that Taiwan cannot participate in the work or activities of 
the UN and its specialized agencies). 
303 See Nigel D. White & Robert Cryer, UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT OF RESOLUTION 687: A 
THREAT TOO FAR?, 29 Cal. W. Int'! L. J. 243, 244(1999) (discussing provisions of Article 2(4»; see 
also id., at 247 ("Resolution 2625 includes the passage "such a threat or use of force constitutes a 
violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and shall never be employed as a 
tneans of settling international issues. "). 
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Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable m Armed Conflicts" 
adopted two Protocols in 1977.304 These Protocols defined armed conflicts caused by 
self-determination movements (in which people are fighting against colonial 
domination or alien occupation), as international armed conflicts and therefore subject 
to the international law of armed conflict. 305 As discussed above, not only should the 
PRC be refrained from using any form of forcible action to unify Taiwan, but Taiwan 
has the right to exercise the related rights provided by the UN Charter as well as other 
international legal instruments so long as it is attacked by alien powers(inc1uding the 
PRC).306 
§ 2-27 Individual Self-Defense & Collective Self-Defense 
According to this approach, if China uses force to suppress the claim of the 
people of Taiwan to self-determination, it would be regarded as an aggressive act 
according to a consensus definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 of the UN 
General Assembly.307 Based on the condition of necessity and proportionality, 
304 See Janet E. Lord, LEGAL RESTRAINTS IN THE USE OF LANDMINES: HUMANITARIAN 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, 25 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 311,330(1995) ("[T]he Geneva Diplomatic 
Conference on Humanitarian Law which met from 1974 to 1977 and produced two Additional 
Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions."); see also Michael J. Matheson, CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENT: THE REVISION OF THE MINES PROTOCOL, 91 AJ.I.L. 158, 160, n.13(1997) 
(discussing paragraph 4 of Protocol I). See generally George H. Aldrich, PROSPECTS FOR UNITED 
STATES RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS, 85 A.1.I.L. 1, 1(1991) (describing Protocol I as an important treaty codifying and 
developing international humanitarian law). 
305 
See id., Aldrich( covering armed conflicts in which people are "fighting against colonial domination 
~~d alien occuation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination"). 
See Hsiao, supra note 78, at 721 ("It leaves only a few exceptions where the use of armed force by 
~~~tes is permissible. These are: individual or collective self-defense (Article 51). "). 
See Stephen C. McCaffrey, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 83 Am. 1. Int'l L. 153, 159-60(1989) (discussing how the 
adoption of the defmition of aggression through Resolution 3314 (XXIX) cleared the way for further 
Work on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind); see also Rosemary 
Rayfuse, THE DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF 
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aggression by China would constitute a basis for Security Council jurisdiction under 
Article 39 of the UN Charter. 308 Taiwan is also entitled to exercise the right of 
individual self-defense or proceed with collective self-defense with its neighboring 
states in coping with any aggression by China under the principle guaranteed by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. 309 An aggression against a self-determination 
movement is regarded as a most serious and dangerous form of illegal measures in 
managing claims for self-determination.31o Therefore, the right to seek protection 
MANKIND: EATING DISORDERS AT THE INTERANTIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 8 Crim. L. F. 
43,58-62(1997) (defining "aggression" in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) within the framework of problems 
regarding the linkage of the individual crime with aggression committed by a state). Compare Louis 
Rene Beres, AFTER THE "PEACE PROCESS:" ISRAEL, PLESTINE, AND REGIONAL NUCLEAR 
WAR, 15 Dick. J. Int'l L. 301, 328 n.82(1997) ("Resolution 3314: Article 1 enjoins members to refrain 
from lithe threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. "). 
308 See Helmut Freudenshubeta, ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER REVISITED: THREATS TO 
THE PEACE AND THE RECENT PRACTICE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 46 Aus. J. Pub. 
Int'l L. 1,36 (1993) (discussing the impact of Article 39 in international disputes and the role of the 
security council in this context); see also Hanna, supra note 138, at 244 ("Article 39 of the UN 
CHARTER states that the "Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace ... and 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken. "); see also Christopher K. Penny, "NO 
JUSTICE, NO PEACE?:" A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 30 Ottawa. L. Rev. 259, 287 (1999) 
("Article 39 stipulates, the determination that a threat exists to international peace and security is within 
the discretion of the UNSC,"); see, e.g., William D. Rogers, James A. Beat & Christopher Wolf, 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: APPLICATION OF EL SALVADOR TO INTERVENE IN THE 
JURISDICTION AND ADMISSABILITY PHASE OF NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES, 78 A.J.I.L. 
929,931(1984) (discussing El Salvador's argument, which stated that the International Court of Justice 
did not have proper jurisdiction over the matter between Nicaragua and the United States under Article 
39 of the UN CHARTER). 
309 Article 51 of the UN Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measure necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measure taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security." See also Charney & Prescott, supra note 
81, at 477 (analyzing Taiwan's right of individual self-defense and right to seek outside support through 
collective self-defense in the case of an attack by China, pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter); 
Hsiao, supra note 78, at 721 ("It leaves only a few exceptions where the use of armed force by states is 
permissible. These are: individual or collective self-defense (Article 51). "); see also Nicholas Rostow, 
TAIWAN: PLAYING FOR TIME, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 707, 709-10(1998) (applying Article 51 and 
Article 2(4) to Taiwan, while analyzing the question of whether or not Taiwan is widely recognized as 
an independent state); see also James P. Rowles, NICARAGUA VERSU THE UNITED STATES: 
ISSUES OF LAW AND POLICY, 20 Int'l L. 1245, 1245, n.155 (1986); see also Maria Stavropoulou, 
THE RIGHT NOT TO BE DISPLACED, 9 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 689, 744(1994) ("[A] person's 
rights legitimize their individual or collective efforts to seek protections from threatening acts and 
redress adequately enough to restore a harmed interest. "). 
310 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 460 (questioning whether the Post-World War II peace 
treaties between China and Taiwan constituted violations of Taiwan's self-determination movement). 
See generally George E. Edwards, APPLICABILITY OF THE "ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS" 
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under armed attacks caused by self-determination has been deemed as a universal 
principle in customary internationallaw.3lI Taiwan, in spite of lack of membership in 
the UN, is absolutely qualified to exercise the right of self-defense enshrined in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. 312 There is a growing realization that any aggressive 
action by China to attack Taiwan should be placed on the level of "international 
affairs" rather than Chinese domestic issues, especially if the armed conflict is caused 
. I If d .. 313 by a typlca se - etermmatlOn movement. 
§ 2-28 The Principle of Preventive Deployment 
It appears that where there are armed conflicts caused by a self-determination 
movement, an intervention by military force in a peacekeeping operation will follow 
HONG KONG MODEL TO TAIWAN: WILL HONG KONG'S POST-REVERSION AUTONOMY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD DISCOURAGE TAIWAN'S 
REUNIFCATION WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?, 32 New. Eng. L. Rev. 751, 
757-8(1998) (analyzing the differences between Taiwan's self-determination movement and Hong 
Kong's acquiesence to Chinese rule); see e.g., Kolodner, supra note 69, at 163-64 (discussing the 
aggressions of China and Israel against internal and external self- determination movements of Tibet 
and Palestine, respectively). 
311 See Hsiao, supra note 78, at 721 (providing exceptions, found in Article 51, for when states can use 
armed force, such as individual or collective self-defense); see also Lieutenant Commander Catherine S. 
Knowles, LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY, THE BIRTHRIGHT OF ALL HUMAN BEINGS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI GENOCIDE OF THE KURDS AND EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 45 Naval. L. Rrev. 152, 172-4(1998) (discussing the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as a binding treaty defining various human rights described in the Universal 
Declaration, giving rise to customary international law); Kolodner, supra note 69, at 166 ("Promoted 
within a myriad of international instruments, principles of self-determination have become embedded 
within international law. "); Stavropoulou, supra note 309 (" [A] person's rights legitimize their 
individual or collective efforts to seek protections from threatening acts and redress adequately enough 
to restore a harmed interest."). 
312 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 477 (arguing that since Taiwan is not legally under 
Beijing's rule, the use of force by China to try and extend PRC governance over Taiwan would be a 
violation of the right of self-defense under Article 51); see also Hsiao, supra note 78, at 721 
(emphasizing that there must be an "armed attack" before a state can claim self-defense). See generally 
Malvina Halberstam, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE ONCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES 
ACTION, 17 Mich. 1. In!'l L. 229, 248(1996) (arguing that the most plausible interpretation of Article 
51 is that a state retains the right of self-defense until the Security Council has taken measures that 
have succeeded in restoring international peace and security). 
313 See Kolodner, supra note 69, at 167 (arguing that the international community must foster human 
rights, support democracy, and maintain world peace and stability by limiting movements for external 
self-determination and recognizing legitimate movements for internal self-determination); see also 
Chen, supra note 123, at 1291 (noting the vital roles of the United Nations and the world community in 
seeking out solutions to international problems of self- determination). See generally Charney & 
Prescott, supra note 81, at 465-66 (discussing the decline of the traditional state-centered framework 
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to deliver humanitarian assistance and to prevent a deterioration of the situation.314 In 
other words, the principle of self-determination has become the very purpose for the 
UN to maintain international peace and security.315 The world community has begun 
to move toward that direction by following the principle of "preventive deployment" 
III order to avoid the unilateral intervention to support a self-determination 
movement.316 This would cause an infringement of a State's sovereignty guaranteed 
by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 317 This principle of "preventive deployment" 
means to deploy the UN-authorized military, police or civilian personnel in conditions 
due to the self-determination doctrine in the international arena). 
314 See Halperin, Scheffer, & Small, supra note 102, at 105-111 (discussing the legitimacy of claims by 
sub-state groups by posing alternatives to the "internal" and "external" self-determination categories); 
see also Stephan A. Wangsgard, SECESSION, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND CLEAR 
OBJECTIVES: WHEN TO COMMIT UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES, 3 Tulsa J. Compo & 
Int'l L. 313, 315-23(1996) (analyzing the doctrine of self-determination within the context of human 
assistance and intervention). See generally Yogesh K. Tyagi, THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION REVISITED, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 883, 891-4(1995) (highlighting the differences 
between humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance, specifically stating that pursuant to 
Article 2(5), it is a duty of all member states to extend every assistance to the United Nations to 
promote fundamental freedoms). 
315 See Eckert, supra note 138, at 70-78 (discussing the interpretation of self-determination by the 
International Court of Justice, within context of the UN's Charter to maintain international peace and 
democratic entitlement); see also Bartram S. Brown, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHT IN 
DISINTEGRATING STATES: A NEW CHALLENGE, 68 Chi.-Knet. L. Rev. 203, 217-218 (1992) 
(noting that the maintenance of international peace and security were at the forefront of the agenda for 
the first summit, in 1991, of the United Nations Security Council); Head, supra note 135, at 285 
(stating the purpose of the UN CHARTER is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace. "). 
316 See Stephen T. Ostrowski, PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS AS PREVENTIVE 
MEASURES: MACEDONIA AND BEYOND, 30 NYU. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 793, 801(1998) 
("Preventive diplomacy requires the constructive engagement of the international community"); see 
also Lilly R. Sucharipa-Behrmann and Thomas M. Franck, PREVENTIVE MEASURES, 30 N.YU. J. 
Int'! L. Pol'y 485, 485(1998) (discussing how United Nations measures have shifted their focus on 
preventive plannings in the post-Cold War era); see also Shashi Tharoor, THE CHANGING FACE OF 
PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-ENFORCEMENT, 19 Fordham Int'l L. J. 408, 422(1995) (noting 
the various positive effects of preventive deployment, including the cheaper costs in lives and 
resources) . 
317 
See W. Michael Reisman, NATO'S KOSOVO INTERVENTION: KOSOVO'S ANTINOMIES, 93 
AJ.I.L. 860, 860 (1999) (discussing how Article 2(4) was changed by the contraction of Article 2(7), 
eliminating serious human rights violations). But cf. Antonio F. Perez, 89 A.J.I. L. 658, 659(1995) 
(reviewing LOUIS B. SOHN, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH 
AFRICA (1995)); Wedgwood, supra note 189 (stating that Article 2(7) forbids intervention within the 
123 
t f' ,I' 
'I( t, 
, 
of crisis within an area where military conflict has occurred with the expectation of 
alleviating suffering and to limit or control violence. 318 In inter-State disputes, such 
deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests an 
appropriate United Nations presence.319 In a national crisis, such deployment could 
be employed at the request of the Government or all parties concerned with their 
consent. 320 
The Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina was proclaimed in 1992 which led 
to the aggreSSIOn against independence and territorial integrity by the Yugoslavia 
national Army (Serbian troops).321 The deteriorating situation cost thousands of lives 
domestic jurisdiction of a member state except by Council decision under Chapter VII). 
318 See Ostrowski, supra note 313, at 798-800 (describing preventive deployment as a "dispute 
resolution ladder," whereby low-cost procedures are utilized early and more costly and intrusive 
measures are only employed if those fail); see also Thomas G. Weiss, THE UN'S PREVENTION 
PIPE-DREAM, 14 Berk. J. Int'l L. 423, 424-25 (1996) (stating that the most desirable and efficient 
employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict); see, e.g., Diego 
Garcia-Sayan, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 41, 
44(1994) (explaining that the only "preventive deployment" operation undertaken by the UN has been 
a mainly military one in the observing the boundary with Serbia since June 1993). 
319 See Brown, supra note 315, at 219 (arguing that the UN presence in Yugoslavia provided an 
example of the new broader role for UN peacekeeping, especially as it applies to the significant 
problems resulting from changes to state structures); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, CONTINUING 
LIMITS ON UN INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WAR, 67 Ind. L. J. 903, 912(1992) (discussing U.S. 
presence in Yugoslavia, constituting the largest amount of deployed troops since the U.S. intervention 
in Congo). See generally Soong, supra note 252, at 364 (discussing how Taiwan's imminent admission 
to the GATT may provide the island with an indirect route to some form of UN presence). 
320 See Ostrowski, supra note 313, at 796 (arguing that preventive deployment should be undertaken 
only with the consent of all parties to the conflict and when if it is closely linked to achievable political 
or humanitarian goals.); see also Christine Gray, THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND MILITARY OPERATIONS: HOST-STATE CONSENT AND UNITED 
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN YUGOSLAVIA, 7 Duke J. Compo & Int'l L. 241, 243-9(1996) 
(discussing issue of whether consent of all parties is needed or consent of only the host government is 
needed for deployment of UN troops). 
321 See Nanda, et aI., supra note 158, at 837-40 (discussing Yugoslavia's historical struggle in failing to 
SUcceed as a political community and always being forced to compete with its subsidiary national 
communities); see also James C. O'Brien, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR VIOLATIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 87 A.lI. L. 639, 640(1993) 
(explaining the role of the Security Council in response to the ethnic cleansing and other violations of 
human rights); see also Weller, supra note 196, at 579 (explaining the historical setting of the dispute in 
Yugoslavia and how it represents a direct threat to international peace and security). 
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and hundreds of thousands became homeless. 322 In response to the request for 
deployment of UN peace-keeping forces from the new de Jacto Bosnia-Herzegovina 
government, the UN established the United Nations Protection Force (hereinafter 
"UNPROFOR") in order to operate "preventive deployment" within the territory of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.323 The UN collective military presence in Bosnia to deter the 
Serbian aggressIOn proves that the consent could be obtained from the de Jacto 
government on whose territory the "preventive deployment" is to take place.324 
As a matter of fact, the "preventive deployment" for the resolution of conflicts 
arising from self-determination movements has been applied not only to the external 
situation, but also to the internal condition.325 For example, the Kurds in Northern 
322 See Nanda, et a!., supra note 158, at 837 (discussing the dispute in former Yugoslavia and how it 
had a huge toll in human life and property damage captured the attention of the world); see also 
O'Brien, supra note 321, at 639 (discussing the atrocities undertaken during the fighting in the former 
Yugoslavia, including the abuse of women, inhumane detention facilities, indiscriminate targeting of 
defenseless civilians, forced expulsions and deportations, and the obstruction of relief convoys); see 
also A. Mark Weisburd, THE EMPTINESS OF THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS, AS 
ILLUSTRATED BY THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 17 Mich. J. InCI L. 1, 6-7(1995) 
(suggesting that the death tolls for all the contending parties in Bosnia were likely in the 25,000-60,000 
range, representing 0.5%-1.5% of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
323 See Yasushi Akashi, THE USE OF FORCE IN A UNITED NATIONS PEACE-MAKING 
OPERATION: LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE SAFE AREAS MANDATE, 19 Fordham Int'l L. J. 
312, 312(1995) (stating that at the height of its deployment, UNPROFOR was the largest, most 
complex, and most expensive peace-keeping operation in the United Nations' history, with personnel 
numbered some 45,000 and an annual budget close to US$ 2 billion); see also Weller, supra note 198, 
at 585 (1992) (discussing the composition and history of the creation of the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR)). 
324 See Gray, supra note 320, at 249-50 (stating that in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in 
Yugoslavia, consent for deployment of troops was supposed to be attained by the contributing states on 
the recommendation of the Secretary-General after consultation with the Yugoslav parties, but mostly 
took place in private). See generally Akashi, supra note 323, at 313 ("For peace-keeping operations to 
be successful, they must be based on the consent and cooperation of the parties in conflict. "); see also 
Ostrowski, supra note 313, at 796 (discussing the idea of preventive deployment within the framework 
of political consent). 
325 See Kolodner, supra note 69, at 163-64 (analyzing the distinctions between internal and external 
self-determination movements of various nations); Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 460 
(questioning whether the Post World War II peace treaties between China and Taiwan constituted 
violations of Taiwan's self-determination movement). See generally Kolodner, supra note 69, at 166 
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Iraq sought political autonomy following the Gulf war in March 1991.326 As a result 
:f) of inhuman repression by the Iraqi army, there was a massive flow of refugees toward 
and across international frontiers, which threatened international peace and security in 
the region.327 In consideration of requests from Turkey and France, as well as the 
report on the human rights situation III Iraq by the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, the UN Security Council conducted a collective 
military intervention in Northern Iraq under the unified command of the United States 
to deter the repression by the Iraqi army and to deliver humanitarian assistance.328 
§ 2-29 China's Complaint to the UN Security Council 
It IS apparent that if the need and feasibility of protecting humanitarian 
("Promoted within a myriad of international instruments, principles of self-determination have become 
embedded within international law. "). 
326 See Leslie A. Benton & Glenn T. Ware, HAITI: A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE AND THE EFFICACY OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
CRISIS, 12 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 851, 917-8(1998) (discussing how the Kurdish rebellion against 
Saddam Hussein was quashed by the more powerful Hussein); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, 
REGULATING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE 21 st CENTURY: THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE 
OF STATE AUTONOMY, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 473, 484-6(1997) ("At the end of February 1991, 
as the fighting to liberate Kuwait was ending, the Kurds of northern Iraq began a rebellion against the 
Iraqi government, apparently either to secede from Iraq or at least to establish an autonomous Kurdish 
region. "). See generally O'Connell, supra note 319, at 903 (noting the Kurd rebellion against the Iraqi 
government caught the UN off guard). 
327 See Benton & Ware, supra note 326, at 917-18 (discussing the resettlement of the Kurdish refugees 
who had fled into southern Turkey); see also Jon E. Fink, FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT: THE BLURRING OF THE MANDATE FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN 
MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, 19 Md. 1. Int'l L. & Trade 1, 1(1995) 
(discussing how the passing of Resolution 688 pointed to the threat to international peace and security 
which emanated from the transboundary impact of a mass exodus of refugees into other states); see 
also O'Connell, supra note 319, at 907 (stating that the United States sent its troops to place camps for 
the refugees inside Iraq and tried to defend the refugees from Iraqi attack). 
328 
See S.c. Res. 688, UN SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., UN Doc. SIRes/688 (1991); see also Benton 
& Ware, supra note 326, at 917-18 (stating that the main primary focus of UN launched Operation 
Provide Comfort was humanitarian, not military). See generally O'Connell, supra note 319, at 906 
(noting the UN decided not to interfere with Iraq's political internal affairs by helping the Kurds secede 
or re-arrange Iraq, but rather only interfered by providing humanitarian assistance, such as food, water, 
and shelter). 
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imperatives and maintaining international peace and security can be proved, a 
.1' proportional military intervention by the world community in response to an armed 
conflict caused by a non-colonial self-determination movement will be considered as 
a necessary measure. 329 This is especially relevant to the fact that the PRC, without 
membership in the UN, complained to the President of the UN Security Council that 
the US Seventh Fleet Battle Groups' movement towards the Taiwan Strait and 
contingents of the US Air Force in Taiwan were a direct aggressive action, and that 
the Security Council should take the immediate measures to ensure complete 
withdrawal of US forces. 33o 
Accordingly, the Security Council adopted a resolution to accept this complaint 
from the PRC and invite a representative of the PRC Government to attend the 
meeting of the Council held during the discussion of the issue of an armed invasion of 
329 See Fink, supra note 327 (discussing how the humanitarian aspects of the UN assistance present the 
UN with new challenges to its foundational principles of sovereignty and non-intervention); see also 
Gavin A. Symes, FORCE WITHOUT LAW: SEEKING A LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
SEPTEMBER 1996 U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 581, 581(1998) 
(describing the justifications of the State Department supporting military intervention in Iraq in order to 
protect U.S. national security, to contain an Iraqi threat to neighboring countries, to enforce general 
norms of international law, and to protect Kurdish human rights). See generally Mahalingam, supra 
note 95, at 224 (recognizing historical ambivalence and tension with respect to the legitimacy of 
unilateral intervention, but general support for collective intervention). 
330 See Joyner, supra note 78, at 822 (explaining how diplomatic situation became extremely tense 
When the United States sent a fleet of sixteen warships to the Taiwan Strait in response to PRC's firing 
live missiles offshore Taiwan in retaliation for US-Taiwan talks in mid-1995); see also Warren I. Cohen, 
One China Plus One Taiwan Equals Trouble, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 15, 1995, at 19 
(stating that the PRC has found its relationship with the US too valuable to jeopardize over the Taiwan 
issue); see also James Lilley, THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND TAIWAN: A FUTURE WITH 
HOPE, 32 New. Eng. L. Rev. 743, 743(1998) (discussing how U.S. assurances concerning Taiwan's 
security after the Mutual Defense Treaty had been terminated were "given teeth" when the U.S. sent 
two carrier battle groups off the east coast of Taiwan in response to Chinese missile shots). 
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Taiwan declared by the PRC.33 ! The Council held that this action was based on its 
duty to investigate any situation likely to lead to international friction or endanger 
international peace and security.332 Thus, the PRC was recognized as having the 
entitlement to request the UN Security Council to take measures necessary for the 
restoration of international peace and security.333 
The presence of the UN preventive deployment in the cases of northern Iraq and 
Bosnia and the complaint by the PRC to the UN Security Council concerning the 
armed invasion of Taiwan by the US have created salient and persuasive precedents 
for Taiwan to apply for preventative deployment if it is ever under an armed attack by 
rt China.334 Based on the foregoing, it is definite that a request by Taiwan for a 
331 See Fu, supra note 259, at 329 (presenting different reasons as to why PRC would launch a military 
attack against Taiwan); see, e.g., Chris Ajemian, THE 1997 U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE GUIDELINES 
UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY, 7 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y 323, 344 (1998) (discussing the March 1996 incident, when China 
staged military exercises in the Taiwan Straits in a dramatic show of force, as a response to Taiwan's 
presidential message that reunification with China was uncertain). See generally Joyner, supra note 78, 
at 832 (discussing both China and Taiwan's geo-strategic interests in the framework of each nation's 
military strengths and weaknesses). 
332 See, e.g., Jonathan Broder, Israel, Jordan Come Step Nearer To Peace Talks, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 
1987, at 4 (discussing the participation of the five United Nations Security Council members in the 
process of international peace and security); see also Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. May Back 
International Talks ifIsrael Stymies Vote Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,1989, at 1-16 (explaining the UN's 
plan for calling an international peace conference due to frictions between rival states). See generally 
O'Connell, supra note 319, at 904 (liThe Security Council may take action only to maintain 
international peace and security. "). 
333 See Bruce Fein, Rethinking Veto Power at the UN, WASH. TIMES, December 12, 1990, at G3 
(liThe PRC, not the Soviet Union, is thus the likely bete noire of the Security Council in the future "). 
See generally John Metzler, Give Taiwan a Voice at the UN, WASH. TIMES, October 28, 1996, at A17 
(discussing China's strong influence in the UN by being a part of the Security Council since 1945); see 
also John J. Metzler, The Year of the Rat, WASH. TIMES, March 11, 1996, at A-19 (discussing the 
PRC's mission of trying to work through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to solve the 
Taiwanese crisis in an attempt to keep the issue away from the UN Security Council). 
334 See Coffey, KEYNOTE ADDRESS: RULE OF LAW AND REGIONAL CONFLICT, 19 Whittier 
L. Rev. 257, 260(1997) (discussing the importance of preventive diplomacy being institutionalized on 
the multilateral level.); see, e.g., Scott Keefer, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS, 6 Ilsa J. Int'l & Compo L. 107, 108(1999) (discussing the production of preventive 
measures against biological warfare, including biological disaster training for first response medical 
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preventive deployment in order to deter a deteriorating situation should be justified by 
the international community if China attacks Taiwan to oppose the self-detennination 
movement. 335 
VI. THE FORCIBLE INTEGRATION AND THE ENTITLEMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
As mentioned earlier, the successful political refonns in the 80s and 90s that 
resulted III full self-governance by the people of Taiwan led to a trend toward 
Taiwanization at the same time.336 Consequently, the inhabitants of Taiwan began to 
question the fundamental assumption of Chinese nationalism that the Chinese elite 
has held for decades. 33? Since the political division of the Chinese state in 1949, there 
personnel and stockpiling of antibiotics). See generally Sucharipa- Behrmann & Franck, supra note 313, 
at 485-86 (explaining how preventive diplomacy has become emphasized in the UN and in the 
international arena in the Post-Cold War Era). 
335 See Ostrowski, supra note 313, at 794-95 (emphasizing the new international propensity towards 
taking preventive deployment measures); see, e.g., Lilley, supra note 330, at 749 (liThe U.S., on the 
Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia, must steadfastly stand behind only peaceful means to 
resolve disputes. "); see also Carolan, supra note 229, at 467 (discussing the vital role of international 
law in acting as a resource in not only conflict resolution but conflict prevention). 
336 See John Marks, Taiwanization of SDI Allows the Dialogue to Continue, L.A. TIMES, December 
20, 1987, at 5 (providing an alternative defmition to the concept of "Taiwanization"); see also Lena H. 
Sun, Taiwan Election May Reflect Emerging Pride of a People: Opposition Turning Today's Vote into 
'Taiwanization' Referendum, WASH. POST, December 21, 1991, at A16 (explaining that the movement 
for "Taiwanization" began a decade ago and is indicative in Taiwan's electoral process). See generally 
Voting in Taiwan is a Sign of Gains, N.Y. TIMES, December 5, 1983, at 7 (explaining "Taiwanization" 
as bringing more native Taiwanese, who comprise 85 percent of the island's 18.5 million people, into 
positions of responsibility in the government and the ruling party). 
337 See Sunny Goh, Why China is So Testy with the West, STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), April 4, 
1999, at 31 (stating that a storm of protests broke out not only in the mainland, but also among Chinese 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan as well); see also Teresa Poole, Humiliating History Feeds an Obsession 
with Race--Hong Kong Handover, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Jan. 3, 1997, at 10 (discussing how 
Chinese nationalism is still a powerful mobilizing force). See generally Che-Fu Lee, CHINA'S 
PERCEPTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 695,697(1998) (questioning whether 
a peaceful reunification could be achieved by merely relying on age-old Chinese nationalism). 
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has been no linkage between Taiwan and China and the population of Taiwan has 
developed a strong sense of self-identity belonging to its own society.338 Although 
having been educated in Chinese politics through the political ideology that Taiwan 
should be part of China, the people of Taiwan generally do not identify themselves 
with China on an emotional level. 339 Meanwhile, the steady economic growth in the 
past two decades (due to free market principles and the increase in foreign trade) have 
given rise to the explicit desire for asserting Taiwanese interests economically.34o In 
fact, the vast majority of the population of Taiwan has already identified itself as 
Taiwanese rather than Chinese in arguing that: 
338 See Carolan, supra note 229, at 431 (discussing the history of Taiwan as showing that, while 
ethnically and culturally Taiwan may be said to be Chinese, the force of events has set the island and 
the mainland on different paths, providing a rationale for their current, continued separation); see also 
Daniel c.K. Chow, RECOGNIZING THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF THE RECOGNITION 
PROBLEM: THE ADVANTAGES OF TAIWAN'S DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATIES, 14 Stan. Envtl. LJ. 256, 283 (1995) (stating that Taiwan 
adamantly refuses to submit to China's governmental authority); see also Zaid, supra note 235, at 808 
(stating that recently, Taiwan has sought to stake out a position separate and distinct from that of 
China). 
339 See Chung Huang, One China Based on Fiction, ATL. J. CONST., March 14, 2000, at 16A 
(recognizing that today Taiwan is a nation of 22 million free people who identify themselves as 
Taiwanese, not Chinese); see also Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Chinese, Taiwanese See a Reunion 
Through Diverging Lenses, BOST. GLOBE, May 20, 2000, at A2 (citing the statement of a Taiwanese 
graduate student who regards Chinese not as brothers, but as enemies); Frank Langfitt, Ocean of 
Difference Lie Across Taiwan Strait--Island Splits Over Chinese Heritage, BALT. SUN, August 25, 
1999, at lA (recognizing that although the terms are not mutually exclusive, more and more identify 
themselves as "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese" in public polls). 
340 S . 
ee MIchael S. Bennett, UNLEASHING A TIGER: FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN TAIWAN, 
11 UCLA Pac. Basin. L. J. 1, 5(1992) (discussing the small manufacturing companies that fuel 
Taiwan's export-driven economy that comprise eighty-five percent of the island's industrial sector); see 
also Lawrence L.c. Lee, INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STANDARDS FOR THE CHINESE ECONOMIC AREA: THE CHALLENGE FOR CHINA, HONG 
KONG, AND TAIWAN, 20 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1, 17(1999) (stating that the growth of Taiwan's 
financial market has evolved from Taiwan's stable economic environment during the past decades and 
how Taiwan's impressive economic performance stimulated the development of its financial sectors); 
see also Shin-Yi Peng, ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: A 
REVIEW OF TAIWAN'S "GO SOUTH" POLICY, 16 Wis. Int'l L. J. 639, 647(1998) (noting Taiwan's 
cOmmitment to strengthen its economic ties with the other countries of this region and how, over the 
past 30 years, it has achieved the status of a dynamic region for economic growth). 
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"Chinese is a cultural or ethnic category, not a political category; the 
Taiwanese nation is not the same as the Chinese nation; Taiwanese 
are not Chinese, just as Americans are not British.,,341 
§ 2-30 Taiwanese Self-Identification 
Resulting from decades of China-ization policy from the 1940s to the 1970s, it 
cannot be ignored that there are some forms of shared identities between Taiwan and 
China in terms of ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity and linguistic unity.342 
However, the indigenous population of Taiwan does not desire to be identified as 
Chinese people and lacks the consciousness of being a Chinese people.343 On the 
contrary, they would like to enhance their own political destiny and develop a 
distinctive economic, social, and cultural system of their own.344 In essence, the 
341 See Keith B. Richburg, Modem Taiwan Looks Inward for New National Identity, WASH. POST, 
June 11, 1995, at A26 (recognizing the significance of deciding on a national identity); see also Two 
Views of Monetary Park's Bilingual Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1991 at 3 (stating that a substantial 
number (at least 50%) of "Chinese-Americans" prefer to be designated as "Taiwanese- Americans" 
instead and went to considerable pains to ensure that this classification won official recognition in the 
1990 Census); see, e.g., Letters to the Editor, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., April 7, 1996 at 6 (stating the 
vast majority of those calling themselves "Taiwanese" are direct descendants of ethnic Chinese who 
moved to the island starting in the seventh century and the only true Taiwanese are the aborigines 
whose culture and civilization have existed on Taiwan since prehistory). 
342 See id., Two Views of Monetary Park's Bilingual Dispute (stating that a substantial number (at least 
50%) of "Chinese-Americans" prefer to be designated as "Taiwanese-Americans" instead and went to 
considerable pains to ensure that this classification won official recognition in the 1990 Census). 
343 See Reunification, DET. NEWS, August 29,1999 at A18 (citing Chen, who with every threat China 
makes against Taiwan, states "I am Taiwanese, not Chinese. "); see also Julie Schmit, Despite 
Unification Dreams, Taiwan, China Worlds Apart Rich, Busy Island Forges Own Identity, USA 
TODAY, August 26, 1999, at lOA (stating that 46% of Taiwan residents identified themselves as strictly 
Taiwanese). See generally Survey Says Taiwanese Identity on the Increase, CHINA NEWS, May 20, 
1998 (finding that the number of those who still consider themselves "Chinese" has dropped to a record 
low, while the number identifying themselves as "Taiwanese" has surged compared to previous polls). 
344 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 473 (discussing Taiwan's right of self-determination and 
the substantial ways in which their socioeconomic system and culture differ substantially from that of 
the mainland); see also Bulldozers Demolish 44 South Military Village, CHINA NEWS, May 5, 1999 
(stating the Taipei City Government decided to restore part of Taiwan's first military village and tum it 
into a Military Cultural Village); Poll- Economic Outlook Grim, CHINA NEWS, February 22, 1999 
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overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese people do not desire to be a part of China 
and prefer to be characterized as a people existing on their own identity -
Taiwanese. 345 
These factors mentioned above are relevant to the reason why, regardless of the 
constant threats of force which they face from China, most Taiwanese still favor the 
status quo of continued autonomy rather than immediate reunification with China that 
remains under a dictatorship.346 Indeed, the achievement of democracy and 
prosperity in Taiwan has dramatically evolved into a new Taiwan value that could in 
tum have an influence on Chinese nationalism.347 This evolution suggests that the 
growing identification with Taiwanese nationalism by the indigenous population of 
(placing blame on barriers to developing their own systems on international economic factors and 
unsound systems). 
345 See Valerie Epps, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE TAIWAN/CHINA CONTEX, 32 New Eng. 
L. Rev. 685, 692( 1998) (citing a recent poll in Taiwan, which said that if given the choice of gaining 
independence, maintaining the status quo or achieving unification, the majority opted for status quo); 
see also Fu, supra note 259, at 348 (stating that Taiwanese independence would operate against the 
wishes of the majority of Taiwanese resident who wish to maintain their de facto independence from 
China). 
346 See id., Epps(stating that Taiwanese independence would operate against the wishes of the majority 
of Taiwanese resident who wish to maintain their de facto independence from China); see also James 
Harding, Taiwanese Rulers Boosted in Elections, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 7, 1998, at A3 
(asserting that the gap between the DPP and the KMT over the relationship with China has narrowed in 
recent years around a consensus in favor of the status quo--Taiwan's de facto independence); see also 
Wire Reports, Taiwan Taking 'Dangerous Steps,' China Warns--President Lee Accused of Seeking 
Independence, BALT. SUN, July 14, 1999, at 16A (stating that most Taiwanese favor the status quo of 
de facto independence from China). 
347 See Robert Dole, The Challenges To Peace And Prosperity in Asia, TRADEWINDS, Sep. 8, 1997, 
at Business (recognizing that Taiwan's growing prosperity gives "unassailable testimony to the power 
of free markets to free any people from the circumstances of their birth"); see also Graham Hutchings, 
Wind of Change Sends Shudders Through the Corridors of Power in Beijing Defiance of China by the 
Voters of Taiwan Has Opened a New Political Era, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Mar. 20, 2000, 
at 9 (stating democracy in Taiwan has involved an affirmation of "Taiwaneseness" and greater 
separation from the mainland in everything but trade and investment); also see Terence Tan, Why 
China's Leaders Fear Full Democracy, THE STRAITS TlMES (SINGAPORE), Sep. 17,2000, at 23 
(stating that Beijing thinks democracy will lead to the break-up of the country and threaten eventual 
reunification with Taiwan, says a Chinese scholar). 
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Taiwan would unambiguously create a new nationhood transcending the Chinese 
. l' 348 natlOna Ism. 
Nationalism is not synonymous with shared cultural, ethnic, linguistic identities, 
but with the sentiments of self-identity to be a groUp.349 As Prof. Dr. P'eng Ming-min 
suggested: 
"[T]he most fundamental basis of the modem state is not ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic heritage but a sense of commonality - having 
the same destiny regardless of the ethnic identity. This is the most 
fundamental aspect of modem nationality, not one's ethnic group, 
but a common destiny. Even if different ethnic groups are together, 
people can be of the same nation because they share a common 
destiny. But without it, even if the people are of the same ethnic 
348 See Maurice Meisner, China: The Volatile Ties With Taiwan--The Historical Basis For A Free 
Taiwan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000, at 1 (discussing the future of Taiwan and how Chinese 
nationalism, at a minimum, demands "one China," including Taiwan.); see also Taiwan Should Finance 
China Movement, CHINA NEWS, Dec. 29, 1998, at News (recognizing that because of the lack of 
freedom and democracy in China, Taiwan must be more cautious in its dealings and endorsed Taiwan's 
so-called "Go Slow, Be Patient" policy while recognizing the island's political and economic 
development during the past 50 years); see also Lee Issues National Day Address, CHINA NEWS, Oct. 
10, 1998, at News (citing President Lee Teng-hui issued a congratulatory message saying that Taiwan 
has completed its "quiet revolution" and has won worldwide acclaim because of its active promotion of 
constitutional reform, democracy and rule oflaw). 
349 See generally Sarah Clift, How Canada's Identity Is Tied to Kosovo's War, TORONTO STAR, May 
10, 1999, at News (stating there are no general values to which the nationalist subscribes--all cultural, 
linguistic, or historical values are, for him, dictated by that which they are not); Pankaj Mishra, India 
Needs More Than Muscle to Attain Greatness, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 20, 2000 at 37 
(discussing how the Hindu nationalists remain attached to a stem 19th-century idea of nationalism, 
Which dilutes traditional social and cultural diversity and replaces it with one people, one culture and 
one language). See id., The author discusses how Hindu nationalists remain attached to a stem 
19th-century idea of nationalism, which dilutes traditional social and cultural diversity and replaces it 
with one people, one culture and one language. 
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group, they cannot have that commonality.,,35o 
§ 2-31 Taiwan's qualification as a People for Purpose of Self-Determination 
Concerning the definition of the term "people" for the right to self-determination, 
territorial connection and common economic life would indeed be critical criteria for 
identifying a people for purposes of self-determination. 351 Accordingly, this 
contemplates the facts that: 1) the vast majority of the inhabitants of Taiwan prefer to 
be characterized as a people with the term "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese"; 2) the 
vast majority of the inhabitants of Taiwan have the consciousness of being a people 
with the term "Taiwanese"; 3) the inhabitants of Taiwan have their own common 
economic life differing from that of the people of mainland China; 4) the inhabitants 
of Taiwan are indigenous to a territory under the control of the government by their 
free choice not by China's authority; 5) The population of Taiwan is a large and 
complete society with a population of over twenty-two million. There is no doubt that 
350 See generally Kevin Baxter, Around the Dial; Radio; New Frontiers; After Helping Foster 
Spanish-Language Market, Libennan Adds Chinese, Vietnamese Programs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
1997, at 22 (discussing commonalties, including culture and the commonality of religion); Times Poll 
On American Jews, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at 4 (discussing commonalties, including culture and 
the commonality of religion); see also Wilson, supra note 93, at 438 (recognizing that certain groups of 
people languages, religions, cultures and other characteristics -- gender, occupation, political ideology, 
Sporting activity, and so on and that ethnic group identity becomes intensely important and exclusive). 
351 See Ioms, supra note 86, at 288 (noting that, in the context of self-determination, the ordinary 
meaning of "people" relates to "a specific type of human community sharing a common desire to 
establish an entity in order to ensure a common future."); see also Lloyd, supra note 95, at 434 
(discussing how the problem of identifying or designating the "peoples" to whom the right to 
self-determination has accrued still remains). See generally Jill C. Watson, SELF-DETERMINATION 
OF PEOPLES AND POLITIES, 86 Am. Soc'y lnt'l L. Proc. 369, 393(1992) (stating that 
self-determination is not simply dependent on the choice of the indigenous people but also on more 
precise criteria tied to the underlying purposes served by the right). 
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the inhabitants of Taiwan are a distinct people from the Chinese people. 352 
VII. COMMENTARY 
In the discussion above, it has been shown that the concept "all peoples have the 
right to self-determination" in international law refers to the colonial context. The 
internal aspect of self-determination has not been recognized as an accepted universal 
right, but as a principle that the world community is not necessarily obliged to provide 
its responsibility or recognition in response.353 Whether or not a particular group is 
entitled to self-determination, it should be judged by an international process on a 
case-by-case basis. However, at least, it IS clear that any aggressIOn against 
self-determination movement is regarded as a most senous and dangerous form of 
illegal measure. 
352 See Chang & Lim, supra note 231, at 428 (concluding that the international community is largely 
uninformed about Taiwan's democratic changes and the UN membership aspirations of its 21 million 
people); see also Shen, supra note 69, at 1127 (stating that there are about 21 million permanent 
residents in the province of Taiwan). See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, RECOGNIZING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF THE RECOGNITION PROBLEM: THE ADVANTAGES OF 
TAIWAN'S DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
TREATIES, 14 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 256, 264(stating that Taiwan illustrates the costs of the Asian 
economic "miracle" and now among the wealthiest nations in the world, Taiwan has achieved its 
success, today with twenty-one million people crowding the small island). 
353 See Kathleen Cavanaugh, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OR INTERNAL 
SELF-DETERMINATION? SELF-DETERMINATION, GROUP ACCOMODATION, AND THE 
BELFAST AGREEMENT, 22 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1345,1347(1999) (stating that "[s]elf-determination 
is essentially a right of peoples .... It is peoples as such which are entitled to the right to 
self-determination"); see also Hill, supra note 209, at 126 (noting that the 1970 Declaration extends the 
right of self- determination beyond the realm of traditional colonial domination and recognizes that in 
some situations groups suffering oppression within an independent state may have the right to seek 
self-determination). See generally James A.R. Nafziger, THE USE OF FORCE IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA: SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A 
COMMUNITY OF POWER, 20 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 9, 167(1991) (stating that by the international 
Community supporting movements for internal self-determination, it can potentially avoid the 
disruption that often accompanies movements for external self- determination). 
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§ 2-32 The Problem of Maintaining the One-China Principle 
In essence, the principle of self-determination itself does not provide a right 
which automatically attaches to whoever claims it.354 As mentioned above, it IS 
always judged by the international community on a case-by-case basis. In that regard, 
if Taipei is less ambiguous on its alleged "one-China" policy so that the international 
community is convinced that, without territorial connection and common economic 
life, both Taiwan and China do not share a common destiny, it is thus not necessary 
for Taiwan to become a part of China. Otherwise, it would be harder for Taipei to gain 
significant recognition for its self-determination movement. 355 This is because the 
one-China principle has created international confusion, gIVmg a misleading 
impression that there is no need for the people of Taiwan to implement the external 
self-determination on the unwarranted assumption that Taiwan is part of China and 
that this is acceptable to the people of Taiwan.356 
354 See Ryser, supra note 130, at 154 (recognizing the principle of self-determination as unique in that 
it is a recognized collective right within the realm of international law); see also Simpson, supra note 
75, at 285 (stating that the reserve domain of sovereign states no longer automatically includes an 
exclusive right to deal with the internal claims of its peoples to self-determination). See generally Iorns, 
Supra note 86, at 345 (discussing the characteristics associated with the term self-determination). 
355 See Clinton China Trip Fuels The Fears: Foreign Relations By Laura Tyson: There Are Concerns 
That The U.S. Is Carrying Out a Secret Dialogue With the Mainland, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 
Oct. 12, 1999, at 2 (citing Mr. Yang who stated "Taiwan can only take the moral approach that we are a 
democracy now, and as such we should be entitled to self-determination"); see also Joseph S. Nye Jr., A 
Taiwan Deal, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at C07 (discussing a three-part package could 
preserve these freedoms in Taiwan while reducing the significant risks in the present circumstances). 
See generally Edward A. Gargan, Taiwan Pushes to Rebuild Its Position in Global Community, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 1994, at 8 (stating that in promoting its claims for renewed international recognition, 
Taiwan has trumpeted its democratic politics, its free markets and its growing economic influence, 
fueled by Taiwan's substantial investments in the region). 
356 
See Chen, supra note 228, at 227 (stating that the world community must recognize its 
responsibility to uphold basic tenets of international law and both challenge and resist China's coercive 
tactics aimed at denying Taiwan recognition as a sovereign nation-state); see also Shen, supra note 72, 
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Even though the indigenous population of Taiwan is qualified as a people in the 
self-determination context, considering China's possible aggressIOn against the 
Taiwan's separatist movement that would absolutely affect the regional peace and 
security, politically, it is foreseeable that the world community will not readily respect 
the exercise of self-determination by the people of Taiwan as regards the external 
aspect. 357 In this regard, the implication is that any move by the Taiwanese people 
toward external self-determination would be subject to political negotiation between 
Taipei and Beijing.358 Thus, the key to mobilizing the right of the Taiwanese people 
to external self-determination is to find an effective procedure under the agreement 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.359 Moreover, as Taiwan is already a 
at 1139 (discussing that the international community recognizes the persistent Chinese position that, 
throughout history, Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China); Cabinet Holds Mainland Meeting, 
CHINA NEWS, Nov. 3, 1998, at News (stating that both sides of the strait are equally deserving of 
respect without one excluding the other). 
357 See Chen, supra note 228, at 227 (stating that the world community must recognize its 
responsibility to uphold basic tenets of international law and both challenge and resist China's coercive 
tactics aimed at denying Taiwan recognition as a sovereign nation-state); see also Shen, supra note 72, 
at 1139 (discussing reasons why the international community sees Taiwan as a part of Taiwan). 
358 See Ching Cheong, Is China and Taiwan Headed For War? Look Up This Checklist, STRAITS 
TIMES (SINGAPORE), Aug. 21, 2000, at 45 (stating that the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies 
(CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies that runs this project hopes to identify both 
trends and incidents that could bring Beijing, Taipei and Washington into a war situation and find ways 
to avoid such a crisis); see also Tozzi, supra note 233, at 1243 (discussing the detailed 1994 White 
Paper revisions made to the Republic of China's traditional "One China" policy); see also Linda 
Jakobson, The Taiwan That Beijing Doesn't Want To See, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 12, 2000, at 
B01 (stating that the question of Taiwanese national identity evokes excruciating anxiety in the 
People's Republic of China, spelled out in a white paper issued by the Communist government last 
month discussing Beijing's and Taipei). 
359 See Chen, supra note 78, at 676 (stating that in reality, Taiwan has existed as a sovereign, 
independent country for more than forty years and that the question today is whether to recognize 
Taiwan as an independent state in name, as well as in fact); see also Michael J. Kelly, POLITICAL 
DOWNSIZING: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE MOVEMENT 
TOWARD SMALLER, ETHNICALLY HOMOGENOUS STATES, 47 Drake L. Rev. 209, 226(1999) 
(discussing external self-determination and how most countries recognize the People's Republic of 
China over Taiwan). See generally BOOK NOTES: The New GATT: Implications For The United 
States, Edited By Susan M. Collins And Barry P. Bosworth. Washington, D.C., 28 Gw. J. Int'l L. & 
Eeon. 753, 753 (1995) (discussing Taiwan's economic growth and the difference between external and 
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popular and independent regime separated from Communist China totally, there is no 
need for the Taiwanese people to rush to exerCIse the external self-determination 
regarding Taiwan's political status. 
§ 2-33 The Ripe Time to Exercise the Right to External Self-Determination 
However, if Beijing carries out a forcible integration of Taiwan by claiming the 
area to be an integral part of its territory (as was the case in the Moroccan occupation 
of Western Sahara as well as the Indonesian occupation of East Timor), there is no 
doubt that the implication of the right to external self-determination of the Taiwanese 
people subjected to China's military occupation will become "ripe" to gather an 
international momentum. 360 Any hostile military action by China would be identified 
as an act of aggression against the will of the Taiwanese people and armed conflict 
would affect the maintenance of international peace and security. 361 Under this 
situation, it is quite predictable that to affirm the right of the Taiwanese people to 
internal self-determination). 
360 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 495 (discussing the 1940s and 50s relationship between 
Beijing and Taiwan saying that the peace treaties that placed the island's population under Beijing's 
control would violate the doctrine of self-determination, at least as it later came to be understood); see 
also Lee, supra note 265, at 695 (discussing Beijing's use of military threat against Taiwan). See 
generally Chang & Lim, supra note 251, at 424 (stating that it was the pro-independence DPP that first 
argued for Taiwan's pursuit of de jure independence, if not an end to the KMT's own "One China" 
policy, to counter Beijing's alarming diplomatic isolation tactics against the island). 
361 See Kiyotaka Shibasaki, G-8 Calls For Global Partnership Digital Divide, GMO Threat, Armed 
Conflicts Highlighted, THE DAILY YOMIURI (TOKYO), July 24, 2000, at 1 (emphasizing the need to 
nurture a "culture of prevention" to prevent armed conflicts from breaking out around the world 
relating it to Taiwan and China as well as other areas); see also Felix Soh, Bad News: Tension In N.E. 
Asia, Good News: Dialogues Going On THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), June 14, 1996, at 4 
(stating that the greatest threats to the security of Asia are the cross-strait tension between China and 
Taiwan). Compare War Games, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 13, 1996, at B6 (stating that no one 
seriously expects China to attack Taiwan, but Taiwan's delicate position in international relations 
allows room for alarums and excursions at China's will). 
138 
external self-determination under international process will serve as a satisfactory 
resolution of international conflict between Taiwan and China. The recent case of 
Kosovo has especially set the precedent that even a domestic ethnic conflict cannot be 
resolved by forcible means because it would engage international responsibility.362 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
With impressive political transformation and economIC growth, the people of 
Taiwan deserve the right to form their own political entity even though they live 
beside China which is undoubtedly a more powerful nation that considers the issue 
differently. 363 Now, it is conceivable that the principle of non-colonial 
self-determination could be more generally accepted by the international community 
(as in the case of former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union). The people of 
362 See Mertus, supra note 155, at 1743 (discussing how international policymakers were 
overwhelmingly aware that the pressure in Kosovo was mounting and that an even greater human 
rights disaster loomed near). See generally Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: 
REVIEWING THE LAWFULNESS OF NATO'S USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND 
KOSOVO, 23 Maryland. J. Int'l L. & Trade 295 (1999) (discussing NATO's role in the Kosovo crisis 
and the support of the international community); see also William Drozdiak, Nato Will Send 20,000 
More Troops To Balkans--Leaders Won't Rule Out Kosovo Invasion If Mediation Fails, THE PLAIN 
DEALER, May 26, 1999, at lA (stating that NATO allies approved plans to send more than 20,000 
additional troops to Macedonia and Albania as part of a peacekeeping force that will await orders to 
move into Kosovo and help ethnic Albanian refugees return to their homeland). 
363 See Eva Chen, DGBAS Will Not Revise Upward Taiwan's Annual Economic Growth: Official, 
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Taiwan), Apr. 26, 2000, at News (stating that economic growth in 
Taiwan will be supported by robust foreign trade, rosy domestic consumption and increasing private 
investment, according to officials of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research). See generally 
Herman Pan and Angel Liu, IMF Says Taiwan's Economic Growth Will Reach 4.9% In 1998, 
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Taiwan), Dec. 22, 1998, at News (stating that Taiwan's economic 
growth wi111ikely reach 4.9 percent in 1998, the third highest of 28 developed countries); Taiwan 
Economic Growth Was Fifth-Highest In World In Past 11 Years, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 
Mar. 16, 1997, at Financial Pages (noting Taiwan's rate of economic growth as the world's fifth-highest 
in the past 11 years but has begun to slow down). 
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Taiwan should deserve an equal chance for determining their own future. Therefore, 
the international community should pave a way for the Taiwanese people, so that the 
Taiwanese people could achieve what they desire rather than what the authorities of 
Beijing plan for them. 
§ 2-34 Not an Outcome of Independence 
As noted above, self-determination is not an outcome of independence but it is a 
process to present the legitimate will and aspirations of the people. Regarding the 
specific situation of Taiwan, the world community need not withhold its affirmative 
response to Taiwan's self-determination movement until an armed conflict occurs. On 
the contrary, the world community needs to explicitly declare the necessity of an 
international process to prevent the potential conflict of Taiwan's self-determination 
movement and recognize the right of the Taiwanese people to self-determination. To 
cooperate with this external aspect of self-determination in Taiwan would be more 
likely to contribute to a satisfactory solution. A commitment would also reconcile the 
divergent opinions on Taiwan's status between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait if 
there existed a well-defined procedure for exercising a choice that can be adopted 
through negotiation, commitment, or agreement by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Since self-determination itself is not an answer but an ongoing process, the feasibility 
of a potential outcome cannot be confined to the level of the 
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"independence-reunification" dichotomy. 364 If the way of implementing 
self-determination is based on the will of the Taiwanese people, the free choice of the 
people of Taiwan should be respected and recognized internationally whether or not it 
is for an independent state. 
364 See Cavanaugh, supra note 353 ("[sJelf-determination is essentially a right of peoples .... It is 
peoples as such which are entitled to the right to self-determination"); see also Hill, supra note 209, at 
126 (stating that the 1970 Declaration extends the right of self-determination beyond the realm of 
traditional colonial domination and recognizes that in some groups suffering oppression within an 
independent state may have the right to seek self- determination). See generally Nafziger, supra note 
~53 (stating that by the international community supporting movements for internal self-determination, 
It can potentially avoid the disruption that often accompanies movements for external 
self-determination) . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MODERN CONCEPT OF STATE 
,t SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD AND RECOGNITION: A CASE 
STUDY OF TAIWAN 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1 i h century, first in Europe and then elsewhere, the concept of state 
sovereignty has led to the emergence of the territorial state. Despite the persistence of 
ethnic and religious identities, the notion of the territorial state emerged as the basic 
unit of social organization that presumably was responsible at least for order, justice 
and prosperity within a state's boundary. As the term "territorial state" refers to a 
governing system for a specific territory with a stable population and a functional 
government, the emergence of the territorial state was accompanied by the notion that 
a state was sovereign.365 
§ 3-1 Territorial State & State Sovereignty 
Accordingly, the sovereignty of all social groupmgs within a state's 
boundaries was legally subordinated to the sovereignty of the state. This was the 
position at the earliest stages of development of the concept of state sovereignty. 
Since then, state sovereignty has become an idea that has come to be widely accepted 
as the ultimate authority to make policy within a state's borders. Sovereignty is 
therefore deemed to enhance the power of those persons making up the government 
that represents the state. Some pertinent questions arise: What is the legal foundation 
of sovereignty? Does it reside in a state or a nation? If the territorial state was 
365 See Thomas G. Weiss, Devid P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS, Westview Press, 1997, ppA-9. 
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sovereign within its boundaries, is there no outside power over the state? 
The concept of state sovereignty is a topical issue. Decolonization in the 1950s 
and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union366 and the former Yugoslavia367 in the 
1990s resulted in the birth of numerous states in the world. Apart from the issue of 
state sovereignty, the confusing notion of the multinational state is another salient 
question that is being raised around the world today. Especially, in the aftermath of 
World War II, divided states such as former West and East Germany, South and North 
Korea, and the case of China (the Republic of China and the People's Republic of 
China) have made it complicated to define the notion of the multinational state. This 
is because some of them possibly may make claims to being independent states. 
366 The definitive stages of the break-up of the former Soviet Union began with the failed coup by 
hard-line Communists in August 1991 that sparked declarations of independence from all of the 
republics of the former Soviet Union except Russia and Kazakhstan. In the midst of these declarations 
of independence, the Soviet Government formally recognized the independence of the Baltic States of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on September 6, 1991. 
but attempted to keep the other twelve republics together in a Union of Sovereign States with both the 
Union and the individual republics maintaining international personalities. As a result of a referendum, 
affirmed by 90% of the vote that doomed the Union Treaty at the outset, the Republics of Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia formally declared that the Soviet Union had disintegrated and announced the 
formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. By December of 1991, all of the republics 
except Georgia had agreed to membership in the Commonwealth. See generally Urs W. Saxer, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: FROM A SOCIALIST FEDERATION TO A 
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES, 14 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 581, 670 ( 1992); 
see also Paul R. Williams, THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA: DO THEY CONTINUE 
IN FORCE?, 23 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1, 3(1994). 
367 See id., Paul R. Williams, THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF 
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA: DO THEY 
CONTINUE IN FORCE?, at 4-6.See also Svetozar Stojanovic, THE DESTRUCTION OF 
YUGOSLAVIA, 19 Fordham Int'l L. J. 337, 358(1995) (discussing that the secessions from Yugoslavia 
was viewed as self determination movements); see also Gideon A. Moor, Note, THE REPUBLIC OF 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND ARTICLE 51: INHERENT RIGHTS AND UNEMT 
RESPONSIBILITIES, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 870,873-4(1995) (discussing the fall of communism in 
1989, the changing face of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and the nationalist self-determination 
movement). See generally John Tagliabue, CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, 
at A6 (describing political successors in Yugoslavia as former communists who evoke old national 
aspirations as a way of casting off that which originally gave rise to communism). 
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Taiwan is a typical example of that. 
The situation in Taiwan presents a very different international law problem at 
the outset because two governments on each side of the Taiwan Strait are involved, 
one in Beijing and the other in Taipei, both of which are simultaneously claiming 
sovereignty over Taiwan. While there is a strong argument that Taiwan should be 
regarded as a sovereign state in international law, most countries still do not feel 
comfortable to regard Taiwan as a state. 
In view of this environment that reflects the issue that if Taiwan is a state, it 
has to be a sovereign equal with other states (including China) regardless of its actual 
power. Dose state sovereignty become an idea that guarantees Taiwan's status 
internationally? International law must deal with the issue of coming into being of a 
state. As is the case with Taiwan, this further leads to another important issue: the 
need for international law to make the contemporary connection between the concept 
of "state sovereignty" and the concept of "statehood." In this respect, what basis 
would there be for regarding Taiwan as a sovereign state under international law? 
Considering that the word "sovereignty" is used in a variety of shapes and sizes, 
should we draw a further distinction between a legal sovereign and a political 
sovereign? As a practical matter, particularly in the European Community/Union,368 
368 The European Union (hereinafter "EU") was set up after the 2nd World War. The process of 
European integration was launched in 1950 when France officially proposed to create the first concrete 
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we can assess, with regard to the concept "state sovereignty," whether the reciprocal 
benefit that is derived from the correlative restriction upon the power of another state 
makes the loss of one's power acceptable. 
§ 3-2 Territorial Dispute Settlement 
Since the Middle East Peace treaty of 1979369 and the Panama Canal Treaty 
of 1977,370 there has been no negotiated settlement of a major territorial dispute 
involving sovereignty issues other than the 1997 Hong Kong mode1.371 Under that 
foundation of a European federation. Six countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands) joined from the very beginning. Today, after four waves of accessions (1973: 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; 1981: Greece; 1986: Spain and Portugal; 1995: Austria, 
Finland and Sweden) the EU has 15 Member States and is preparing for the accession of 13 eastern and 
southern European countries. For detail, see the EU website (www.europa.eu.intlabc-en.htrn). 
369 See generally JillAllison Weiner, ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE OSLO ACCORDS, 23 
Fordham Int'l L.J. 230(1999); see also David R. Karasik, SECURING THE PEACE DIVIDEND IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST: AMENDING GATT ARTICLE XXIV TO ALLOW SECTORAL 
PREFERENCES IN FREE TRADE AREAS, 18 Mich. 1. Int'l L. 527, 564 n.2(1997) (As of January 1, 
1997, several significant peace agreements have been signed between Israel and the Arabs. See Treaty 
of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Mar. 26, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 362; 
Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 
I.L.M. 43; Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles On Interim 
Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993,32 I.L.M. 1525). 
370 See Panama Canal Treaty, United States-Panama, 193 Stat. 4521, 33 U.S.T. 39, T.I.A.S. No. 
10030 (signed Sept. 7, 1977; entered into force Oct. 1, 1979); see also Ruth Wedgwood, THE USE OF 
ARMED FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: SELF-DEFENSE AND THE PANAMA 
INVASION, 29 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 609, 627, n.2(1991) (The Panama Canal Treaty recognizes 
Panamanian sovereignty over the former Canal Zone, but allows the Panama Canal Commission, a U.S. 
government corporation, to continue operating the Canal itself until the year 2000, subject to 
requirements of paying at least $10 million annually to Panama in toll revenues, increasing Panamanian 
employment in operating the Carral, and having a Panamanian Administrator for the Canal Commission 
as of January 1, 1990. In the year 2000 and after, the new legal regime of a Permanent Neutrality 
Treaty will govern the Canal. The Canal is to be a neutral international waterway operated by Panama, 
and as of that date only Panama may "maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations 
within its national territory." The United States retains the right to "defend the Canal against any 
aggression or threat against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal. "). 
37i In 19th century, Great Britain acquired Hong Kong from China pursuant to three treaties, which are 
(1) the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, which ceded Hong Kong Island and some adjacent territory in 
perpetuity to Great Britain; (2) the 1860 Convention of Beijing, which ceded Stone-Cutters Island and 
a portion of Kowloon Peninsula in perpetuity to Great Britain; (3) the 1898 Convention of Beijing, 
which leased the rest of Kowloon and the New Territories to Great Britain for 99 years. The two 
treaties of the 1842 Treaty of Nanking as well as the 1869 Convention of Beijing account for the 
cession of an area of about 8 percent of the total area of what is now Hong Kong, and the 1898 
Convention of Beijing accounts an area of about 92 percent of the total area of what is now Hong Kong. 
In 1984, the United Kingdom concluded a joint declaration with the People's Republic of China to 
relinquish its claim of enforceable legal right to Hong Kong and Kowloon (Hereinafter: "Hong Kong"), 
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model, the governments of the United Kingdom (hereinafter "UK") and the People's 
Republic of China (hereinafter "PRC") signed a joint declaration in 1984, which was 
ratified III 1985, to decide the future status of Hong Kong beyond 1997. That 
arrangement holds unmense value as a peaceful solution to a major territorial 
dispute.372 Indeed, the 1997 Hong Kong handover was the focus of international 
attention because the idea of "one country two systems" 373 that it promoted was 
bold and unprecedented. In considering the Hong Kong model that provides one 
option for dealing with the problem of disputed territories under international law, 
extensive debates have taken place regarding the issue of whether that model is a 
workable model for settlement of other territorial disputes. There are also debates on 
the feasibility of applying the Hong Kong model to Taiwan. Would the status of 
Taiwan also be that of a special administrative region under which Taiwan could be 
reunified with mainland China? 
Regardless of whether Taiwan can be regarded as a sovereign state, the change 
or resolution of the status of Taiwan could occur in a number of ways. For example, it 
and transfer its full authority over Hong Kong to PRC after 1997. The issue of the "Hong Kong 
model" will be discussed later in part V of this chapter. 
372 See Kevin M. Harris, THE HONG KONG ACCORD AS A MODEL FOR DEALING WITH 
OTHER DISPUTED TERRITORIES, 80 Am. Soc'y Int'! L. Proc. 348, 352(1986). 
373 On China's resumption of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong becomes a special administrative 
region, that should be directly under the authority of the Central Government of China. Yet, Hong 
Kong can enjoy a high degree of autonomy except in foreign affairs and defense matters, which are the 
responsibility of the central government. That is, Hong Kong can retain the status of a free port, a 
separate customs territory, and an international fmancial center. The status of Hong Kong, a 
quasi-autonomous entity of a semi-Capitalist nature within the framework of a Socialist polity, is what 
has been called "one country two systems." Issues related to the "one country two systems" concept 
will be discussed later in part V of this chapter. 
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could take the fonn of a forcible re-integration of Taiwan into Beijing's political 
system through the military prowess of Beijing authority. It could also result from the 
ability of Taipei authority to continue to expand its international influence and 
eventually request support for independence from other states. Yet another option may 
be to pursue Taiwan's reunification with China on a similar "one country two 
systems" basis as Hong Kong. 
§ 3-3 Statehood Doctrine & Recognition Practice 
The international community has accorded official recognition to the PRC as the 
sole legitimate government for representing the whole of China. At the same time, and 
in spite of that, most countries maintain unofficial trade, political and cultural 
relations with Taiwan as though Taiwan were a sovereign state. 374 While the 
recognition of Taiwan as the Republic of China (a divided state of China) continues to 
draw tremendous attention on the grounds that international practices of according 
recognition are the main detenninants of whether the effect of recognition on 
statehood is turned by recognizing states. In this respect, how we should deal with the 
extent of implied recognition to a satisfactory resolution of the relationship so that it 
can benefit and improve Taiwan's legal status would be a critical point to the future of 
Taiwan. Maybe it is difficult to evaluate this charge absolutely. But, at least, before 
374 See Tzu-Wen Lee, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON 
TAIWAN, 1 u.c.L.A. J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 351, 351(1996). 
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answenng questions related to the Taiwan's entitlement of a sovereIgn state as 
separated from Communist China, before doubts of the Taiwan's status can be 
entertained due to the lacks of recognition as a state by the majority of international 
community, it is essential to generate a legal analysis in a rather advanced way to 
systematize the effect of recognition on statehood. Only by going there, will we be 
able to have a better look at Taiwan's legal status through examining Taiwan's factual 
background. After all, there might have been some guidelines that indicate how the 
international community might react if Taiwan were to assert its independence either 
upon its own volition, or subsequent to a military incursion by Communist China. 
This is because, in the past and even today, there has been an attempt to reassure 
under international law that a state's sovereignty will continue to be guaranteed. 
As noted earlier, many doubts have been raised as to whether Taiwan already 
satisfies the criteria for statehood and therefore independence as a sovereign state, or 
something less than an independent state but an entity entitling it to a certain degree 
of international recognition. This issue involves not only the state sovereignty and 
statehood of Taiwan, but also borders on the issue of recognition. 
Primarily, the object of this chapter is to analyze the legal issues surrounding 
any attempt by Taiwan to move from its current status at the periphery and into the 
realm of independence, or in the alternative, an attempt by China to coerce Taiwan 
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into one China with the "one country two systems" policy. However, in doing so, the 
significant and practical issue of evolution of the concepts of "state sovereignty" 
regarding the "sovereign's sovereignty" and the "people's sovereignty" cannot be 
ignored here. 
This chapter starts with the issue of state sovereignty, which is covered in part 
II. The point here is to focus on the level of international law and explain the 
development of the concepts of state sovereignty and statehood. Thereafter, Part III 
discusses aspects related to recognition of a state and recognition of a government. 
This issue is discussed not only from a legal perspective, but also in terms of policy 
considerations and pragmatic imperative. The point is that the issue may tum more on 
states' practices than on legal considerations. Part IV of the chapter focuses on the 
current position of Taiwan and discusses the significant differences that exist between 
the authority in Beijing and the authority in Taipei regarding the view of Taiwan's 
status. After that, Part V will discusses issues relating to the "Hong Kong" or the "one 
country two systems" model, which is used by the PRC as a basis for the prospective 
reunification of Taiwan and mainland China, and then argue why this model remains 
inappropriate for Taiwan. This is because the positions of the governments on both 
sides of the Taiwan Straits with respect to the status of Taiwan are quite different from 
each other and it is really problematic whether a Socialist government like PRC can 
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govern such non-Socialist enclaves as Taiwan within its borders in the near future. 
Applying this analysis to the Taiwan context, Part VI turns to demonstrate some 
precedents of divided statehood such as Germany, Yemen and Korea so as to define 
the current position of Taiwan and its relation with China. By this logic, any decision 
regarding recognition of Taiwan vis-a-vis the Peoples' Republic of China, where the 
will of the people in Taiwan is involved, is a matter that should not be ignored. That is, 
any attempt at linking the international status of Taiwan without, at the same time, 
considering the will of the people of Taiwan would amount to an abuse of the 
principle of international law. 
II. THE MORDERN CONCEPTS OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATEHOOD 
§ 3-4 Definition of State Sovereignty 
The term "sovereignty" has had a long and varied history during which it has 
been defined in a variety of ways depending on the context and the objectives of those 
using the word. In the most significant doctrine of international law, state 
sovereignty itself means not simply the power of an independent state, but the 
ultimate authority of the state, which is absolute within its territory and equal in its 
relations with other sovereigns. Accordingly, sovereignty in this sense is important in 
that it is a relevant concept for describing the right of a state to freely exercise its 
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power within its territory, and the right of a state to exclude from its territory the 
exercise of power by any other state without any permission to do so. As such, the 
sovereign's will was the only one that was legally relevant. The power of sovereigns 
and their political authority must be respected, meaning that no outside rules and 
organizations are held to be superior to the state. The word "state" is closely linked to 
the word "nation." Since the notion of "nation" refers to any grouping of people as 
well as to the totality of persons governed by a state, nations and states are not the 
same. A nation is a people linked to a state. By definition, where there is a state there 
is a nation, but there may be several people within (or under) a state.375 
§ 3-5 The 1933 Montevideo Convention 
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States376 provides four requirements for de facto status as a State. These four 
requirements are: (1) the existence of a stable population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a 
functioning, governing government; and (4) the capacity to engage in foreign relations. 
From the view of international practice, it is understood that a political entity without 
statehood has no sovereignty and cannot enter into relations with other states. 
Moreover, the equal status with other states in the concept of state sovereignty is 
375 For example, in Switzerland, by definition there is the Swiss nation, but in reality there are four 
peoples linked to that state: the Swiss-German, the Swiss-French, the Swiss-Italians, and the 
Swiss-Rornanisch. 
376 See CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 
T.S. No. 881 (1933). 
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meaningful when the state deals with other states. 
In light of Dr. James Crawford's observation that legal title, or legitimacy, 
refers to a government's exclusive sovereignty and the legal right to govern a territory 
under international I aw, 377 sovereignty is an indispensable requirement for statehood. 
Notably, the power of a state is closely linked to its territory. It is possible that this 
territory came into acquisition by way of occupation, prescription, succeSSIOn or 
secession by the former sovereign of the territory.378 Judging the actual exercise of 
authority, the concept of territorial sovereignty limits the power of a state to exercise 
its authority within its borders. At this point, territory is the space within which the 
state can exercise absolute power and that separates one sovereign state from another. 
Governments act III the name of states to determine how to manage certain 
transnational issues. It is obvious that, by defining the use of territory, a sovereign 
state registers an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction whose boundaries were territorial 
under international law. 379 In this respect, one sovereign state cannot bind another to 
its law. Absent consent, a sovereign was immune from the jurisdiction of another. As 
Dr. Robert Lansing has noted:38o 
377 See James Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th ed., 1998), 
at 77. 
378 See id., see also Jianming Shen, SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, SELF-DETRMINATION, AND 
THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1132(2000). 
379 See David Kennedy, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: HISTORY 
OF AN ILLUSION, L. Rev. Ass. Quinnipiac C. L. (1997). 
380 See Robert Lansing, NOTE ON SOVEREIGNTY IN A STATE, I Am. J. Int'l L. 105, 124 (1907). 
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"It is an accepted principle of the law of nations that every state, 
whatever may be its population, power and resources, is the 
political equal of every other state, and that its sovereign is 
independent and supreme within the state. There is no such thing as 
degrees of sovereignty among states. " 
As the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction within its territory should be rooted in 
the effect of the sovereIgn state concerned, the consolidation of an absolute 
sovereignty would create a need for doctrines regarding the binding effects of treaties 
and custom. Accordingly, states have used their freedom to make policies to reduce 
their freedom. That is to say, international law is created by consensus of the states to 
restrain or limit their own power. 381 
§ 3-6 Non-Territorial Consideration of State Sovereignty 
As a result of improvement in communications and the development of the 
range and scale of international trade, states have become more interdependent, 
meaning that it is impossible to see how any state can live in a separate compartment 
without relations with one another. Hence, initial sovereignty, linked to territory, has 
381 There are three principal sources of international law, namely, international convention; 
international custom; and the general principles of law recognized by nations (See Statute of the Int'l 
Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993). These sources are all based on the self-limitation 
and self-regulation of states and the basis of international law is consent. Treaties or international 
conventions are most explicit on the consensus because they are signed by the contracting states. See 
Arthur M. Weisburd, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 
1205(1998); see also Y. Frank Chiang, STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN, 23 Fordham Int'l L. 
J. 959(2000). 
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been used to restrict that sovereignty by means of international managements acting 
primarily on the basis of non-territorial consideration. In this sense, international law 
must evolve a new pattern field of state sovereignty and in some instances because 
several states also highly value state sovereignty. For example, the United States has 
neither ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights nor accepted the 
Jurisdiction and authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. China, too, 
argues that only the state, not outside parties, can determine what is best for the 
Chinese people whether in the realm of security, human rights, or sustainable human 
development. 382 
As the peoples and states of the world become more interconnected today, there 
are demands for international treaties for effective international management, 
particularly those treaties that establish international organizations to promote and 
coordinate state endeavor III diverse fields, l.e., peace and security; economIC 
development and international finance. Hence, III the eyes of this progreSSIOn, a 
system of institutions must be linked to a consciousness of the methodology under 
international law and therefore, international law can become substantive, and deal 
directly with war and peace to avoid conflicts arising out of sovereign states. 
If there remained differences in the rules applicable in different parts of the 
382 See Thomas G. Weiss, Devid P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS, Westview Press, 1997, p.7. 
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world, it would be common III international legal literature to suggest that 
international law might be different in the various regions of the world and thus, there 
could be African, Asian, European or American international law. But, of course, there 
is but one international law, wherever two sovereigns are gathered in its name, and 
there can be only one government in a State, which represents the State and exercises 
its sole sovereign power. As a result, all sovereign states, in relations with one another, 
would be subject to the same international law. The very concept of international law 
requires that one State be separate from any other State, and by doing so, international 
law can enforce the boundaries between sovereign states and explains the 
expectations of one sovereign's absolute right for the behavior of another. 
§ 3-7 Declaration for the Purpose of Establishing a State 
In this respect, state sovereignty on this basis becomes not only a description of 
ultimate political discretion, but also a legal idea of independence. Indeed, it is law 
that provides a language to explain, ratify, and protect sovereignty which IS so 
essential for statehood.383 As noted above, to qualify as a sovereign state, a political 
entity that acquires the criteria for statehood does not become a state unless it declares 
that it is an independent sovereign state. This is derived from international custom that 
383 See "COMPULSORY PILOTAGE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EARLY PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TORTS" by Daniel Bederman, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1033 (1990) or 
"COMITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW "by Joel R. Paul" 32 Harv. Int'! L. J.l (1991). 
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a declaration of the establishment of a state is necessary to create a new state. 384 The 
process often used is a declaration of independence, such as the United States from 
England in 1776 and Belgium from the Netherlands in 1831. While discussing the 
historical evolution of the concept of "state sovereignty," both the American 
Revolution385 and the French Revolution386 are prominent examples of progression 
to the modem concept of state sovereignty that should be noted. Since then, to 
commence a subsequent democratic-government has turned to be a comprehensive 
way to confirm the modem concept of state sovereignty. That is to say, political 
legitimacy derives from popular support and governmental authority is based on the 
consent of the people in the territory. As Dr. Thomas G Weiss, Dr. David P. Forsythe 
and Dr. Roger A. Coate noted: "Governments are governed by states, states have 
governments, sovereignty is an attribute of states, but it is exercised by governments. 
What is frequently called national sovereignty is actually state sovereignty. Whether 
the persons of a nation are sovereign referred to whether the state derived its 
384 See generally Y. Frank Chiang, STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 
959, 972-4(2000) (noting that "there are two characteristics of a declaration of the establishment of a 
state. First, it is a claim of statehood. Second, it is an announcement to the international community that 
the entity is a state from the time of the declaration); see also, Kathryn M. Mckinney, THE LEGAL 
EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI-PLO DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES: STEPS TOWARD 
STATEHOOD FOR PALESTINE, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 93,124(1994) (noting that achieving the 
objective requirements of statehood will be closer to being met after the interim period if everything 
contemplated in the Declaration of Principles is actually accomplished). 
385 See generally Carlton FW. Larson, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A 225TH 
ANNIVERSARY REINTERPRETATION, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 701(2001). 
386 See generally Hurst Hannum, THE STATUS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 25 Ga. J. InCI & Compo L. 
287(1995). 
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legitimacy from popular will.,,387 
During a century beset by imperialism, colonialism and fascism, by the end of 
the Second World War, popular sovereignty was firmly rooted as one of the 
fundamental postulates of political legitimacy. With regard to this evolution, the 
United Nations Charter (hereinafter "UN Charter") has deemed it as one of the 
purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations between states, not on 
any terms, but based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples. 388 The significant statement in the UN Charter is of such universal value 
that it is expressed in a fundamental international constitutive legal document. 
§ 3-8 Popular Sovereignty 
In an effort to affirm the concept of popular sovereignty, the UN, the 
international lawmaking system, proceeded to prescribe criteria for appraising the 
conformity of internal governance with international standards of democracy.389 At 
present, international and regional organizational monitors use the international 
standard of democracy in observing critical national elections so as to ensure that they 
387 See Thomas G Weiss, Devid P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS, Westview Press, 1997, p.6 
388 See UN Charter, art. 1. (June 26, 1945) U.S.T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031. 
389 Evidently, the UN has adopted numerous resolutions to confirm the concept of popular sovereignty. 
For example, see DECLARATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 
AND ABUSE OF POWER, U.N. GA. Res. 40/34 (1985); CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, U.N. GA. 
Res. 39/46 (1984); DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE 
AND OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION OR BELIEF, U.N. GA. Res. 36/55 (1981); 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
WOMEN, U.N. GA. Res. 341180 (1979); INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE 
SuPPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF APARTHEID, U.N. GA. Res. 3068 
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are free and fair. For instance, a UN observation mISSIon for the verification of 
elections in Nicaragua (ONVNEN) was set up there in December of 1989 to observe 
and monitor the 1990 elections?90 As a matter of fact, it was during this period that 
the common will of the people served as evidence of popular sovereignty and became 
the basis for international endorsement of the elected government. A similar case is 
the UN observation mISSIOn III East Timor of 1999. Obviously, this effort, III 
functional terms, would lay the ground work for the international community to 
develop a type of inclusive international collective-recognition,391 harmonizing 
reciprocal differences among states. 
§ 3-9 People's Sovereignty vs. Sovereign's Sovereignty 
As mentioned above, in spite of the fact that sovereignty itself continues to be 
used differently due to the national legal culture and political influence, there is no 
doubt that the international law of value still protects state sovereignty as a "people's 
sovereignty" rather than a "sovereign's sovereignty.,,392 As sovereignty comes to be 
(1973). 
390 This international legal supervision of elections was designed to include an adequate period for 
candidacies to be developed and to allow campaigning, so that voters could make the informed choice 
that was at the center of free and fair elections. 
~l . ili See Ian Brownhe, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 96-8 (4 ed., 1990); see 
also P.K. Menon, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 51-4 (Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1994). The issue of collective recognition will be touched in the latter part of this paper. 
392 See W. Michael Reisman, SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 84 AMJIL 886,869 (1990) (noting that "[W]hat happens to sovereignty, in 
its modem sense, when it is not an outsider but some home-grown specialist in violence who seizes and 
purports to wield the authority of the government against the wishes of the people, by naked power, by 
putsch or by coup, by the usurpation of an election or by those systematic corruptions of the electoral 
process in which almost 100 percent of the electorate purportedly votes for the incumbent's list (often 
the only choice)? Such a seizer of power is not entitled to invoke the international legal term "national 
sovereignty" to establish or reinforce his own position in international politics."). 
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conceptualized more sharply, we find the theoretical disputes concernmg the 
distinctions between "people's sovereignty" and "sovereign'S sovereignty." This 
evolution in content of the term "state sovereignty" has also raised a new concern as 
to who can violate that sovereignty. The reality of the situation is that those who 
possess legal sovereignty may not always be able effectively to exercise their legal 
sovereignty. Rather, the effectiveness of legal sovereignty is dependent on the will of 
the people. That IS, international law IS concerned with the protection of state 
sovereignty. In the contemporary sense, the objective of protection is not the power 
base of the tyrant who rules directly by naked power or through the apparatus of a 
totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a population to freely 
express and effect choice about the identities and policies of its governors. It is also 
clear that popular sovereignty is violated when an outside force invades and imposes 
its will on the people. Such it was the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979393 or Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,394 for example. 
Going by the understanding of the economIC integration m the European 
Community, the underlying concern m relations between state sovereignty and 
393 Since Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United Nations had repeatedly criticized the 
Soviet presence and called for withdrawal by affIrming the principle that "the inalienable right of all 
peoples to determine their own future and to choose their own form of government free from outside 
interference. i.e., UN Doc. S/13729(1980); GARes. ES-6/2(Jan. 14, 1980). 
394 In response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait of 1990, the United Nations, for the second time in 
its history (the first time was in response to the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950), 
authorized the deployment of armed forces to stop an aggressor nation. By adopting numerous 
resolutions (i.e., the UN Security Council resolution 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, & 678), the UN 
condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared its annexation "illegal," as well as took all 
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membership of the fifteen states, to be sure, presents a matter that international law 
will develop by solidifying its cooperative machinery. Evidently, in the European 
Community, the comprehensive and persuasive example that states can accept major 
limitations of national power politically without at the same time losing their 
sovereign identity in a system of absolute territorial sovereignty is a good point that 
the consequence of a number of significant conceptual developments relating to the 
concepts of "state sovereignty" and "statehood" is clearly beneficial to the new 
value of the international legal system. In this case, the prospective emergence of a 
new regional society in the European Community is to expose a future possibility that, 
at least, state sovereignty which people appear to have in mind is no longer what it 
once was thought to be. What does matter is that states may, in consequence, have 
fewer powers and freedoms; in exchange, they may receive certain benefits at the 
same time. 
§ 3-10 Conceptual Development of State Sovereignty in the European Community 
Regardless of the fact that the right to use of force in support of the national 
interest other than by way of self-defense is deemed an important element in state 
sovereignty, the state has compromised its sovereignty resulting in an enhancement of 
security by the acceptance of a limitation on the right to resort to force when the state 
necessary steps to demand Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. 
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has accepted the duty to refrain from the use of force. 395 Much the same can be said, 
for example, for the variations according to the extent to which states are parties to 
human rights conventions, the members of a free trade area, a common market or 
otherwise find themselves III a situation, where by reason of some international 
obligation, their national freedom of action is severely curtailed. Again, regarding 
regional security and prosperity as a whole, to develop a modem state sovereignty of 
value in the functional views of globalization is just a matter of time. As Professor 
David Kennedy suggested, H[IJnternational law has taken us from coexistence to 
cooperation, and from autonomy to community.,,396 With regard to the evolution of 
the concepts of "state sovereignty" and "statehood," these must be seen largely as 
foreseeable-the state remains a sovereign state under international law and continues 
to be able to guide its future destiny within the limits that it has itself accepted. 
III. RECOGNITION OF A STATE AND RECOGNITION OF A GOVERNMENT: 
LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE 
When the emergence of a new state or the rise to power of a new government 
395 For instance, Iraq was subject to extensive measures of international investigation and supervision 
following its aggression against Kuwait and consequent UN action. Even the fact that Iraq continues to 
exist as a state with sovereignty, it had to agree that it would destroy all chemical and biological 
weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers, as well as nuclear weapons. 
The fulfillment of these obligations was supervised by a special international commission which can be 
regarded as a compromise of sovereignty. 
396 S . d 0 ee supra note 379, DavId Kenne y, INTERNATI NAL LAW AND THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY: HISTORY OF AN ILLUSION, L. Rev. Ass. Quinnipiac C. L.(1997) at 4. 
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I' 
within an existing state occurs, recognition may be accorded to the new state or the 
government. As recognition denotes the expression of the recognizer's willingness to 
accept both the fact of change and the legal consequences by recognizing the new 
state or government, it is certain that a political entity in question can improve its 
legal status and effectuate its relations with the recognizing world through recognition. 
In general, the issue of recognition is more of a political matter than a legal issue. 
Practically, recognition is an optional and political act, the recognizer may withdraw 
or repudiate its recognition based on its own national interest.397 Hence, the law of 
recognition is a highly politicized part of public international law. That is why the 
issue of recognition has not been resolved smoothly either in theory or in practice.398 
§ 3-11 Distinction between Recognition of a State and Recognition of a Government 
The term "recognition" imports two different components in legal doctrine and 
state practice. One aspect of it involves the "recognition of a state" and the other 
397 See supra note 381, Y. Frank Chiang, STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN, at 968-9. The 
author has different views regarding the issue of withdrawing or repudiating recognition (noting that 
"State recognition is different from recognizing a government. State recognition is recognition of 
another political entity as equal with the recognizing state, and signifies that the recognizing state is 
willing to enter into relations with the recognized state on equal footing. State recognition is permanent 
and cannot be withdrawn unless the recognized state becomes extinct. Government recognition is 
recognition by the recognizing state of a certain government as the legitimate representative of another 
state. This type of recognition may be withdrawn or repudiated. When a new state is just established, 
state recognition and government recognition occur simultaneously, and government recognition also 
implies state recognition."). 
398 See Hungdah Chiu, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION AND THE STATUS OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 3 1. Chinese L. 193, 195(1989) (noting that "[L]ike the question of 
identifying an entity as a state, the determination that a government can represent a particular state is 
left to the decision of the individual states of the international community through the system of 
recognition. Again, state practice indicates that such decisions are based primarily on policy 
considerations rather than legal principles.); see also Hersh Lauterpacht, RECOGNITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1947) (noting that "[A]ccording to what is probably still the predominant 
view in the literature of international law, recogniticn of States is not a matter governed by law but a 
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aspect relates to the "recognition of a government." There is a fundamental difference 
between them. It ts important to distinguish the two aspects of recognition. 
Recognition of a state is a statement that an entity in question will be treated by the 
recogntzer as a state with legal rights and duties prescribed by international law. 
Accordingly, the recognized state and the recognizing state should be regarded as an 
equal with each other. The issue of whether there is a duty of state recognition has 
been argued and no consensus has been reached yet. Regarding this debatable issue, 
in a deeper sense, the views expressed by Professors Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford 
Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit are instructive. According to the learned writers, 
"[t] here is no legal duty in this regard. However, if an entity bears the marks of 
statehood, other states put themselves at risk legally if they ignore the basic 
bl ' . J' t I' " 399 o IgatlOns oJ sta e re atlOns. The present thesis subscribes to the above view. 
Theoretically, the decision of whether to recognize an entity as a state may 
take into consideration, such factors as whether entity being recognized has effective 
control over a defined territory and stable population, an organized governmental 
administration, and the capacity to act effectively to maintain its international 
relations and to fulfill international obligations prescribed by the UN Charter.4oo In 
question of policy."). 
199 See Louis Henkin, Rechard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 3rd ed, (1993), at p. 255. 
400 See David O. Lloyd, Note SUCCESSION, SECESSION, AND STATE MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS, 26 NYU. J. Int'I L. & Pol. 761, 792(1994) (The recent practice of the United 
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essence, if an entity has met the criteria as mentioned above, it is in the interest of 
international relations for the international community to accommodate the entity and 
accord it recognition. 401 However, from a practical standpoint, the decision to 
recognize a state often depends on political policy rather than on the ability to meet 
the objective test as set under international law. 
The concept of recognition of a government is employed to indicate the position 
of the recognIzer III its relations with a government III question and treat the 
government as a legal entity for the state it represents. Generally, a decision as to 
whether to recognize an entity as a government may be based on such considerations 
as the consideration with the question of whether the entity is in fact in control of the 
government. From a legal perspective, the recognized entity, on obtaining its 
recognition, becomes an international person who can directly implicate international 
law on behalf of the State it represents. By this logic, when changes in governments 
occur, the new government succeeds in acting as the sole legal entity responsible for 
conducting the affairs of the state it represents in the international community. 
Recognition of a state IS not the same as recognition of its government. 
Nations has been to recognize secessionist entities when they have fulfilled two criteria: they must be 
"states" and they must be willing to abide by the U.N. Charter). 
401 See Johan D. Van Der Vyver, SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLES OF QUEBEC 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 1, 30(2000) (To recognize a political 
community as a State is to declare that it fulfills the conditions of statehood as required by international 
law. If these conditions are present, the existing States are under the duty to grant recognition); see also 
Alfred P. Rubin, RECOGNITION VS. REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, 32 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 669 (1998). 
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Recognizing a new state does not necessarily include recognition of its government, 
but normally it does. That is to say, "recognition of a state" and "recognition of its 
government" may occur at the same time when a new state is just established by a 
declared legitimate government. Such was the case of Israel, for example. In 1948, 
Israel was recognized as a new state by other states after it established statehood by 
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. 402 Another notable example of 
this is the recent case of East Timor. 
§ 3-12 Recognition of an Insurgency or a de (acto Government 
In most cases, there is only one government existing within a state. However, 
when a state is facing a rival change of government, quite possibly, there may be more 
than one contesting authority and each claims in turn to be the only effective 
government throughout the territory of the existing state it represents. Such was the 
case of the two governments of China. 
In such instances, considering the necessity of having relations with the rebels, 
recognition of an insurgency or a de facto government would possibly be given to the 
rebels by a third-party State if the rebellion grew in size and persisted. This type of 
recognition is only in relation to the status of an independent administering authority 
(called an insurgency or a de facto government), but not a legitimate government. It is 
402 See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3(1948). 
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understood that such an authority cannot be a subject of international law unless it 
represents the state "in the process of fonnation.,,403 Actually, the recognition 
decision here is based more on political preferences, rather than on legal criteria. 
Under this circumstance, the legitimate government would then be recognized as the 
de jure government of the state it represents, but the de jure government would be 
considered responsible only for acts perfonned in that part of the territory under its de 
facto contro1.404 
§ 3-13 Effective Control and Recognition of a Government 
By going with the assumption of the fact that there are two rival governments 
co-existing within a state, how a government comes to be competent to represent its 
state in international society becomes a critical issue when considering the state's right 
to participate in international affairs.405 Regarding the principle of the according of 
recognition on this issue, a notable example that can be cited here is that of the two 
governments of China (Nationalist China and Communist China). 
403 See Louis Henkin, Rechard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 3rd ed., (1993), at p. 271. 
404 Generally and simply speaking, a de jure government is one which should hold power but doesn't, a 
de facto government is one which does hold power but shouldn't. Prof. Dr. Maryan Green suggested 
that there would appear to be no difference between recognition de facto and de jure in international 
law so far as the legal consequences are concerned. See Maryan Green, INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 
38-9, (3 rd ed., 1987). 
405 Since recognition becomes an issue only when regimes come to power in ways contrary to the 
constitution, laws, or customs of the country in effect, this is a powerful argument against it. Though a 
legal succession can be interpreted to mean that the recognition granted to one government was handed 
to its successor along with the rest of its legitimate claim to power, the idea that origins should be 
treated as the fact that the unrecognized regime is in clear control of its state, given full legal effect if it 
regulates the activities of persons on its own territory. Regarding this point, see generally M.J. Peterson, 
"RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT BE ABOLISHED", 77 Am. 1. [nt'l L. 31 
(1983). 
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Before the 60s, despite the fact that Communist China had met the requirements 
of statehood, it was clear that the majority of the international community refused to 
recognize Communist China as the legitimate government for China internationally. 
Rather, Nationalist China was recognized as the legitimate government for China. 
This was regardless of the fact that Communist China had effective control over the 
Chinese territory of the mainland area and thus, this situation prompted a long debate 
at the UN as to which government (Nationalist China or Communist China) was 
entitled to represent China at the United Nations. Indeed, the question of China's seat 
at the United Nations was an issue of the representation matter and also a factual test 
of the criteria of "recognition of a government," which was to see what principle 
should be followed in choosing between the two rivals (Communist China and 
Nationalist China). 
Communist China's success, in 1971, in maintaining such a majority against 
seating delegates of Nationalist China in the UN General Assembly not just evidenced 
that a state may have only one legitimate government, but also implied that the 
withdrawal of recognition of Nationalist China as the legitimate government of China 
was because the ROC did not effectively control the mainland Chinese territory and 
therefore, Nationalist China was not entitled to represent the Chinese territory of the 
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mainland area.406 
As a matter of recognition in state practice, this has created a notable principle 
to us. That is, if recognition of a government is to perform the proper function of the 
State it represents, the recognition decision must be based on "whether the regime 
exercises effective control within the territory of the State it represents" and "whether 
the regime came to power by means of violating international law." If the regime 
came to power as a result of foreign imposition or a violation of international law, it is 
the duty of the international community to refuse to accord its recognition, as in the 
cases of Manchukuo's secession from China,407 and the Iraq's annexation claims to 
Kuwait. Similarly, the same rationale should equally apply to the case of Taiwan, if 
China forcibly annexes Taiwan. Also by this logic of the effective control theory, it is 
unacceptable for Communist China to seek recognition as a government representing 
Taiwan internationally, because Taiwan is not under Communist China's effective 
control at all. 
§ 3-14 Effect of Recognition on Statehood 
406For the resolution on presentation of China, see United Nations General Assembly, Oct. 25, 1971. 
G.A.Res. 2758, 26 GAOR Supp. 29 (a/8429), at 2. 
407In 1931, the League of Nations rejected Manchuria's declaration of independence from China due to 
Japan's involvement in Manchuria's secession. The author believes that recognition should be denied to 
regimes that are imposed by foreign intervention, base themselves on policies of racial discrimination, 
represent counterrevolutionary movements, or commit massive violations of human rights in the course 
of consolidating power. See M. Kelly Malone, THE RIGHTS OF NEWLY EMERGING 
DEMOCRATIC STATES PRIOR TO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THE 
SERBO-CROATION CONFLICT, 6 Temp. Int'l & Compo L.J. 81,85(1992) (members of the League of 
Nations refused to endorse Manchuria's claim to independence in 1931 because of Japan's involvement 
and continued presence in its liberation movement). 
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There are two dominant views on the effect of recognition.408 One school is the 
"constitutive theory" which regards recognition as indispensable to establishing the 
international legal personality of the state and competence of a government,409 the 
other school, the "declarative theory," rejects this the "constitutive theory,,410 instead 
taking the point that a new state exists prior to and independent of recognition. Under 
this declaratory view, a state may exist without being recognized. If it does exist in 
fact, whether or not it has been formally recognized by other states, it has a right to be 
treated as a state.411 The main function of recognition here is "to acknowledge the 
fact of the state's political existence and to declare the recognizing state's willingness 
408 See generally H. Lauterpacht, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (AMS Press 1978) at 
66-73; see also Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, (4th ed., 1990) at 
87-106; see also Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 255-75 (3rd ed. 1991); see also N. A. 
Maryan Green, INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 33-40(3rd ed., 1987); see also E. D. Brown, A MANUAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 55-62 (6th ed., 1976). 
409 See L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. II, (9th ed., 1992) at 109-13; see also id., Ian 
Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 88-9\. 
410Dr. James Crawford criticized the constitutive theory arguing that "it does not indicate the number of 
states required to recognize a new political entity before the latter become a state, it does not explain 
the character of the agreements signed by the new political entity with other states before it becomes a 
state neither." Cited in Y. Frank Chiang, STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TAIWAN, 23 Fordham Int'l L. 
1. 959, 1005 n.53(2000); see also, Thomas D. Grant, Review BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND 
DISORDER: A REVIEW OF JORRI C. DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES: SELF- DETERMINATION AND 
STATEHOOD, 12 Am. U. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 629, 685 n.94(1997) (noting that one of the criticisms 
commonly leveled against constitutivism is that it posits entities outside the protection of international 
law. If rights of statehood depend on recognition, the unrecognized entity lies open to abuse. The 
declaratory view seems more consistent with the contemporary emphasis on individual rights. The 
declaratory view reasons that even absent recognition, an entity--or at least the people inhabiting 
it--still enjoys the protections of international law). 
411 It is a widespread view taken by many scholars; See Louis Henkin, Richard C. Rough, Oscar 
Scharchter, & Hans Smit, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (3rd ed. 1993) at 244; Malcolm N. Shaw, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 243-7 (3 rd ed. 1991); James Brierly, THE LAW OF NATIONS, (6TH 1963), 
at 138-9; see also generally 1\.1. 1. Peterson, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL 
DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE (1815-1995), (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); see also 
Thomas D. Grant, Comment TERRITORIAL STATUS, RECOGNITION, AND STATEHOOD: SOME 
ASPECTS OF THE GENOCIDE CASE (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. YUGOSLAVIA), 33 
Stan. J. Int'l L. 305, 326( 1997) (The dominant view is that recognition does not create the state and is 
thus declaratory rather than constitutive). 
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, 
to treat the entity as an international person with the rights and obligations of a State." 
The different viewpoints on recognition have given rise to the discussion of 
whether an entity that fulfills the criteria for statehood is disqualified as a State merely 
because of the lack of recognition and whether the international community should 
recognize an entity that fulfills the criteria for statehood as a state.412 Although the 
declarative theory enjoys majority support, and both the Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States413 and the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States414 adopt this theory, the practice of some states does not absolutely 
412 See Jianming Shen, SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE 
ISSUE OF TAIWAN 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1124-5(2000) (Generally, a situation denied 
recognition, and the consequences directly flowing from it, will be treated by non-recognizing states as 
without international legal effect. Thus a non-recognized state will not be treated as a state, nor its 
government as a government of the state); see also David O. Lloyd, Note SUCCESSION, SECESSION, 
AND STATE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS, 26 N.Y.U. 1. Int'l L. & Pol. 761,764(1994) 
(The relationship between statehood and recognition is complex, and scholars have long debated on the 
declarative theory of statehood and the constitutive theory of statehood); See also Thomas D. Grant, 
BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND DISORDER: A REVIEW OF JORRI C. DUURSMA, 
FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES: SELF-
DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD, 12 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 629,678(1997) (The terms of 
the old debate--constitutive and declaratory--have been retained, though scholars are now less 
interested in the nature of recognition as a concept); see also Yasmin Abdullah, Note THE HOLY SEE 
AT UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES: STATE OR CHURCH?, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1835, 
195891996) (noting that [t]he debate between proponents of the constitutive and declaratory theories 
of state recognition ... question is whether a previously unrecognized entity becomes a state because it 
is recognized by other states as such, or whether it becomes a state because it has attained the factual 
indicia of statehood). 
413 See Matthew N. Bathon, THE ATYPICAL INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE HOLY SEE, 134 
Vand. 1. Transnat'l L. 597, 620(2001) (The four-part test set out in the Montevideo Convention, 
establishing objective criteria only, thus reflects the declarative theory of statehood). Moreover, the 
Montevideo Convention itself is generally accepted as reflecting the requirements of statehood at 
customary international law. See DJ. Harris, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, (5th ed., 1998), at 102. 
414 See Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, Cmt. a (3 rd ed. 1987). 
(Noting that "definition of state in Restatement is nearly identical to that in Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention."). See also United States Department of State Press Relations Office Notice, Nov. 1, 
1976, cited in Thomas D. Grant, DEFINING STATEHOOD: THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS37 Colum. 1. Transnat'1 L. 403, 415(1999) (The United States Department 
of State, for example, wrote in 1976: In [judging whether to recognize an entity as a state], the United 
States has traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These facts include effective control 
over a clearly defined territory and population; an organized governmental administration of that 
territory; and a capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and to fulfill international 
obligations ). 
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support the view that they have legal existence before recognition. 4lS The doctrine of 
non-recognition 416 in the late 1970s may certainly be in fact an acceptance of the 
constitutive theory. Actually, non-recognition of a particular regime is not necessarily 
a determination that the state represented by that regIme does not qualify for 
statehood, rather, it is always a part of a general policy of boycott and disapprova1. 417 
Although a state is not obligated to accord recognition to any other entity in 
question, the view that "a state may exist without being recognized and recognition is 
not a requirement for statehood" has been well supported by legal doctrine and state 
practice. As the Charter of Organization of American States provides: 418 "The 
political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States. Even 
before being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and 
independence, to provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently to 
organize itself as it sees jit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its 
services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise 
415 See Omar M. Dajani, STALLED BETWEEN SEASONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STATUS OF PALESTINE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD 26 Denv. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 27,81(1997) 
(noting that Lauterpacht attempts to reconcile the declaratory and constitutive approaches by 
suggesting that whilerecognition is "declaratory of facts," it is "constitutive ofrights." He reasons, "[a] 
State may exist as a physical fact. But it is a physical fact which is of no relevance for the 
commencement of particular international rights and duties until accompanied by recogniation). 
416 Regarding the legal consequences of non-recognition, Dr. Oppenheim pointed out that "generally a 
situation denied recognition, and the consequences directly flowing from it, will be treated by 
non-recognizing states as without international legal effect. Thus a non-recognized state will not ~e 
treated as a state, nor its government as a government of the state; and since the community or 
authority in question will thus not be treated as having the status or capacities of a state or government 
in international law. " See supra note 405, L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW at 199. 
417 See Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4TH ed., 1990. pp. 87-93. 
418 See THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES at art. 12,119 U.N.T.S. 
3 (1951). 
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of these rights is limited only by the exercise of the rights of other States in 
accordance with international law. " 
As mentioned above, since recognition is not a requirement for statehood under 
internationa11aw, the legal effects of recognition must be minimal in the international 
legal order. In this sense, recognition is only a declaratory act. Hence, by minimizing 
the effect of recognition, this work strongly believes that it would always be 
supported by legal doctrine and state practice that "a state may exist without being 
recognized. " 
§ 3-15 Implied Recognition 
In recent decades, multilateral conferences and intergovernmental organizations 
provided channels through such fields as commercial, economIC, humanitarian, 
technical, and various ad hoc contacts that have multiplied far beyond their numbers 
of a hundred years ago. Soon, technological matters, trade, the environment, and all 
manner of regulatory fields meant governments had to stay in more constant and more 
varied contact with one another. 
In most multilateral undertakings, considering matters regarding financial benefit 
or other humanitarian Issues with another entity that it does not recogmze, the 
international community might take it as a connection to pursue a wider variety of 
negotiations and have wider eligibility to conclude agreements. The fact is that a need 
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to maintain relations with other states has sometimes been interpreted as the unofficial 
term which is separated from the according of official recognition but close to the 
official recognition. However, the conclusion of a bilateral treaty regulating relations 
between the state and the unrecognized entity should be highly considered as the 
requisite intent for expressmg or implying the state's formal recognition of the 
unrecognized entity for the territories of the State it represented. This is because to 
conclude a bilateral treaty would serve as a basis of a de facto state for purposes of 
enforcing the unrecognized entity's rights and duties under international law in the 
state's relations with the unrecognized entity.419 
In fact, the growth of unofficial contacts among states for economic, technical, 
cultural, humanitarian, and other purposes has broadened the effect of the informal 
recognition. Although a state is not required to accord formal recognition to any other 
states, this kind of implied recognition has provided the unrecognized regime a good 
position to maintain its international functions. A notable example of this is Taiwan's 
informal relations with the international community, especially Taiwan's relations 
with the US.420 This visible tendency shows us that in the practice of recognition, the 
419 See Cheri L. Attix, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: ARE TAIWAN'S 
TRADING PARTNERS IMPLYING RECOGNITION OF TAIWANESE STATEHOOD?, 25 Cal. W. 
Int'l L.J. 357, 380(1994) (stating that due to the nature of the international legal system, in which 
sovereign states enjoy a high degree of freedom from imposed obligations, recognition is rarely implied. 
The exception to this general rule is the conclusion of a bilateral treaty regulating relations between the 
state and the new entity and/or the exchange of official representatives) 
420 Following its switch of official recognition from Taiwan to China, the US still maintains 
semi-official relations with Taiwan. The related issue will be discuss later in this chapter. 
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according of fonnal recognition seems less important than before.421 
§ 3-16 Collective Recognition & Recognition on Humanitarian Concern 
Membership In international organizations IS not necessary for detennining 
whether an entity has acquired the status of statehood, but it is an effective way of 
improving the international status of the unrecognized entity. This IS because, 
sometimes, membership in such organizations serves as an accommodation that the 
official recognition will be eventually accorded to the entity In question by the 
member states of the organizations.422 However, this is just a strong indication of 
their intention or position, rather than a binding act on the member states. In other 
words, each member state of the organization is free to decide whether or not to 
render its fonnal recognition to the unrecognized entity even though the entity has 
already been granted access to the organization with full membership. 
Going by the international practice, the recognition decisions would be put in a 
position where bilateral relations cannot always be kept separate from multilateral 
ones. From the widespread recognition In the 1990s and especially, the recent 
421 In general, declining to use recognition as a response to changes of government may have two 
grounds, one is resulting from doubts over effectiveness of a regime, the other one is resulting from 
political objections. 
422 See generally Angeline G. Chen, TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: CROSSING 
THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 223(1998); see also 
Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemner, THE ENDURING POLITICAL NATURE OF 
QUESTIONS OF STATE SUCCESSION AND SECESSION AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVE 
STANDARDS, 17 U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L. 753, 818(1996) (noting that under the constitutive theory of 
state succession, recognition of a new state effectively determines its rights and duties. It affects an 
emerging state's right to its predecessor's property and its right to be heard in courts within recognizing 
States. While a state seeks recognition, it also seeks admission to the United Nations and other 
international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank.). 
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admission into the UN of several European micro-states, we notice that many 
recognized entities may have not yet met certain criteria traditionally viewed as 
prerequisite to statehood.423 But, by so doing, it would give those entities access to 
foreign aid which may help them to consolidate the territory and enhance their 
legitimacy with the population.424 
It IS always true that the according of recognition IS never a guarantee of 
qualifying for the requirements to be a state, but importantly it creates a viable future 
on the attempted integration of international law and international relations. As with 
the question of recognition, greater integration of globalization does raise a serious 
issue of whether it is necessary today for a country simply to isolate a certain entity 
where there are no benefits of continuing any kind of relationship with the entity. The 
precedent of collective recognition within the European Union (hereinafter "EU") 
might gIve us some ideas to respond to the above Issue. In other words, the 
humanitarian concern is also a critical alternative for the recognizer while considering 
its recognition policy. The precedents surrounding the dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia III particular evidenced that recognition can be 
423 See David O. Lloyd. Note SUCCESSION, SECESSION, AND STATE MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS, 26 NYU. 1. Int'l L. & Pol. 761,791(1994) (noting that a secessionist entity, 
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose statehood is in doubt will still be promptly recognized if this is 
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Charter). 
424Concerned with increased claims for recognition in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s, the Member states of the European Community adopted the guidelines on the recognition 
of new states in eastern European and in the Soviet Union to respect those claims and to constitute the 
general criteria on the process of recognizing such new states. For the "DECLARATION ON THE 
GUIDELINES ON THE RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IN THE 
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decided by states together. Especially within the EU, governments endeavored to 
coordinate their recognition policy.425 There was no doubt that the concessions were 
not traditional but a new approach to the recognition decision. This was because they 
did not run to the traditional practice by considering the direct material benefit to the 
states offering recognition. Instead, they concerned themselves with minority rights, 
other human rights, and state succeSSIOns, especially with regard to financial 
obligations and duties under force reduction. This has created a new approach to the 
evolution of the modern concept of recognition. In a similar vein, Taiwan is very 
qualified to receive respect from the international community in receiving official 
recognition as a state, the state of Taiwan. With that, the people of Taiwan can receive 
greater benefit from the recognizing world. As a matter of fact, this is just the same 
humanitarian concern as the international community extended to those dissolved 
entities of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
IV. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT POSITION OF TAIWAN 
SOVIET UNION ", 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992), see supra note 415. 
425 Though collective discipline was not entirely maintained, the European governments repeatedly 
expressed the view that international law required it to be and that suggests a rule may be forming. See 
e.g., Declaration on the "GUIDELINES ON THE RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES IN EASTERN 
EUROPE AND IN THE SOVIET UNION," 31 1. L. M. 1485 (1992) (laying the foundation for 
self-determination with respect to former Communist Bloc countries who sought independence); see 
also Ruth Wedgwood, NATO'S KOSOVO INTERVENTION: NATO'S CAMPAIGN IN 
YUGOSLAVIA, 93 Am. 1. Int'l L. 828, 833 (1999) (discussing how the "Guidelines" make clear that 
political membership in the European- Atlantic community requires minimum guarantees for the rights 
of minority populations); see, e.g., Political Cooperation: EEC Moves to Recognize Georgia, 
EUROPEAN REPORT, March 25, 1992, at 13 (stating that Georgia has met the stated requirements in 
the Guideline on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and proceeded 
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A. The Nature of the Taiwan Issue: Some Factual Background 
In the 1 ih, 18t\ 19th centuries, Taiwan was under continuous colonial rule by 
the Portugese, the Dutch, and then the Japanese.426 The Dutch controlled the island 
of Taiwan until 1662 when Cheng Ch'eng-kung, a Ming loyalist and military leader, 
expelled them.427 In 1683, the Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty attacked Taiwan and claimed 
Taiwan as part of the Chinese Empire. The international community did not dispute 
China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan until the end of the Sino-Japanese war.428 
However, keeping a close eye on the relations between Taiwan and mainland China, 
some historical evidence taught us that Taiwan has not always been an integral part of 
China.429 For example, in 1874, in response to a legal claim brought by the Japanese, 
with recognition); see also, M. J. Peterson, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL 
DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE (1815-1995), at ch. 7. 
426 See Parris Chang, Kok-Ui Lim, TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 
UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 405(1997); See also Angeline G. Chen, TAIWAN'S 
INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: CROSSING THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES, 20 Loy. 
L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 223, 241(1998) (stating that theDutch, Portuguese, and Japanese settlers at 
various points in history maintained ports and colonies throughout Taiwan); See also Markus G. Puder, 
THE GRASS WILL NOT BE TRAMPLED BECAUSE THE TIGERS NEED NOT FIGHT--NEW 
THOUGHTS AND OLD PARADIGMS FOR DETENTE ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, 34 Vand. 
J. Transnat'l L. 481, 525 n.24(2001). 
427 See Jonathan I. Charney and J. R. V. Prescott, RESOLVING CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 453,454(2000); see also Parris Chang, Kok-Ui 
Lim, TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 
393,418(1997). 
428 See generally Seokwoo Lee, THE 1951 SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN AND 
THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA, 11 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 63 (2002). See Kwan 
Weng Kin, DESERTED ISLES AROUSED INTEREST ONLY AFTER REPORT OF OIL RESERVES, 
THE STRAITS TIMES, September 21, 1996, at 36 ("Taiwan [was] ceded to Japan as spoils of war 
through the Treaty of Shimonoseki after China's defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War."); see also 
Yoshio Nakagawa & Yomiuri Shimbun, TAIWAN'S COLONIAL LEGACY REVISITED, The Daily 
YOmiuri, May 7, 1995, at 5 (stating that Japan acquired Taiwan from China with the signing of the 
treaty at the end of the Sino-Japanese War); Xiao-huang Yin and Tsung Chi, IS US PLAYING THE 
TAIWAN CARD BY GRANTING ITS PRESIDENT A VISA?, Los Angeles TIMES, June 4, 1995, at 
M2 (stating that since the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty, Taiwan has been "lost" from China). 
429 
See Charney & Prescott, RESOLVING CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN 
AND CHINA, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 453, 456(2000) (stating that Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895); 
see also Chang & Lim, TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS' MEMBERSHIP, 1 UCLA J. Int'l 
L. & Foreign Aff. 393,429(1997) (asserting that while there may be civility between the two, there is 
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the Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty declared Taiwan to be outside of Chinese jurisdiction and 
refused to assume responsibility for the massacre of shipwrecked Japanese sailors 
killed by Taiwanese aborigines.43o Even in an interview regarding the issue of how 
Taiwanese people had to conform to Japanese ways, Mr. Mao Zedong, the former top 
leader of Communist China indicated that "[IJfthe Koreans wish to break away from 
the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their 
struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa (Taiwan).,,431 Taiwan 
had been formally occupied and colonized by Japan since the time when the Manchu 
Ch'ing Dynasty China was forced to surrender Taiwan "in perpetuity" to Japan under 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 after its defeat in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War. 432 
Consequently, and flowing from a deep sense of despair and indignation, the people 
of Taiwan made an attempt to take charge of their own political destiny leading to the 
establishment of the Taiwan Democratic Republic, the first democratic republic 
country in Asia. However, without any recognition or support from the international 
no strong pull to consider Taiwan as a part of China). See generally Piero Tozzi, NOTE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON TAIWAN: FULFILLING A CHINESE NOTION OF 
DEMOCRATIC SOVEREIGNTY?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1193, 1251 n.245(1995) (discussing the 
difficulty of forming strong identity in the middle of their "hodgepodge" history). 
430 This is called the event of Mu-Tan-Se, which is a famous incident in Taiwanese history. See John 
King Fairback, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY, (Harvard University Press, 1992); see also Walter Chen, 
HISTORY OF TAIWAN, (http://www.leksu.comlleksu-e.htrn). 
431 See Edgar Snow, RED STAR OVER CHINA, NY TIMES, Feb. 9,1968 at 106-13. 
432 See Treaty of Shimonoseki, Apr. 17, 1895, Japan-China, art. II, reprinted in TREATIES AND 
AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA 1894-1919, at 18-9 (John V.A. MacMurray ed., 
1973). Under the Shimonoseki Treaty, the residents of Taiwan were given the treaty right to relocate in 
China, however, the overwhelming majority chose to remain in Taiwan. See Christopher 1. Carolan, 
THE REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR A TAIWANESE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 75 NY u.L. Rev. 429, 432(2000). 
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community, the Taiwan Democratic Republic completely collapsed soon after the 
Japanese troops landed on Taiwan. 
§ 3-17 China's Occupying of Taiwan on Behalf of the Allied Powers 
During the Second World War, in anticipation of Japan's defeat in the war, the 
Allied Powers (including China, the United Kingdom and the United States), together 
in the 1943 Cairo Declaration expressed their intent to return Taiwan to China. Later, 
in the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation "the term of the Cairo Declaration" was once again 
affirmed by the Allied Powers. Following Japan's defeat, Nationalist China was 
authorized by General Douglas MacArthur to take over Taiwan on behalf of the Allied 
Powers in 1945. Four years later, by the latter part of 1949, Nationalist China lost the 
Chinese mainland because of its defeat in the civil war by Communist China and 
subsequently fled to Taiwan. 
Even though Nationalist China had taken control of Taiwan in 1945, it was not 
until 1951 that Japan formally surrendered sovereignty over Taiwan in the San 
Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan (hereinafter "the 1951 Peace Treaty,,).433 The 
treaty clearly indicated the terms of surrender of Japan,434 but neither Nationalist 
China nor Communist China was authorized to control Taiwan while Japan formally 
gave up its sovereignty over Taiwan in the treaty. The notable absence of 
433 See Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 UN.T.S. 46. 
434 The Article 2(b) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that "Japan renounces all right, title and 
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representatives from either side of the Taiwan Strait at the San Francisco Peace 
Conference435 gave rise to a controversy as to whether Taiwan's international status 
was still unresolved.436There is an obvious example of this: Mr. John Foster Dulles, 
Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, concluded that Taiwan's status 
was unsettled by saying that: 
[Tjechnical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has 
never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely 
involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these 
islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace 
treaty; nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded 
between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical 
status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different 
from the juridical status of the offshore islands [Quemoy and MatsuJ 
which have always been Chinese territory. 437 
claim to Formosa and Pescadore." (136 U.N.T.S. at 48). 
435 Neither the ROC nor the PRC was invited to join the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. 
More significantly, neither government concluded "the Treaty of Peace with Japan" which entered into 
force on April 8, 1952. 
436The UK Representative at the Conference for the Treaty of Peace with Japan concluded that "the 
Treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands (Taiwan and the Pescadore). In due course a 
solution must be found, in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations."(Dep't of State Pub. 4392, 1951). Some scholars therefore take the position that Taiwan's 
status is still unsettled, i.e., see generally Parris Chang & Kok-Ui Lim, TAIWAN'S CASE FOR 
UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 UCLA 1. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393(1997); but other scholars 
take the view that Taiwan's status is settled, i.e., Hungdah Chiu, THE ONE CHINA POLICY AND 
TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS, Vol. 52, No.2, the Law Monthly, Taipei(2001). 
437 See John Foster Dulles, PURPOSE OF TREATY WITH REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Dep't St. Bull., 
Dec. 13, 1954, at 896. 
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Officially both Britain and France also took the similar position that Nationalist 
China, authorized by General Douglas MacArthur, undertook temporarily military 
occupation of Taiwan as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers. In 1955, Mr. 
Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of 
Commons that 
[IJn September, the administration of Formosa was taken over from 
the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor 
did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements 
made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military 
occupation pending further arrangements and did not of themselves 
constitute territory Chinese ... [FJ ormosa and the Pescadores are 
therefore, in the view of Her Majesty s Government, territory the de 
jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined. 438 
In 1964, Mr. Georges Pompidou, French premier, reiterated that: " [FJrench 
recognition of the PRC on January 27, 1964 in no way explicitly or implicitly 
recognized Beijing s territorial claim over Taiwan, and the island s status must be 
438 See GREAT BRlTAIN, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE (Hansard), House of Commons, Official 
Report, vol. 536, col. 159(Feb. 4, 1955). Cited in J.P. Jain, THE LEGAL STATUS OF FORMOSA,57 
Am. 1. Int'l L. 25(1963); cited also in Majorie M. Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Vol. 3, 565, Washington, D.C.(1964); cited also in Gary Klintworth, TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL 
IDENTITY: 400 YEARS IN THE MELTING POT, 10 J.E. Asian Aff. 373, 383(1996). 
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decided on these days, taking the wish of the Formosa population into 
·d . ,,439 consl eratlOn. 
§ 3-18 Nationalist China Behaves Like a Colonial Master 
For more than three decades, from 1949 to 1987, Taiwan was placed under 
martial law, imposed by the Chinese Nationalist government, a minority government 
in Taiwan. During the period, politically and culturally, the way that Nationalist China 
treated the people of Taiwan was more like a colonial behavior.440 A notable example 
was the incident of2-28. A widespread uprising burst out on Feb. 28 of 1947, leading 
the Taiwanese public from expectation to disappointment and then to anger.441 
Regardless of the fact that the effective area of Nationalist China has been 
confined to Taiwan SInce 1949, the constitution of Nationalist China, which was 
drafted and ratified in mainland China, established a state called the "Republic of 
China," whose boundaries include the Chinese mainland and Outer Mongolia.442 
439 See SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TAIWAN IS SUGGESTED BY FRENCH PREMIER, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 24, 1964. 
440 An official report of U.S. State Department noted "[O]ur experience in Formosa is most 
enlightening. Many were forced to feel that conditions under autocratic rule [Japanese rule] were 
preferable [to KMT rule] ... The [Taiwanese people anticipated sincerely and enthusiastically 
deliverance from the Japanese yoke ... However, [the KMT] ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously 
imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population ... There were indications that Formosans 
would be receptive toward the United States guardianship and the United Nations trusteeship. See 
Dep't of State, U.S. Relations with China 309(1949). 
441See John F. Copper, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE?, at 35 (1996) (discussing the 
culmination of the "2-28 Incident" through the developing feelings of rebellion and resistance to KMT 
rule). In the 228 Incident, the Nationalist was not only unable to reflect on it or practice democracy in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of Taiwan, but instead, sent troops to cruelly suppress the 
resulting demonstration and make widespread arrests, leaving a deep scar in the history of Taiwan. For 
the reflection of the 2-28 Incident, see Ma Ying-Jeou, A REFLECTION UPON THE 2-28 INCIDENT, 
Feb. 28, 2002, Taipei Times. 
442 Under the ROC Constitution, which was written in 1946 and implemented in 1947, two years 
before the Nationalist China fled to Taiwan following a defeat in the Chinese civil war by the 
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This assumed that any territory that was once under China's rule, after the founding of 
, the ROC in 1912, should forever remain part of China, setting the stage for extremely 
confrontational relations politically that made both sides of the Taiwan Strait refuse to 
recognize the other as a legitimate government, but both firmly asserting that there 
was only one China and that Taiwan was at the same time part ofChina.443 
The PRe has continuously claimed its sovereignty over Taiwan and the ROC 
has never denied that Taiwan is part of China. This has not only made Taiwan's status 
more ambiguous,444 but has also confused the international community and the 
people of Taiwan as to whether Taiwan is an independent state. However, it was the 
very thing on which the two governments of the Taiwan Strait could agree with each 
other politically, regardless of the fundamental difference between the two sides as to 
how to define the concept of "one China" and who should govern the State of China. 
§ 3-19 Consequence of Nationalist China's expulsion from the UN 
communist, the Nationalist China viewed Mongolia as an integral part of its territory, even though the 
People's Republic of Mongolia declared its independence through a referendum in 1945 and then the 
PRC officially recognized the Mongolian People's Republic in 1949. 
443 See Eric Ting-Iun Huang, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMIATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 
167,205(2001) (stating that it was assumed that Taiwan should be an anti-communism base for 
recovering the Chinese mainland so the people of Taiwan were impelled to "China-iation," with a 
greater emphasis on cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, common historical tradition and ethnic 
identity). As a matter of fact, this is more like a fanatic of "Great China" nationalism, under this 
circumstance, any idea of the territory not being part of China would be deemed blasphemy. That is 
also the case with Tibet. 
444 For example, Dr Y Frank Chiang suggested, in his essay entitled "STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
TAIWAN," that the reason that other states do not regard the ROC or Taiwan as a state is because the 
ROC government has never declared the establishment of a new state, separate from China. It asserts 
itself to be the government that represents the state of China or more recently part of the state of China. 
As the sovereignty of a state is indivisible, and a state can have only one government that exercises its 
sovereign power, he takes the view that the ROC's insistence on the one China policy can only 
reinforce the PRC government's claim that Taiwan is a renegade province (see generally 23 Fordham 
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After the PRC took China's seat and expelled the ROC's representative from 
the United Nations in 1971, the government of Taiwan consequently failed to retain 
its seats in numerous other international organizations. That was because the PRC 
successfully blocked the ROC's entrance into many of these organizations. In spite of 
that, the government of Taiwan has still remained or gained membership in several 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank (hereinafter 
"ADB"), the World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") and so forth. More 
significantly, the switch of the US' official recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 
1979 provided an incentive precedent for other hesitant countries to follow. Suffering 
from this consequence, Taiwan now maintains official relations with only 
twenty-seven states as of September, 2002. 445 Most are Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, and several are tiny and poor island nations located in the South 
Pacific and Oceania region. Currently Taiwan retains substantive relations with most 
of the non-recognizing states. This realistic trend is rather extraordinary, but also 
predictable for Taiwan. 
As the PRC preconditions diplomatic relations on non-recognition of the 
Int'l L. 1. 959, 2000). 
445 According to information released by the ROC Government Information Office(www.gio.gov.tw). 
Taiwan currently has official diplomatic ties with 27 countries. Four countries in South Pacific and 
Oceania region: Palau, Solomon Island, Marshall Island, and Tuvalu; eight countries in Africa: Burkina 
Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Liberia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, as well as Swaziland; one 
West European countries: Holy See; fourteen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean area: Belize, 
Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, EI Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, as well as Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
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government of Taiwan, those among Taiwan's trading partners who recognize the 
PRC have been very careful to accompany any change in relations with an affirmation 
of the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan. The PRC is fully aware of that and thus uses 
every effort to oppose Taiwan's formal diplomatic relations with other states and 
challenges Taiwan's participation in regional and international governmental 
organizations. In view of these facts, it gives rise to a concern of whether 
non-recognition prevents governments from treating the ROC as the de Jure 
government of Taiwan. 
The fact that Taiwan recently gave a dozen used fighter jets to Paraguay 
evidently is an attempt to repay Paraguay for continuing to recognize Taiwan as the 
Republic of China. 446 As a small, poor, geographically disadvantaged Latin 
American state, Paraguay, through its recognition policy, successfully extracted a 
material concession by taking those planes from Taiwan, one of the premier trading 
powers of the world. This observation is particularly relevant in showing that many 
states, still recognizing Taiwan as the Republic of China, have extracted similar 
concessions.447 Given this factual background above, it is not difficult to understand 
why Taiwan is in an anomalous position in the world. 
446 See Jane's Def., PARAGUAY WILL BE GIVEN F-5S, Weekly, Oct. 1, 1997, atp8. 
447 See Tim Healy & Laurence Eyton, PERILS OF MONEY DIPLOMACY: IT'S EXPENSIVE, AND 
SOMETIMES IT BACKFIRES, Asia Weekly, Dec. 20, 1996, at p20. (noting that "Increasingly, the 
smaller nations of Africa, the Caribbean and South America feel they have the upper hand. By 
threatening to switch to Beijing, they can pry more cash out of Taipei.") 
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B. China's Stance on Taiwan's Position 
2..3-20 The 1993 White Paper: The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China 
Regardless of the ROC's strong claim as a sovereign state, by assuming to be 
the legitimate successor government of China, the PRC government has regarded 
Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory, arguing that the PRC inherited all 
territorial boundaries of the previous government(the ROC).448 Thus, Taiwan's issue 
is within its "domestic affairs" and not subject to international law. On August 31, 
1993, the PRC issued a White Paper, entitled "The Taiwan Question and 
Reunification of China" (hereinafter "the 1993 White Paper"),449 through which the 
PRC reiterated its stance on Taiwan's position. In summary, the primary assertions for 
the PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan based on the 1993 White Paper are: (1) 
the 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty, ceding Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan, was 
rendered null and void by China's declaration of war against Japan in 1941; (2) the 
1943 Cairo Declaration stated that territories stolen from China, including Taiwan and 
the Pescadores, should be restored to China; (3) the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation 
affirmed the terms of the 1943 Cairo Declaration; (4) in its instrument of surrender of 
448It is a well-established rule of international law that a shift of government in a State neither changes 
that State's legal personality, nor does it affect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State. 
When the PRC Government replaced the ROC Government in 1949, a matter of succession took place. 
This succession was not a succession of State, but a succession of Government. i.e., the new 
government of the PRC inherits all the rights and obligations of its predecessors, the ROC, and 
becomes the sole legal representative of China as a subject of international law. See Jianrning Shen, 
SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN, 15 Am. 
D. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1108(2000). 
449 See WHITE PAPER ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND THE REUNIFICATION OF CHINA, 
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August 15, 1945, Japan undertook to carry out the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation; 
(5) on October 25, 1945, the Japanese surrendered Taiwan to the Chinese government 
in Taiwan; under Chinese law, Taiwan was restored to China on that day; (7) the civil 
war between the Nationalists and Communists ended in an establishment of the PRC 
as the sole legitimate government of China on October 1, 1949, and also established 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan; this is how the Taiwan question originated.45o 
In this sense, from viewpoints of the PRC, Taiwan is neither under colonial 
rule, nor subject to alien domination, rather, it originated from the Chinese civil war 
haIfa century ago and is a left-over from this war.451 As the reunification of Taiwan 
with mainland China has been a strategic goal smce 1949, the PRC would react 
strongly to any possible application for the people of Taiwan to exercise the right of 
self-determination, under international norms and principles, to achieve de Jure 
independence. As enshrined in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, there is no basis whatsoever for the people of Taiwan 
to exercise the right of self-determination upon an issue that concerns the sovereignty 
Aug. 31, 1993, Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council of China. 
450 As a result of the Japanese surrender to the Chinese government on Oct. 25, 1945 and following the 
announcement by the representative of the Chinese government that, as of that day, Taiwan and the 
Pescadores had been restored to China, and all the people, land and state affairs of Taiwan and the 
Pescadores came under Chinese sovereignty. In terms of Chinese law, Taiwan was returned to China on 
the same day. 
451 See Su Wei, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 
1169,1171(2000). 
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and territorial integrity of China as a whole.452 
Another notable stance in the 1993 White Paper for the PRC to uphold its title 
to Taiwan is the legal implication of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758.453 It is 
on this very basis that the United Nations has recognized the Government of the PRC 
as the sole legal government representing the whole of China. Since the adoption of 
this resolution, all specialized agencies within the UN system have restored China's 
seat to the PRC and expelled the ROC's representative. As the PRC has maintained 
diplomatic relations with more than 160 states in the world, the international 
community generally recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China and 
Taiwan as part of China. It is believed that the international community must adhere 
to the one-China policy under international law, by recognizing the principle that a 
State cannot have two equally representative governments, to respect the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of China, and to refrain from any act that might contribute to 
Taiwan's secession from China. Indeed, this is where the PRC's "one-China" concept 
originated. 
§ 3-21 Conceptual Dimensions of the One-China Principle 
452 The Declaration provides that "immediately after affIrming a people's right to self-determination, 
such a right is not to be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of a sovereign and independent State." 
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY 
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, Doc. 
AJ8028( 1970). 
m ili See THE U.N. RESOLUTION 2758, G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26 Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, 
U.N. Doc. Al8439(1971). 
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Primarily there are three conceptual dimensions underlying the principle of 
(~ "one China," namely, (1) the sovereignty and territory concept (the sovereignty of 
China includes the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Taiwan region, which is an 
undivided sovereignty belonging to all the Chinese people including those residing in 
the Taiwan region. It is not acceptable to split the sovereignty of China into "two 
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan"); (2) the concept of international space (only one 
Chinese government can legitimately represent the sovereignty of China in the 
international arena. Special regions of China like Hong Kong and Macao can be 
governed internally by an administration highly autonomous from China's central 
government, but not to the extent that dual representation of China's sovereignty is 
allowed); (3) the concept of national security (any threat to the integrity of China's 
sovereignty and territory is an issue of China's national interest and security, and thus 
deployment of force against Taiwanese independence and the schemes of foreign 
forces to interfere with China's reunification is a part of China's national defense).454 
Under the principle of "one-China," the PRC has adjusted its strategy first 
from "forceful liberation" of Taiwan, then to "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan. 
That is, since the 1960s, the PRC has shown its tolerance for the status quo of 
Taiwan's de facto independence as long as Taiwan continues to acknowledge the 
454 See generally Che-Fu Lee, CHINA'S PERCEPTION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, 32 New. Eng. L. 
Rev. 695(1998). 
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"one-China" policy and does not move toward de jure independence.455 Regarding 
the "peaceful reunification" policy which marks a critical turning point in the PRC's 
orientation on domestic policy and its attitude toward Taiwan, a brief summary of the 
main points of the peaceful reunification follows: 456 
(1). To make every effort to achieve a peaceful reunification while 
not committing to forgoing the use of force as a last resort. 
(2). To promote actively personal, economic, cultural, and other 
cross-strait exchanges and work for the early realization of the 
"three links" between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
(3). To conduct peaceful negotiations for reunification, where, 
within the overall framework of one China principle, any issue can 
be addressed. 
(4). To adopt "one country two systems" after reunification, by 
which the main body of China (the mainland of China) will stick to 
455 Probably considering the military solution to the Taiwan issue would be costly, in a meeting with 
Khrushchev on October 2, 1959, the PRC leader, Mao Zedong, stated that "we do not want to take over 
Taiwan and other islands all at once, they can still be placed in the hands of Chiang Kai-sheik, and it 
does not matter if this be ten years, twenty years, or thirty years." See Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong 
Waijiao Wenxuan [SELECTED WORKS OF MAO ZEDONG ON DIPLOMACY] 381(1994). Like 
Mao, another leader of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping, has also shown patience for a solution to the Taiwan 
issue by noting that "reunification of Taiwan should be left to the future generation." See PRC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Sixian Yanjiu Lunwenji [SYMPOSIUM OF THE STUDY 
OF DENG XIAOPING'S THOUGHTS ON DIPLOMACY] (1996), cited in Zhengyuan Fu, CHINA'S 
PERCETION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE, 1 UCLAJ. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 321(1996). 
456 See WHITE PAPER ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE, 2000 
(hereinafter "the 2000 White Paper"), Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State 
Council of China; cited in Su Wei, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE, 23 
Fordham Int'l L. J. 1169, n.75(2000). 
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its socialist system while Taiwan will maintain its existing capitalist 
system for a long time to come. 
(5). To give Taiwan a high degree of autonomy after reunification 
while the Central Government will not station any troops or 
administrative personnel in Taiwan. 
(6). To solve the question of Taiwan is an internal matter of China 
and it is up to the Chinese people themselves to find the solution 
without any foreign involvement. 
§ 3-22 From Forceful Liberation to Peaceful Reunification 
Regarding the Taiwan Issue, the latest policy directive of peaceful 
reunification began with a proclamation III the 1979 Standing Committee of the 
People's Congress of the PRC.457 The concept of "one country two systems," which 
was deemed as a major change in China's policy toward Taiwan, first appeared in 
detail in the State Council's White Paper in 1993. Part III of the 1993 White Paper 
reiterates the PRC's basic position of peaceful unification(one country two systems). 
The 1993 White Paper sets out four key principles, which may be stated as follows: 
(1) There is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part. The central 
government of China is in Beijing and the "authorities in Taipei" 
457 See Jan. 1, 1979, MESSAGE TO COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN, Beijing Rev., Jan. 5,1979. 
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are therefore not a legitimate government of China. The PRC 
opposes the following models: the "two Chinas" model (the 
mainland as one China and Taiwan as a separate China); the "one 
Country two governments" model (one China but one government 
in Beijing and a separate government in Taipei); and the "one 
China, one Taiwan" model (the existence of an independent 
Taiwan-that is, Taiwan as a separate country). The White Paper 
states that "Self-determination for Taiwan is out of the question. " 
(2) Although there is only one China, it is possible for socialist and 
capitalist societies to co-exist within it, so that, after reunification, 
Taiwan s "current socio-economic system, its way of life as well as 
economic and cultural ties with foreign countries can remain 
unchanged. " 
(3) After reunification, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy 
as a special administrative region. It will have its own 
administrative and legislative powers, and independent judiciary 
and right of adjudication and "will run its own party, political, 
military, economic and financial affairs. " It will, to some extent, be 
able to conclude agreements with foreign countries (but not, of 
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course, as a sovereign nation}. Government representatives in the 
Taiwan special administrative region will be eligible for 
appointment to senior posts in the central government. 
(4) Economic and other links between mainland China should be 
rapidly expanded and negotiations towards reunification 
commenced as soon as possible. 
Part III of the White Paper also states that the "Taiwan issue" is a domestic 
affair, involving no foreign government-that it is not analogous to the Korean and 
German "divided country" situations, and that the PRC reserves the right to use 
military force to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity over Taiwan. 458 
§ 3-23 Localization of Taiwan's Current Status 
Truly, as mentioned above, under the basic content of China's stance on 
Taiwan's position, Taiwan IS a special local government that has separately 
administered itself under a different political system from that of Beijing and without 
affecting the entire sovereignty of the State of China. As a sole legitimate government 
representing China as a whole, the PRC is obviously promising that the legitimate 
right and interests of the Taiwanese people would be guaranteed, regardless of 
whatever political differences that remain between the two sides. 
458 Cited in Sean Cooney, WHY TAIWAN IS NOT HONG KONG: A REVIEW OF THE PRC'S "ONE 
COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" MODEL FOR REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN, at 503-4, 6 Pac. 
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C. Legal Analysis of Taiwan's Status 
Given the fact that such instruments as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam 
Proclamation are only the form of joint declarations to express the Allied Powers' 
common foreign policy, unlike treaties which have a binding effect on parties, it is 
clear that both of the two documents have no binding effect under intemationallaw. 
Thus, we may say that the two declarations have no legal authority to dispose of 
territory of a sovereign country like Japan, nor did the Allied Powers have the right to 
enforce such a transfer. 
§ 3-24 The Status of the 1943 Cairo Declaration & the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation 
The 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation served as a 
basis for Nationalist China to take over Taiwan after Japan's surrender in the second 
World War. As mentioned above by Mr. John Foster Dulles (the former U.S. Secretary 
of State), Mr. Anthony Eden (the former British Foreign Secretary), and Mr. Georges 
Pompidou (the former French Premier), the occupation of Taiwan by China was only 
on behalf of the Allied Powers, not for the exercise of China's sovereignty. This is 
because Japan had not formally and legally renounced its authority over Taiwan until 
1951 while concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers. This is 
also because the 1952 Peace Treaty did not determine the future of Taiwan, rather, it 
Rim L. & Pol'y 1.497(1997). 
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only indicated the tenn that Japan fonnally gave up its sovereignty over Taiwan. 
:, § 3-25 An Occupying Power 
At this point, during the period between 1945 and 1951, Nationalist China was 
only an Occupying Power in Taiwan, pending a postwar settlement which meant that 
it must abide by "the 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare" and "the 1949 
Geneva Conventions on Protection of Civilians" to maintain the public order and 
safety of Taiwan without any change in the status of Taiwan. 459 That is, after Japan 
fonnally renounced all its rights, title and claim to Taiwan under the 1952 Treaty of 
Peace with Japan, the future of Taiwan would be decided at an opportune time in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, notably the principles of 
se1f-detennination of people and non-use of force III settling territorial or other 
disputes. This IS a situation involving the international legal principle of 
self-detennination that cannot be excluded from the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
by a claim of domestic jurisdiction. As such, international customary law is binding 
on all states regardless of consent. In any event, states have bound themselves under 
the Charter to respect this princip1e.46o 
459 For a detailed discussion on the rights and duties of the Occupying Power, see Lilian C. Green, 
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, at 246-57, (Manchester University Press, 
1998). 
460 As enshrined in the concept of Article 1 (4) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, such conflicts with respect to peoples engaged in resisting the suppressing of their right 
of self-determination are regarded as international conflicts. See Eric Ting-Iun Huang, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 167,201(2001). 
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Indeed, this was such an opportunity in 1971 when the United States proposed a 
compromise to resolve the Chinese representation question in the UN. Under this 
proposed formula, the PRC would have taken over China's seat in the Security 
Council, and the two Chinas would have been represented in the General Assembly as 
separate states in the UN. However, it was unsuccessful because both Nationalist 
China and Communist China asserted that there was only one China, and that it 
included Taiwan as well as the mainland.461 
§ 3-26 The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty & the 1952 Japan-ROC Peace Treaty 
Regardless of the issue of Taiwan's undetermined status, Cold War politics, 
especially the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, made it difficult for the 
non-communist bloc of western states to abandon Nationalist China in Taiwan. Rather, 
they upheld the government of Taiwan effectively and supported its claim as China's 
sole legitimate government in the world. By this logic, the Treaty of Peace between 
the ROC and Japan, that referred to the terms in the 1951 Peace Treaty, was signed in 
1952 (hereinafter "the 1952 Peace Treaty,,).462 In spite of no specific provision for 
the transfer of Taiwan to the ROC government, it is beyond any doubt that, with the 
entry into force of the 1952 Peace treaty, by recognizing that Japan had abandoned 
461 See Kirgis, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 180-81 
(2nd ed. 1993); also see generally Lung-chu Chen, TAIWAN'S CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL STATUS, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 675(1998). 
462 See Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 UN.T.S. 3. 
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Formosa, the ROC acquired the title to Taiwan and the establishment of permanent 
sovereignty over Taiwan. This is because the ROC exceeds all the requirements of 
intemationallaw for the acquisition and maintenance of territorial title either by way 
of occupation or prescription.463 
§ 3-27 The Case of Lai-Chin-Jung-Yi 
After its renouncement of its sovereignty over Taiwan III the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Japan-ROC Peace Treaty, Japan took 
no-committed position on the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. Instead, it just stated that 
Japan "understands and respects" the PRC position.464 This view has been firmly 
upheld by Japanese judicial opinions as in the case of Lai-Chin-Jung-Yi, for example. 
In 1956, the Supreme Court ofJapan decided that: 
[TJ he determination as to whether the parties have lost the 
Japanese nationality they had once held should be made on the 
basis of the Formosan Register of Personal Status Established for 
the Formosans as a special category, separately from the Family 
Register of Japan, ever since the establishment of Japanese 
463 See generally Hungdah Chiu, THE ONE CHINA POLICY AND TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL 
STATUS, Vol. 52, No.2, the Law Monthly (Taipei, 2000). 
464Dr. Takakazu Kuriyama suggested in his essay, entitled "SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
JAPAN-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE (17 Japanese Annual of Int'l L. 42)," that "[J]apan is unable 
to pronounce independently on the question as to whether or not Taiwan is part of China, it is perfectly 
consistent with the past history as well within the Peace Treaty for Japan to take the position that 
Taiwan should be returned to China as intended by Cairo and Potsdam Declaration." Cited in Tzu-Wen 
Lee, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE ROC ON TAIWAN, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & 
Foreign Aff. 351 (1996). 
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Sovereignty over Formosa. It is therefore proper to understand that 
those who held such personal status in the Register referred to 
above have lost Japanese nationality and acquired the nationality of 
the Republic of China with the establishment of permanent 
sovereignty of the Republic of China, i. e., with the entry into force of 
the Peace Treaty in 1952 when the de jure change of sovereignty 
h . 465 over t at terrztory. 
§ 3-28 The Case of Maersk Dubai 
Notably, since the PRC was established in 1949, it has never exercised control 
over Taiwan for a single day. In this sense, without actual possession or control over 
Taiwan, the PRC cannot assert jurisdiction over Taiwan, such as in the 1996 Maersk 
Dubai case.466 As Dr. Angeline G. Chen noted: 
465See Material on Success of States, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.BI14(N.Y./u.N., 1967), cited in supra 
note 102, Hungdah Chiu, THE ONE CHINA POLICY AND TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS. 
466See State of Romania v. Cheng, (1997), N.S.R.2nd 13,45 (Can.). The Maersk Dubai case was cited in 
Elissa Steglich, HIDING IN THE HULLS: ATTACKING THE PRACTICE OF HIGH SEAS 
MURDER OF STOWAWAYS THROUGH EXPANDED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 
1323(2000); cited also in Moira McConnell, "FORWARD THIS CARGO TO TAIWAN":CANADIAN 
EXTRADITION LAW AND RELATING TO CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS, 8 Crim. L.F. 335(1997); 
cited also in supra note 47, Angeline G. Chen, TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: 
CROSSING THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES. In early 1996, six Taiwanese sailors from the 
merchant container ship Maersk Dubai were arrested in Nova Scotia Canada. They - all officers - were 
accused of murdering three Romanian stowaways on the high seas. This incident became the focal 
point of a diplomatic tussle between Canada, Romania, China, and Taiwan over who had jurisdiction 
over the matter. Canada initially sought to extradite those suspects to Romania, with which it has an 
extradition treaty. Taiwan, however, opposed the extradition attempts and offered instead to prosecute 
them in Taipei. Meanwhile, the PRC attempted to intervene, claiming sovereignty over the suspects and 
the case because Taiwan is part of China and is an integral part of China's territory and thus emphasize 
that Taiwan has no part to play without jurisdiction. The PRC insisted that extradition could take place 
only between two sovereign states, not "between a province of a country and another country." Despite 
China's position, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court decided to return those officers to Taiwan to stand 
trial there. Taiwan welcomed the decision by saying that "the decision not only complies with 
international law and practice, but also shows Canada's respect for our judicial system." 
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The Maersk Dubai case illustrates the ambiguity created by 
I , Taiwan's indeterminate status within the international community. 
Nevertheless, the statements issued by the Chinese officials are 
accurate: under international law, one sovereign state cannot extradite 
an individual to anything other than another sovereign state. If Taiwan 
did not hold the attributes of a nation-state independent and apart from 
China, the officers could not have been released from the Canada courts 
to stand trial in Taiwan. 467 
Indeed, what Dr. Angeline suggested resulted from the developments in 
customary international law that bears directly on territorial sovereignty. Thus, even 
though international recognition of the PRC and many countries have 
"acknowledged," "understood," or "noticed" China's position that Taiwan IS an 
integral part of China, it cannot be concluded that legal recognition of Chinese 
sovereignty or that the PRC's jurisdiction over Taiwan has been conferred. At this 
point, it is notable that conflicts of territory are inevitably matters of international 
concern, not just a domestic issue. 
Although the international status of Taiwan would be derived from the situation of 
a choice between the ROC and the PRC, as mentioned above, recognition itself is 
467 See id. 
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considered more to be a matter of political decision on the part of recognizing States 
than to be constituted of the government or State in question. However, it is the 
common consent of the civilized States that a State is and becomes an international 
personality through recognition.468 In this regard, self-recognition is critical to 
Taiwan. 
§ 3-29 New Claims of Territorial Sovereignty 
As enshrined in the ROC constitution, the boundaries of the ROC's territory are 
defined to be "the country's existing territory.,,469 The vagueness and absurdity of 
this definition are self-evident. In order to bring the legal concept into line with 
current reality that mainland China is an area under control by Communist China, 
rather than the government of Taiwan, the ROC has redefined the original boundaries 
of the ROC's territorial claims as only the total area of the Taiwan Islands (including 
Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu), and recognized that the PRC is the legitimate 
government of mainland China in 1991. In 1994, Taiwan officially announced that it 
would no longer compete with the PRC for the right to represent China in 
international society. Moreover, in response to a question during an interview by 
German journalists in 1999, Taiwan President Lee made an unprecedented remark 
that the relations across Taiwan Strait should be "State-to-State relations" or at least 
468 See supra note 405, L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 125; see also Huang-ch'ih Chiang, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TAIWAN, at 99, (Taipei, 2000). 
201 
"special State-to-State relations.,,47o Notably, these new claims of territorial 
sovereignty are good circumstantial evidence to prove that the government of Taiwan 
is fully aware of self-recognition. In fact, such an official declaration can be deemed 
as a declaration of the establishment ofa state.471 For the purpose of this point, under 
the concept of recognition of governments, if the ROC continues to claim to represent 
the State of China, then it would be impossible for Taiwan to gain formal recognition 
from a majority of the international community. This is because it becomes only an 
issue of choosing the government to represent the State of China, and thus the PRC, 
instead of the ROC, should be the one to survive. 
§ 3-30 Self-Governance and People's Sovereignty 
The effort of impelling political reform has transformed Taiwan into profound 
self-governance. Since the 1970s, an increasing political conSCIOusness of 
self-governance by the indigenous population of Taiwan has led to the 
commencement of democratic reform III Taiwan. As a result, martial law was 
abolished in 1978 and therefore, the people of Taiwan are able to present a strong 
469 See Constitution of the Republic of China, art. 4. 
470 In response to a question during an interview with a German radio station, Deutche Welle, on July 
9 of 1999 that "the Beijing government views Taiwan as a renegade province," President Lee remarked: 
"the cross-strait relationship is a "special state-to-state relationship." See The Position Paper To 
Elaborate On The Controversial State-To-State Remarks Made By President Lee Teng-Hui To Define 
Relations Between Taiwan And Mainland China, issued by the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, on 
Aug. 1 of 1999. After this unpredictable statement, Mr. Lee was regarded as a naked separatist by 
moving towards creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." 
471 As Professor D.P. O'Connell noted in "FORMOSA AND THE CHINESE RECOGNITION 
PROBLEM (50 AM. J. Int'l L. 405, 1956)," that "a government is only recognized for what it claims to 
be." By this logic, statehood is a claim of right and in the absence of any claim to secession, the status 
of Taiwan can only be part of the State of China under separate administration. 
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desire to push the government toward "Taiwanization" in a democratic manner. The 
notable example is that Taiwan has peacefully held its direct election of its President 
smce 1996. Full-fledged democratic governance m Taiwan IS regarded as a 
universal principle m the context of internal self-determination. 472 Moreover, 
Taiwan's political achievement has earned it more respect from the international 
community. This is because the people of Taiwan have successfully exercised their 
right of internal self-determination and transformed Taiwan from a dictatorial regime 
into a representative sovereign government. 
Taiwan has a stable population of over twenty-two million people. The 
government of Taiwan has been in effective control over an area of roughly 36,000 
square miles, defined by Taiwan and its outlying islands of the Pescadores, Kinmen 
and Matsu since 1945, when the territories were controlled by the ROC at the end of 
the World War II. In addition, Taiwan has its own independent and representative 
government(the ROC) which was established in 1912. Despite the fact that many 
states do not recognize Taiwan, the government of Taiwan presents itself to enter into 
treaties in bilateral and multilateral settings with these states. 
472 See Eric Ting-Iun Huang, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMIATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 
167,211-2 (stating that since a people's domestic right to self-determination is regarded as a universal 
principle in the context of internal self-determination, the fact that Taiwan has evolved into full-fledged 
democratic governance by Taiwanization and Democratization, therefore makes it clear that the people 
of Taiwan have successfully exercised their right of internal self-determination and transformed Taiwan 
from a dictatorial regime to a representative government of internal and external sovereignty). 
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§ 3-31 Qualifying the Objective Criteria for Statehood 
There is no doubt that Taiwan meets the objective criteria for statehood, namely, a 
permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government that IS III 
effective control of that territory, and the capacity to engage in international relations 
with other states.473 Although a state can withhold recognition of the entity's 
government, interaction with it creates rights and obligations for that unrecognized 
entity. 
For this practical reason, countries treat Taiwan as a de facto state for purposes of 
enforcing Taiwan's rights and duties under international law. Therefore, numerous 
states have entered into commercial treaties with Taiwan despite an absence of 
diplomatic relations. These agreements, such as the airspace agreements, illustrate the 
legal effect of sovereignty that implies the recognition of Taiwan's international 
status. This is because, under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, "every 
state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over that airspace above its territory.,,474 
§ 3-32 The Convention on International Civil Aviation 
When states conclude agreements with Taiwan, it is for the purpose of direct 
flights, instead of seeking the permission of the PRC. This accurately indicates that 
473 See CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, art. 1,49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 
T.S. No. 881 (1933). 
474 See CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION, art. 1,61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 
259. 
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they recognize the complete and exclusive sovereignty of the ROC over Taiwan's 
airspace. It is strong evidence to show intent to recognize Taiwan as a state. 
§ 3-33 The equivalent of official relations between US and Taiwan 
An example disregarding the legal consequence of non-recognition is the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979 (hereinafter "TRA"), ratified by the US, which rendered the 
US-Taiwan relations nearly the equivalent of official relations soon after the time 
when the US switched its formal recognition from the ROC to the PRC on January 1, 
1979.475 As Prof. Dr. Hungdah Chiu observed: "the effect of this legislation is to treat 
Taiwan as a state and its governing authorities there as a government, despite the 
lack of formal recognition for the ROC on Taiwan.'0476 
With the lack of effective control, the PRC's current claim to be the legitimate 
government of Taiwan is much more suspect in both international law and states 
practices than the ROC's past claim to be the legitimate government of the Chinese 
mainland. Although the majority of the people of Taiwan still appear to favor eventual 
reunification with mainland China, the people of Taiwan desire a continuation of the 
status quo under the principle of sovereign equality. This principle of sovereign 
equality cannot be changed with time and continued progress III cross-strait 
interactions between Taiwan and China. 
475 See TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14(1979). 
476 See generally Hungdah Chiu, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION AND THE 
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V. COMMENTARY ON "ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" MODEL FOR 
REUNIFICATION POLICY 
§ 3-34 The Special Administrative Region 
Since 1997, Hong Kong has become the Special Administrative Region 
(hereinafter "Hong Kong SAR" or "HKSAR") of the People's Republic of China. 
After its transfer of full sovereignty over Hong Kong477 and Macau,478 the PRC 
faces one remaining obstacle to its goal of national reunification, what is called the 
"Taiwan issue." Since the PRC links the resolution of Hong Kong and the Taiwan 
issue together, the policy for the PRC to achieve peaceful reunification of the Chinese 
mainland and Taiwan would be similar logic to that applied in Hong Kong, which is 
well known as "one country two systems"(Hong Kong model).479 Thus, the success 
or failure of "one country two systems" is critical to the PRC's reputation and its hope 
STATUS OF THE ROC, 3 J. Chinese L. 193(1989). 
477 See Dec. 19, 1984 "JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG", U.K.- P.R.e., 
D.N.T.S. No.26 (1984). In the 1800s, the United Kingdom defeated China in the Opium War and China 
consequently relinquished Hong Kong to the British. Since then, Hong Kong had been under the 
control of the United Kingdom until July 1, 1997. The 1984 joint declaration outlines the parties' plans 
for Hong Kong. In addition, there are three annexes. Annex 1 contains 14 paragraphs specifying 
China's basic policy with respect to Hong Kong; annex 2 establishes a Sino-British liaison group to 
supervise transfer of sovereignty; annex 3 describes treatment of land leases in Hong Kong after 1997. 
478 In 1887, the Portugese agreed to rule over Macao from Chinese Manchu Dynasty under the 
Sino-Portugese Treaty of Reconciliation and Trade. In April 1987, China and Portugal signed the 
Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration concluding that Macao is Chinese territory and the Chinese 
government would resume the exercise of sovereignty over it from Dec. 20, 1999. For details, see He 
Qing, DENG XIAOPING AND THE RETURN OF MACAO; also see Ren Min, MOCAO IN 
HISTORY OF CHINESE TERRITORY, Beijing Review, Vo1.42 No.51, Beijing, Dec.20, 1999. 
479 So far, the "one country two systems" model has been implemented in relations between Beijing as 
well as Hong Kong and Macau, by enacting the "Basic law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
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of creating a model to settle the Taiwan issue. In this respect, Taiwan would, like 
Hong Kong, become a "special administrative region" under the authority of the PRC 
central government. 480 
Although the PRC does not provide clear details of how this Hong Kong model 
will work III practice III the case of Taiwan, it IS understood that the result of 
negotiation between the PRC and the United Kingdom regarding the future of Hong 
Kong led the PRC to adopt the "one country two systems" principle as the basis for 
regulating the relations between Hong Kong and the PRC central government 
following its resumption of sovereignty.481 Accordingly, the PRC adopted the Basic 
Law of Hong Kong (hereinafter "Basic Law,,)482 to apply in Hong Kong when Hong 
Kong returned to China. The purpose of the Basic Law IS to further guarantee 
autonomy and capitalism in Hong Kong after 1997. 483 
Region" and the" Basic law of the Macau Special Administrative Region. " 
480 The "one country two systems" model, as a proposed framework for the unification of Taiwan was 
recently reaffirmed in September 1997 of PRC President Jiang Zemin at the 15th Party Congress, at 
which he highlighted: 'The concept of "one country two systems" is an important component of Deng 
Xiaoping theory. The basic idea is that on the premise of national reunification, the main part of China 
will stick to the socialist system while Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau will retain the current capitalist 
system and way of life for a long time to come. This concept is the basic policy for promoting the great 
cause of the peaceful reunification of the Motherland, because it not only embodies the principled 
position of achieving national reunification and safeguarding state sovereignty, but also embodies a 
high degree of flexibility. The adoption of the policy of 'one country, two systems" is in the interest of 
the reunification of the Motherland and the reunification of the Chinese nation and conducive to world 
peace and development." For "Full Text of Jiang Zernin's Report at 15th Party Congress", see XINHUA 
NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 21,1997. 
481 See Brian Tamanaha, POST-1997 HONG KONG: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
MEANING OF HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY, 20 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 41(1989). 
482 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
Was passed by the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Third 
Session on Apr. 4, 1990. 
483 See Patricia Homan Palumbo, ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION 
AND THE BASIC LAW OF HONG KONG: WHAT DO THEY GUARANTEE THE PEOPLE OF 
HONG KONG AFTER 1997, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 667 (1991). 
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§ 3-35 The Basic Law of Hong Kong & High Degree of Autonomy 
Under the Basic Law, it would be permitted to enjoy a "high degree of 
autonomy" in executive, legislative, and judicial matters, and its capitalist way of life 
would be preserved for an indefinite period.484 Even, in the view of the 1993 White 
Paper, the central feature of the "one country two systems" model for Taiwan 
suggested that the Taiwanese people would enjoy greater autonomy than the people of 
Hong Kong in that Taiwan would retain its military, parties and political system after 
reunification.485 The PRC has repeatedly stated that the basic principles of the Hong 
Kong model are applicable to Taiwan since the fundamental concepts would be the 
same as in the case of Hong Kong and, therefore, the Hong Kong experience of "one 
country two systems" model is viewed as having great significance for Taiwan. As the 
Hong Kong model is based on the premise that Hong Kong is part of the PRC, at this 
point, an analysis of the Hong Kong model thus would indicate some important 
differences between the application of this model to Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Generally speaking, the original logic for applying the Hong Kong model to the 
case of Taiwan comes from the 1993 White Paper. The PRC claims that there is only 
one China, of which Taiwan is part, and the central government is in Beijing. That 
484 According to the 1987 Sino-British Joint Declaration, the people of Hong Kong have been 
promised both autonomy and capitalism for fifty years by Chinese and British governments. 
485 George E. Edwards, APPLICABILITY OF THE "ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" HONG 
KONG MODEL TO TAIWAN: WILL HONG KONG'S POST-REVERSION AUTONOMY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD DISCOURAGE TAIWAN'S 
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means the authorities in Taipei, therefore, are not a legitimate government of China; 
rather, the authorities III Beijing are the sole legitimate government of China. 
Although the Hong Kong model has been implemented first III Hong Kong, the 
argument here is that the imposition of this "one country two systems" model on 
Taiwan would radically reduce the degree of autonomy and accountability which 
currently exists in Taiwan's political system.486 This is because the authorities in 
Taiwan, which describe themselves as the government of the Republic of China, have 
continuously been a sovereign state since 1912.487 Regarding the Hong Kong model, 
it would pull Taiwan back from the proximity of independence and might then take a 
significant amount of time to re-establish the status quo if Taiwan found this 
arrangement of "one country two systems" unacceptable, especially, since China, at 
present, is divided into two areas under two political entities, the government of the 
ROC and the government of the PRC, each having exclusive rights in the territory 
under its control. 
§ 3-36 Not a Political System of Self-Governance 
REUNIFICATION WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 751 (1998). 
486 Officially the authorities in Taipei has consistently rejected the Hong Kong Model and argued that 
the Hong Kong Model would bring about the loss of the way of life and basic human rights the 
Taiwanese presently enjoy and eventually force Taiwan to abandon its liberal democratic system of 
government in favor of the PRC form of socialism. In this respect, the authorities in Taipei regard this 
model as "the biggest obstacle to reunification" which is "objectively unfeasible and subjectively 
absolutely unacceptable." For detail, see OUR VIEWS AND STATEMENT ON MAINLAND 
CHINA'S WHITE PATER, Feb. 22,2000, issued by Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC. 
487 In 1644, the Manchus destroyed the Chinese Ming Dynasty and established the Manchu Ching 
Dynasty in Beijing. From then, the Manchu Ching Dynasty ruled China for 268 years until 1912 when 
its regime was replaced by the Republic of China, led by Sun Vat-sen. 
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In spite of the fact that the government system of Hong Kong was refonned 
during the 1980's and early 1990's, comparing it with Taiwan, the changes in Hong 
Kong have not been as fundamental as those in Taiwan. Since the wake of political 
liberation, 488 the refonn of the constitutional system in Taiwan has transfonned 
Taiwan into a full-fledged democratic government. Since the elections of 1996, the 
President of the ROC has been directly elected by universal suffrage. The Premier, 
although not directly elected, is appointed by the President with the consent of the 
Legislative Yuan, which is also directly elected by the people of Taiwan. In contrast to 
the case of Taiwan, the people of Hong Kong only enjoyed a little autonomy under 
British rule which was a creation of the British authorities, not the people of British 
colonial Hong Kong.489 The People of Hong Kong were largely denied the right to 
exercise control over the institutions in Hong Kong and the power to detennine the 
constitutional structure of Hong Kong. This denial culminated in the agreement of the 
United Kingdom to return Hong Kong to China without first obtaining the consent of 
488 Before the authorities in Taipei conducted the political reforms in1980's, there were many 
similarities between Taiwan during martial law period and Hong Kong during its period as a British 
colony. Although, unlike Hong Kong that was ruled as a colony, Taiwan was regarded as a part of 
China, but in many ways, the people of Taiwan were treated as though they had been colonized. 
489 The formal constitution of Hong Kong consisted of Letters Patent, supplemented by Royal 
Instructions, which was passed by exercise of the prerogative power of the Crown to establish a 
government of British colonial Hong Kong, these documents could be amended at any time by the 
Crown without reference to the wishes of the people of Hong Kong. Amendments to the formal 
constitution of Hong Kong maybe effected by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, but not by 
elected representatives of Hong Kong. The fundamental purpose of the Hong Kong formal constitution 
Was to announce and preserve control over British colony by metropolitan power. For detail see 
generally Sean Cooney, WHY TAIWAN IS NOT HONG KONG: A REVIEW OF THE PRC'S "ONE 
COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" MODEL FOR REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN, 6 Pac. Rim L. & 
Pol'y J. 497(1997). 
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the people of Hong Kong to that decision, or to the tenns upon which the return 
would occur.490 It is believed that Hong Kong has never experienced a system of 
self-governance. What is so clear in this connection is that the fonnal constitution of 
Taiwan has so little in common with that of Hong Kong. 
Notably, the authorities of both the ROC and the PRC officially consider Taiwan 
to be part of one-China; the two sides only disagree on who should control this 
unified China and on what political principle it should be unified. As a matter of 
international law, this concept of one-China is essentially a modern notion. However, 
the "one country two systems" policy has been predicated on the subordination of the 
people of Taiwan to the central government of the PRC as is the case with Hong Kong. 
The relationship between the people of Taiwan and their government can no longer be 
characterized as subordination. The continuity in the nature of government achieved 
in Hong Kong is not now possible in Taiwan. 
As mentioned above, in contrast to the rest of China, the Hong Kong model 
practices a capitalist, rather than a socialist economic system. Under the Basic Law, 
the people of Hong Kong can exercise a high degree of autonomy including executive, 
490 As the treaties under which the United Kingdom ruled Hong Kong were certainly as valid as every 
treaty under which the United Kingdom ruled states in Africa or Asia, some scholars have thus argued 
that the people of Hong Kong, as a "distinct community" and a "distinct people," should enjoy the right 
to self-determination. Regardless of all the debate as to whether or not the people of Hong Kong should 
have a right to self-determination, for approximately 150 years until 1997, Hong Kong was a Crown 
Colony of the United Kingdom, and any attempts by the people of Hong Kong to assert a claim for 
self-determination were abruptly quashed by both the United Kingdom and China, each of which 
selfishly endeavored to enjoy their respective period of control over Hong Kong. See Nihal 
Jayawickrama, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW: 
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legislative and independent judicial power. That means the region of Hong Kong has 
its own currency, is a separate customs territory, issues its own passports, maintains 
its own education system and so forth. Still, it can retain its economic and cultural 
relations with foreign countries under the name "Hong Kong, China." If these 
provisions were applied to Taiwan, its people could clearly, on one level, continue to 
enjoy control over many aspects of their social, economic, legal and political life. 
Reunification on those terms might in tum lead to relatively little surface change. Yet, 
other provisions in the Basic Law indicate that, in constitutional terms, reunification 
on the PRC's terms would significantly reduce Taiwan's state sovereignty. For 
example, Taiwan cannot represent itself on an equal footing with the PRC III 
international affairs. 
Article 68 of the Basic Law provides guidelines for elections to the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Legislative Council, as follows:491 
The Legislative Council of the HKSAR shall be constituted by 
election. The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be 
specified in the light of the actual situation in the HKSAR and in 
accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1990). 
491 See generally Patricia Homan Palumbo, ANALYSIS OF THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT 
DECLARATION AND THE BASIC LAW OF HONG KONG: WHAT DO THEY GUARANTEE THE 
PEOPLE OF HONG KONG AFTER 1997, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 667 (1991). 
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ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative 
Council by universal suffrage. The specific method for forming the 
Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on bills and motions 
are prescribed in Annex IL which provides "an electorate formula for 
the first Legislative Council of the HKSAR. This formula, which is not 
dissimilar to that used in the 1995 Legislative Council elections, 
provides that the Legislative Council shall be composed of 60 members, 
with 20 members returned by geographical constituencies through 
direct elections, 10 members returned by an election committee, and 30 
members returned by functional constituencies. " 
§ 3-37 A Local Government 
Thus, it is understood that the legislative powers, even the executive powers, in 
Hong Kong are not fully and directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong, nor is 
the Chief Executive directly elected by the people of Hong Kong.492 This is because, 
without directly and fully reflecting the will of the people of Hong Kong, the Basic 
Law does not promise immediate universal suffrage by using the proportional 
492 See generally George E. Edwards, APPLICABILITY OF THE "ONE COUNTRY TWO 
SYSTEMS" HONG KONG MODEL TO TAIWAN: WILL HONG KONG'S POST-REVERSION 
AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD DISCOURAGE TAIWAN'S 
REUNIFICATION WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 751 (1998). 
Dr. George E. Edwards argued that what the Hong Kong model provides was not really a high degree 
of autonomy, because this system is not accountable to the people of Hong Kong, and he believed that 
"accountability" should be defined as the extent to which Hong Kong government officials and 
Legislative Council were selected by, responsible to, and answerable to the people of Hong Kong. 
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representation list system, but decreases Hong Kong's autonomy; universal suffrage is 
only the "ultimate aim." It is clear that the right of the people of Hong Kong to 
universal suffrage is in accord with both international covenants on human rights(the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights),493 which apply to Hong Kong by virtue of having been ratified by 
the United Kingdom and extended to protect the people of Hong Kong in 1976. In this 
respect, truly, the fundamental concept of the Basic Law is not a state in a federal 
system, but rather a "local government" directly under the authority of the PRC. 
Hence, under the similar logic of the Basic Law system, Taiwan clearly would 
have no sovereignty of its own and thus, the people of Taiwan would be subject to the 
PRe rule whether or not they so choose. As a result, neither the Basic Law nor any 
other PRe legislation gives the people of Taiwan the right to secede should they 
express such a desire, for instance, through a referendum which is a device to make 
important decisions by the people. Simultaneously, it is difficult to see how the PRe 
government could allow a situation to occur in which the head of the Taiwanese 
administration is a person who was both popularly elected and actively denounced 
. d h I 494 commumsm an t e centra government. 
493See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 171(1966); See International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993. U.N.T.S. 3(1966). 
494 Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong provides that the Legislative Council must enact laws 
under the situation "to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central 
People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from 
214 
§ 3-38 The Sino-British Joint Declaration 
It is not to mention that the Hong Kong constitutional changes required for the 
Basic Law to become operational were made by the British and PRC governments 
rather than by the consent of the people of Hong Kong. At the very least, the position 
of Hong Kong is based on the Sino-British Joint Declaration which is an international 
agreement similar to a treaty under international law and should be accorded the same 
treatment as a treaty. That is, it has the binding effect on China under international 
law.495 By contrast, in the case of Taiwan, there would be no international restraint on 
the PRC amending a Basic Law of Taiwan. Accordingly, if a Basic Law of Taiwan is 
to be implemented in accordance with the above existing procedures in Hong Kong, 
then, to be sure, it is feasible that the ROC Constitution would be altered in order to 
maintain a unitary system under the concept of the "one country two systems" model. 
By this logic, to surrender entire control over the political structure of Taiwan to the 
PRC is definitively the only result without any consideration regarding the will of the 
people of Taiwan. Obviously, Taiwan will never settle for anything less than full 
democracy. 
conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the 
Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies." For THE BASIC LAW 
OF HONG KONG, see the Government Information Centre of HK Special Administrative Region of 
the PRe. (www.info.gov.hk). 
495 In 1984, China and the United Kingdom signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong 
Kong, a treaty ratified in 1985 by both parties and registered with the United Nations. For detail, see 
Paul Vitrano, HONG KONG 1997: CAN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BE COMPELLED 
TO ABIDE BY THE JOINT DECLARATION, 28 Geo. Wash. J. InCI & Econ. 445 (1995). 
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As discussed above, a fundamental reason why the "one country two systems" 
model cannot feasibly be implemented in Taiwan has been identified. In a similar vein, 
it will not be a feasible plan for the peaceful reunification of China. This is because 
not only was the model originally designed to deal with a colonial regime like Hong 
Kong, but also transfers ultimate state sovereignty over constitutional matters to the 
PRC that may deny the right that is already being enjoyed by the people of Taiwan to 
conclusively determine their own future. In the discussion of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration above, it must be kept in mind that the announced PRC policy to establish 
such a special administrative region is only "when necessary" implying that the 
special administrative region in Hong Kong presumably will be abolished when the 
situation is no longer needed, such as in the case of the 1949 Shanghai event. 496 
Also, another notable example IS Tibet, which III the early 1950s was promised 
autonomy in return for its "peaceful liberation." By the mid-1950s, however, the PRC 
broke its promise of just deploying its Chinese troops at the border and used military 
force to occupy Tibet that led the Tibetan independent militia eventually to be 
disbanded under the direction of the Communist Chinese Army. 
There is no indication under the joint declaration showing who, after 50 years, is 
496 In 1949, when the PRC was being established as a Socialist state in China, the Shanghai Capitalists 
were promised that their forms of business would be tolerated under the new Socialist state. In utter 
disregard of the above promise, those Shanghai Capitalists and their businesses, within five years, were 
effectively and, in some cases, personally wiped out. This experience is still very vivid in the minds of 
people in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
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to make the decision. On this point, this leaves open the question of what is there to 
guarantee the continued enjoyment of the special privileges promised by the PRe. 
§ 3-39 Taiwan's Ultimate State Sovereignty vs. Hong Kong's High Degree of 
Autonomy 
In comparison with the current position of Taiwan, where the people of Taiwan 
exercise final control over their own government exclusively, the model of "one 
country two systems" as reflected in the Basic Law of Hong Kong is not appropriate 
for Taiwan. After all, the Hong Kong model is to promote, not independence, but what 
is called a "high degree of autonomy," which is to function "directly under the 
authority" of the Central Government of the PRC. This shows that the Hong Kong 
model represents a situation where unification under the concept of "one country two 
systems" is not applicable to Taiwan. 
One major benefit is that as a result of the basic principle of "one country two 
systems," the smooth return of Hong Kong and the maintenance of its long-term 
prosperity and stability will undoubtedly create favorable conditions for the settlement 
of the Taiwan issue on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It is difficult to conclude 
whether the "one country two systems" model has been a success in Hong Kong. 
However, it is the key for the people of Taiwan to take the Hong Kong reversion as a 
case to examine the commitments of the PRe. Despite the fact that history gives us 
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several other negative explanations, this experience of the Hong Kong model may 
make the Taiwanese people very reluctant to trust the Communists on the mainland of 
China again. If that is the case, this reflects something meaningful not only to the 
people of Hong Kong, but to the people of Taiwan in their future as well. 
VLCONCLUSION 
The government of Taiwan, since its break from mainland China in 1949, has 
existed functionally as an independent sovereign state. It is enshrined in the principle 
of "people's sovereignty" described earlier that state sovereignty itself is a collective 
right that can only be possessed and exercised by the entire population of the land 
constituting the territory of that State. Successful self-governance in Taiwan 
represents the concept that the sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to the Taiwanese 
people.497 This implies the common will of the people of Taiwan to establish a state. 
With a popUlation of over twenty-two million (more people than over three-quarters 
of the UN member states), not only has Taiwan the political will of its people to 
sustain its sovereignty, but also, judged by the international legal concepts of state 
sovereignty and statehood, it possesses virtually all the elements of a defined State 
497 See generally Paul R. Williams, CREATING INTERNATIONAL SPACE FOR TAIWAN: THE 
LAW AND POLITICS OF RECOGNITION, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 801(1998). Professor Paul noted 
that "[I]n the case of Bosnia in particular, the US or the EU required that Bosnia hold a referendum 
before it would consider granting Bosnia recognition as a state. Taiwan might be able to successfully 
rely upon this precedent to assert that any declaration of independence would not be an affront to the 
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and qualifies as a sovereign state legally. 
§ 3-40 The Duty of According Recognition to Taiwan 
According to the legal doctrine and states practices mentioned above, although 
recognition is used in different ways, to qualify as a state, the recognition by other 
states is not a requirement under customary international law. More importantly, the 
denial of recognition is not meant to effect political change but rather is the result of 
either (1) the observation that the putative government simply does not control the 
state; or (2) a government comes to power by means of violating international law. i.e., 
once a political entity has met the criteria which are that it posses a territory and a 
population that is subject to the control of the authority which is sovereign, it is a duty 
of the international community to consider that entity as meeting the first threshold 
for recognition. In a similar move, as a matter of the interest of international relations, 
Taiwan should be recognized as a state and its status should be acknowledged. 
Perhaps it is too much to hope that the majority of the international community 
will move to consider Taiwan's entitlement to the rights and privileges of being a 
State and then recognize Taiwan as an independent state separated from China in the 
near future. This is because politically, rather than legally, most states of the world 
have found it difficult to consider the status of Taiwan without an eye to its bearing on 
territorial integrity of China, so long as it was supported by a public referendum in Taiwan. 
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general relations with the PRC, despite the fact that Taiwan should be given the status 
it deserves. Thus, if it were not for the stated or anticipated obj ection of the PRC, the 
international community would recognize Taiwan as a state. Going by this logic, 
although Taiwan has been an independent state with full legal sovereignty and posed 
on the periphery of independence separating from China politically, its international 
status is much more influenced by the China-Taiwan relations than its other 
international relations. Obviously, not surprisingly, Taiwan's current diplomatic 
difficulties caused by the PRC's one-China principle are not likely to be over soon. 
Yet, the possibility of settlements for political sovereignty disputes between the PRC 
and the ROC cannot be ruled out, though such settlements may take a while before 
materializing. 
§ 3-41 Dual Participation & Dual Recognition 
Currently Taiwan is at once recognized as a state by some and not by others. 
That makes the integration of recognition a choice between two competing 
govemments(the ROC and the PRC) in some important ways critical to Taiwan. 
Historically, by going with the mistaken assumption of having the exclusive political 
sovereignty over the whole of China, the ROC rejected any attempt at dual 
recognition or dual participation in the international community. Yet, by deciding to 
compete no longer with the PRC for the right to represent China, the ROC has shown 
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a degree of flexibility to accept the principle of "dual participation" in its efforts to 
Jom international organizations by usmg titles other than its official designation 
"Republic of China." For example, it is called "Chinese Taipei" at the APEC Forum, 
"the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu" at the GATT before 
and the WTO now, "Taipei, China" at the Asian Bank and so forth. Simultaneously, 
the ROC adopts the similar logic of "dual recognition" m its relations with other 
countries. In spite of the enormous cost of the flexible diplomacy,498 Taiwan has been 
effective m maintaining its relations with numerous countries by establishing 
nominally private organs, which nonetheless perform the equivalent of official 
function and enjoy a certain degree of diplomatic privileges and immunities.499 
As noted earlier, for the PRC, the "one country two systems" model (as applied 
to Hong Kong) could be considered a success as long as the transition of power went 
smoothly, the government of the Hong Kong SAR was tightly controlled, and Hong 
Kong's society and economy remained stable. However, this Hong Kong model 
498 See Charles R. Irish Book Review and Note THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 92 Am. 1. Int'l L. 167, 
168-9(1998). (discussing Taiwan's use of informal diplomacy with other nations to counteract 
China's efforts to isolate Taiwan, and concludes that the enormous costs of informal diplomacy has 
successfully effectuated and even improved Taiwan's influence in the international community). 
499 For instance, following its switch of formal recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1972, Japan 
founded a semi-official organ, "the Interchange Associate," to maintain its relations with Taiwan. 
Likewise, the ROC established a similar organization, "the Association of East Asian Relations," to 
manage its relation with Japan. Simultaneously, the United States and the ROC adopted a similar step 
to the model of ROC-Japan relations by setting up "the American Institute in Taiwan" as well as "the 
Coordination Council for North American Affairs" to maintain their relation with each other when the 
US granted recognition to the PRC and, at the same time, withdrew its recognition ofthe ROC in 1979. 
Indeed, the model of either ROC-Japan relations or US-Japan relations presents a notable example that 
two countries can substantially maintain semi-official relations without establishing an official 
relationship. 
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would only be suitable for Taiwan if Taiwan were to abandon control over its own 
destiny. The reason that the Hong Kong model is not applicable to Taiwan is because 
of the distinct difference between Hong Kong and Taiwan both historically and 
geo-politically. If Taiwan is to reunify with China, it must do so under a different 
model perhaps under a model where Taiwan might find it possible to retain its legal 
sovereignty. At this point, it is certain that Hong Kong will not serve as an example 
for unifying Taiwan with China as the PRC hopes. Hence, the PRC now needs to take 
a different view. If negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are to 
progress, and the PRC's stated preference for peaceful reunification remains a 
realistic goal, the substance of the Hong Kong model will need to be transformed. 
Given the potential conflicts which may arise under a diverse economic and 
social system under an integrated Chinese State, more important in connection to 
these, are the issues of sovereignty and self-determination as perceived by both sides. 
This concept has come very close to be what has been termed "associated statehood" 
within the UN system, which is one of the options through which a people can 
exercise their right to self-determination.50o Another possible alternative under UN 
norms for the exercise of self-determination is that of complete integration with 
500 The U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960, the Granting of independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, provides that the state with which a territory is to become associated should 
respect the individuality and cultural characteristics of the territory. Associated statehood status can 
only be entered into as a result of free elections and must be based on the consent of the people 
concerned. 
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another state, which should be on the basis of complete equality between the peoples 
of the former territory and the state concerned, and again, should only come about if 
these criteria are met, i.e., the integrating territory should attain an advanced stage of 
self-government with free political institutions resulting from the freely expressed 
wishes of the people through elections. sol 
§ 3-42 A Divided State 
The founding of the PRC in Beijing and the relocation of the ROC to Taipei in 
1949 gave the former control of the Chinese territory of the mainland area and the 
latter control of the Chinese territory of the Taiwan area. It is accurate that the State of 
China(the ROC) has been divided into two parts, ruled by separate governments with 
full sovereignty, rather than a succession of a State or Government. In this sense, the 
current position of Taiwan is part of a divided State of China similar to Korea or 
pre-reunification Germany.SOl It is the result of particular historical circumstances 
following the Chinese Civil War. As a matter of international law, divided statehood is 
a legal concept that can be widely recognized as "a state divided into two entities, 
each equipped with an operative government."S03 Practically, in the German and 
501 For details, see Kevin M. Harris, THE HONG KONG ACCORD AS A MODEL FOR DEALING 
WITH OTHER DISPUTED TERRlTORlES, 80 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 348(1986). 
502 West and East Germany officially united to form a single, enlarged Federal Republic of Germany in 
1990, this unification occurred in accordance with the Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity of 
Aug. 31, 1990. See Albrecht Rande lzho fer, GERMAN UNIFICATION: CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS, 13 Mich. 1. Int'! L. 122(1991). 
503 See Gerhard von Glahn, LAW AMONG NATIONS, pp. 126-7, (3d. ed. 1976). 
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Korean cases (Germany was divided into the Federal Republic in the West and the 
Democratic Republic in the East; Korea was divided into the Republic of Korea in the 
South and Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North). Despite the divided 
statehood of the two parts being in dispute, both were admitted to the United Nations, 
meaning that these divided states could be recognized as independent states by the 
outside world without any preclusion at the same time. 504 Another possible example 
is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the Yemen Arab 
Republic (North Yemen) before their unification in 1990.505 Given these precedents, 
it must at the very least be a perfectly logical step to provide a guideline in the 
direction that the presence of the one-China policy should not preclude the existence 
of Taiwan as an independent, sovereIgn state. That IS to say, the position of the 
China-Taiwan ties across the Taiwan Strait should be defined as "one country on each 
side with its own state sovereignty." 
504 Both the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic were admitted to the United Nations in 
1973, and achieved eventual reunification in 1990; both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea were admitted to the United Nations in 1991. 
505 See THE AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN, 30 1. L. 
M. 820, 822(1991). Before both sides of the South Yemen and the North Yemen agreed to form a 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TAWAIN'S STATUS IN THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING 
WORLD: TAIWAN'S CASE IN THE QUESTIONS OF 
REPRESENTATION AND MEMBERSHIP 
unified "Republic of Yemen" in 1990, both had claimed that they were parts of Yemeni Homeland. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1945, countries from around the world carne together to form the United 
Nations(hereinafter "UN") to give all members a voice on international Issues and 
help in case of conflicts. 506 The founders hoped that the United Nations would live 
up to its promise, but attaining this goal has not been easy.507 
§ 4-1 The Ideal of Establishing the UN 
Among the most important contributions of the UN to world problems and needs 
are the prOVISIOn of channels for seeking consultation and the development of 
common interests. With many states achieving formal independence as a result of the 
rapid de-colonization that commenced in the 1950s leading to a significant increase in 
membership of the UN, demands for effective international management has arisen as 
a major Issue III UN programs. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union has 
deprived the world community of a counterbalancing force that was there for many 
decades. Hence, the changing world underscores the necessity for cooperative action 
506 See Major Bialke, UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: APPLICABLE NORMS AND 
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 50 A.F.L. Rev. 1, 6(2001)(Noting that 
following World War II, the drafters of the UN Charter presumed the victors, acting perhaps out of 
enlightened self- interest, would continue to cooperate with each other, in light of their recent 
successful joint effort). See Kimberly D. Barnes, INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UNITED NATIONS, 
AND INTERVENTION IN CIVIL CONFLICTS, 19 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 117, 128(1995)(Noting 
that because the Charter's drafters were concerned with war as they knew it-namely international 
war-the United Nations primary purposes, stated in the Preamble and Article 1, focus on international, 
rather than international, peace and security). 
507 See Thomas G. Weiss, Devid P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS, Westview Press, 1997, pp.46-63(Noting that for a brief time after 
World War II, an improved international order seemed feasible. The Soviet Union's establishment of a 
Communist bloc in Eastern Europe quickly ended the big-power cooperation. With its members 
polarized into two camps, the UN was unable to maintain the peace and prevent conflict as was 
originally intended. Superpower support in any given case meant that UN conflict management was 
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among the UN member states in attacking the common problems of humanity which 
often are the issues of economic and social needs. In response to this environment, the 
UN must adapt to the needs of its growing modem role. This requires changes in 
approach to a new balance between the authority of states and the authority of the 
international society. 
§ 4-2 Major Trend of the New World Order 
Greater international dialogue and economic cooperation have become major 
trends of the new world order. Going by that, what we see is an increasing number of 
Issues including environmental protection, terrorism prevention, human rights, the 
well-being of mankind, financial cooperation, economic development and the various 
aspects of democracy, which require worldwide cooperating and planning, especially, 
the participation of every member of the United Nations. The complexity of the above 
issues is much more evident in a developing economy. At this point, Taiwan's current 
economic prosperity coupled with its full-fledged democracy can playa critical role in 
helping the UN to fulfill its modem function. 
Following World War II, several countries were divided. Germany was divided 
into the democratic West and the communist East; Korea was divided into the 
democratic South and the communist North; and also China was split into the 
problematic because either the US or the Soviet Union would block effective UN involvement.) 
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Republic of China(hereinafter "ROC") and the People's Republic of China(hereinafter 
"PRC,,).508 How to admit applicants from divided countries into the UN presented a 
great challenge to the foundations of the world organization and the legal concept of 
sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the question of representation for divided countries is 
one of the most difficult issues faced by the UN. In view of the need for all people in 
the world to be free from exclusion and discrimination, and for all to be represented in 
the United Nations system, the issue of state sovereignty arose regarding the question 
of representation. This was the case with the Chinese seat at the UN. The issue of 
representation for divided countries and who is entitled to sit at the UN turned out to 
be a tough task. 
§ 4-3 The Question of Representation for Divided Countries 
Distinct from the problem of admitting new members is that of determining the 
representation of states that are already members. The decision of the UN to deny the 
right of a delegation to represent a state may have the same practical consequences as 
a decision not to admit a state to membership.509 Even now, this issue has not been 
508 As a result of civil war in 1949, the Republic of China was divided into two governments: the ROC 
on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China located in the Chinese mainland. See Su Wei, SOME 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE, 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1169, 1170(2000)(noting 
that in October 1949, the Chinese people won their New Democratic Revolution and established a new 
central government called the People's Republic of China); see also Tzu-wen Lee, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF TAIWAN: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, 1 UCLA 1. Int'l L. & Aff. 351, 353(1996)( discussing that 
the forces of the Republic of China finally retreated to Taiwan on December 8, 1949, leaving Mao 
Zedong and the People's Republic in control of the mainland); see also Shen, supra 72, at 1117 
(discussing the civil war and how it caused the regime of the Republic of China to be overthrown by 
the People's Republic of China). 
509 See Leland M. Goodrich, THE UNITED NATIONS, 1959, PP.99-102(Noting that the problem of 
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resolved completely since Taiwan is still outside the UN. 
The Republic of China was one of the founding members of the United 
Nations.5lO For over twenty years the ROC served as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council.511 After the ROC lost its seat in the UN in 1971, it consequently 
failed to retain its seats in numerous other international organizations. Although the 
ROC has been out of the UN since 1971, it did not simply disappear. On the contrary, 
the government of Taiwan has been a very active member of the international 
community and maintains close ties and friendly relations with more than 140 
nations.512 Currently the ROC on Taiwan only maintains membership in very few 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank(hereinafter 
"ADB"),513 the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum(hereinafter "APEC"),514 
representation did not arise in the UN until Nov., 1949 when in a cablegram to the President of the 
General Assembly the Foreign Minister of the Government of the PRC, the Communist regime which 
had succeeded in driving the Nationalist Government from the mainland, stated that his government 
repudiated the legal status of delegation headed by T. F. Tsiang, appointed by the National Government 
seated on Taiwan, and held that it could not represent China and had no right to speak on behalf of 
the Chinese people in the United Nations). 
510 Delegates from the ROC government signed the UN Charter on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco. 
511 From 1950 to 1971, the UN attempted to resolve the dispute over a UN seat for China, which since 
1949 had been divided into two antagonistic political entities, the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on 
mainland, each having its own territory, people, and government. 
512 See, FOREIGN RELATIONS, The Republic of China Yearbook-Taiwan 2002, Government 
Information Office of the ROC on Taiwan(www.gio.gov.tw)(Noting that The Republic of China 
maintains its own national defense and conducts its own independent foreign policy, including full 
diplomatic relations with nearly 30 countries and substantive ties with more than 140 others). 
513 See Peter J. Illig , THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1 
Buff. J. Int'l L. 47, 47(1994)(Noting the Asian Development Bank(ADB) was founded in 1966 to meet 
the urgent needs of more than 700 million people living in poverty in the Asia-Pacific region. The ADB 
is charged with designing and providing a source of funding for regional economic development 
projects. These projects are structured to alleviate poverty and stimulate economic growth, while at the 
same time ensuring the viability of the region's ecosystem). 
514 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) forum had its origins in a 1989 proposal by Australian 
Prime Minister R.J. Hawke. APEC is the result of a clear recognition of the importance of economic 
cooperation and consultation in the region to sustain its dynamic economic development I See Kenneth 
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and the World Trade Organization(hereinafter "WTO,,).515 Through membership III 
international organizations that do not require statehood, the ROC on Taiwan can best 
exercise its independent authority.516 
§ 4-4 Taiwan's bid for UN Membership 
The ROC on Taiwan has sought admission to the United Nations and proposals 
to that effect consistently have been made in the past ten years. Taiwan's move has 
attracted worldwide attention to the principle of representation and the principle of 
b h · . l' 517 mem ers Ip umversa Ity. However, the government of Taiwan continues to be 
W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION FOR THE ASIAN CENTURY: AN 
EARLY LOOK AT NEW APPROACHES, 4 Transnat'l 1. & Contemp. Probs. 187, 
213-5(1994)(Noting APEC's leaders reached an uneasy compromise in 1993 regarding the structure of 
APEC itself and its relations with other Asia-Pacific organizations as follows: (1) APEC will remain an 
informal organization, without any formal treaty or other constitutional document; (2) APEC will 
remain institutionally decentralized and non-hierarchical; (3) APEC will not supersede other 
organizations within the Asia-Pacific region, such as PECC, ASEAN, and the EAEC). 
515 In 1944, at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, a comprehensive economic and financial plan was 
proposed for post-World War II reconstruction and development. It was the formation of three 
international economic and financial institutions. (Two of them, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, were created to address development and monetary issues.) The International Trade 
Organization rounded out the institutional triad and GATT was first concluded in 1947 to serve as an 
interim agreement until the most important of the Uruguay Round agreements were concluded. The 
Uruguay Round agreements is the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization under which 
the institutional functions of GATT are replaced by the World Trade Organization. The function of the 
GATT-WTO system is to open international markets for goods, services, and capital. See General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. (5), (6), 55 UN.T.S. 194; Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993,33 I.L.M. 1, see also generally 
Kevin e. Kennedy, THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM AT FIFTY, 16 Wis. Int'l 1.1. 421, 443-4(1998).The 
membership in these organizations is not based on state-hood; otherwise, it would be opposed by the 
PRe. 
516 This is because the PRC regards the ROC on Taiwan as a renegade province, not a state and does 
not allow countries to have any official contacts with Taiwan. At this point, the PRC also pressures 
those countries with whom it is in relations to exclude Taiwan from any international organization in 
which statehood is required. Taiwan's acceptance of international obligation, through participation in 
international organizations that requires statehood, as if it were a state, will create a growing 
impression of independence. 
517 For the past few years, Taiwan has continually sought to enter the UN. Usually Taiwan's small 
number of allies sponsor a proposition to put Taiwan's status in the UN up for discussion at the UN 
General Assembly. For example, in 1999, one of Taiwan's allies, Solomon Islands, spoke at the UN 
General Assembly general debate session to reiterate its country's support for Taiwan's membership in 
the UN by indicating that Taiwan's brilliant economic achievement allows it to playa positive role in 
promoting international trade and annihilating poverty, citing the fact that Taiwan has long provided 
assistance in terms of skills training and technology transfers to Solomon Islands and many other 
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excluded from membership of the UN because of strong opposition from the PRe. 518 
The PRC even successfully blocked the UN from accepting humanitarian financial aid 
from Taiwan519 that was offered to help Rwandan refugees and the Turkish Kurds in 
the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion.52o The PRC argued that such involvement from 
Taiwan in UN activities would grant de facto recognition to the ROe. 
The language of Article 4 of the UN Charter suggests that the procedure 
concerning the admission of new members to the United Nations include not only that 
a state wishing to become a member of the UN should be a peace-loving State, accept 
the obligations contained in the UN Charter and be able and willing to carry out these 
obligations, but also that a decision of the General Assembly should be upon "the 
d · f h S . C '1 ,,521 recommen atlon 0 t e ecunty ounCI. 
As mentioned above, without the recommendation of the UN Security Council, 
an applicant such as the ROC cannot qualify to become a member state of the United 
developing countries. (For detail, see China Times, October 2, 1999). 
518 See TAIWAN'S U.N. BID BLOCK, New York Times, Sep. 12, 2002(Noting that envoys from 
nearly 90 of 190 member nations, most of them opposed to Taiwan's membership, spoke on the matter 
during several hours of committee debate. Taiwan has tried to join the United Nations since 1993, but 
China and its supporters have kept it off the agenda). 
519 Geographically, the term "Taiwan" refers to the islands of Taiwan area, including a group of islands 
consisting of Formosa(Taiwan) and its outlying islands of Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu. The word 
"Taiwan" in political terms may refer to "the Republic of China," or "the Republic of China on Taiwan, 
or "the ROC on Taiwan," which is used to refer to the political entity existing on the islands of the 
Taiwan area. 
520 See Mark S. Zaid, TAIWAN: IT LOOKS LIKE IT, IT ACTS LIKE IT, BUT IS IT A STATE? THE 
ABILIITY TO ACHIEVE A DREAM THROUGH MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, 32 NENGLR 805,814(1998). 
521 In Article 4, the UN Charter states that: (1) membership in the UN is open to all other peace-loving 
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; (2) the admission of any such state to 
membership in the UN will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. 
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Nations. This is because any attempt at linking the implementing of Taiwan's UN 
membership bid would invite antagonism and pressure from the PRC. As a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council with its double veto power,522 the PRC's 
impeding of Taiwan's entry into the UN has significantly aroused this curiosity: "how 
can Taiwan become a member state in the United Nations? Is it possible?" "What 
happens if there is a dramatic change in the Taiwan Strait that leads to an armed 
conflict affecting or threatening international peace? When will the UN make the 
decision to enforce the peace?" These are the types of questions to be faced by the 
United Nations. 
Before answering such questions, absolute priority should be given to supporting 
the notion that membership issues must not be a substitute for objective standards. 
Such objective standards(1ike peace-making and peace-keeping) are influenced not 
only by the political Issue between China and Taiwan, but also by the obvious 
problem relating to the status of Taiwan itself and the possibility of an armed conflict 
with China. That is to say, Taiwan's bid to improve its position in the UN should 
not just be deemed as a zero-sum game in which "the PRC won and the ROC lost," or 
522 What procedure to follow in deciding the preliminary question which is based on whether a given 
proposal is a matter of procedure requiring a simple majority of seven members, or a matter of 
substance requiring a qualified majority of seven members, including the votes of the five permanent 
members. If it is decided that the preliminary question is governed by the principle of unanimity of the 
five permanent members, then any permanent member may establish the non-procedural character of a 
given proposal by use of the veto and then may veto the proposal itself. This has come to be called, in 
and out of the Security Council, the double veto. For related issues regarding the double veto, see 
generally Leo Gross, THE DOUBLE VETO AND THE FOUR POWERS STATEMENT ON VOTING 
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 251, 251-80(1953). 
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"the ROC won and the PRC lost." Rather, it should be viewed as a mission to prevent 
the situation from triggering a serious armed conflict on a massive sca1e.523 
In efforts to provide for adequate and optimistic views as applying to Taiwan's 
UN membership issue, no attempt will be made to isolate the related subjects 
discussed in this chapter from the political and legal realities to which they are 
inextricably related. This is because legal concerns and political activities in the UN 
sometimes cannot be distinguished completely. 
This chapter starts with an overview of basic conceptual issues about the UN and 
its modem function. The focus on this part will be the concepts of representation and 
membership universality. After we get to better understand the UN, some discussions 
then follow, all of which deal mainly with such issues as "the ROC's exclusion from 
the UN IS inconsistent with the universal principle of representation," "Taiwan's 
efforts to join the UN," "the increasing importance to improve Taiwan's status in the 
UN," and "the UN's considerable benefits to access Taiwan's UN entry bid." 
In addition to the issue of reexamining the significant UN Resolution 2758, the 
most complicated part of this chapter is that Taiwan's position in the UN is obviously 
influenced by Taiwan's relations with China. However, in spite of the obstacles and 
523 The threat of force by China has brought the Taiwan issue into the lime-light. It is listed with the 
North Korean and Kashrniri issues as the three destabilizing factors that might suddenly burst into full 
fledged crises in Asia. See Robert A, HERE COMES THE ASIAN CENTURY, China Post, Taipei, Dec. 
29, 1999. 
233 
limitations from the PRC, there is substantial room for improvement with regard to 
the membership issue. In a spirit of compromise, it is from the viewpoint of the whole 
world's best interest to see Taiwan breaking out from the current international 
isolation and playing a valuable role in the United Nations. That will be highly 
meaningful in the enhancement of the legal status of Taiwan and regional security. 
Accordingly, this chapter IS organized into seven parts, which are: part one _ 
introduction; part two - role of the United Nations in a changing world; part three _ 
the membership Issue III the United Nations; part four - the United Nations 
Resolution 2758 and the question of representation; part five - commentary on the 
United Nations Resolution 2758; part six - Taiwan's case for the United Nations 
membership; and part seven - conclusion. 
II. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 
Just as World War I led to the formation of the League of Nations,524 World 
War II was the catalyst for the establishment of the United Nations.525 The UN was 
524 The end of World War I brought an initial attempt to unify nation- states into an international 
organization to maintain world peace. The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, included a provision for 
a "League of Nations," an international organization created by thirty-two nations. The League, as 
the fIrst defInitive and statutory organ of, international cooperation attempted to substitute arbitration, 
mediation, and judicial settlement for war. Despite its efforts, the League failed to maintain 
international peace and security and could not prevent the course of events that ultimately led to the 
start of World War II. (See Brian M. Spaid, COLLECTIVE SECURITY v. CONSTITUTIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY: CAN THE PRESIDENT COMMIT U.S. TROOPS UNDER THE SANCTION OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL? 17 
U. Dayton L. Rev. 1055, 1060-3, 1992). 
525 On October 30, 1943, the foreign minister of the USSR and the United Kingdom, Secretary of State 
Hull, and the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union issued a declaration in Moscow that, for the fIrst 
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organized in 1945 based on the UN Charter which was a form of multilateral treaty 
that was regarded as the constitution of the world body. At the time of its founding, 
the UN had a membership of 51 states. 526 Since then, the number has grown year by 
year and currently the total number of member states is 190, including all the world's 
independent nations. Only Taiwan and a few mini-states are not UN members yet. 
The UN Charter outlines all the UN's subsequent relations and programs. As a 
written constitution, the Charter provides for the UN's organizational structure, 
function, principles and purposes along with a set of standards, and so forth. The 
Charter itself is a multilateral treaty establishing the pattern of agreements among and 
obligations of its members. It is subject to interpretation by the member states and by 
each organ of the UN on new meamngs with widely accepted interpretation and 
resulting practice. Hence, it is an important addition to international law. 527 
time, clearly pledged their efforts for the establishment of a general international organization. One 
month after the Moscow Declaration, President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Prime Minister 
Churchill, meeting in Teheran, announced in their final communique: We recognize fully the supreme 
responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the 
goodwill of the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of 
war for many generations ... We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations large 
and small ... [for] the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome 
them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations(For detail, see A. LeBoy 
Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1995, pp.47-8). 
526 The United Nations Conference on International Organization(UNCIO) was held in San Francisco 
on April 25, 1945, all forty-six states that had adhered to the United Nations Declaration and that had 
declared war on one or more Axis powers accepted invitations to participate and, by agreement of the 
participants, Argentina, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and the Denmark were added to the roster. The 
Soviet Union urged the inclusion of the provisional government of Poland, but that recommendation 
was rejected, although Poland was subsequently allowed to sign the Charter as an original member.(See 
A. LeBoy Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1995, p.51). 
527 As a multilateral treaty that prescribes principles for the member states and that is subscribed to by 
most national governments, the UN is a part of the developing body of international law. International 
law may emerge from many sources within the United Nations. Not only do agencies such as the IC] 
and Int'l Law Commission playa major role in developing law, but some of the decisions of other 
organs gradually acquire the status of law as well. 
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A. The UN's Basic Principle and Position 
The world body was founded on the principles of universality, equal rights, 
democracy, freedom, and self-determination528 and thus, its ultimate goal is to serve 
all mankind in the world. The UN system has made positive contributions to the use 
of international channels for conflict resolution. The relevance to use UN channels 
may result from a desire by the member states to fulfill the above ultimate goal. The 
preamble to the UN Charter contains an affirmation by the signatories' lofty ideals: 
"we the peoples of the United Nations ... reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small. " 
The nation is recognized as the agency through which the international 
community would be understood to have transferred rights to individuals. That is, 
without representation in the United Nations, those rights are threatened. 
§ 4-5 Maintenance of International Peace and Security 
The UN Charter529 lays down principles that aim to accomplish certain 
common desires,530 the most significant of which is the promise of all members to 
528 Regarding the concept of self-determination, see generally, Eric, Ting-Iun Huang, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 167(2001). 
529 See UN Charter, art. 1. 
530 In Article 55 of the UN Charter, with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
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maintain international peace and security. Undoubtedly, this is because the United 
Nations was created near the end of the greatest world war and thus, the 
multifunctional organization was defined as an instrument for eliminating armed 
conflict and for strengthening means for conflict control and resolution. Whether 
achievable or not, these common desires point the direction for action and give shape 
to the program of the world body through the development of friendly relations 
among nations; the achievement of international cooperation in solving international 
problems of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character; 531 and the 
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all human beings without 
discrimination. 532 The means for achieving the common desire include peaceful 
settlement of disputes and collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
hr f · 533 t eats to peace or acts 0 aggressIOn. 
§ 4-6 International Constitutional Supremacy 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the UN highlights the common desire as 
follows: (1) to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development; (2) to promote solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and (3) to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion. 
53! The social goals of the UN are best summarized in the phrase from the preamble of the Charter "to 
promote social progress and better standard of life in larger freedom. 
532 Conventions on economic and social rights have been developed by the UN and its affiliated 
institutions such as the International Labour Organization (hereinafter "ILO"). Besides, the UN also 
has reached numerous treaties addressing economic and social rights which can be distinguished 
between two types ofrights: (1) social rights referring to the adequate standard of living; (2) economic 
right referring to the right to property. For example, see generally Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (hereinafter "UDHR"), at art. 25, 17, and 23. 
533 Closely related to the primary goal of the United Nations to maintain international peace and 
security are the twin principles that all members states (1) shall refrain from the threat or use of force in 
any manner inconsistent with United Nations purposes, and (2) shall settle their international disputes 
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The UN Charter contains a supremacy clause providing that "in the event of a 
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."s34 Apparently, this principle, 
giving it a status on the international stage roughly comparable to that of a national 
constitution in domestic law, represent the most fundamental obligations of members 
of the United Nations and are the basic legal standards to which they promIse 
adherence. In this sense, it is remarkable to note that establishing justice and respect 
for international law is the vague goal of the United Nations. 
Since enforcement is dependent upon the actions of the individual members, 
without the cooperation of member states, any assurance of action by the United 
Nations is diminished. The tradition of state sovereignty as practiced in international 
conferences and treaty making requires unanimity among all parties according to the 
principle that no state could be bound without its own consent. For this purpose, 
evolving and implementing more effective international laws are important goals of 
the UN. Therefore, the UN Charter contains an essential and self-evident principle in 
Article 2(2) providing for the obligation of all members to fulfill in good faith all the 
obligations assumed by them in the Charter. 
~y peaceful means. 
'34 See UN Charter, Art, 103. 
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In general, consent IS most often demonstrated either through written 
agreement (such as treaty, convention and so forth) or through customary practice. In 
other words, the primary sources of international economIC and social rights are 
treaties, customs and general principles of international law that states have 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill. As a matter of international law, this is a 
huge increase given by the world body that member states move to implement the 
achievement. As the former UN secretary-general Boutros Ghali highlighted: "The 
time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched 
by reality. It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this and find a balance 
between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more 
interdependent world."s3s Indeed, nowadays movements toward promoting and 
protecting human rights across borders is a critical example to match Ghali's above 
comment that states have used their sovereignty to create international obligations that 
in tum have restricted their operational sovereignty. 
§ 4-7 Six Principal Organs 
According to the UN Charter, there are six principal organs in the UN, which 
are the General Assembly,S36 the Security Council,s37 the Economic and Social 
535 See Boutros Ghali, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 1995, New York: United Nations, 1995, para. 17. 
536 The General Assembly is the only UN organ in which all members have the right to be represented 
and to vote in the annual General Assembly sessions, which last at least three months and which 
occasionally may be prolonged for most of the year. In light of the UN Charter Art. 10, the General 
Assembly has plenary powers in the sense that it "may discuss any question or any matter within the 
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Council,538 the Trusteeship Council,539 the International Court of Justice,54o and 
Secretariat.54l Some of these bodies have numerous subsidiary organs. UN agencies 
have made major contributions to the positive accomplishments of the organization. 
Member states may have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly 
scope of the Charter." That is, the General Assembly exercises coordinating and supervisory functions 
for all other agencies within the United Nations. 
537 According to the UN Charter Art. 24(1), the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security." It consists of 15 member states, five of them 
permanent members which are China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, and the US; the remaining 
members are elected to two-year terms in accordance with a formula that is designed to ensure an 
equitable geographic representation. The reform of the Security Council has been a much debated topic 
in recent years, most of the attention has been focused on permanent seats for German and Japan as 
well as the area of reducing the damaging potential of the veto. In fact, the voting formula in the 
Security Council was reached in 1945 Yalta meeting by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Under this 
formula, unanimity of the big powers would be required on substantive matters, including any 
enforcement action in response to a breach or threat to the peace or act of aggression, but none of the 
permanent members could use the power of veto to block a procedural vote, and a party to a dispute 
was required to abstain on a decision by the Security Council to discuss the dispute. 
538 The Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) consists of 54 member states elected by the General 
Assembly to three-year terms. The function of ECOSOC is to deal with its responsibilities in the 
economic, social and humanitarian areas. In furtherance of this purpose, the ECOSOC has established a 
large number of subsidiary organs with specialized competence in those fields. Among these are 
regional economic commissions and bodies, including the UN Commission on Human Rights and the 
UN Commission on the Status of Women. 
539 In the early days of the UN, the Trusteeship Council supervised the administration of many 
so-called non-self-governing territories. Today all of these territories are independent states and the 
Trusteeship Council has become an organ with greatly diminished responsibilities. 
540 The International Court of Justice(ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN that came into 
being in 1945. According to the UN Charter Art. 92-94, all member states of the UN are parties to the 
Statute of the Court. The Statute of the Court is annexed to and forms an integral part of the UN Charter. 
States that are not UN members may adhere to the Statute under conditions that the UN has prescribed. 
The ICJ consists of 15 judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state. The judges are 
elected by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council; they have to receive an absolute 
majority of the votes in both bodies. The regular term of the judges is nine years; and they may be 
reelected. In light of UN Charter Art. 34(1), the contentious jurisdiction of the ICJ applies only to 
disputes between states which accepted that jurisdiction. The Court lacks contentious jurisdiction to 
deal with disputes involving individuals or entities that are not states. In addition to hearing cases, the 
ICJ is authorized to give advisory opinions on legal questions. The UN Charter provides that the 
General Assembly and the Security Council may request such opinions and that the General Assembly 
may authorize other organs and the specialized agencies to request opinions on legal questions within 
the scope of their activities. 
541 As enshrined in the UN Charter Art. 97, the Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and 
such a staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General is elected to a five-year term by 
the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. As that recommendation is 
subject to the veto power, the Secretary-General can be elected only with the acquiescence of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, as the chief administrative officer of the 
Organization, the Secretary-General has the power under article 99 of the UN Charter to "bring to the 
attention of Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security." This right of initiative is potentially a very powerful political weapon, 
although it has not been used to any significant extent. For detail, see Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G. 
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and one each in the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship 
Council. The UN's growing importance is amply illustrated by the fact that the UN 
headquarters is the closest approximation to a world capital and serves as a neutral 
territory where negotiations can take place without loss of prestige by any party to the 
negotiations. At this point, the national missions of the UN are more important than 
embassies to individual countries. 
B. The UN's Modern Function: Integrating Global Economy and Implementing 
Democratization 
Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union542 and the former Yugoslavia543 
which led to the end of the Cold War, the UN is no longer a place for confrontation, 
Maier, Public International Law, 1990, pp. 38-41. 
542 The definitive stages of the break-up of the former Soviet Union began with the failed coup by 
hard-line Communists in August 1991 that sparked declarations of independence from all of the 
republics of the former Soviet Union except Russia and Kazakhstan. In the midst of these declarations 
of independence, the Soviet Government formally recognized the independence of the Baltic States of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on September 6, 1991, 
but attempted to keep the other twelve republics together in a Union of Sovereign States with both the 
Union and the individual republics maintaining international personalities. As a result of a referendum, 
affIrmed by 90% of the vote that doomed the Union Treaty at the outset, the Republics of Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia formally declared that the Soviet Union had disintegrated and announced the 
formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. By December of 1991, all of the republics 
except Georgia had agreed to membership in the Commonwealth and the Soviet Union was considred 
dissolved. See generally Urs W. Saxer, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: FROM 
A SOCIALIST FEDERATION TO A COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES,14 Loy. L.A. 
Int'l & Compo LJ. 581, 670 ( 1992); see also Paul R. Williams, THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF 
THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: DO THEY CONTINUE IN FORCE?, 23 Denv. J. Int'l L. & pory 1,3(1994). 
543 See id., Paul R. Williams, THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF 
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA: DO THEY 
CONTINUE IN FORCE?, at 4-6.See also Svetozar Stojanovic, THE DESTRUCTION OF 
YUGOSLAVIA, 19 Fordham Int'l L. J. 337, 358(1995) (discussing that the secessions from Yugoslavia 
Was viewed as self determination movements); see also Gideon A. Moor, Note, THE REPUBLIC OF 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND ARTICLE 51: INHERENT RIGHTS AND UNEMT 
RESPONSIBILITIES, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 870, 873-4(1995) (discussing the fall of communism in 
1989, the changing face of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and the nationalist self-determination 
movement). See generally John Tagliabue, CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, 
at A6 (describing political successors in Yugoslavia as former communists who evoke old national 
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but has been transfonned into a forum for reaching real decisions that matter to the 
d 544 real worl . 
§ 4-8 Aftennath of the Cold War 
More importantly, national political leaders cling stubbornly to national 
sovereignty and independence m a world m which traditional approaches are 
inadequate to the needs of humankind. Contrary to earlier practice in the UN, in fact, 
going beyond the traditional peacemaking and peacekeeping techniques that have 
been applied both to disputes between states and to internal conflicts, there is a 
growing realization that, for these to be effective, integrating the global economy and 
implementing democracy is an idea whose time has come. 
Although a large proportion of the world population still suffers from severe 
deprivation of human welfare including widespread poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and 
disease, the rapid growth of multinational cooperation has contributed to development 
of common economic policies among the member states. In this respect, the UN is a 
useful step toward the world's new economic order in spite of the fact that there is no 
guarantee of rapid progress in economic development. Significantly, the mapping out 
of advance strategies for the promotion of common interests often leads to the 
application of efficient methods for maximum progress. In reality, the majority of the 
aspirations as a way of casting off that which originally gave rise to communism). 
544 See Christoph Schreuer, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
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world has always shared a common interest in focusing on economic issues. The 
international community may be willing to seek accommodation through the UN for 
the strengthening of international means for assuring this common interest in order to 
satisfy this crucial need which is a process of arrangements for global cooperation 
between national and international economies. Under the circumstances, in such an 
increasingly interdependent world, those UN member states with strong economic 
power must provide their efforts to assist the UN regarding these modem issues. 
§ 4-9 Improving the Well-Being of Mankind 
In response to the concerns mentioned above, the UN, as a multifunctional 
organization, must focus its particular attention on the basic needs of its member 
states so that the progress of national implementation of this common interest can 
therefore assure minimum levels of basic rights to the citizens of each member state. 
Accordingly, this involves cooperation and coordination within the UN system. For 
this purpose, the UN clearly has a primary role in creating conditions whereby the 
integration of the global economy becomes achievable with every member state being 
able to take appropriate measures to improve the well-being of its citizens by 
implementing the UN approved projects or policies. 
Since the economic rights of every human being should be treated equally under 
ORGANIZATION, 11 Transnat'l Law. 419, 421-2(1998). 
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the concept of equality of international law545 and an entity with "economic 
sovereignty" is the key actor for the economIC globalization In international 
organization,546 a legal approach to guaranteeing these basic rights generally 
encounters a substantial overlap between economic rights and political rights. It is 
impossible to separate completely economic Issues from political matters. Hence, 
besides the function of the international global economy which is to guarantee the 
economic right of every member state, the enhancing of the UN's mediating function 
to implement democratization in its member states is also part of the expanded role of 
the UN in the modern world. After all, the UN and its agencies are organized around 
both economic and political concerns. 
In fact, the concept of "implementing democratization" rests on the 
assumption that every state is entitled to protect the full and equal enjoyment of 
political rights both on the domestic and international planes, which should be 
respected and recognized by other states SInce there IS a pnmary interest III 
545 International law is deficient in several of the attributes that contribute to the effectiveness of 
national legal systems. Traditionally, only states have been considered the subjects of international law 
although, in recent years, in such areas as human rights, a trend toward the applicability of international 
law to individuals has been emerging. 
546 See Eleanor D. Kinney, THE EMERGING FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: ITS CONTENT AND POTENTIAL, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 415, 417(2002)(Noting that the 
development and existence of public international organizations to regulate aspects of the global 
economy or environment is a relatively recent phenomenon). See also John W. Head, THROWING 
EGGS AT WINDOWS: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL GLOBALIZATION IN THE 
21ST-CENTURY ECONOMY, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 731, 732(2002)(Noting that there are numerous 
definitions of globalization and an overwhelming proliferation of books, articles, symposia, and 
hand-wringing over various aspects of it; but the most important aspect is economic in character, 
largely because it is in the economic sphere where we see globalization having the most profound legal 
and institutional ramifications). 
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maintaining peace and a fundamental value of human rights guaranteed under 
international law. That is to say, the scope of the international guarantee of human 
rights should be seen as a contribution to the maintenance of peace among nations. 547 
In this sense, regardless of the difference between de facto and de jure government,548 
all the member states must agree in advance that the legal equality of rights refers to 
the enjoyment of economic and political rights which is without distinction of any 
kind. 
§ 4-10 Accommodating of States with Popular Sovereignty to Join the UN and Its 
Specialized Agencies 
Popular participation and cross-cultural dialogue IS essential for the 
implementation of global integration economically and politically. Accordingly, the 
UN must open up its participatory procedure in order to accommodate any de facto or 
de jure government with popular sovereignty to join the UN and its specialized 
547 See for example, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS: REPORT OF 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, 24 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 61) at 10, U.N. Doc. An720 
(1969)( Noting that the Second World War gave conclusive proof of the close relationship which exists 
between outrageous behavior of a Government towards its own citizens and aggression against other 
nations, thus between respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace). 
548 A de facto government is one in actual control of the governmental machinery of the State and 
exercising its authority without substantial opposition.(P. K. Menon, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1994, P.83,92). In response to a question with regard to the principles of 
recognition, Bristish Foreign Secretary, H. Morrision indicated in the House of Commons: "The 
conditions under international law for the recognition of a new regime as the de facto Government of a 
State are that the new regime has in fact effective control over most of the State's territory and that this 
control seems likely to continue. The conditions for the recognition of a new regime as the de jure 
Government of a State are that the new regime should not merely have effective control over most of 
the State's territory, but that it should, in fact, be firmly established."( Hansard, House of Commons, 
Vol., 485, March 21, 1951). In fact, there are few meaningful distinctions between a de facto and a de 
Jure recognition(Ma1colm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1991,249-57). 
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agencies.549 This would help the UN in fulfilling its modem function. In the sense 
that the effectiveness of the Organization would be increased by the achievement of 
universality, one possible approach is to develop an international right to popular 
sovereignty of individual states that can act as a standard and be applied to each 
situation in attempting to promote membership universality. That is, one efficient way 
of implementing democratization and economIC globalization at the individual 
country level is for the UN to proceed with its membership admission process with 
justice and fairness so that all mankind can be substantively served by the world body. 
Only when the UN system does have this kind of achievement, can the goal of 
establishing a truly democratic and prosperous society be realized. 
III. THE MEMBERSHIP ISSUE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
The United Nations is an universal organization.55o The universality principle 
means that all states and all persons should be properly represented in the world body. 
549 See Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G. Maier, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, West Group, 
1998, pp. 45-6.(Stating that despite their names, the so called specialized agencies of the UN are 
neither organs nor subsidiary organs of the UN. They are autonomous international organizations 
having an institutional affiliation with the UN .... [M]ore than a dozen international organizations have 
obtained specialized agency status by concluding the necessary agreements with the UN. Some of these 
organizations predate the UN itself, among them the International Telecommunications Union(ITU), 
the Universal Postal Union(UPU), and the International Labor Organization(ILO). Other well known 
specialized agencies are the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization(UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization(lCAO), the World Health 
Organization(WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO). The two major international 
financial institutions: the World Bank and the International Monetary(lMF), also have specialized 
agency status.) 
550 See J.A. Lindgren Alves, THE UNITED NATIONS, POSTMODERNITY, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 479, 486-7(1998)(Noting that the United Nations is still the only existing 
universal body for dealing with the problems of the contemporary scene on a global scale) 
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Article 4 of the UN Charter states that the UN membership IS "open to all the 
peace-loving states who are willing to accept the obligations in the Charter." Evidently, 
UN membership presupposes statehood. 551 In an Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice(hereinafter "ICJ") on Conditions of Admission of a 
State to membership in the United Nations, the Court pointed out that additional 
considerations, over and above that of statehood, apply when membership of the UN 
is at stake. In tenns of article 4(1) of the UN Charter, the aspiring member must:552 
(1) be a state;553 (2) be peace loving; (3)accept the obligations of the Charter; 
(4) be able to carry out those obligation, and willing to do so. 
At the earlier stages of the UN, regardless of the fact that the applicants could 
meet the standards for admission, many unsuccessful candidates were the victims of a 
Cold War political contest in which the United States and the Soviet Union each 
managed to block the candidates favored by the other through voting requirements in 
55l See van der Vyver, STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5 Emory. Int'l L. Rev. 9, 
26-7(1991)(Noting that the view that UN membership presupposes statehood is shared by, among 
others, Frowein: "[I]t is clear that the quality of State of a UN member cannot be denied."(H. Kelsen, 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL 
PROBLEMS, 1951, pp. 946-48); Philip Jessup agreed that the criteria of statehood were included in 
those of UN membership, but the opposite, is not the case. (P. Jessup, A MODERN LAW OF 
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION, 1968, p. 47)). 
552 See ADMISSION OF A STATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Advisory Opinion, 1948 ICJ REP. 
57,61 (May 28). 
553 Non-self-governing political units or autonomous states are sometimes considered as the units 
eligible for membership in the UN, despite the fact that the principle of sovereignty is one of the 
cornerstones upon which the United Nations is constructed. For instance, the UN granted exceptions to 
the requirement of statehood in its list of original members. The Soviet Union claimed a right of 
separate membership for each of its sixteen union republics. The concession to include the Ukraine and 
Byelorussia as original members did not meet generally accepted standards of statehood. India and the 
Philippines were also accorded the status of original member prior to the transfer of sovereignty. See 
A. LeBoy Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,1995, p.59. 
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the Security Council. This deadlock in membership applications led to a request from 
the General Assembly to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion. The request raised two 
major questions: one was with regard to whether a member state is juridically entitled 
to make its consent to the admission of a new member dependent on conditions not 
expressly provided by Article 4 of the UN Charter. The other one was whether a 
member can make its consent subject to the condition that other states be admitted at 
the same time. 
In response to these substantive issues raised by the General Assembly in 1948, 
the Court advised that the conditions for admission of members specified in Article 4 
of the Charter were exhaustive and that members were not justified in adding other 
conditions. Following this conclusion, the Court continued to indicate that the 
admission of one member cannot be made contingent upon the admission of another, 
and that each member's admission should be based solely on its own qualifications. 
Another attempt to clarify the issues behind the admission process was the request 
made by the General Assembly in 1949 regarding the question as to whether the 
General Assembly could admit a state to membership in the absence of a positive 
recommendation by the Security Council. The Court replied that such a procedure 
would violate the clear intent of the Charter. 
i 4-11 The Principle of Membership Universality 
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In general, the principle of membership universality may be achieved if three 
conditions are present: (1) if the procedures for admission are not too difficult or rigid; 
(2) if the existing members are cooperative and committed to achieving universality, 
and (3) if nonmembers are willing to seek membership.554 In this respect, the 
principle of membership universality can reinforce legality in two types of cases. One 
is the admission of Monaco, whose statehood had for long been doubted by scholars 
and who once filed but then withdrew an application for admission to the League of 
Nations. Membership for Monaco, an entity that was already a member of a number 
of international organizations and generally recognized by other states, became more 
understandable in the light of the principle of universality. The other one is the case of 
the admission of the Congo, illustrating the admissions decisions rendered without 
regard to the traditional definition but in accordance with the principle of 
self-determination. In fact, the principle of self-determination has been frequently 
mentioned in the UN by member states in favor of those admissions. 555 Both types of 
cases mentioned above presents strong evidence that the United Nations is becoming 
almost universal. Obviously, the principle of universality could provide flexible 
reinforcement for exceeding the proper limits of the traditional conditions for 
554 See A. LeBoy Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1995, p. 78. 
555 See generally Frederick, Tse-Shyang Chen, THE MEANING OF "STATES" IN THE 
MEMBERSHIP PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, 12 Ind. Int'l & Compo L. 
Rev. 25, 25-51(2001). 
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application to UN membership. 
When states are represented in the United Nations, they are equally represented. 
No state possesses a higher status than another state. The sovereign equality of the 
members refers to legal status rather than to size, power, or wealth. However, there 
are millions of people in the world who are trying to be represented in the UN, e.g., 
the people of Taiwan. But this universal organization cannot be of benefit to these 
people due to the gap of membership. There is the need for the UN to seek solutions 
to these problems. 
§ 4-12 Admission to Membership 
As mentioned above, membership in the UN is open to all "peace-loving" states. 
To declare a nation "peace-loving," it is necessary to prove that it is ready and able to 
accept and fulfill the obligations of the UN Charter. Moreover, the elements of 
statehood comprise one of the basic conditions for membership. Traditionally, a valid 
claim to statehood requires the satisfaction of four criteria: a permanent population; a 
defined territory; a self-government, and the capacity to enter into formal relations 
with other states. 556 However, the principle of admission membership can possibly 
be subject to political considerations.557 At this point, before examining the legal 
556 See art. 1, Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1,49 Stat. 
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force, Dec. 26, 1934) (hereinafter Montevideo Convention) 
557 See Igor Janev, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF A PROVISIONAL NAME FOR 
MACEDONIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 155, 155(1999)(Noting that 
the conditions for the admission of states were the subject of exhaustive political and legal 
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conditions of membership, it is important to understand that the issue of the admission 
of members to the UN is based on partly legal and partly political considerations as 
noted above. Hence, which political entities constitute "state" and which ones are 
"peace-loving" or deemed "able and willing to carry out international obligation" are 
sometimes highly based on political decisions. In particular, during the period of the 
Cold War, politics often overpowered legalities. 558 
In order to break the deadlock III membership applications, the Australian 
representative proposed that: when the Security Council initially considered its 
procedure III dealing with membership questions, the applications should be first 
considered by the General Assembly, that the Security Council should only consider 
and make recommendations with respect to matters relating to peace and security, and 
that decisions on membership should be taken by the Assembly alone. However, this 
view did not gain support from other members of the Council as being consistent with 
Charter Provisions. 559 
§ 4-13 Procedures for Granting UN Membership 
Under the UN Charter, as discussed earlier, states can only be granted UN 
deliberations at the United Nations during the 1940s when many states were applying for membership); 
See Ibrahim J. Gassama, WORLD ORDER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE RELEVANCE 
AND ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER FIFTY YEARS, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 155, 
330(1999)(FNI50)(Noting that UN practice generally has been to treat the issue of membership in 
purely political terms with little attention paid to the character of the national government or to its 
treatment of its citizens). 
558 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., International Organizations, 1993, p.138. 
559 See UN Security Council, OFFICIAL RECORDS, 50 th Meeting(Aug. 28, 1946), pp. 47-60. See 
also Leland M. Goodrich, THE UNITED NATIONS, 1959, P.91. 
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membership with a decision of the General Assembly, reached by a two-thirds 
majority upon the recommendation of the Security Council, where five states hold 
veto powers on nonprocedural matters. 560 Therefore, anyone of the five "great 
powers" can single-handedly block any aspmng state from jOllllllg the United 
Nations. 561 In fact, it did happen in the early history of the United Nations. During 
the time of the Cold War, the admission of members to the UN became a battleground 
issue between the Soviet Union and the West. It is noted that all pro-Communist(pro 
Soviet Union) candidates were blocked by the Western states under the US leadership, 
and all non-Communist (pro United States) applications were vetoed by the Soviet 
Union.562 Charter criteria for admission were robbed of significant meanlllg by 
consent for political power in the United Nations. Since the admissions problem was 
560 The specific procedures for application are as follows: In accordance with rules 58-60 of the 
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, a State desiring U.N. membership must submit 
its application to the Secretary General, who places the application upon the Security Council's 
provisional agenda. Unless the Council decides otherwise, the application is submitted to the 
Committee on the Admission of New Members, comprised of a representative of each Council member, 
for its report. After considering the Committee's report, the Council votes on whether to recommend 
the applicant for membership. Votes on admitting new members are subject to veto. In evaluating the 
applicant, the Council may consider "any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to 
connect with the conditions laid down" in the advisory opinion of the IC] on Conditions of a State to 
Admission in the United Nations. If the Council recommends membership, it forwards its 
recommendation to the General Assembly. Article 18(2) of the Charter requires that admission 
decisions be made by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly members present and voting.(See 
generally Michael P. Scharf, MUSICAL CHAIRS: THE DISSOLUTION OF STATES AND 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS, 28 Cornell Int'l L. 1. 29, 69,1995). 
561 In recent years, due to an increase in large numbers of the UN members, it has become more 
difficult than before for any great power to manipulate the General Assembly. In this respect, resulting 
from the realization of a common interest, the General Assembly has started making efforts to influence 
the Security Council to eliminate certain categories of questions from the exercise of the veto power. 
The admission of members is one of the certain categories. 
562 As like other big powers, the Soviet Union used its veto right to protect the vital interests. During 
the earlier years of the UN, the Soviet Union's vital interests were frequently threatened because of 
western control of the issues in the Security Council and because of the minority position of the Soviet 
Union. Since 1970, the US increasingly resorted to the veto, while the Soviet Union seldom needed 
recourse to this device. 
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basically political rather than procedural, compromise of competing interests had to 
be the final solution in the form of a "package deal." 
Notwithstanding that Article 5 and 6 of the UN Charter provide for suspension 
and expulsion of members from the UN,563 there is no provision made in the Charter 
regarding the issue of withdrawal from membership. In all of UN's history, only one 
state, Indonesia, has ever announced its withdrawal due to the election of Malaysia to 
a Security Council Seat, but after an absence of twenty months, it returned to full 
participation. Regarding the issue of Indonesia's returning to the UN, no readmission 
process was deemed necessary. This is because the withdrawal of Indonesia from the 
UN was only a statement of intent but no official acceptance of this withdrawal had 
been issued by the United Nations. 
§ 4-14 Observer Status and the Case of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
Observer status does not appear III the UN Charter, but the UN General 
Assembly has granted it to some nonmember states and to an international 
organization. In 1990 the UN General Assembly accorded observer status to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, a non-governmental organization. A 
number of UN specialized agencIes have also adopted the practice of granting 
observer status to some entities that do not qualify for full membership. 
563 According to Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter, the General Assembly may suspend or expel a 
member by a two-thirds vote upon the recommendation of the Security Council. So far, no action has 
253 
On October 14, 1974, the UN General Assembly invited the Palestine Liberation 
Organization(hereinafter "PLO,,)564 to participate "in the debate relative to the 
Palestine question. ,,565 Later, in November 22 of the same year, the UN accorded to 
the PLO the status of an observer by adopting General Assembly Resolution 3237 
which invited the PLO to "participate in the sessions and the work of the General 
Assembly in that capacity." Since then, the PLO has continued to enjoy its observer 
status without interruption and has maintained its Mission to the UN without trammel. 
In 1975, the UN General Assembly established a Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to help with the settlement of the 
Palestine problem.566 
However, due to the US declaring that the PLO was a terrorist organization,567 
the right of the PLO's participation in the UN turned to be a huge challenge to UN 
ever been taken under this principle. 
564 The creation of the PLO in 1964 was authorized at an Arab summit conference pursuant to a 
previous Arab League council decision to affirm a Palestinian entity and place the cause of liberation in 
the hands of the Palestinians themselves. In the same year, the PLO was defined by a Palestine 
National Congress as a responsible organization for the direction of the Palestinian people in their 
struggle for the liberation of their homeland, in all liberational, political, and financial fields and also 
for whatever measures may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international level. 
The Congress immediately notified the UN that the PLO would be "the only legitimate spokesman for 
all matters concerning the Palestine people." Today, the PLO retains the support ofthe Arab League. 
565 See Beth DeBernardi, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND CONFLICTING TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS: UNITED STATES v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, 23 Cornell 
Int'l L. J. 83, 89(1990). 
566 In 1976, the Committee recommended that the UN Security Council establish a timetable for Israeli 
evacuation of the occupied territories, and that "[t]he evacuated territories, with all property and 
services intact, should be taken over by the United Nations, which with the co-operation of the League 
of Arab States, will subsequently hand over these evacuated areas to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people."(See 31 GAOR Supp. No. 35, at 15, 1976) 
567 According to § 5201(b) of the US Anti-Terrorism Act, the PLO was stated to be "a terrorist 
organization and a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law and 
should not benefit from operating in the United States. 
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practices. For instance, in 1987, the US Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism 
Act(hereinafter "ATA,,)568 to force the PLO mission to close within the jurisdiction of 
the United States. This prompted the UN General Assembly to take the position 
overwhelmingly that the US would be violating the 1947 Headquarters Agreement 
and therefore, requested a legal opinion from the ICl. 
§ 4-15 The 1987 Anti-Terrorism Act & the 1947 Headquarters Agreement 
The Court unanimously issued an opIlllOn that the US legislation was III 
violation of the Headquarters Agreement and under an obligation to enter into 
arbitration for the settlement of the dispute between itself and the UN.569 This 
position was also sustained in a New York federal district court case.570 Again, in 
December 1988, despite the fact that the UN invited Mr. Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of 
the PLO, to address the UN General Assembly in New York, the US denied a visa to 
Mr. Arafat to prevent him from entering the United States in order to safeguard its 
own security.571 In response, the General Assembly reconvened its session in Geneva 
568 See ATA, 22 U.S.C §§ 5201-5203. 
569 Applicability ofthe Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the UN Headquarters Agreement of 
26 June 1947(See I.CJ. 12,35,1988). 
570 Despite the State Department's concession and the UN General Assembly support for the right of 
PLO mission to remain, the US Department of Justice brought an action in federal district court in New 
York to evict the PLO. After the New York district court dismissed the action, a conflict developed 
within the U.S. govermnent over whether or not to appeal. The Justice Department wanted to appeal, 
but the State Department did not. President Regan had to resolve the conflict. He decided that no 
appeal would be undertaken. 
571 The U.S. Govermnent presented evidence declaring that PLO elements engaged in terrorism 
against Americans and others. This evidence includes a series of operations undertaken by the Force 17 
and the Hawari organizatons since the PLO claimed to foreswear the use of terrorism in the Cairo 
declaration of November 1985. As Chairman of the PLO, Mr. Arafat is responsible for actions of these 
organizations which are units of Fatah, an element of the PLO of which he also is chairman and which 
is under his control. For details, see generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. INTERNATIONAL 
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to hear Mr. Arafat's address. This consequently made the US open the negotiations 
with the PLO on the basis that Mr. Arafat had modified and clarified his positions on 
terrorism and Israel's right to exist, the grounds for denial of the visa. As mentioned 
above, to sum up, it is particularly significant that the language of the 1947 
Headquarter Agreement572 restrains the US from interference with the PLO Observer 
Mission in the discharge of its functions at the United Nations. Therefore, the PLO 
has continued to enjoy the opportunity to make its positions known to the membership 
of the UN. 
Regardless of the fact that the PLO did not qualify for full membership, the 
PLO asked to be allowed to participate in the general debate that gave rise to a 
controversial issue in the UN as to whether or not only representatives of Member 
states are qualified to participate III the general debate. The question of PLO's 
participation has also come up in the UN Security Council. In fact, the request for the 
participation of the PLO was faced with the situation that there IS an inherent 
difference between the PLO and a sovereign State, to the extent that the PLO lacks 
statehood but is a body which has been granted an official status within the UN, 
namely, the status of permanent observer, as the sole legitimate representative of the 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING, 2nd edition, 1993, p.114 
572 See, for example, Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement reads, in part, "The federal, state or 
local authorities of the US shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters 
district of: (1) representatives of Members ... , (5) other persons invited to the headquarters district by 
the United Nations ... on official business."(Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. INTERNATIONAL 
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Palestinian people. After very careful examination of the Charter, the rules of 
procedure of the UN General Assembli73 and the Security Counci1574 as well as the 
spirit of this Organization, theoretically, it would be inappropriate to accord an 
observer(such as the PLO) the right of reply to any member in the general debate 
because the right to speak in the general debate is enjoyed by member states. In the 
case of the Security Council, an observer(such as the PLO) would be granted 
permISSIon to speak only if the request complies with Rule 39 of the Security 
Council's provisional rules of procedure. 
§ 4-16 Granting of PLO 's Participation in the General Debate and the Security 
Council 
However, in the UN existing practice, the PLO, as a UN observer, has been 
granted permISSIon to speak both III the General Assembly and III the Security 
Council. 575 In spite of that, as a matter of the basic principle of the UN Charter, the 
PLO's UN position should not be taken as a change in the observer status of the PLO 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING, 2nd edition, 1993, p.lIO) 
573 Articles 3 and 4 of the UN Charter highlights that only states can be Members of the Organization. 
Moreover, the language of Rule 73 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly provides the right 
of reply in the plenary Assembly available to Members. 
574 Rule 37 and 39 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure provides: Any Member of 
the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a 
decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought 
before the Security Council when the Security considers that the interests of that Member are specially 
affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with 
Article 35(1) of the Charter(Rule 37). The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or 
other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give 
other assistance in examining matters within its competence(Rule 39). 
575 In the case of the participation of the Security Council, a proposal indicating that "there should be 
accorded an invitation to the PLO to participate in this debate, and that invitation will confer upon it the 
Same rights of participation as are conferred when a Member State is invited to participate under rule 
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at the UN or the recognition of any State of Palestine,576 although some 
commentators have argued that Palestine is a state for meeting all the four traditional 
criteria for statehood.577 
Since the UN General Assembly's grant of observer status to the PLO in 1974, 
the PLO, as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has 
increasingly been allowed to act on the international plane as the exclusive agent of 
the Palestinian people. It has been accepted as an observer member of the 
organization of non-aligned countries, and has been invited to participate in numerous 
international conferences. This IS because the UN General Assembly Resolution 
3236 578 identified the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people," 
reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) 
the right to self-determination without external interference; (b) the right to national 
37" was adopted to resolve the conflict. 
576 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., ADMISSION OF "PALESTINE" AS A MEMBER OF A 
SPECIALIZED AGENCY AND WITHHOLDING THE PAYMENT OF ASSESSMENTS IN 
RESPONSE, 84 Am J. Int'l L. 218, 219-20(1990)(Noting that even though the Palestine National 
Council has declared "the establishment of the State of Palestine," and even though many governments 
have apparently recognized such a state, several other governments have withheld recognition on the 
ground that "Palestine" does not meet the conditions required to be a state. When the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted its resolution on the "Question of Palestine" in December 1988, it did not 
recognize a Palestinian state; nor did it call the PLO a provisional government. Instead, it 
acknowledged that the Palestine National Council had proclaimed the State of Palestine, affIrmed the 
need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise sovereignty over the occupied territories, and changed 
the PLO's designation to "Palestine" in the UN system). 
577 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING, 
2nd edition, 1993, p.380(Noting that (a) the territory does not have to be determinate, as shown by the 
fact that Israel is recognized as a state despite its lack of fixed territorial boundaries( except with Egypt); 
(b) the Palestinian people constitute the population, and have for centuries; (c) the PLO serves as the 
provisional government of Palestine, effectively controlling substantial sections of the territory and 
providing public services to Palestinians in Palestine and abroad; and (d) Palestine's capacity to enter 
into international relations is shown by the fact that more than 100 states had recognized it as a state 
within two years of the Proclamation ofIndependence, and by the General Assembly resolutions.) 
578 See Nov. 22, 1974,29 GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 4. 
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independence and sovereignty," and recognized "the right of the Palestinian people to 
regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations." 
In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted its Resolution 43/17i79 to 
acknowledge the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National 
Council on November 15, 1988, and decided that the designation "Palestine" should 
be used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the United 
Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization within the United Nations system. 
As discussed above, except the right to vote in official UN sessions, there is no 
doubt that representatives of observer missions have access to UN facilities in the 
headquarters district and to all open sessions of the UN General Assembly. On certain 
occasions, they are even entitled to speak in official UN sessions. 
IV. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 2758 AND THE QUESTION OF 
REPRESENTATION 
At the inception of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, the Republic of 
China was a founding member and one of the five permanent members of the UN 
579 See G.A. Res. 431177,43 GAOR Supp. No. 49(A/43/49), at 62. 
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Security Council. 580 Consistent with the basic principle of the sovereignty of 
members, the UN Charter does not specify any qualifications for representation. The 
question of representation came up in the United Nations when the Soviet Union 
proposed a Security Council resolution that would have rejected the credentials of the 
Republic of China representative in 1950. From then on, the Soviet Union had argued 
that the ROC did not have the right to represent the seat of China in the United 
Nations. This is because, in 1949, after the ROC lost the civil war, the ROC also lost 
control over mainland China. 
§ 4-17 Background: Draft Resolution by the Soviet Union 
After the Chinese civil war resulting in the emergence of two governments in the 
Chinese nation, the issue of who should sit in the United Nations to represent China -
whether the ROC or the PRC - came up and became disputable. In January 1950, a 
draft resolution that would have denied the credential of the ROC representatives was 
first raised by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Without support by the 
majority of members, the draft resolution was defeated. That led to the boycott of the 
UN Security Council by the Soviet Union for a few months in 1950 as a way of 
protesting the continued sitting of the ROC representatives. 581 
580 In Article 23 of the UN Charter, the Republic of China was named among the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. 
~I ili See UN ANNUAL REPORT: 1 JULY 1949- 30 JUNE 1950,5 Sess. Supp. 1 (AI1287), pp. 31-33. 
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Coincidentally, the Korean anned conflict broke out at the same time. 582 Hence, 
without the presence of the Soviet Union, a series of UN resolutions583 relating to the 
Korean crisis (including the offer of necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea to 
repel the armed attack by North Korea, as well as the recommendation that all 
Members provide military forces to a unified command under the United States to 
restore international peace and security in the area due to the increase of intervention 
by the Chinese Communist military units in Korea) were adopted in the Security 
Counci1.584 During the Soviet absence, a unified UN command was established. In 
reality, this command deputized the United States to lead the defense of South Korea 
in the name of the United Nations.585 
§ 4-18 The Question of Representation 
As a matter of fact, the question of Chinese representation was regarded as a 
unique case in the history of the United Nations since it involved a revolutionary 
582 World War II left Korea divided with Soviet forces occupying the North and US forces, the South. 
A UN call for withdrawal of foreign troops and elections throughout a unified Korea was opposed by 
the Communist government, leading to elections only in the South and the withdrawal of most US 
troops. In June 1950, force from North Korea (the Democratic Republic of Korea) attacked South 
Korea (the Republic of Korea). The Soviet Union, the PRC and the rest of the Communist world 
supported the North. 
583 See the 1950 UN Security Council Resolution 82, 83, 84, and 85.(RESOLUTIONS AND 
STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 1946-1992, edited by Karel C. 
Wellens, Kluwer Academic Publisher, US, 1993, pp.323-327) (hereinafter: RESOLUTIONS OF THE 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL). 
584 Only the accident of Soviet absence, piqued over the Chinese-representation issue, allowed the 
Security Council, in 1950, to authorize collective action in Korea. The return of the Soviet 
representative to the Council table on August 1, 1950, precluded any further agreement on the basic 
issues in Korea. 
585 See Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS, Westview Press, 1997, pp.47-8.(Noting that the defense of South 
Korea was not a classic example of collective security.) 
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change of government and the first time the two rival governments coexisted. In 1950, 
the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie made public a memorandum, entitled "Legal 
Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United Nations,,,586 which mentioned 
that the question of representation was linked to the question of the recognition by 
Member States; the Chinese case is unique in the history of the UN, not because it 
involved a revolutionary change of government, but because it was the first time in 
which two rival governments existed.587 In the same year, a subcommittee of the 
General Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee worked out a draft resolution related 
to the representation as follows: 588 
(aJ That whenever more than one authority claims to 
be the government entitled to represent a Member 
State in the United Nations, and this question becomes 
the subject of controversy in the United Nations, it 
should be considered in the light of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter and the circumstances of 
each case; 
586 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING, 
2ND edition, 1993, pp.l77-l78. 
587 In his memorandum, Mr. Trygve Lie also pointed out that it is quite possible that such a situation 
will occur again in the future and it is highly desirable to see what principle can be followed in 
choosing between the rival. For detail, see U.N. Doc. SI1466 (1950). 
588 This resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly included paragraph (a) as its first operative 
paragraph but did not contain any other standards by which to determine such questions. 
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(b) That the following should be among the factors to 
be taken into consideration in determining any such 
question: 
(i) The extent to which the new authority exercises 
effective control over the territory of the Member State 
concerned and is generally accepted by the 
population; 
(ii) The willingness of that authority to accept 
responsibility for the carrying out by the Member State 
of its obligations under the Charter; 
(iii) The extent to which that authority has been 
established through internal processes in the Member 
State. 
Before 1960, for ten years, the proposal sponsored by Albania and twenty other 
member states, calling for the seating of the PRC as the only legitimate 
representatives of China and the expulsion of the representatives of the ROC, was 
avoided in the UN General Assembly agenda by adopting a resolution to postpone 
considering the matter in the UN General Assembly. After 1960, due to the expansion 
of UN membership by the admission of newly independent states, the Western powers 
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no longer dominated the UN as before. Thus, more and more member states began to 
contemplate the Chinese representation question. In 1961, for the first time, the issue 
was put before the UN General Assembly. In the meantime, a draft resolution, 
sponsored by the US, that declared the expulsion of the ROC as an "important 
question" (meaning it should be made by a two-thirds majority for approval)589was 
adopted III the UN General Assembly. From then on, the United States had 
successfully used such a resolution to keep the PRC out and the ROC in until 1971. 
This IS because any attempt to change the Chinese representation would have 
collected a simple majority to admit the PRC, but no majority could be mustered. 
Because of its commitment to the Chiang Kai-shek regime of the ROC,59o the 
US for more than two decades led the fight to save the ROC by using procedural 
tactics. However, it could not ignore the fact that the PRC was the regime effectively 
in control of the Chinese mainland. In this regard, it became more difficult for the US 
to fight for the ROC on the issue of Chinese representation591 on the grounds that 
589 Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-third majority of 
the members present and voting. Admission of new Member to the United Nations is deemed as an 
important question under Article 18(2) of the UN Charter. For detail of Article 18, see 1945 Can. T. S. 7; 
1945 S.A.T.S. 6. 
590 See A. LeRoy Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES, 
Prentice Hall, US, 1995, p.86. 
591 In order to hold a seat in the UN for Taiwan, the US proposed a compromise by favoring a Security 
Council seat for the PRC so that both Chinas can sit at the UN at the same time. But the proposal was 
defeated by both Chinese regimes because of the assertion of one China policy. See Frederic L. Kirgis, 
Jr., INTNERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, West Publishing Co., US, 1993, p.180.(Hereinafter: 
Kirgis, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS). Regarding the Chinese dual representation issue, 
see generally James Wang, WHO LOST THE UN, Taipei Times, August 1, 2002(Noting that, instead of 
fighting for a seat for the ROC in the UN, Chiang Kai-shek was competing with the PRC for the 
legitimacy of representing "the whole of China." That is, he would rather have lost the ROC's UN seat 
than co-exist with the PRC in the world body.) 
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more and more member states were convinced that the PRC was the government 
exercising effective authority within the territory of China and thus, should represent 
the State in the United Nations. The changing world situation made it unfeasible for 
the ROC to preserve its seat in the UN, despite efforts made by the United States. As a 
result, in 1971, the issue of Chinese representation took an about tum and was no 
longer characterized as an important question under Article 18 of the UN Charter by 
the majority of the members present and voting in the UN General Assembly.592 At 
this point, the ROC Delegation left the General Assembly Hall. Realizing the 
imminence ofthe PRC's entry to assume China's seat in the UN at the next subsequent 
ballot on a substantive "unimportant" question, the ROC representatives announced 
its gracious withdrawal from the United Nations. Resolution 2758,593 no longer 
requiring a two-thirds majority and without any recommendation from the Security 
Council, was adopted within minutes by a simple majority with the immediate effect 
to admit the PRC to take China's seat and "expel" the Chiang Kai-shek 
representatives from the United Nations. 
Because of the resolution, the ROC, representing the people on Taiwan, has been 
592 The key decision that signaled the United States' defeat came when the General Assembly voted, 
59 to 55 with 15 absentees, to reject the American draft resolution. An analysis of the voting showed 
that the abstention of eight nations that had been thought almost to the last to be leaning toward the 
United States position had been fatal to the American cause. Had they voted with the United States, the 
American "important question" resolution would have been adopted, 63 to 59. For detail, see New York 
Times, October 26, 1971. (www.nytimes.comllibrary/worldiasiall02671china-re1ations.html) 
593 The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 was passed in the 26th session of the UN General 
Assembly to admit Beijing to replace Taipei to sit in the Untied Nations and its Security Council. For 
details about the resolution, see GA. Res. 2758, 26 GAOR Supp. 29 (A/8429), at 2, United Nations 
265 
deprived of appropriate and effective representation in the United Nations as well as 
the right to participate in the political, economic, cultural and social development 
activities within the UN system. 
§ 4-19 The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 
The General Assembly, 
Recalling the principle of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 
Considering that the restoration of the lawful 
rights of the People s Republic of China is essential 
both for the protection of the Charter of the United 
Nations and for the cause that United Nations must 
serve under the Charter, 
Recognizing that the representatives of the 
Government of the People s Republic of China is the 
only lawful representatives of China to the United 
Nations and that the People s Republic of China is one 
of the five permanent members of Security Council, 
Decides to restore all its rights to the People s 
General Assembly, Oct. 25, 1971. 
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Republic of China and to recognize the representatives 
of its government as the only legitimate 
representatives of China to the United Nations, and to 
expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek 
from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the 
United Nations and in all the organizations related to 
it. 
V. COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 2758 
Since the UN adopted the UN GA Resolution 2758, apparently whether or not an 
authority can be regarded as an effective government to represent a member state in 
the UN should be based on two considerations: (1) to exercise effective control over 
the territory; and (2) to be accepted generally by the population of the territory.594 
However, many arguments were raised after the adoption of this resolution, because 
the resolution only resolved the representation issue for the people of mainland China 
but not for the people of Taiwan. 595 
594 See Ibrahim J. Gassama, WORLD ORDER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE RELEVANCE 
AND ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER FIFTY YEARS, 20 Brook. J. Int'l L., 255, 
330(1994)(Noting that Secretary-General Trygve Lie's memorandum dated 8 March 1950 on the 
credentials issue advocated the adoption of the "effective control" standard because the United Nations 
is not an association limited to like-minded States and governments of similar ideological persuasion 
(as in the case of certain regional associations). As an organization which aspires to universality, it must 
of necessity include States of varying and even conflicting ideologies.) 
595 For instance, Dr. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. argued the adoption processes of Res. 2758 concerning 
China's admittance into the UN by saying that "if political considerations determined the outcome of 
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In short, it could only affirm the right of the PRC to represent the people who 
were under its effective control. Admittedly, part of the rationale enabled the PRC to 
take over China's seat in the UN since the ROC no longer effectively controlled the 
Chinese mainland. Conversely, the people of Taiwan have never been under the 
control of the PRC for any single day but have been ruled by the ROC since 1945. A 
jortiorissime, the same rationale should equally apply to the case of Taiwan with a 
population of twenty-three million to be represented at the United Nations. As 
mentioned above, for the sake of justice and universality, it is necessary for the UN to 
review its Resolution 2758. Otherwise, the absence of representation of Taiwan in the 
UN has weakened the implementation of adopted resolutions and introduced an 
element of uncertainty into the fact showing that universal membership IS only a 
vague goal but not a basic principle in the United Nations. 
§ 4-20 Re-evaluating the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 
The adoption processes of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971 
was a product of ideological confrontation which was developed during the Cold War 
era. It did not constitute a complete solution to the issue of China's representation 
resulting from China's division III 1949, but provided only for the international 
the issue, why did the representatives waste their time with arguments about specific provisions of the 
Charter or about precedents? Does the General Assembly Resolution 2758 make any reference to 
Taiwan's situation? If the ROC on Taiwan were now to seek separate representation for Taiwan in the 
General Assembly, would it be proper to treat its request simply as a representation matter? Or would 
the ROC on Taiwan have to apply for membership under article 4?" See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., 1993, 
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representation of the territory under the jurisdiction of the PRe. The issue of the 
Chinese seat at the UN was presented in the General Assembly as a matter of 
credentials and thus, it is one of representation issues rather than one of membership 
issues. Specifically, the present international environment and the relations between 
the ROC and the PRC are clearly different from those prior to 1971 because not only 
has the Cold War come to an end, but international dialogue and economic 
cooperation have become the major trends as well. Moreover, the government of 
Taiwan has officially made clear that its sovereignty and legitimacy are over the 
Taiwan area only, instead of recognizing Taiwan as a part of China and claiming that 
ROC's authority extends to all of China. 
Resulting from the legal obligation found in human rights law,596 states are 
bound to respect and protect the right that all people are entitled to be represented in 
the UN. The UN should not deny a state such as Taiwan the right to participate in its 
system by respecting and accepting the credentials of that state's representation. As 
explained III the preVIOUS discussion of universal membership and representation 
Issues, the revolution of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 is highly an 
unsettled issue that the world body has to respond to. With this background, we expect 
p.1S0. 
596 With a US$ 250 billion GNP and an annual per capita income exceeding USS 12,000, the ROC on 
Taiwan is not only a prosperous state, but also has been a leading holder of foreign exchange reserves 
for years. 
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more specific efforts of the UN to transform theories and principles into practical 
programs for solving such issues. After all, the desire of every state to belong to the 
UN is a beginning toward further development of world order. 
In fact, in view of the UN's history, there are precedents for the UN General 
Assembly to review its own outdated resolutions. For instance, due to the different 
political climate of 1950, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 386(V) to 
revoke its Resolution 39597 which recommended that the Franco Government of 
Spain be debarred from membership in UN agencies and from participation in UN 
activities.598 More recently, In 1991, In efforts to repeal UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3379599 equating Zionism with racism, the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 46/86 to revoke its former recommendation.6oo 
VI. TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP 
597 See UN. GEN. ASS. OFF. REC. 1st Sess., 1st pt., Resolutions 39 (Al64) (1946). 
598 When the Security Council failed to act on the continuation in power of Franco's Government in 
Spain in 1946, the General Assembly gave comprehensive guidance to UN organs and members 
regarding their relationship with Franco's regime and recommended that the "Franco Government of 
Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into 
relationship with the United Nations." Due to the different political climate of 1950, especially after the 
United Nations action against aggression in Korea, the 50th session of the General Assembly 
reconsidered the question of relations with Spain, and adopted a resolution revoking the former 
recommendation. See, Louis B. Sohn EXPULSION OR FORCED WITHDRAWAL FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1402-4(1964). See also Jane D. 
Weaver, THE UN CHARTER AS HISTORY, 89 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 45, 48(1995). 
m ( ) See UN. GAOR 3d Comm., 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83-84, UN. Doc. Al10034 1975. 
600 See G.A. Res. 46/86, UN. GAOR, 46th Sess., UN. Doc AlRes/46/86 (1991); see also Kumiko 
Matsuura, Joachim W. Muller & Karl P. Sauvant, ANNUAL REVIEWS OF UNITED NATIONS 
AFFAIRS, 1991, Vol. I, p.19. 
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As the world's 14th largest trading and 16th largest economic nation,601 the ROC 
on Taiwan is well known as a major economic player in the Asian-Pacific and world 
economies, that making it a member of the international community is something that 
should not be neglected. Given its solid economic strength, the ROC on Taiwan has 
an important role to play in the international community. 602 With such an 
achievement, the ROC on Taiwan has a strong desire, and sufficient capability to play 
a prominent and responsible role in the world body. Moreover, membership in the UN 
will not only provide ROC on Taiwan with a channel for formal contacts with many 
important countries(including the People's Republic of China), but it will also have a 
very positive effect in raising Taiwan's international status. 
In 1991, the ROC on Taiwan recognized that the PRC controls the Chinese 
mainland while the ROC's jurisdiction includes only Taiwan and other small islands 
which are Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.603 Progress toward Taiwan's independence 
has been furthered and expedited by this official statement. Hence, the ROC on 
Taiwan would no longer compete with the PRC for the right to represent China. Since 
601 According to a survey of the world's top 100 economic entities of 2000, released by the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development, Taiwan ranked 16th with a GDP of US$309 billion. See China 
Times, Taiwan, August 9,2000. 
602 With a view to promoting international cooperation, the ROC government set up the International 
Cooperation and Development Fund(ICDF) on July 1, 1996, under the supervision of the Ministry of 
foreign Affairs. Major applications of the fund are: (1) technical cooperation, (2) loans, (3) 
international investments and (4) donations, including all equipment. The ICDF focuses its cooperation 
on countries in Central and South America, the Caribbean region and Africa with which the ROC has 
diplomatic relations. The ICDF also expanded its investment projects with neighboring countries in 
Asia in order to further enhance the substantive relations between the ROC and the countries of this 
area. For detail see the website of the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mofa.gov.tw). 
603 See generally Government Information Office, ROC, 1995, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
271 
1993, Taiwan has put III a bid for UN membership annually and its allies have 
continually suggested that the UN should address the issue of the representation of the 
ROC on Taiwan in international organizations by re-examining the General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 and the importance of Taiwan's geographical location to regional 
stability, security, and prosperity.604 More importantly, the government of Taiwan 
made pronouncements on a new "One China Two Governments" policy to 
accommodate its bid to enter the UN under the divided China position.605 It is 
pertinent to reiterate that there exists a genuine desire or a preference for the status 
quo - an independent Taiwan seeking a fonn of parallel representation as a separate 
country from the PRC through membership in the UN system, and promoting itself 
wherever possible as if it were an independent state. 
§ 4-21 A Joint Proposal Made by Twelve UN Member States to the UN606 
Upon the instruction of our respective governments, 
we have the honour to request, pursuant to the rule 14 
YEARBOOK(1995). 
604 See "A JOINT LETTER, DATED 8 AUGUST 2001, TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL," 
information released by the ROC Foreign Ministry(httpllwww.mofa.gov.tw). 
605 This policy can be seen in an address by Taiwan's Premiere Lien Chan, entitled "HEADING FOR 
THE 21 ST CENTURY," to the 85th Annual Convention of the Rotary International on June 12, 1994. 
See also Parris Chang & Kok-Ui Lim, TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 
UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 424-5(1997)(Noting that the government of Taiwan proposes that 
Taiwan might join the UN under parallel representation alongside the PRC by arguing China is 
currently divided and ruled by two separate and equal political entities: the PRC on mainland, and the 
ROC on Taiwan.") 
606 The joint proposal dated 3 August 2000 from the representatives of Burkina Faso, the Gambia, 
Honduras, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, 
Solomon Islands and Swaziland to the United Nations, requesting for the inclusion of a supplementary 
items in the agenda of the fifty-fifth session. For related information, see the website of ROC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs(www.mofa.gov.tw). 
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of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the 
inclusion in the agenda of the fifty-fifth session of the 
Assembly of a supplementary item entitled "Need to 
Examine the Exceptional International Situation 
Pertaining to the Republic of China on Taiwan, to 
Ensure that the Fundamental Right of its Twenty-Three 
Million People to Participate in the Work and 
Activities of the United Nations is Fully Respected. " 
Pursuant to rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the 
General Assembly, we attach an explanatory 
memorandum and a draft resolution. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
1. The Republic of China is a democratic country and 
its democratically elected Government is the sole 
legitimate one that can actually represent the interests 
and wishes of the people of Taiwan in the United 
Nations. 
2. The exclusion of the Republic of China from the 
United Nations and its related agencies has created a 
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major and serious obstacle for both the Government 
and the people of the Republic of China in their 
pursuit of normal participation in international 
organizations and activities. 
Draft Resolution 
The General Assembly, 
Considering the fact that the twenty-three million people 
of the Republic of China on Taiwan are the only remaining 
people in the world that still do not have actual and 
legitimate representation in the United Nations, 
Recognizing that since 1949 the Government of 
the Republic of China has exercised effective control 
and jurisdiction over the Taiwan area while the 
Government of the People s Republic of China has 
exercised effective control and jurisdiction over the 
Chinese mainland during the same time period, 
Acknowledging that the Republic of China on 
Taiwan is a constructive and responsible member of 
the international community, with a democratic system 
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and a strong, dynamic economy, 
Observing that the strategic location of Taiwan 
is vital to the peace and security of the East Asian and 
Pacific regions and the world, 
Understanding that the determination of future 
relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan 
and the People s Republic of China should fully 
respect the free will of the people on both sides and be 
implemented in a peaceful way, 
Mindful of the fact that the Republic of China 
has committed itself to peaceful resolution of 
differences with the People s Republic of China and 
has repeatedly offered friendly and conciliatory 
gestures towards the leadership of the People s 
Republic of China, 
Noting the declaration of the Government of 
the Republic of China on Taiwan that it accepts 
without condition the obligations contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations, that it is able and 
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willing to carry out those obligations, and that it is 
fully committed to observing the principles and spirit 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Affirming the significance that recognition of 
and respect for the fundamental rights of the 
twenty-three million people of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan would have for upholding the principles 
and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Decides: 
(aJ. To respect fully the choice of the people on both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait with regard to their future relations and 
to reject any unilateral arrangement or forced resolution of 
their difference by other than peaceful means; 
(b). To express its concern about cross-strait 
tension and its possible impact upon regional peace, 
stability and prosperity, and to encourage the 
Republic of China on Taiwan and the People s 
Republic of China to resume their dialogue and 
communication on a peaceful basis and equal footing. 
276 
Regardless of the fact that Taiwan's participation in the UN absolutely is to 
fulfill its international responsibility and contribute to global peace as well as enhance 
the increasing integration of the global economy, without gaining acceptance in the 
UN General Assembly Steering Committee,607 the perennial proposal has been 
excluded from the UN General Assembly agenda because Beijing was able to rally its 
allies to voice their opposition against Taiwan. 608 The risk of the PRC and its 
succession to China's seat in the UN and its systems such as the World Bank and the 
IMF (not to mention the near universal recognition of the PRC by foreign 
governments as the legitimate government of China) has made Taiwan very defensive 
and very cautious notwithstanding that China is a divided country, much as Germany 
was until a decade ago, or Korea is today. 
§ 4-22 Taiwan's Popular Sovereignty 
As a matter of international law, there is no doubt that the ROC on Taiwan meets 
the requirements for the common indicators of statehood609 and the inherent rights 
607 The committee, which organizes the agenda for the session, hears speakers for and against seating 
Taiwan. As a result of intensive lobbying by the PRC, opponents invariably outnumber supporters of 
Taiwan and a decision is made, without a vote, not to inscribe the item on the agenda. 
608 The PRC continuously objected to Taiwan's application, and blocked the application from being 
included on the daily agenda of the General Assembly for discussion and a possible vote. This is 
because Taiwan UN membership will raise fundamental questions about national sovereignty that is 
profoundly against the PRC's so-called "one China" policy. See Angeline G. Chen, TAIWAN'S 
INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: CROSSING THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES, 20 Loy. 
L.A. Int'! & Compo L.J. 223,245-8(1998). Regarding the issue that the UN Charter Article 4 further 
mandates that the Security Council must approve any membership vote by the General Assembly, Dr. 
Angeline has indicated that "even assuming that the General Assembly approved Taiwan's membership 
to the UN, the PRC could veto this vote because it retains a permanent seat on the Security Council." 
609 The four-part test(a permanent population, a defined territory, a effective government with the 
capacity to have relations with outside world) is set out in the Montevideo Convention which 
establishes objective criteria of statehood, the Montevideo Convention itself is generally accepted as 
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that can be enjoyed by the entire population of the land of Taiwan.610 Resulting from 
the political process of democratization in Taiwan,611 the ROC's government is an 
effective authority with legal capacity and rights to act on behalf of the "State" in the 
international system. It is enshrined in Article 21(3) of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government.,,612 With a full-fledged democracy, the ROC on Taiwan is an established 
people's sovereign state. That is, even Taiwan has a right to join the UN as a new state 
under the name "Taiwan." 
With a population of twenty-three million, the issue of Taiwan's UN bid does not 
only relate to the principle of membership universality, but also relates to the 
humanitarian concern for those twenty-three million people of Taiwan. At this point, 
the UN General Assembly should establish an "Ad Hoc Committee" to consider the 
difficult situation imposed upon the people and to gIve effect to the popular 
reflecting the requirements of statehood at customary international law. 
610 The government of Taiwan, since its break from mainland China in 1949, has existed functionally 
as an independent sovereign state. As enshrined in the principle of "people's sovereignty," sovereignty 
itself is a collective right that can only be entitled to and exercised by the entire population of the land 
constituting the territory of that State. Successful self-governance in Taiwan represents the concept that 
sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to the people of Taiwan and implies that the common will of the people 
of Taiwan to establish a state. For detail, see generally Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
611 Thanks to the efforts of impelling political reforms, the people of Taiwan have achieved profound 
self-governance through the processes of democratization and Taiwanization. This continuing processes 
of Taiwanization and democratization created a new milestone in 1996 when the people of Taiwan 
directly elected their President for the first time in history. For detail, see Eric, Ting-Iun Huang, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 167,204-12(2001). 
612 The International Bill of Rights consists of three important documents: (1) the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. Al810, at (1948); (2) the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966); (3) the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, GA. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAPR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. 
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sovereignty(the ROC on Taiwan) by thoroughly reviewing the representation principle 
involved III the UN Resolution 2758. Only III this way can the principle of 
membership universality be really fulfilled as expected. 
§ 4-23 UN's Response to an Armed Conflict in the Taiwan Strait 
Seriously considering the importance and urgency of establishing a referendum 
legal system is the ROC's current policy,613 and thus it would be easily accomplished 
in the near future. As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this chapter, the PRC 
has repeatedly threatened to use force against any separatist movement in the name of 
self-determination in Taiwan,614 hence, if people of Taiwan from a pro-independence 
background were to use a referendum to assert Taiwan's current position as an 
independent state, the result could definitely provoke China into using military force 
against Taiwan. In a typical case where such an armed conflict IS caused by a 
self-determination movement, an intervention by the UN in a peacekeeping operation 
would be conducted to deliver humanitarian assistance and to prevent a deterioration 
Doc. Al6316 (1966). 
613 In a speech to the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations, Taiwan's President, Chen Shui-bian 
publicly called for the establishment of a referendum legislation as a policy strategy. If China were to 
threaten Taiwan militarily, then Taiwan's residents could choose their own future path by referendum. 
In other words, the referendum law will be designed to settle the matter of unification or independence. 
For detail, see Trong Chai, REFERENDUM LAW COULD BE PRECIOUS WEAPON, Taipei Times, 
August 7,2002. 
614 See James R. Lilley, Face-off over Taiwan; Uncle Sam is the Middle as the Two Chinas Escalate 
Their War of Words and Threats, THE SAN DIEGO UNION- TRIBUNE, March 19, 2000, at Gl 
(comparing the ways that American and Chinese leadership view democracy, self-determination and 
sovereignty); see also China Warns Taiwan OfIndependence "Disaster," supra note 293 ("China would 
"do its best to achieve peaceful reunification" but would not rule out the use of force. "); see also Yates, 
Supra note 291 (noting China's method of imposing its will through force or intimidation). 
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of the situation.615 This is because the principle of self-detennination has become the 
very purpose for the UN to maintain international peace and security. 
Accordingly, as Taiwan is recognized as having the entitlement to request the UN 
Security Council to take measures necessary for restoration of international peace and 
security, preventive deployment(meaning to deploy the UN authorized military, police 
or civilian personnel in conditions of crisis within an area where military conflicts has 
occurred with the expectation of alleviating suffering and to limit or control violence) 
from the UN could take place when requested by a Taiwan threatened by China's 
military attack. Alternatively, in a response to the request for deployment of a UN 
peace-keeping force from Taiwan, the UN would continue to decide what type of 
necessary measures would be used to deter the repression by the Chinese anny and to 
deliver humanitarian assistance.616 This is regardless of the fact that currently Taiwan 
is not a member state in the UN. As a guarantor of international peace and security, 
615 See Halperin, Scheffer, & Small, supra note 165, at 105-111 (discussing the legitimacy of claims by 
sub-state groups by posing alternatives to the "internal" and "external" self-determination categories); 
see also Stephan A. Wangsgard, SECESSION, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND CLEAR 
OBJECTIVES: WHEN TO COMMIT UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES, 3 Tulsa J. Compo & 
Int'! L. 313, 315-23(1996) (analyzing the doctrine of self-determination within the context of human 
assistance and intervention). See generally Yogesh K. Tyagi, THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION REVISITED, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 883, 891-4(1995) (highlighting the differences 
between humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance, specifically stating that pursuant to 
Article 2(5), it is a duty of all member states to extend every assistance to the United Nations to 
promote fundamental freedoms). 
616 In general, a proportional military intervention by the UN in response to an armed conflict caused 
by a non-colonial self-determination movement will be considered as a necessary measure. Regarding 
the issue of the potential of an armed conflict in the self-determination movement of Taiwan, see Eric, 
Ting-Iun Huang, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE 
RIGHT OF PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 167, 
212-23(2001).(Noting that if the need and feasibility of protecting humanitarian imperatives and 
maintaining international peace and security can be proven, a proportional military intervention by the 
UN in response to an armed conflict caused by a non-colonial self-determination movement will be 
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the UN must fulfill its duty to find a way to address this concern about future changes 
in the Taiwan Strait. 
Despite the fact that the self-determination movement in Taiwan could easily 
trigger an aggression by China, it IS anticipated that this claim by the people of 
Taiwan for a free choice of Taiwan's status will unavoidably continue unless the 
dispute of Taiwan's sovereignty is amicably and smoothly settled by both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. 617 Since a potential armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait has been listed 
together with the Kashmiri and North Korean issues as the most troubled in Asia, a 
continuously hostile tension in the Taiwan Strait is therefore likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.618 In view of that, the situation 
should be monitored by the United Nations, because a peaceful Taiwan Strait is a 
considered a necessary measure.) 
617 See Christopher 1. Carolan, THE REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN: A LEGAL HISTORICAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR TAIWANESE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 75 N.YU. L. Rev. 429, 
465(stating the absence of war between Taiwan and China does not point to the presence of peace, 
indicating that until a solution is found that resolves the status of the island, there will be no peace); see 
also Christopher C. Joyner, THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: WHAT ROLE FOR 
NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN?, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 819, 837 
(discussing how the issue of sovereignty represents different social and political dimensions for Taiwan 
and China); see also James Lilley, THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND TAIWAN: A FUTURE 
WITH HOPE, 32 New. Eng. L. Rev. 743, 744-5 (describing tensions between China and Taiwan as 
further exacerbated because China blames Taiwan for the major downturn in U.S.-Chinese relations in 
1995). 
618 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 477 ("Unfortunately, the serious differences of opinion 
across the Taiwan Strait stem from deep cultural, political, and historical foundations. These differences 
might make war inevitable."); see also Jainming Shen, SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, 
SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1161(2000) 
("Independence for Taiwan is a dead-end. It is not only a legal impossibility, but also an actual 
impracticability, because the PRC Government will not allow that to happen or succeed.). See generally 
Charles R. Irish, THE "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN": A LEGAL-HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR 
A TAIWANESE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 75 N.YU. L. Rev. 429, 465(2000) 
(discussing tension throughout Taiwan). 
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common desire of the international community.619 
According to Article 11(3) of the UN Charter, the General Assembly may call the 
attention of the Security Council to situations that are likely to endanger international 
peace and security.620 In order to have a clearer understanding of the potential 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the UN General Assembly needs to build a "pre-warning 
system" by setting up a special committee to monitor any self-determination 
movement in Taiwan as well as the potential reaction from China. 621 The Assembly 
can then effectively call the attention of the Security Council to help in managing the 
increasing tensions before they result in a devastating war as was the case in the 1996 
missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. 622 The function of this committee is to create the 
619 See Omar Saleem, THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: CHINA DEFINES THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 527, 536(2000)(recognizing the important implications of 
China accepting Taiwan as independent state); see also Carolan, supra note 229, at 465 ("Not to 
recognize Taiwan's claim would be to dilute the product of decades of international legal development, 
something that states would be hesitant to do. "). 
620 See The New Security Council, N. l L. l, September 19,1994, at 16 (discussing how the Security 
Council's powers have been redefined by allowing them to permit intervention into the internal 
domestic affairs of member states in order to protect people from human rights abuses); Charter 
Committee Reports Progress Regarding UN Fact-Finding Process, 27 UN CHRONICLE 2, 32 (1990) 
(discussing the role of the Security Council in dealing with threats to international peace and security in 
the framework of the UN as a whole); see, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. May Back International 
Talks if Israel Stymies Vote Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1989(stating the UN's plan for calling an 
international peace conference because of an international situation which is likely to endanger 
international peace). 
621 See Coffey, KEYNOTE ADDRESS: RULE OF LAW AND REGIONAL CONFLICT, 19 Whittier 
L. Rev. 257, 273(1997)( discussing the importance of early warning systems being institutionalized on 
the multi-laterallevel.); see also Ambassador David l Scheffer, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOREWARD: DETERRENCE OF WAR CRIMES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 23 Md. l 
Int'! L. & Trade 1, 1(1999) (stating President Clinton's concern with the establishment of a formal 
mechanism in the U.S. Government to facilitate early warning of atrocities and to consider means to 
prevent or respond to them as quickly and effectively as possible); see also John Shattuck, 
PREVENTING GENOCIDE: JUSTICE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR WORLD, 3 Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp. 15, 18(1999) (recognizing the importance of early 
warning and preventive in an effort to prevent the recurrence of furture problems like what happened in 
Bosnia and Rwanda). 
622 See Why Did So Many People Look the Wrong Way?, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1999, at 1 
(categorizing the Taiwan missile crisis of 1996 as a "world changing event"); see also George Wehrfritz, 
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necessary condition for a pre-warning mechanism, based on information gathering 
and fact-finding without getting involved in the dispute as to Taiwan's status.623 It is 
conceivable that a proposal for creating such a special committee will be accepted by 
the UN General Assembly because it is deeply related to the interests of most member 
states of the UN.624 
§ 4-24 Taiwan's Accession to the WTO & Cross-Strait's Economic Integration 
As a result of the PRC's Three NOs policl25 that refers, in part, to "no support 
for Taiwan's membership m international organizations m which statehood IS 
required," regardless of its continuous efforts to the bid for UN membership in the 
past decade, Taiwan is still excluded from the UN specialized agencies, especially the 
two major international financial institutions: the IMF and the World Ban1e 626 
Blaming the Messenger, NEWSWEEK, December 30, 1996, at 33 (classifying 1996 as a bad year for 
China, due to several factors including the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait). See generally John 
Pomfret, Business Takes Back Seat on China Trip; U.S. Firms Find Access at Low Ebb, WASH. POST, 
June 26, 1998, at FOI (stating that government-to-government ties between the United States and China 
have improved since the 1989 crackdown on student-led protests in Tiananmen Square and the Taiwan 
missile crisis of 1996). 
623 See Lucia Mouat, Taiwan Looks for a Seat in the House of Nations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
August 25, 1994, at 7 (discussing how Taiwan has gained a much more democratic status in the eyes of 
the UN as well as the international sphere); see also Marilyn Greene, Taiwan Campaigns for United 
Nations Status, USA TODAY, September 17, 1993, at 4A (noting Taiwan's efforts to gain status in the 
U.N. after two decades of exclusion); Taiwan Offers $1 Billion to UN for Membership, Telegraph, 
BALT. SUN, June 27, 1995, at 6A (discussing Taiwan's rigorous efforts to try and end its outcast status 
in the UN). 
624 See id., Mouat, (stating that Taiwan's status is an important issue for the UN); see also id., 
Greene,(explaining that the issue of Taiwan's status is important to UN members). But see Wen-Yen 
Chen, Earthquake Illustrates Importance of Recognizing Taiwan, WASH. TIMES, October 2, 1999, at 
A-II (recognizing the disappointment of Taiwanese-Americans at the fact that the UN waited to get 
China's approval before sending relief assistance to Taiwan after the massive earthquake of 1999). 
625 The "THREE NO'S" refers to: 1) no support for Taiwan's independence, 2) no support for "two 
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and 3) no support for Taiwan's membership in international 
organizations in which statehood is required. 
626 The International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank, also known as the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs), were formed in Bretton Woods in 1944 on the eve of the end of World War II. 
They were precursors to the United Nations and other multilateral institutions formed after World War 
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In order to break through this limitation imposed by the PRC, Taiwan has 
adopted pragmatic diplomacy to ensure its international position by being an active 
member in international economic organizations, such as APEC and the Asian Bank, 
by using titles other than its official designation and accepting dual recognition from 
foreign governments. Apparently, China is somewhat comfortable with this pragmatic 
policy as it acknowledges that China's obstacle on Taiwan's participation III 
international economic organizations does not resolve the differences between the two 
sides of the Strait. On the contrary, given the fact that Taiwan's economy is much 
more developed than China's, it would be likely to have a negative economic impact 
on the Chinese and Taiwanese people. Taiwan's numerous economic achievements 
brought by Taiwan's democratization is precisely the direction that China can follow 
in its economic development, especially along with the opening up and liberation of 
the Chinese market. 
II and reflected the new spirit of cooperation between nations, especially in economic matters. See 
generally Sandra Blanco & Enrique Carrasco, Symposium, The FUNCTIONS OF THE IMF AND THE 
WORLD BANK, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 67, 67(1999). See also generally Dominique 
Carreau, WHY NOT MERGE THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) WITH THE 
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK)? 
62 Fordham L. Rev. 1989, 1989 (1994). Both the IMF and the World Bank now address human rights, 
which involves a number of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in their relations with 
member countries. This development-oriented operations by the two UN specialized agencies have 
enabled it to influence human rights situations in Member States. At this point, to open up the 
membership of the UN system to either de facto or de jure political entities would assist in developing 
the concept of "implementing democracy" as a whole. In this sense, the ROC on Taiwan is well known 
as a major economic player in the Asian-Pacific and world economy. As a trade-oriented and major 
investor state, Taiwan is more qualified than most other developing countries to join the UN and its 
specialized agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMFRegarding the critical issues facing the 
Bretton Woods System, see Enrique R. Carrasco, CAN THE IMF, WORLD BANK, AND THE 
GATTIWTO PROMOTE AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT? 6 
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. I, i-xx(1996); see also Daniel D. Bradlow, THE WORLD BANK, 
THE IMF, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 6 Transnat'l L. & Contep. Probs. 47, 47-90. 
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After twelve years of negotiations, Taiwan was admitted as a full member of the 
World Trade Organization on January 1, 2002. The WTO admission of both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait has created a new opportunity for the further development of 
cross-strait relations. This is because not only will there be closer cross-strait trade 
and economic relations, but both sides will also be able to use the WTO spirit of 
consultation to handle other issues resulting from promoting cross-strait trade 
normalization. Although the WTO is not a place to discuss political affairs, the two 
sides of the Strait can reduce political tensions and gradually increase economIC 
cooperation through their repeated contacts at WTO meetings. 
§ 4-25 Taiwan's Accession to the IMF and the World Bank 
Taiwan's membership in the APEC, the Asian Bank and the WTO are evidences 
that the two sides' mutual interest lies in economic cooperation and any issue relating 
to economic sovereignty is no longer a sensitive issue to cross-strait relations. The 
PRC apparently does not regard these efforts by Taiwan to maintain its political 
economic sovereignty as an affront to its one-China policy. In this respect, allowing 
Taiwan's presence in international financial institutions will not only be conducive to 
the process of growing global concern on the issues of the humanitarian level and 
economic integration, but also serves the best interest of all people of both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait in terms of economic prosperity. Hence, the model of Taiwan's WTO 
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membership provides a good example to help Taiwan access to the IMF and the World 
Bank which can benefit by having another economically viable member. As for a 
long-term solution, if such a bid for Taiwan to join the IMF and the World Bank can 
succeed, as a matter of economic integration, it would create an evolution of the 
concept of political economic sovereignty that might be useful to some of the 
arrangements between Taiwan and China, without affecting each side's territorial 
sovereignty and integrity, in which people on both sides can enjoy reciprocity and 
prosperity. As such, both sides of the Taiwan Strait can improve bilateral relations 
with each other through contacts within the IMF and the World Bank systems. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In 1945, the ROC affirmed its commitment to these ideals when it signed the UN 
Charter in San Francisco and thus originally become a UN founding member in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council until1971. As a founding member of the 
UN, the ROC played a very positive, constructive role during its 26-year-10ng ties 
with this world body. 
Since leaving the UN m 1971, the ROC has encountered many diplomatic 
frustrations and weathered an array of crises. 627 In order to respond to these 
627 See Jianming Shen, SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE 
ISSUE OF TAIWAN, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1101, 1121-1(Noting that more States recognize the PRe 
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challenges, the ROC must blend its political status into its economIC position by 
working for long-term development focusing on domestic, economic, political and 
social growth.628 Currently, the ROC has transformed Taiwan into a model of 
freedom, democracy and equitable prosperity in developing countries.629 Taiwan is 
willing to share its economic success with the world community and to contribute to 
international development. However, while Taiwan's economIC achievement has 
reshaped its role on the global economIC stage, it has not been sufficient III 
strengthening its political position in the global context. 
§ 4-26 Parallel Representation of Divided Countries 
Government instead of the "ROC." In 1949, eight States entered into diplomatic relations with the 
newly established PRC. By 1956, twenty-five States established diplomatic relations with the PRC 
Government. By 1969, the number doubled to some fifty States. In 1972, particularly following the 
resumption of China's representation at the United Nations, the number of States with diplomatic 
relations with the PRC dramatically increased to about eighty-eight. In 1979, more than 110 States 
maintained such relations with Beijing. The number kept growing at a steady pace in the following two 
decades: about 128 by the end of 1985, about 141 by the end of 1991, and 161 by 1999. Currently, 
about only twenty-nine States, mostly in Central America and Africa, are maintaining official relations 
with Taiwan). 
628 See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & James Ting-Yeh Yang, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN TAIWAN: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY SCHEME, 4 1. Chinese L. 3, 5-6(1990)(Noting that 
historically, the government pursued an economic policy of strict surveillance. This initial policy 
contributed to the reform of Taiwan's economy and laid the foundation for its early financial expansion 
and economic prosperity. In its transformation from an agrarian economy to a major economic power, 
Taiwan has managed to achieve an economic growth rate that very few other countries have matched). 
See also Tay-sheng Wang, THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN IN THE 20TH CENTURY: 
TOWARD A LIBERAL AND DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY, 11 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 531, 
537-8(2002)(Noting that in the 1960s and 1970s, the prosperous economy in Taiwan further promoted 
the prevalence of modem civil and commercial law based on the Western concept of capitalism. In the 
1950s, the ROCOT government joined the Cold War camp of the Western democracies led by the 
United States, and, consistent with this, American legal institutions and ideas were to a certain extent 
"imported" into Taiwan). 
629 See Michael E. Mangelson, TAIWAN RE-RECOGNIZED: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN'S FUTURE 
GLOBAL STATUS, 1992 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 231, 251(1992)(Noting that Taiwan's economic and political 
progress, coupled with the changing order of the Pacific region, necessitates a more active role for it in 
world affairs. Granting Taiwan increased international rights and allowing it to participate in world 
organizations would improve the peace and prosperity of the region. It would also foster change in the 
PRC and affirm Washington's support for democracy, a free market economy, human rights, and loyalty 
to its allies). 
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What the ROe seeks is only proper and effective protection for the twenty-three 
million people of Taiwan, and representation of their fundamental rights in the UN. It 
does not seek to represent the territory under the effective jurisdiction of the PRe. In 
the UN, there are precedents for parallel representation of divided countries. The 
former East Germany and West Germany, as well as North and South Koreas were 
admitted into the UN,63o first as observers and later as full members. The former East 
and West Germanys have already achieved national unification since 1990, and the 
two Koreas still aspire to national unification. This demonstrates that the divided 
status of nations does not impede equal and parallel participation by both sides in the 
international community. On the contrary, it may help to ease the tension between 
them, thereby helping to create more favorable conditions for either status quo or 
reunification. 
Due to the possibility of the use of force by the PRe to enforce its claim of 
sovereignty over Taiwan, maintaining a peaceful Taiwan Strait should be regarded as 
a common desire of the international community.631 In this respect, allowing the 
630 Regarding the UN precedents on "divided nation" membership, see Parris Chang & Kok-Ui Lim, 
TAIWAN'S CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 
425-6(1997)(Noting that admission to the UN as a divided country is contingent on (1) the competing 
governments' qualifications being relatively equal and (2) the rival government's mutual acquiescence. 
For example, in the Korea's case, dual admission for Seoul and Pyongyang occurred simultaneously in 
July 1991, only after the rival governments did not object each other's entry. Similarly, UN admission 
for a divided German state occurred only after a detente was reached between the two rivals in 1973.) 
631 See Charney & Prescott, supra note 81, at 477 ("Unfortunately, the serious differences of opinion 
across the Taiwan Strait stem from deep cultural, political, and historical foundations. These differences 
might make war inevitable. "); see also Shen, supra note 72, at 1161 ("Independence for Taiwan is a 
dead-end. It is not only a legal impossibility, but also an actual impracticability, because the PRC 
Government will not allow that to happen or succeed.). See generally Charles R. Irish, THE 
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ROC on Taiwan to join the UN is not challenging the PRC's position in the United 
Nations. The world body can therefore provide necessary assistance to settle the 
existing disputes between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait before they degenerate 
into serious conflicts. After all, the UN's assistance is provided on the basis of 
commitments from the member states concerned to maintain a peaceful Taiwan Strait. 
§ 4-27 Common Interest of Maintaining a Peaceful Taiwan Strait 
If Taiwan were a UN member state, greater access to information about potential 
threats to the peace of the Taiwan Strait would enhance the UN's ability to launch any 
necessary measures to maintain a helpful role. Here the Korean model can be used for 
Taiwan's membership in the UN that would allow both the PRC on the mainland and 
the ROC on Taiwan to have UN membership. In this case, the major positive vision 
would be for the ROC to seek its peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the PRC 
in the UN and thus, they can settle any dispute between them through peaceful 
dialogue. Accordingly, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be able to forge good 
will and mutual trust to benefit the people of both sides that will be a boon to regional 
peace and prosperity. 
Currently, the ROC and the PRC are full members III some international 
organizations(such as the Asian Bank, the APEC, and the WTO) showing that it is 
"REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN": A LEGAL-HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR A TAIWANESE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 465(2000) (discussing tension 
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becoming possible to see both sides of the Taiwan Strait seated and represented in the 
international arena. It is in the best interest of both governments to create a stable 
framework in which the PRe and the ROC on Taiwan can negotiate toward 
reunification or some form of association over the long term. 
§ 4-28 A Worthy Member of the UN 
For the purposes of globalization, it is true that more progress has been made in 
the area of economic rights by the international community. The establishment of the 
WTO is a notable example that is easily visible. In view of the increasing integration 
of the global economy, it is important to emphasize again that Taiwan's responsibility 
for economic rights must be related to its actual participation in any international 
organization it deserves. As a matter of fact, the UN is the most significant one that 
Taiwan desires to join. This is because only the actual participation as a member state 
in the UN would ensure accountability for the protection of these people on Taiwan. 
In today's world, the interdependent global community requires the positive 
contributions of many other actors in the international community. Accordingly, in 
order to fulfill the goal of membership universality and equal respect for state 
sovereignty, it IS necessary for the United Nations to consider the exceptional 
situation of the ROC on Taiwan and accommodate Taiwan's accession to the world 
throughout Taiwan). 
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body. As we all know that even before the UN was founded, the ROC has been 
already an established state. Until now, the ROC is a state as it was. Moreover, Taiwan 
embraces democratic values and has full respect for human rights; its economy is 
larger than ninety percent of the UN member states; and its population is bigger than 
two-thirds of the UN members.632 The record of the ROC on Taiwan economically 
and politically is highly impressive. If a major contribution that the UN can make to 
world affairs is to aid in breaking down barriers that divide the people of the world, 
the question here arises as to what possibly could be the reason for the government of 
Taiwan not being admitted to membership in the United Nations. 
In spite of the fact that Taiwan stands ready to join the UN, it could be that the 
time is not yet ripe enough for the ROC on Taiwan to gain a full membership in the 
United Nations in the near future due to the opposition from the PRe. It does not 
mean, however, that it will be impossible in the future. The end of the Cold War has 
raised expectation of people across Taiwan to look toward the world body to work its 
way into a wide humanitarian concern about this matter. Moreover, because Taiwan's 
UN membership would pose no barrier to the future peaceful and democratic 
unification of a divided China, therefore, Taiwan's UN bid may be structured on an 
632 See John J. Metzler, WHY CAN'T TAIWAN COME TO THE UN?, China Post, Taiwan, Sep. 29, 
1999.(Noting that "if Taiwan should participate in the world body, its budget assessments and 
contributions to enhance economic development programs would be a boon for the cash-strapped 
organization.") 
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individual basis such as "one country two territorial entities," or "one country two 
adhering bodies.,,633 At the very least, to participate in a UN observer status, as is the 
case of Palestine, could be a positive precedent that could be first applied to the ROC 
particularly with respect to the humanitarian concerns as well as the inalienable right 
of the Taiwanese people. As a matter of fact, the international sUpport634 for Taiwan 
to playa valuable role in the UN system is growing so that it will eventually look for 
ways for Taiwan to be heard. In this sense, the government of Taiwan should increase 
its efforts to join as many international organizations as possible that do not require 
statehood for membership. This would be a more flexible strategy to build stronger 
ties with other countries that eventually can actively benefit Taiwan's UN bid. 
633 See Michael C. Davis, THE CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD AND THE STATUS OF TAIWAN, 4 J. 
Chinese L. 135, 142(1990)(Noting that membership may be structured on an individual basis, as an 
affiliation with full, or an observe status, or as "one country, two organization," "one country, two 
adhering bodies," or "one country, two territorial entities.") 
634 On July 18, 1996, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on "Taiwan's Role in International 
Organizations," supporting Taiwan's bid to secure better representation in international forums and 
encouraging the UN to set up a working group to study the scope of Taiwan's participation in the 
United Nations. In September of the same year, the US Congress expressed its support for 
incorporating Taiwan into the global community by passing Resolution 212 to endorse the resolution 
adopted by the European Parliament. The Resolution 212 indicating that "the people of Taiwan ought 
to be better represented in international organizations than they are at present, which would benefit 
both Taiwan and the whole of the international community." (See H.R. Con. 212, 104th Cong., 1996). 
See also the US House of Representatives Resolution 390 (passed in 106th Congress, October 3,2000), 
which emphasized that "(1) Taiwan and its 23,000,000 people deserve appropriate meaningful 
participation in the UN and other international organizations such as the World Health Organization; 
and (2) the United States should fulfill the commitment it made in the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review to 
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more actively support Taiwan's participation in appropriate international organizations." 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since it took power in 1949, the PRC has long embraced, as a basic policy, the 
position that it regards the integration of Taiwan into China as an essential goal. In 
this sense, the PRC repeatedly demands Taiwan to commit to reunion rather than 
independence by accepting its so-called "one China" principle,635 which downgrades 
Taiwan as part of the PRC and to accept so-called "one country, two systems," which 
makes Taiwan another Hong Kong, or Macao. It is obviously a virtual rejection of the 
Taiwan people's position that deems Taiwan a state equal in status with China. As the 
Government on Taiwan and the Government on the Chinese mainland have been 
separated into different political entities for decades, it is communism vs. capitalism 
or democracy vs. authoritarianism, and thus, the unification issue must not be decided 
unilaterally by the mainland side. 
§ 5-1 Two Separate Chinese States 
The assumption of the PRC's declaration of its sovereignty over Taiwan implies 
that the PRC has succeeded the ROC as China's representative since 1949. However, 
legally, the ROC has been a sovereign state since its foundation in 1912 and it has not 
disappeared because of its retreat from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan. Politically, 
the PRC has never ruled Taiwan for one single day since taking control of the Chinese 
635 "One China" is repeatedly mentioned in China's communiques with over 160 countries that have 
formal diplomatic relations with China. Taiwan and China are both part of "one China," this "one 
China" refers to the People's Republic of China, instead of the Republic of China, and the PRC is the 
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mainland. Accordingly, in terms of institutional, legal, and political structure, there is 
no continuity of the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan. This is certainly grounded in the 
legal aspects. 
Such an assumption by the PRC is unfounded. The PRC's political proclamation 
of its one China principle may create international obligations for itself, but it will not 
impose legal obligations on the ROC. In the past, the ROC officially followed the 
political fiction of a "one-China" principle, but regarded its ties with the PRC on the 
basis that they were two equal political entities within a divided country. Despite the 
fact that the one-China principle is actually very much accepted internationally and 
the international reality is not in Taiwan's favor, this is not a matter of right or wrong 
for Taiwan to accept or reject the PRC's view of one-China, rather, the ROC's view of 
shaping the Taiwan-China ties as two divided Chinese states anchored in the 
undeniable fact of a historical, political, and legal reality that the whole world already 
knows. 
In fact, one-China should be in the future tense. Since the reality of two Chinas 
was created with the birth of Communist China on the Chinese mainland and the 
relocation of Nationalist China to Taiwan since 1949, bilateral relations between the 
Taiwan Strait(the Strait) would be "one country on each side." Accordingly, Taiwan 
sole, legitimate government for all of China. 
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has its own position on the "one-China" issue. If China composed of the ROC and the 
PRC is already a sovereign state at the present period of time, why does "one China" 
remain an issue? In this logic, how can unification be achieved without admitting 
division by both sides in the first place? Accordingly, cross-strait relations between 
the ROC and the PRC are not a unilateral problem, but a bilateral one. Whether 
unification between Taiwan and China can be realized to pursue a win-win situation 
only depends on how the two sides' bilateral relations have developed. 
§ 5-2 Dispute on One-China Issue 
Identifying the current cross-strait relations as "special state-to-state 
relationship"(the two Chinese states have been separated by civil war) is one issue, 
promoting the scenario that the two sides of the Strait integrate into a political unit or 
union is another. Logically, there is no gap between the two issues because they are 
not subordinate to each other, rather they should be considered independently. 
However, despite the fact that Taiwan, together with China, are two divided and 
separate Chinese states, the PRC has always thrown people into confusion by stirring 
the two issues together under its political fiction of the "one-China" concept, instead 
of providing a satisfactory clarification. Should the PRC continue to maintain a 
hegemonic reunification policy toward Taiwan by its intransigent position on the 
sovereignty issue, it will only make the one China goal unattainable. 
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As mentioned above, there is no compelling reason why, after enjoying years of 
prosperity and democracy, the vast majority of Taiwanese people, as shown in public 
opinion polls, support the status quo of the current Taiwan position(neither a drive for 
independence, nor a push for reunification, but a careful management of the 
longstanding sovereignty dispute). 636 Despite the fact that the lure of investment and 
markets has a strong pull for Taiwan's business community, Taiwan's people are 
averse to being absorbed by China. Although China offers Taiwan the Hong Kong 
model of autonomy to accommodate the difference, there are not many takers III 
Taiwan for this favor. 637 
So far, the one-China Issue has been discussed, but no consensus has been 
reached.638 Any form of the one-China concept can only be served as a vision of the 
future because of the acceptance of the present status-quo that both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have gone their own ways on the political, economIC, social, and 
636 See Kam Yiu-yu & Chris Wu, A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE A FOOL'S 
ERRAND, Taipei Times, Fed. 22, 2002(Noting that pro-independence force are not in the majority. On 
the contrary, around 80 percent of all Taiwanese people insist on maintaining the status quo of the 
ROC). Also see information of public polls released by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council(Noting that 
on the question of unification or independence, the latest MAC-commissioned poll, conducted by the 
Survey and Opinion Research Group of National Chung-cheng University between July 6-9, 2001, 
showed that 80.5 percent of the respondents approved maintaining the status quo)(www.mac.gov.tw) 
637 See Annette Lu, FOLLOWING THROUGH ON "TWO STATES," Taipei Times, July 23, 1999, 
Taiwan(Noting, in a recent poll regarding the relations between Taiwan and China, as many as 73 
percent of the people in Taiwan support the two-states theory). 
638 In October 1992, representatives from Taiwan and China met in Hong Kong, and both sides had 
substantive discussions on how to resolve the question of "one China." In spite of the fact that no 
conclusion was reached at the meeting, the PRC telephoned Taiwan's representative and expressed 
"respect and acceptance" of our suggestion. This means on the question of "one China," the two sides 
were willing to verbally handle this by "respective interpretation." This was the process that led to the 
two sides to making their own interpretations respectively. "One China respectively interpreted by each 
side" has been positive way of describing the whole process. 
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cultural fronts for more than half a century since a Chinese country(the ROC) was 
divided in 1949. Hence, a solution to the tension between Taiwan and China may lie 
in the establishment of a common interest in which each side would maintain 
considerable status quo of the Taiwan Strait situation and that provides a long-term 
solution satisfactory to the cross-strait relations. Before finding the genuine meaning 
of one China that is acceptable to both sides, it should be understood that each side 
could have its own interpretation of one China. The consolidation of a consensus over 
the interpretation of a future new China will be the starting point so as to make the 
cross-strait relations move forward on a basis that is mutually acceptable. That is to 
say, in terms of cross-strait relations, politics and economics must be kept as separate 
as possible and thus, difficult problems at present will be shelved for later handling 
and the promotion of cross-strait exchanges can be accelerated. 
§ 5-3 Economic Exchanges 
Although the two sides of the Taiwan Strait strongly disagree over political 
issues, they have developed fairly good people-to-people contacts, especially in the 
economic sphere.639 Obviously, economic interests have encouraged Taiwan and 
China to adopt a pragmatic approach to deals with each other. Despite the fact that the 
639 See Taiwan Must Protect Its Economy, Taipei Times, September 29, 2002, Taiwan(Stating that 
according to the Chinese government's statistics, in the past 10 years, the total amount of contracted 
investments by Taiwan to China takes up about 2 percent of Taiwan's GNP.) 
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two sides share common interests economically,640 they still regard each other as 
longtime rivals politically. Economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait are 
becoming increasingly involved and interdependent. As a result of closer economic 
interchange between China and Taiwan, China is now Taiwan's 4th biggest trading 
partner and Taiwan is now China's 5th biggest trading partner. By 2000, Taiwan had 
become the 4th largest source of foreign investment for mainland China.641 
Regardless of different motivations(some for profit, some for national identity 
objectives or some simply for political reasons), the cross-strait economic exchanges 
have been growing, necessitating both Taiwan and China, because of much that is at 
stake, should let their relations become more interdependent. This reality of 
broadening the economic interchange with China poses both risks as well as presents 
opportunities to Taiwan. Will the increasing interdependent economy across the 
Taiwan Strait be mutually beneficial to dialogue and lead to ultimately resolving the 
existing political differences between Taiwan and China? Will Taiwan eventually 
survive the impact of its economic interchanges with China? Apparently, it is not only 
the business risks but also the security risks that should be taken into account in the 
640 Viewing that regionalization of economy has become an irreversible trend, economic exchanges 
between Taiwan and China would become more inevitable and attractive. Since 1980s, encouraged by 
open policies of the two countries, the relations between the two countries have changed rapidly. It 
makes Taiwan the China's second largest source of Foreign Direct Investrnent(FDI) and Taiwan has 
become China's major trading partner. 
641 See The ROC Yearbook: Taiwan 2002, information released by the ROC Government Information 
Office(www.gio.gov.tw). 
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cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China. With the future of the cross-strait 
relations uncertain, possibly having negative effects on the economy of both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait, the government of Taiwan must handle its China policy 
appropriately. 
§ 5-4 Stabilize Taiwan Economy 
After decades of rapid growth and participation III the international trading 
community, the global receSSIOn IS a major factor affecting Taiwan's current 
economy.642 The result should not come as a surprise that Taiwan's current economy 
is now facing a big challenge due to the global uncertainty risks despite the fact that 
Taiwan is one of the world's most competitive economies.643 This is because Taiwan 
is an export-oriented economic country that depends heavily on the world market and, 
more significantly, there is no doubt that China, the fastest growing economy on earth, 
is the most potential market in the world. 
In this respect, if Taiwan, a major source of investment for China despite the 
conflict over sovereignty, wants to keep its economIC competitiveness and also 
642 See PRESENTATION BY CHAIRPERSON lNG-WEN TSAI CHAIRPERSON OF THE 
MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL AT THE 6TH TAIWAN ROUNDTABLE GOVERNMENT MEETS 
INDUSTRY POLICIES AND PROSPECTS FOR PROFITS THE WESTIN, November 20, 2001, 
Taipei Times, Taiwan(Noting that the world recession is, of course, a major factor affecting our(Taiwan) 
economy today, ... At the same time, we have found ourselves faced with structural changes which are 
much triggered by the rapid global changes, the technology changes, and the emergence of other 
economies as competitors in areas where Taiwan once excelled in.) 
643 According to a recent survey released by the World Economic Forum(WEF), Taiwan is the world's 
most competitive economy after the US and Finland. The growth competitiveness index is made up of 
three variables( technology, the quality of public institutions and the macroeconomic environment) that 
drive medium and long-term growth. For detail, see a summary of the WEF's Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003, quoted by Taipei Times, Taiwan, November 14,2002. 
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maintain a stable cross-strait relation, the importance of continuing Taiwan's relations 
with China in economic terms would outweigh everything. Moreover, China's 
continuous economIC growth and integration into the world economy provide 
enormous opportunities for developing a more pluralistic social and political system 
in China that would accelerate China's democratization. As was true in Taiwan, a 
rapidly modernizing economy in China is likely to generate effective pressure for 
political change toward democracy. 
Given the rapid changes in the world market, the economIC environment In 
Taiwan is much more dependent on external factors in the 21 51 century.644 To develop 
the sector into a competitive Chinese community in the world is to achieve the 
measure of the stability of Taiwan's economy and make the stability sustainable. By 
this logic, economic exchanges and cross-strait trade across the Taiwan Strait are not 
only the keys to pave a way for further improvement of cross-strait ties that benefit 
both of the two sides of the Strait, but also a good strategy to reinforce an ongoing 
effort by Taiwan to make its economy more open and more international, and thus, 
even more competitive than it already is. 
§ 5-5 Triangular Relations Between Taiwan, China and the US 
For decades, the US has not taken a position on the future of Taiwan other than 
644 As of Dec. 2001, Taiwan is the world's 14th largest exporter, 16th largest importer and has the third 
largest foreign exchange reserves. See TAIWAN AT A GLANCE 2002, Ministry of Finance of the 
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to insist that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese themselves 
to settle and that it should be settled peacefully. In fact, this position enables the US to 
easily adapt and adjust to practically any policy which may emerge with regard to this 
sensitive Taiwan question. In sum, the US regards peace in the Taiwan Strait as 
squarely in the US interest. Every US president since Richard Nixon has declared the 
American interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Generally, the US 
policy toward the cross-strait relations is guided principally by the three US-China 
joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. 
As China's threat to use force against Taiwan is the source of instability in the region 
of the Taiwan Strait, the prospect of American intervention in the Taiwan-China 
relations has long played a key role in deterring China's aggression against Taiwan. 645 
In this regard, to promote a new approach to the Taiwan status in the Strait and to 
maintain Taiwan's security are not only the business of the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait, but are issues that deeply involve the US' vital interests as well. 
II. ECONOMIC EXCHANGES IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
ROC(www.mof.gov.tw). 
645 See Peter W. Rodman, US MUST REINFORCE PEACE IN ROC, the China Post, August 24,1999, 
Taiwan(Noting American policy has two parallel concerns: first, to deter Beijing from a military attack 
on Taiwan, and second, to discourage Taipei from gratuitous unilateral moves that could generate a 
crisis). 
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Due to political confrontations across the Taiwan Strait after 1949, Taiwan's 
investment In China started much later than Hong Kong's. After 1987 when the 
tension between Taiwan and China began easing,646 the Taiwan government 
officially permitted its citizens to visit the mainland, and two measures were 
promulgated( one for regulating indirect exports to China; the other governmg 
investing and technological cooperation with China) that are desirable to broaden the 
understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.647 From then on, many 
businessmen have used the chance to look for investment opportunities in China.648 
As a result of common language and culture, China is one of most popular investment 
destinations for Taiwan's small-sized and medium-sized enterprises which were 
motivated to invest in China not by politics but by the prospect of cheap labor and a 
giant market. 
646 See Ai Wei, THE DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS OF TAIWAN-MAINLAND 
ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS, Issues & Studies, May, 1991, Taiwan(Stating that in the 
year of 1987, the policy marked a major breakthrough by opening an indirect import of twenty-nine 
agricultural and industrial raw materials from the mainland in August, and permitting visits of relatives 
on the mainland in November.) 
647 See Koo Hang Tse, THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING EONOMIC 
RELATIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE MAINLAND, 6 J. Chinese L. 137, 139-40(Noting that 
despite this prohibition, Taiwanese business enterprises have, in the last decade, increasingly explored 
Mainland trade and investment opportunities presented by the opening up of the Mainland economy. 
Correspondingly, the R.O.C. government has come to realize that its insistence on absolute separation 
between the R.O.c. and the P.R.C. only prevents it from addressing the concrete issues that are 
emerging from the renewed contact. The R.O.c. authorities have thus gradually adopted liberalizing 
measures, from the legalization of visitations in 1987 to the establishment of special entities to deal 
with Mainland affairs in 1991). 
648 Judging from economic need, Taiwan possesses capital, technology, and management know-how 
while China has the natural resources, inexpensive labor, and land. In addition to similar customs, a 
common language and kinship ties, Taiwanese found it easy to set up business in mainland China. 
Hence, China has become the largest destination for Taiwan's outbound investment. Fukien and 
K wangtung Provinces are the most favored locations to Taiwanese investors. Currently, there are about 
35,000 Taiwanese investors who have poured an estimated thirty billion US dollars into China for 
various projects, with or without approval of Taiwan government. It makes Taiwan China's second 
303 
§ 5-6 Indirect Trade 
In order to achieve its economIC goal, China has been very successful m 
. T· . 649 C l· . . . attractmg aIwanese mvestors. onsequent y, Taiwanese mvestors mvest more m 
China than in the ASEAN650 countries. Taiwan's investment in China has resulted in 
a large need for trade across the Taiwan Strait. The more Taiwanese invest in China, 
the more the demand for Taiwan-made industrial material and machinery from China. 
This situation makes the two governments of the Strait become more and more 
important to each other as trading partners. Hence, imports from Taiwan to China 
grew rapidly along with other foreign products. Because no official commercial 
relations existed between China and Taiwan before the middle of 1980s,651 the trade 
conducted between them takes the form of indirect trade through other countries and 
areas. That IS to say, all exports must be processed through a third country or 
largest source ofFDI. 
649 In 1983, China announced "Three Incentives for Taiwanese Investment in Special Economic Zone". 
In 1988, the China's State Council passed a draft law, "Regulations Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots 
to Invest in China", to regulate Taiwanese business in China. Both of these regulations allowed Taiwan 
investors to enjoy the same preferential treatment offered to foreign-funded enterprises. However, these 
regulations were too vague and difficult to enforce, and Taiwanese business people didn't really derive 
great benefit from them. Because of the limitations of the law to Taiwanese businessmen in practice, in 
1994, China government issued a fifteen-article law, "Taiwanese Investment protection Law", to make 
it easier for Taiwanese business to transfer their property rights in China and to be compensated. The 
law also stipulates how Taiwanese investors can remit their net profits to Taiwan. See generally 
Cheng-Tian Kuo, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, Issues & Studies, 
October 1993, Taiwan. 
650 ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations, includes Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. ASEAN was established in 1967 by signing the Bangkok Declaration. The 
main purpose to set up this association is to accelerate the economic growth, social progress, cultural 
development, and promote active collaboration as well as mutual assistance on matter of common 
interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields. 
651 Before the middle of 1980s, Taiwan's government prohibited its businessmen to conduct any direct 
or indirect trade with China. For detail, see generally Chamg Kao, ECONOMIC 
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN TAIWAN AND MAINLAND CHINA, Issues & Studies, April, 
1993, Taiwan. 
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area(such as Japan, Singapore, and Guam). By the late 1980s, longing to boost 
Taiwan's economy, the Taiwan government relaxed regulation on trade and 
commercial activities with China by formulating three principles to the two-way trade 
which are (1) indirect trade, (2) government approval, and (3) balancing national 
security and economic profit.652 The principles marked the foundation of a more 
relaxed policy toward China's economIC exchanges that resulted III rapid trade 
development between Taiwan and China. 
The value of indirect trade between Taiwan and China(via Hong Kong) 
amounted to US$31.25 billion in 2000, over eighty percent of this value was exports 
from Taiwan.653 Although political stand and consideration for national security may 
inevitably limit Taiwan in its trading activities with China and make Taiwan's imports 
from China present a slow growth, in long-term economIC development, steady, 
continual, and cautious programming may establish a solid foundation for further 
development of the trade between Taiwan and China. 
§ 5-7 Economic Interdependence 
Even China has reiterated that the main purpose of strengthening its economic 
relations with Taiwan is to make Taiwan highly dependent on China economically, 
652 See information released by the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs(www.moe.gov.tw). 
653 See the ROC Yearbook: Taiwan 2002, released by the ROC Government Information 
Office(www.gio.gov.tw). 
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and, ultimately, politically. Considering China's potential economic power,654 like 
other countries III the world, Taiwan has little choice but to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to economIC exchange with China. Consequently, this gradual economIC 
integration makes China also dependent on Taiwan. Taiwan's economic exchanges 
with China can provide not only capital and technical expertise, but also its own 
economIc development expenence; but for Taiwan, it becomes much more 
complicated by fearing that too-large an economIC stake there will make Taiwan 
overly dependent on China while considering national security and economic interests. 
Because of this concern, and in order to reduce the danger of becoming a political 
pawn, the Taiwanese government may give priority to encouraging its citizens, who 
need to invest abroad, to go to other Southeast Asian countries that offer similar 
investment incentives to China. 
In reality, as China does not recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, 
China does not extend the same guarantees of protection to Taiwanese investors as it 
does to other foreign citizens. This is regardless of the fact that Taiwan is a leading 
investor in China.655 Taking national security into consideration, the situation of 
654 See Bonnie S. Glaser, BUSH'S CHINA POLICY SHOWS CHANGE, Taipei Times, March 18, 
2002, Taiwan(Noting China's economy is projected to continue to grow at 6 percent to 7 percent during 
the next 20 years. Its per capita income will continue to lag behind many advanced industrialized 
economies, but in terms of GDP it is expected to surpass that of all individual European countries 
within two decades. According to some forecasts, by 2025 the size of China's economy may match that 
of the US) 
655 See Taiwan Must Protect Its Economy, Taipei Times, September 29, 2002, Taiwan(Stating that 
despite frequent characterization by the media as having a China fever, the US and Japan invest only 
about 0.05 percent of their respective GNP in China each year. According to academics' statistics, the 
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Taiwan-China's economic interdependence has turned out to be the strangest one in 
the entire business world. The two sides of the Strait are now highly dependent on 
each other economically on one hand, but both have neither diplomatic relations nor 
any other mechanism for protecting the interests of Taiwan's investors on the other. In 
an effort to avoid unexpected risks and solve economic disputes via other channels, 
the businessmen who intend to invest in China are advised to register with Taiwan's 
Ministry of Economic Affairs656 and make their investment in China through 
subsidiaries set up in a third country so that they can place their investment under the 
protection of investment agreements between China and the third country. 
The negative impact on Taiwan's investments directly flowing to China, will give 
China a political advantage over Taiwan by a further heightening of tensions between 
the two sides of the Strait. Too much investment by Taiwan's entrepreneurs could 
cause them to be held hostage by China, leading China to put Taiwan under political 
siege should the cross-strait conflict deepen. It is preferable therefore for Taiwan to 
maintain its appropriate handling of the normalizing cross-strait relations by 
improving its trade with China, through direct transportation links, rather than get too 
amount of Taiwanese investments in China is 4 percent of Taiwan's GNP - a figure that is twice as 
larger than the one released by the government. The ratio between investments in China and GNP is 
about 80 times greater than those of the US and Japan). 
656 See Charles H. C. Kao & Chu-chia Steve Lin, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TAIWAN'S 
INVESTMENT IN THE MAINLAND, Issues & Studies, June, 1991, Taiwan(Stating that in an effort 
to control business investment and accurately gauge business activity across the Taiwan Strait, Taipei 
has insisted that all firms investing on the mainland register with the Ministry of Econornic Affrrs.) 
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involved in direct investment in China. In tum, direct investment involves many risks 
more than trade. In VIew of this, Taiwan's investment through international 
corporations registered in foreign countries would be a very useful way of minimizing 
risk when compared with direct investment in China. The opening of direct trade and 
transportation with China should be given Taiwan's priority in its implementation of 
normalizing the cross-strait relations. 657 
III. DIRECT TRANSPORTATION LINKS 
Regardless of the political difficulties in the cross-strait relations, more than a 
decade of trade and investment has bound the fortunes of Taiwan's economy closely 
to China.658 As a result, China has replaced the US as the top destination for 
Taiwan's exports. 659 Hence, establishing transportation links(including direct 
cross-strait trade, postal connections, as well as direct flights and shipping routes) 
between the two sides of the Strait to an extent as not to seriously jeopardize Taiwan's 
national security is inevitable and will also be accountable for the cross-strait trade 
657 See Keith Bradsher, TAIWANESE SPLIT ON REPLY TO OVERTURES FROM CHINA, San 
Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 16,2002, USA(Noting that Taiwan businesses have been the biggest foreign 
investors in China in the past decade, and they contend that the lack of direct transportation links and 
closer governmental relations have hurt their competitiveness.) 
658 See H. Asher Bolande, NO END TO INDEPENDENCE STALEMATE?, the China Post, Oct. 1, 
1999, Taiwan(Noting it is at the vanguard of mainland China's effort to woo Taiwan back into the fold 
through economic links. China has successfully pulled in large amounts of investment from Taiwan 
since 1987, when Taiwan began to tolerate cross-strait indirect trade and investment). 
659 According to statistics from the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the ROC, 25.2 % of Taiwan 
exports went to China in the flrst half of 2002 that led to the PRC becoming the top destination for 
Taiwanese exports. See information released by the Government Information Office of the ROC(www. 
gio,gov.tw); see also EDITORIAL: CROSS-STRAIT POLICIES LACK COHERENCE, Taipei Times, 
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and economic exchanges between the two sides of the Strait. 
The implementation of direct transportation would improve cross-strait relations 
through positive and constructive exchanges that would also bring the two sides closer 
in terms of economic, social, and cultural development. However, apart from serving 
to nurture mutual trust and cooperation between the two sides, to implement this 
policy of direct transportation links is a critical challenge to both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. It is quite foreseeable that, regarding the issue of direct links, despite Taiwan's 
intention to handle such an issue by ways of a special status based on the reality of 
divided sovereignty of the two sides, China would rather handle the issue as its 
domestic affair. Therefore, the issue of direct links between the two sides is a simple 
concept with a not-so-easy solution that requires steadiness and collaboration with 
each other on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In spite of that, one thing that is more 
than clear here is that this challenge of implementing direct links will carry a positive 
meaning and does not aim to create problems for the bilateral ties of the Taiwan Strait. 
§ 5-8 National Security 
Accordingly, the direct transportation links will serve as an impetus in improving 
the relationship through meaningful exchanges. However, in the implementation of 
these direct links, the highest consideration and priority is given to the assurance of 
Sep. 19,2002, Taiwan. 
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national security due to the fact that China has refused to renounce the use of force 
against Taiwan.660 In other words, an on-going economic interaction of the two sides 
increasingly presents a dramatic divergence between economics and politics. In this 
context, the plan for the corresponding implementation of the direct transportation at 
the initial stage may be implemented with the necessity of bilateral negotiation. 
Regarding the direct links across the Taiwan Strait, the two sides must relate to the 
issues of ports, quarantine, and customs and the need for communication, consultation, 
and continuous cooperation. Hence, dialogue in bilateral negotiation of the two sides 
not only will enhance the normalization of meaningful exchanges between the 
Governments of the two sides, but will also enhance the well-being of the people on 
both sides ofthe Taiwan Strait. 
In addition, the implementation of the direct transportation links is expected to 
increase commercial activities and tourism, which will in turn benefit local economic 
prosperity and contribute positively to improving the overall cross-strait relationship. 
By so doing, the economic and cultural exchanges across the Strait should continue to 
expand and the direct links for postal, air and shipping services and trade between the 
two sides are an objective requirement for speeding up this development. However, 
660 See EXPLANATION OF PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S REMARKS OF AUGUST 3, 2002, 
Government Infonnation Office of the ROC(Taiwan)(www.gio.gov.tw)(Noting that China has 
continued to expand its military deployments across the Taiwan Strait. At present, China has deployed 
400 missiles directly targeting Taiwan. Every year, it holds large-scale joint military exercise 
simulating attacks on Taiwan and its offshore islands.) 
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Taiwan needs to be extremely careful of how to handle such a direct links issue, 
because it is an issue that not only concerns meaningful exchanges across the Taiwan 
Strait, but also involves a risk of national security that needs to be weighed. 
§ 5-9 Safe and Secure Direct Links 
As discussed above, the complexity of developments between the two sides 
signals the fact to us that Taiwan is playing a strategic gamble between economic 
interest and political interest. 661 Putting national security issues into consideration 
regarding the normalization of the cross-strait relations through direct transportation 
links, the first steps to implement such direct links should be carried on in a narrower 
scope. In this respect, tactically, the so-called "Safe and Secure Links"( direct 
transportation, postal services, and trade between China and Taiwan's offshore islands 
of Kinmen and Matsu)(hereinafter "S&S Links") can been introduced as a preparation 
for the future direct transportation links. By so doing, Taiwan can expand the 
functions and scope of the existing offshore transshipment centers, set up a special 
cross-strait trade and economic exchange zone, as well as open Taiwan to tourism by 
PRC citizens in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually 
beneficial; on the other hand, the increased cross-strait exchanges can be managed 
661 See generally Gary H. Jefferson, LIKE LIPS AND TEETH: ECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR 
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, Graduate School of Int'l Economic and Finance, Brandeis University, 
Sep., 1999. Regarding the issue that currently, mainland China and Taiwan appear to be engaged in a 
process of economic integration and political disintegration, the author argued that this divergence 
between economic and politics is not sustainable and is particularly threatening to Taiwan's economic 
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without a threat to Taiwan's security by practically establishing an effective 
mechanism, such as proportional and reciprocal principles, to monitor the so called 
"S&S Links." This is a very good way, in the interim, to enhance relations across the 
Taiwan Strait and enlarge people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the 
Strait. 
The implementation of Safe and Secure Links does not imply that there is no 
need to put priority concern on national security. Rather, Taiwan must make consistent 
efforts to improve its management experience as great attention to strengthen the 
paramount premise of maintaining national security. Apparently, to implement "Safe 
and Secure Direct Links" between Taiwan and China is the favorable balance of 
priorities between economy and security. 
IV. US STANCE IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
More than two decades has passed since the United States switched its official 
recognition from the ROC, its long time faithful ally,662 to the PRC in 1979.663 This 
de-recognition by the US did spur Taiwan's loss of status in the world because both 
prosperity. 
662 See Mangelson, TAIWAN RE-RECOGNIZED: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN'S FUTURE GLOBAL 
STATUS, 1992 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 231, 234.(Noting that when Chiang Kai-shek and two million ROC 
Nationalists were forced to flee China in 1949, the allegiance of their wartime ally - the United States-
crossed Taiwan Strait with them. Strong U.S. - ROC ties, solidified by the Cold War, continued for 
thirty years). 
663 See Greg Mastel, US SHOULD SUPPORT TAIWAN DEMOCRACY, the China Post, Nov. 18, 
1999, Taiwan(Noting that President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger 
engineered a switch, later completed by President Jimmy Carter, in which the US recognized the PRC 
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the ROC and the PRC insisted that they were the sole legitimate government of China. 
Regardless of the fact that the ROC no longer claims to represent all of China,664 
most of Taiwan's other allies followed the US to recognize the PRC, instead of the 
ROC, to be China's legitimate government.665 
After derecognition, the ROC was no longer China to the US and those countries 
who established official diplomatic relations with the PRC. In reality, the Taiwan issue 
is closely linked to the international power balance. Particularly, the US is the most 
deeply involved country in the world on the Taiwan issue with the exception of the 
ROC and the PRC. 
§ 5-10 The US-PRC Joint Communiques 
Before normalizing its relations with the PRC, the US concluded the Shanghai 
Communique with the PRC in 1972 and acknowledged that "the US did not challenge 
the position of all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait that there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The one-China acknowledged by the US is 
conceptually ambiguous. 666 Later, in the 1978 Joint Communique Establishing 
as the legitimate government of China and dropped formal recognition of Taiwan). 
664 Actually, this policy died with Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan is not attempting to compete with China 
regarding this issue. Instead, the ROC has made a pragmatic revision by no longer treating the PRC as 
a rebel regime. See Tzu-wen Lee, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA ON TAIWAN, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 351,391(Noting that it is this increasing 
diplomatic isolation that forced the RCO to realize that it could not represent China nor afford to force 
other countries to choose between Taiwan and China). 
665 The number of ROC's diplomatic allies dwindled quickly from well over 100 to today's 27. 
666 See Lee Chang-kuei, "CHINESE CONFERATION" VERSES "ONE CHINA," Taipei Times, Feb. 
23,2001, Taiwan(Noting at the time of the Shanghai Communique, the one China the US government 
"recognized" was neither the ROC nor the PRe. Rather, it was "a China built by peaceful means," and 
"a future one China.") 
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Diplomatic Relations Between the US and the PRC(Nonnalization Communique), the 
US recognized "the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government ofChina.,,667 
The two mentioned Communiques above are evidence that the United States has 
assumed that there is only one China in the world, and recognizes the PRC to 
represent China, but the US did not con finn the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and 
was silent on the matter of American anns transfers to Taiwan. Particularly, American 
silence on the point of anns sales are due to the relevant facts and increased concerns 
for Taiwan's security which were: (1) the notice of tennination of the mutual defense 
treaty between the US and the ROC; (2) the decision to withdraw US military 
personnel from Taiwan. 668 
In the aftennath of its recognition of the PRC, the US concluded the third 
communique, the US-China Joint Communique, with the PRC in 1982 in which the 
US acknowledges that American anns transfers to Taiwan is of extreme importance to 
Taiwan. Despite the US' commitment to reduce its anns sales to Taiwan gradually by 
understanding the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
667 See Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of China, Dec. 15, 1978, U.S.-P.R.C., reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 272, 
274 (1979). 
668 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AFTER TEN YEARS, 3 J. Chinese L. 
157, 168. 
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question, 669 this Communique focuses almost exclusively on the sales of defensive 
anns to Taiwan and it would reduce anns sales only as tensions diminished in the 
Taiwan Strait implying the US' long-standing commitment to supporting continued 
security assistance to Taiwan. In turn, the fact that the US continuously supplies 
Taiwan with defensive anns is a good source of legitimacy showing Taiwan's 
existence as a separate sovereign political entity independent of China. 
As a matter of fact, this 1982 US-China Joint Communique is consistent with the 
principle of the Taiwan Relations Act(TRA), enacted by the US Congress since 1979 
when relations between the US and the ROC were restricted to unofficial relations, 
which IS to maintain the US close and friendly commercial, cultural, and other 
relations with Taiwan. 
§ 5-11 Taiwan Relations Act 
Accordingly, the language of the TRA no longer refers to Taiwan as "the 
Republic of China," but as "the people of Taiwan," "their institutions," and "the 
governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the US as the Republic of China prior 
to January 1, 1979.,,670 Besides, the need of the US to protect its commercial interests 
669 See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, US-TAIWAN SECURITY TIES: TOWARD THE NEXT 
MILLENIUM, a paper prepared for delivery at the conference, entitled "Taiwan on the Threshold of 
21 sl Century: A Paradigm Reexamined," National Chengchi University, Taiwan, Jan. 4-5, 1999 (Noting 
that, taken at face value, the 1982 U.S. China Joint Communique appear to pledge the U.S. to eschew 
long-term arms sales to Taiwan and to keep sales from exceeding either the quality or quantity of arms 
sold to Taiwan after the U.S. established relations with the PRC. 
670 See Taiwan Relations Act, 22, U.S.c. § 3301 (a) (1), (1979). 
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in Taiwan in the wake of the US termination of official relations, in efforts to maintain 
the current status quo of peaceful cross-strait relations between the PRC and the ROC 
that absolutely is in the best interest of the United States, the TRA preconditions that 
"any non-peaceful actions against Taiwan, including boycotts or embargoes, will be 
considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
concern to the United States.,,671 Obviously, this is an assumption that the TRA was 
also born of the need for the US to protect Taiwan's significant security meaning that 
the US would find itself in conflict with China should the PRC attack Taiwan.672 Any 
threats of force against Taiwan would be deemed a threat to US' vital security 
interests. In this sense, the TRA, in part, provides necessary measures for the US to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This is because the maintenance of a 
military force by Taiwan as a deterrent to PRC's forcible threats has been another 
major factor in the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait. 
In fact, the Taiwan Relations Act has played an indispensable role in shaping 
American policy toward Taiwan and is the only law governing nearly every aspect of 
US relations with a foreign government in the absence of diplomatic ties. 673 
671 See Taiwan Relations Act, 22, U.S.c. § 3301 (b) (4), (1979). 
672 U.S. President George W. Bush is committed to defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion with 
"whatever it takes." Taiwan is increasingly being integrated into the US defense strategy including a 
nuclear response. 
673 See Stephen J. Yates, THE TAIWAN RELATOINS ACT AFTER 20 YEARS: KEYS TO PAST 
AND FUTURE SUCCESS, the Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, No. 1272, Apr. 16, 
1999(www.taiwansecurity.org)(Noting that the TRA has allowed the United States to preserve peace, 
promote freedom, and maintain flexibility in balancing its relations and interests with governments on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait). 
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Significantly, regardless of its unofficial relations with Taiwan, the US has practically 
treated Taiwan as if Taiwan were a sovereign state674 and assumed its responsibility 
for maintaining Taiwan's security. Because the TRA has helped maintain peace and 
stability in the Taiwan Strait, in turn, under such a stable environment in the Taiwan 
Strait, the economic and political development in Taiwan can be achieved. As a result, 
following the substantive relations with governments and peoples between the US and 
Taiwan, by 2000, the increased trade relations between the two sides has made Taiwan 
the US' 7th largest trading partner.675 
§ 5-12 Faithful Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act 
In the past two decades, the TRA has provided a security environment of 
cross-strait relations that has facilitated Taiwan's impressive economic expansion and 
democratization. Although the TRA is open to interpretation, it does seem to oblige 
the US to protect Taiwan from forcible attacks. Accordingly, in order to maintain the 
importance of continuing the policy of keeping the US commitment on the principal 
goals ofthe Taiwan Relations Act which are: (a) economic freedom(means to promote 
commercial and other similar relations); (b) security issues(means to deter aggression 
674 See Stephen Lee, AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN: THE ISSUE OF THE DE FACTO 
AND DE JURE STATUS OF TAIWAN AND SOVEREIGNTY, 2 Buff. 1. Int'l L. 323, 324(Noting that 
the U.S. maintains the "American Institution in Taiwan" in Taiwan and Taiwan maintains the "Taipei 
Economic and Culture Offices" in the United States. Even though the U.S. and Taiwan defme these 
organizations as unofficial, the heads and staff of both these organizations are provided with official 
functions, diplomatic privileges, and immunities}. 
675 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, World Almanac Education Group, Inc. 
2002, US, P.219. 
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by the PRe), and ( c) human rights issues(means to protect the human rights of the 
Taiwan people), looking to the future, the US should continue faithfully to implement 
theTRA. 
Even though the TRA does not attempt to plan for any possible contingencies that 
might eventually lead to any form of political integration of both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait, it endorses the achievement of Taiwan's ultimate status through peaceful means. 
Hence, with regard to the growing interactions between the US and the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait at stake, as Dr. Stephen J. Yates noted, 676 the US might amply 
interpret the TRA in such a way so that "it can: 
(1) Urge China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. This is consistent with 
the longstanding US insistence that Taiwan s future be determined by peaceful 
means. 
(2) Sell Taiwan missile defense system and technology. Considering China s 
provocative military exercises and tests of nuclear-capable missiles near Taiwan 
in 1995 and 1996, and China s increased deployment of missiles near Taiwan, 
providing assistance for Taiwan s missile defense is both appropriate and 
consistent with the TRA. 
(3) Actively support Taiwan s membership in international organizations. With a 
676 See Stephen 1. Yates, THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AFTER 20 YEARS: KEYS TO PAST 
AND FUTURE SUCCESS, the Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, No. 1272, Apr. 16, 
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strong economy and vibrant democracy, Taiwan is clearly prepared to make 
significant contributions to the international community through institutions 
involved in trade, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. 
(4) Promote Taiwan s democracy in China and abroad. Consistent with its interests in 
human rights on Taiwan, the US must properly recognize and reward the Taiwan 
people for their success in establishing a democracy. One way to do this is to treat 
Taiwan s leader officially with the respect appropriate to duly elected 
representative of a thriving democracy. " 
§ 5 -13 Settling the Taiwan Question by Peaceful Means 
Regarding a realistic understanding of the issues at stake in the Taiwan question, 
the US may playa more active role in cross-strait relations, but should not intervene 
in this relationship by taking specific actions. In this respect, the US has made clear 
that it would not tolerate a use of force from China against Taiwan. Instead, as the 
TRA provides in part, the US' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC 
rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful 
means.677 Indeed, the US approach applies to the Taiwan question the principle of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that states "All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
1999(www.taiwansecurity.org) 
677 See Taiwan Relations Act, 22, U.S.C. § 3301(b) (4) (1979). 
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political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
United Nations." By applying this logic, in an effort to reach a peaceful settlement of 
such a sovereignty dispute between Taiwan and China, both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
can address matters through negotiation, mediation, or even conciliation.678 
That is to say, although the US would not mediate between Taiwan and China, 
the two sides ofthe Taiwan Strait resolving their problems peacefully is in the interest 
of the US in safeguarding the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.679 This 
is not a favor either to China or Taiwan, rather, it is the US' core interest that has been 
the consistent basis of its policy since the 1972 Shanghai joint communique. Hence, 
as long as the Communist regime still rules China, the democratic future of Taiwan 
and the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait require the US to play a more 
active role in the issue of the Taiwan question as it did in 1996 in the Taiwan Strait 
Missile Crisis.68o As Taiwan is indeed as full-fledged a democracy as the United 
678 See C. M. Chinkin, THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 495, 501(1986) (recognizing the international judicial arena as a 
fundamental norm in the settlement of disputes); Richard E. Rupp, COOPERATION, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BALKANS, SOMALIA, AND 
CAMBODIA, 3 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 183, 191 (1998) ("[A]n effectively functioning 
international organization or regime can promote cooperation and peaceful relations by serving as a 
forum where member states exchange information. "). But see Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther, Jr. & 
Amy E. Eckert, TRAGEDIES IN SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HAITI, RWANDA AND 
LIBERIA-REVISITING THE VALIDITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW-PART II, 26 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 827,854(1998) (discussing the failed 
attempts to resolve the conflict in West Africa). 
679 See Nicholas Rostow, TAIWAN: PLAYING FOR TIME, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 707, 712(Noting 
that with respect to the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. interest in Asia's stability and security, deterrence seems 
clear. Achieving these goals would help secure US humanitarian and economic interests in the entire 
region.) 
680 During the Missile Crisis in 1996, two carrier battle groups that the United States dispatched 
around the Taiwan Strait, in a bid to maintain stability in the region, constituted the largest task force 
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States, if the US is to have any credibility in advocating democracy to the PRC, it 
must properly recognize and support the people of Taiwan for their success in the 
democratization process. 
Given this background, it is not difficult to understand the reaction by the US to 
deploy its two aircraft carrier groups near Taiwan in the 1996 Missile Crisis, which 
did evidence that the US was the only outside power that could back Taiwan with 
military might against any aggression from China. As such, the Taiwan issue IS 
indeed a very central topic in relations between the US and the PRe. 
§ 5-14 From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Competition 
Although the US' normalization of its relations with the PRC was consistent with 
its interest in the need for allies to confront the aggressive Soviet Union, Asia is 
different from what it was then. The Soviet Union is no longer in existence as the 
region's expansionist enemy to the US.681 Moreover, the PRC has not timely 
democratized its political system unlike the ROC that has achieved profound 
self-governance through the process of democratization and Taiwanization.682 China 
by the u.s. in East Asia since the Vietnam War. The U.S. clearly presented its policy as one of keeping 
a peaceful Taiwan Strait which is necessary for protecting its national interests. 
681 See Mangelson, TAIWAN RE-RECOGNIZED: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN'S FUTURE GLOBAL 
STATUS, 1992 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 231, 238 (Noting that in 1979, U.S. policy makers renounced any official 
recognition of the ROC after determining that US interests would be better served by strong ties with 
Beijing. Washington felt that strong ties with Beijing could be used as its "China card" to be played 
against the Soviet threat). 
682 See Eric, Ting-Iun Huang, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 14 N.Y. Int'! L. 
Rev. 167, 211-3.(Noting this continuing process of Taiwanization and democratization created a new 
milestone in 1996 when the people of Taiwan directly elected their President for the fIrst time in 
history). 
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remains an authoritarian regime. 
Generally, the US has experimented with various policies toward the PRC, such 
as emphasizing human rights, economic relations, rather, a strategic partnership. In 
sum, the US deemed China as a strategic partner by realizing that lasting security in 
the Asia-Pacific region was not possible without a constructive role played by China, 
a growing regional power. However, following China's 1996 military exercise when 
China fired missiles close to Taiwan shores to cow the people of Taiwan as they voted 
in their first-ever direct presidential election, the US has in fact begun adjusting its 
strategic planning toward the PRC. This is because the security of Taiwan is of 
international strategic concern. 
Despite the intention of the US to build a strategic partnership with China, 
China's 1996 military exercise brought the US to complete a major overhaul of its 
strategy in East Asia that led to a new Security Treaty ratified between the US and 
Japan683 under the key consideration of taking the PRC as a hypothetical enemy and 
placing Taiwan in the inclusion of "peripheral areas." Indeed, it is very evident that 
this development provides a clear new strategic order in which the US no longer 
deems the PRC a partner684 and each party state to this agreement had a well-defined 
683 See Kam Yiu & Chris Wu, UNIFICATION IS NOT AN EASY PROPOSITION, Taipei Times, Feb. 
21, 2002(Noting that after two rounds of Chinese missile tests targeting Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, the 
U.S. expanded the scope of the US-Japan security treaty to include Taiwan). 
684 See Paul Lin, TAIWAN MUST WORK TO BETTER U.S. TIES, Taipei Times, March 12, 2002, 
Taiwan(Noting that in an interview with CNN dated Feb. 17, 2002, during a visit to Japan, U.S. 
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role to play.685 Another notable example of this is that in 1998, the US Congress 
"authorized the Pentagon to study architectural requirements for the establishment and 
operation of a Theater Missile Defense(hereinafter "TMD") system(an anti-ballistic 
missile defense system) in the Asia-Pacific region in order to protect the country's key 
allies: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.686 
These examples above also make clear that the Taiwan issue cannot be solved 
simply by the PRC unilaterally. Instead, the PRC needs to adjust its strategies in 
maintaining the cross-strait relations peacefully as part of the improved relations 
between the US and the PRC, the improved trilateral relationship(China, Taiwan and 
the US) in particular. The further threats and military actions by the PRC will result in 
the progressive reduction of US vague pledges of maintaining a peaceful Taiwan 
Strait. On the contrary, it would lead the US to trigger an American military 
response(as in 1996) and strengthen its commitment to Taiwan. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell said that China is neither a strategic partner nor a competitor. Powell is 
one of the doves in the U.S. government and yet he does not recognize China as a partner), see also 
Chang Yan-ting, WHAT THE PENTAGON'S CHINA REPORT TELL US, Taipei Times, July 30, 2002, 
Taiwan(Noting that the U.S. President George W. Bush regards China as a strategic competitor). 
685 See Lin Cho-shui, LOOKING FOR CLUES TO CHINA'S ACTIONS, Taipei Times, August 28, 
2002,Taiwan.(Noting that the new security agreements cleared up the ambiguous state of affairs that 
had temporarily prevailed in post-Cold War East Asia and revealed a clear new strategic order in which 
each country had a well-defmed role to play.) 
686 See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, US-TAIWAN SECURITY TIES: TOWARD THE NEXT 
MILLENIUM, a paper prepared for delivery at the conference, entitled "Taiwan on the Threshold of 
21 sl Century: A Paradigm Reexamined," National Chengchi University, Taiwan, Jan. 4-5, 1999 (Noting 
that the study was authorized in the U.S. 1999 National Defense Authorization Act). See also Lee 
Chang-kuei, "CHINESE CONFEDERATION" VERSES "ONE CHINA," Taipei Times, Feb. 23,2001, 
Taiwan(Noting the US establishment of a theater missile defense system for Japan and Taiwan 
highlights the Bush administration's policy of skewing toward Taiwan's safety and stability in the 
triangular relationship, and US concerns about the proliferation of PRC nuclear offensive technology 
and missiles. The US also remains concerned about the PRC's human rights conditions. These two 
concerns remain umesolved.) 
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§ 5-15 Strategic Ambiguity 
As Taiwan's growth and security rely so heavily on its relationship with the US, 
the US Taiwan policy must be considered in any assessment of Taiwan's future. 
However, the US wants to create a degree of ambiguity relating to Taiwan's future.687 
At the very least, notwithstanding that the evolution of the independence-reunification 
dichotomy would directly influence the consequence of Taiwan's future, the US 
avoids having to show its stance for publicly determining whether or not the US is 
pro-independence regarding the Taiwan question too early.688 
That is to say, in the event of a formal and explicit declaration of independence 
by Taiwan, the US would not like Taiwan to declare formal independence,689 but its 
relatively low-key response to Taiwan's independent movement suggests that Taiwan 
has some leeway in the matter. As Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, said, 
regarding Taiwan's independence, that: "the US neither supports nor opposes it. 
"is} aying we do not support it is one thing. It's different from saying we oppose it, " ... 
687 See Greg Mastel, US SHOULD SUPPORT TAIWAN DEMOCRACY, the China Post, Nov. 18, 
1999, Taiwan(Noting the United States has an ambiguous security commitment to the fledgling 
democracy(Taiwan), carefully limiting arms sales to it to avoid offending the totalitarian power(China). 
It cautions the democracy not to assert its right to independence and self-determination too loudly and 
supports the totalitarian power's effort to deny the democracy international recognition). 
688 See Paul Lin, REFERENDA, US POLICY AND TAIWAN, Taipei Times, Sep. 8, 2002, 
Taiwan.(Stating that Armitage's detailed explanations tell us that "not supporting" is a policy the U.S. 
administration actively put forward, while "not opposing" requires an objective condition, which is 
what Armitage said: "If people on both sides of the Strait came to an agreeable solution, then the 
United States obviously wouldn't inject ourselves.") 
689 See Kam Yiu & Chris Wu, UNIFICATION IS NOT AN EASY PROPOSITION, Taipei Times, Feb. 
21, 2002(Noting that the U.S. will use Taiwan's democratic society as an incentive to push Chinese 
society toward democratization. The U.S. will not hastily let Taiwan declare independence, which 
could incite a war in the Taiwan Strait and drag the U.S. into the fray). 
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"not supporting" is passive but "opposing" is active. " 
Judged by the US emphasis on a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue, 
there is a different distinction between "peaceful resolution" and "peaceful 
reunification." The latter assumes unification is a given, while the former does not. 
Despite the fact that the US stance toward the Taiwan status is more politically 
ambiguous, "to maintain the status quo of the ROC and wait for change in the PRC" 
is a positive vision of what kind of cross-strait relations the US wants to see. If we 
consider the advocacy of freedom as the most fundamental US value, as a result of 
Taiwan's democratization which attaches to the US a considerable degree of 
responsibility, it is logical and true that the US should deem the decision of Taiwan 
whether or not to unify with the PRC as being in Taiwanese people's hands 
exclusively. However, any support by the US to the exclusive entitlement of the 
Taiwan people to decide Taiwan's future would contradict the PRC's "one China" 
policy that lead to a dilemma accounting for the complicated triangular relations 
between the US and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
In this regard, if the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot remain perpetually 
divided, the US should endorse neither China's vision of reunification nor Taiwan's 
independence for establishment of the Republic of Taiwan. Instead, it should take a 
public stand on the matter that any eventual resolution of the Taiwan question should 
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come through peaceful negotiations and more importantly, with the consent of the 
people of Taiwan by means of a public referendum. In doing so, to maintain a 
stabilization of US-China relations is in Taiwan's interests. 
V. CONCEPT OF A FUTURE ONE-CHINA 
Since China was divided into two nations, the Republic of China on Taiwan and 
the People's Republic of China on the Chinese mainland in 1949, the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have not stopped debating the issue of one-China,690 despite the fact 
that both are independent sovereign states under international law. Regarding the 
definition of what "one-China" means, the two Governments of the Taiwan Strait 
have never reached a consensus on the "one-China" principle. The two sides still hold 
different definitions of one-China. In fact, this has a negative impact on the 
development of cross-strait relations. 
Based on the thinking that China can attack and annex Taiwan, China believes 
that Taiwan's fate is already determined as a part of China. The PRC has hence 
interpreted the "one-China" principle to refer to the PRC as the sole legitimate 
690 See Ruan Ming, IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE LIE THAT IS "ONE CHINA." The Taipei Times, 
July 23, 1999, Taiwan(Noting that the originators of the "one China" policy were Chiang Kai-shek's 
government in Taiwan and its main ally, the US. From 1949 to 1971, the "one China" policy got China 
barred from the UN for 22 years, the US government recognized the existence of the "little China"(the 
ROC) as the only legitimate government by simply ignoring the existence of the "big China"(the PRC). 
Since 1979, however, the US has recognized the "big China" as the only legitimate government, thus 
ignoring the existence of the "little China." The so called "one China" principle, as shared by Taiwan, 
the US and China, is fundamentally based on these lies and dreams that have persisted through the 
years). 
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government of China and has continued to insist that Taiwan's future is under this 
premise of the one-China principle. It is just a unilateral proposition imposed by the 
PRC on the ROC that is quite unsettling for Taiwan's future, easily giving rise to 
conflicts between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As mentioned above, the 
sovereignty dispute is likely a dead end issue to the cross-strait relations. If China 
only places emphasis on such a dead-end issue of the sovereignty dispute by sticking 
to its own view of the one-China concept, rather than renounce this stance and open 
the way for each side to accept each other's sovereignty and legitimacy, apparently, 
the cross-strait issues will be difficult to be resolved. In turn, this will also confuse the 
international community's understanding of Taiwan's status. 
To understand the impact of the independence-reunification dichotomy, it would 
be necessary to examine the different parts of the scenarios that influence the 
cross-strait relations. When compared to the distinctive characters between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, in fact, they share something unique in common: (1) both 
governments once belonged to a unified country, and while divided now; (2) both 
authorities claim to be the legitimate representative of their country; and (3) both 
sides meet the four-part test for statehood as a state under international law. The 
former West and East Germany is a very similar case of the above that can provide 
such an experience to both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Because of their linguistic, 
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geographical, and economic affinities, both Taiwan and China are conducive to the 
goal of future unification of a new, democratic China.691 However, this is just one of 
the conditions that Taiwan might take but would not therefore block the possibility 
that the people of Taiwan are free to determine their own future. 
§ 5-16 Enacting a Referendum Law and Taiwan Moves Toward Its Own Future 
Any initiating action to seek Taiwan independence would pose a senous 
consequence in the Taiwan Strait because it might provoke China into using force and 
trigger a war in the Taiwan Strait. However, the Taiwanese government should keep 
opening the option of someday publicly declaring its political independence from 
China by abandoning the so-called one-China principle. At the same time, it should 
keep the possible option of unification with China before necessarily actualizing its 
independence, because it is the best tactical move that Taiwan can employ to prevent 
China from using force as an excuse. 
By this logic, the question of Taiwan's future status lies not in whether Taiwan 
is an independent state(by any standards of customary international law, Taiwan has 
long qualified as a sovereign state), but rather whether or not to unite with China. 
691 See Mangelson, TAIWAN RE-RECOGNIZED: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN'S FUTURE GLOBAL 
STATUS, 1992 B.YUL. Rev. 231, 249-50(Noting that under Germany's former dual-system 
government, the Federal Republic of Germany(FDR) and German Democratic Republic(GDR) were 
able to develop closer ties and work out their differences. Both the GDR and the FDR have been 
members of the United Nations since 1973. The day after both were admitted to the United Nations, the 
foreign ministers of each side, speaking before the UN General Assembly, renounced, on behalf of their 
countries, the use of force in solving their differences. In the same year, the two sides also entered into 
an agreement to work toward peaceful reunification. In 1974, the two opened formal relations with 
each other. All of these exchanges helped lead to the eventual reunification of the two Germanies.) 
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Judging by the reality that the PRC is becoming stronger and its international position 
is rising, all of this makes Taiwan incompatible with the role of the PRC in deciding 
which way to deal with Taiwan's future and the cross-strait relations. 
As a matter of legal concern, there exists relatively no procedure in Taiwan to 
implement the right of self-determination. In order to democratically decipher the 
political will of the people of Taiwan to resolve the longstanding dispute across the 
Taiwan Strait, the issue of enacting a referendum law to forge national consensus on 
Taiwan's political identity should be deemed a mature political mechanism. This is 
because to commence a direct, secret, and universal ballot is a comprehensive way to 
assess the will of the Taiwanese people.692 As it is a major issue regarding Taiwan's 
future status, it is rising to become an important topic in Taiwan's domestic society 
and polity, much to China's great annoyance. 693 
Instead of a formal political proclamation of independence by Taiwan, to 
legalize the referendum procedure at the highest possible level in Taiwan is not just to 
signal an intention to settle the domestic dispute between pro-unification and 
pro-independence because it helps to present a real outcome of the will of the 
692 The UN Resolution 2625, known as "the Declaration on Principles oflnternational Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations," has fIrmly legalized the effect of people's domestic political collective rights. For UN Res. 
2625, see G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 2S, at 124, UN Doc. A/S02S(1970). 
693 See TAIPEI TIMES, August 7, 2002, Taiwan(Noting that, in a speech to the World Federation of 
Taiwanese Associations, Taiwan President Chen proposed that there is "one country on each side" of 
Taiwan and called for Taiwan to seriously consider the importance and urgency of establishing a 
referendum law.) 
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Taiwanese people, but more significantly, it can serve as an imperative to conflict 
resolution between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait if China decides to use force to 
annex Taiwan.694 In other words, while perpetuating the claim that Taiwan's future 
reunification with China, the PRC could not force Taiwan to go for it, nor could the 
decision of reunification be done by the people on both sides of the Strait. Instead, 
only the respective residents of Taiwan should be eligible to determine the future of 
Taiwan(including the establishment of an independent sovereIgn state, ~ free 
association or integration with China).695 As mentioned above, this merely accords 
respect for fundamental human rights to which the people of Taiwan are entitled. 
§ 5-17 Negotiate Taiwan's Future Within a One-China Framework 
North and South Korea are both members of the United Nations, meaning each 
side maintains its status as an independent sovereign state internationally. Recently, 
the two Koreas met for their historic talk regarding the reunification of the Korean 
Peninsula on parity without setting preconditions.696 This witnesses the fact that even 
694 To collect the free will of people by conducting referendum democratically is deemed the universal 
value that not only fulfill the modem principle of self-determination and should be respected and 
recognized by the whole international community. For details, see Eric, Ting-lun Huang, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF TAIWAN TO SELF-DETERMINATION, 14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 167, 167-229. 
695 See Charney, J.R.V Prescott, RESOLVING CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA 
AND TAIWAN, 94, Am. J. Int'l L. 453, 471(Noting that the PRC's authoritarian character could make 
it difficult to ensure a free and fair plebiscite on independence after a period of PRC interim control 
over Taiwan. A reasonable alternative might be to hold a plebiscite within Taiwan prior to any change 
in the status quo, giving its population the option whether or not to choose some form of association 
with China). 
696 See TAIWAN PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BlAN PRESS CONFERENCE DATED JUNE 20, 2000, 
Government Information Office of the ROC(www.gio.org.tw)(Presedent Chen indicating that both 
North and South Korea still have fairly diverse interpretations of the unification policy of the Korean 
Peninsula. At the present stage, the two sides have inconsistent positions on this topic; and South Korea 
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if Taiwan were to act as an independent sovereign state in its relations with China, the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait can look forward to future cross-strait reconciliation 
just as the day has already arrived for North and South Korea. This IS because 
reconciliation is a new ideal in this world and has become a global mainstream trend 
that creates the environment and timing for the two Koreas to take this great step 
forward.697 
In fact, Taiwan and China have a similar condition as the two Koreas. In tum, it 
IS also understandable and manageable for the two sides to contribute a more 
constructive, cooperative relationship as long as the goodwill and sincerity on each 
side are mature enough. While the two sides of the Strait have deep differences on a 
range of important Issues, I.e., sovereignty dispute, they still have some national 
interests in common. At this point, the "one-China" framework is apparently the most 
important Issue among them. Therefore, reiterating mutual agreement on the 
"one-China" principle with respective interpretation with each side and the peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue would be a good place for both Taiwan and China to 
start. 
still considers it too early even for proposals regarding the establishment of a federal system or setting 
up a confederation, let alone discussing reunification. Still, even in the absence of any pre-established 
premises, the two Koreas have been inspired to sit down together for talk.) 
697 See TAIWAN PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN PRESS CONFERENCE DATED JUNE 20, 2000, 
Government Information Office of the ROC(www.gio.org.tw)(Presedent Chen analyzed the requisite 
condition for North and South Korea to meat face to face in a dialogue on the basis of parity with any 
present condition are (1) South Korea has a new leader, President Kim Dae-jung; (2) North Korea must 
be politically stable; (3) the international environment and the timing are mature.) 
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§ 5-18 ANew Integrated China 
As noted earlier, Taiwan's future is inextricably tied to its relations with the PRe. 
However, the possible legal and political relationships that could develop between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait are numerous. Mainly, the most likely relationships to 
develop can be grouped into four categories: (1) forced reunification under 
communist rule; (2) reunification under the Hong Kong model; (3) Taiwan's 
independence or maintenance of the status quo; (4) peaceful reunification by 
democratic means. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the Taiwanese people are 
satisfied with the status quo (maintaining an ambiguous political relationship with the 
PRC while continuing to maintain economic exchanges in the Chinese mainland), an 
increasingly vocal number of Taiwanese people have expressed a desire to take the 
Number (4) model regarding Taiwan's future relations with the PRC if the current 
status quo of cross strait relations drags on too long.698 As a result of realizing the 
Taiwanese people's increasing concern about Taiwan's peaceful reunification with 
China, the government of Taiwan adopted the Guidelines for National Unification,699 
which outlines the principles for the gradual and sequential steps toward the eventual 
698 The PRC issued a provocative warning to Taiwan regarding reunification in a white paper released 
by the PRe's Taiwan Affairs Office on Februrary 21, 2000. The paper, entitled "The One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue," states that further delays by Taiwan on the question of reunification 
could lead to war. This is a signal that China is getting impatient with the delays in the process of 
reunification. 
699 The Guidelines for National Unification was adopted by Taiwan's National Unification Council on 
February 23, 1991. For the Guidelines, see Government Information Office of the 
ROC.(www.gio.gov.tw) 
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unification of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland under the principles of freedom, 
democracy, and equitable distribution of wealth for all Chinese. Under this logic, the 
ROC and the PRC both belong to a new integrated China. 
§ 5-19 Agreement to Disagree 
If an integral political unit of China were the future of hope by the people of 
Taiwan, both sides of the Strait can deal with the question of a future integrated China 
by setting aside this controversy. That is to say, each side can define the cross-strait 
status at its own discretion so as to by-pass the differences regarding sovereignty 
issues. The concept of a future one-China is developing which refers to neither the 
ROC, nor the PRC. Such a definition of one-China cannot be unilaterally decided and 
manipulated by any single nation or political party. Accordingly, how to unify the two 
sides is an issue of the future that needs to respect the free will of the people on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait. No outsider can make a decision for the twenty-three 
million people of Taiwan without their consent. 
In other words, the position is crystal clear that the definition of a future 
"one-China" should be established on a basis that is acceptable to both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. More important, the process must include all possibilities for all of the 
Taiwan people to decide in the future. In such a case, under the circumstances, US 
President Bill Clinton was right to return to the reality of the present status quo of 
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Taiwan-China relations by clearly saying that whether Taiwan's status quo continues 
or is changed is something to be collectively decided by the people ofTaiwan.70o 
Before seeking a mutually acceptable definition of a political unit, the two sides 
must jointly deal with the question of a future one-China. The outcome is true and 
final only when it is acceptable to both sides. Otherwise, in the interim, to return to 
the 1992 tacit "one-China" agreemene01 in which both acknowledge that there is 
only one China, but that each side would be allowed to have its own interpretation of 
one-China is a best way to keep the Taiwan-China relations going. Tactically the 
"agreement to disagree" of respective interpretations is a good description that starts a 
process of the entire evolution of reaching an acceptable consensus with economics 
and culture as the basis of cross-strait exchanges. As a matter of fact, this intention of 
allowing each side to have its own way to say what it prefers provides both sides more 
opportunities for dialogues, exchanges, and shelving disputes relating to the issue of 
political integration between the two sides of the Strait before both sides consider 
whether or not to accept the concept of a future one-China. 
70'\]S President Bill Clinton criticized a threat by China forcibly to reunify Taiwan with the Chinese 
mainland if there are any further delays by Taiwan on the reunification negotiation by stating that the 
Taiwan issue must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan. For details, see 
CAN, Washtington, Feb 25, 2000."any final resolution to the cross-strait situation must be made with 
the consent of the people on Taiwan." 
701 See Lee Chang-kuei, "CHINESE CONFEDERATION" VERSES "ONE CHINA," the Taipei Times, 
Feb. 23, 2001, Taiwan(Noting in 1992, a conference between Mr. Koo-Chen-fu of the ROC Straits 
Exchange Foundation and Mr. Wang Doa-han of the PRC Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Strait took place in Singapore. During the conference, the issue of one China remained a subject of 
major dispute. With absolutely no consensus between the two sides, China expressed the view that "one 
China is the PRC, of which Taiwan is a part," while the ROC claimed "one China is the ROC, of which 
the mainland is a part.") 
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§ 5-20 Peaceful Coexistence and Cooperation Across the Taiwan Strait 
As discussed above, the gap between the two sides of the Strait is caused not so 
much by the economic differences as by the political differences. Indeed, the key to 
the success of either the "one country two systems" model or the one country two 
governments" under the concept of future one China lies in economics, not politics 
because it is the common interest of the people of the two sides. The development of 
both sides' continuing economic prosperity is an auspicious factor for the cross-strait 
relations, as well as for the Asian-Pacific regIOn as a whole. In the meantime, 
modernization of China's economy IS planting the seeds for the broader aim of 
developing China into a regional power and bringing Taiwan to benefit from it. 
If the common interest can really create a new environment of preventing 
unexpected cross-strait conflict, cross-strait relations should therefore be conducted 
based on reality to put economic matters first in the establishment of an economic 
Chinese community. Leaving political disputes aside in favor of dealing with less 
sensitive but more practical issues until a more opportune time to normalize the 
relationship between Taiwan and China,702 and then, to seek common grounds on the 
702 See ROC(TAIWAN) VS. PRC(CHINA): A COMPARISION, Government Information Office of 
the ROC(www.gio.gov.tw)(Noting that in the realm of political development, Taiwan has grown into a 
free and vibrant democracy ..... In 1996, the people of Taiwan completed their first direct presidential 
election. The presidential election of 2000 ended five decades of government under the KMT and 
peacefully transferred power to the victorious Democratic Progressive Party(DPP). In contrast, the 
advancement of democracy in China has stagnated, and the PRC remains a one-party Communist 
dictatorship. ) 
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basis of the existing foundations would be the major aspiration of the people on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait.703 Each side of the Strait may therefore undertake to 
facilitate the further development of such a new environment to reach consensus on 
the controversial matters. 
Accordingly, both sides can make their greatest contributions by proposing a 
project of joint cooperation such as the case of the joint cooperation between Britain 
and Argentina. For example, in 1996, the foreign ministers of Britain and Argentina 
signed a joint declaration concerning cooperation with regard to offshore activities in 
the south-west Atlantic. This contained a formula on sovereignty over the Falkland 
Island, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime 
areas to the effect that nothing III the declaration or any action carried out III 
consequence of it would constitute a basis for affirming, supporting or changing the 
position of each of the countries in relation to those areas.704 As exemplified in the 
case of joint cooperation between Britain and Argentina, we sense the critical role that 
joint cooperation has played in the political and security agendas between Britain and 
Argentina. 
703 Regarding the existing foundation meaning any result and consensus reached in past contacts, 
dialogue, or negotiations conducted between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation(SEF) and the 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in China(ARAT). 
704 See Eli Lauterpacht, SOVEREIGNTY: MYTH OR REALITY, 73 INTAFFS 139 (1997). In this 
case, sovereignty is a concept with a specific meaning, it is possible to separate the nominal part of 
sovereignty, the formal title, from the actual exercise of power in the area. By agreeing upon the 
manner in which the latter will be exercised without prejudice to the former, the significance of the 
dispute over title is reduced. 
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Likewise, without the risk of a war, the future development of the cross-strait 
relations should follow this direction of shared values by joint cooperation that would 
provide a good mechanism for economic integration between the two sides of the 
Strait. Under such a mechanism, both sides can establish mutual trust, understanding 
and assistance. As Dr. Mangelson has noted: "Increased contacts between Taiwan and 
China are propelled by the potential economic benefits of increased business contacts, 
the common heritage of Taiwan and China's people, incentives from Beijing, and the 
possibility that Taiwan's wealth could help change the PRC's social system.,,705 
The growing economic and trade interaction between Taiwan and China allow 
more room for both sides to engage together in constructive ways so that the workable 
parallel approach to simultaneous cooperation with Taiwan and China can serve the 
interests of the whole regional economy. For instance, China and Taiwan have 
suffered much less from the economic crisis in East Asia. On the contrary, both have 
indeed become global major economic players: thus, the two sides of the Strait can 
make joint efforts in solving the regional economic crisis 706 that would be desirable 
and beneficial to the region in particular. 
705 See Mangelson, TAIWAN RE-RECOGNIZED: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN'S FUTURE GLOBAL 
STATUS, 1992 B.Y.u.L. Rev. 231, 244. 
706 See Murray Weidenbaum & Harvey Sicherman, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: A NEW SCENARIO, 
Jan. 1999(www. taiwansecurity.org)(Noting that the problem-Asian financial crisis-arose first in 
Thailand and then quickly spread to other East Asian nations, especially Korea, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. The key manifestations of financial distress were plummeting currencies, failing banks, 
massive layoffs, and a wholesale flight of foreign capital.) 
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VI. THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF THE CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
With the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union that led to the emergence of a new global society, globalization brings 
universal properties of human conditions with the international political economy. The 
mainstream trend in international political economy is a process of integration and 
arrangements for global cooperation between national political and international 
economies in the foreseeable future. Under such an evolution, national identity seems 
to be a conceptual ambiguity to nationhood.707 In an increasingly interdependent 
world, this might make boundaries become less significant as it is the case of the 
European Union(EU}. In this respect, there is a crucial need for the PRC to accelerate 
and broaden its thinking to achieve a holistic view of the Chinese community that 
refers to the national identity of Chinese states, such as Taiwan and Singapore. 
Although the PRC is still one of a minority of remaining authoritarian regimes 
today, the complexity of patterns of development in the economic and political realms 
underlies the fact that the PRC is now necessary for an understanding of the change 
707 See LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, Asiaweek, May 21, 1999, p.34. In an interview regarding the 
question as to "what is the future of the Asian nation state?" the fonner Singapore President Lee Kuan 
Yew responds that "[I]f Asia stabilizes and grows and there's more economic integration, then, while it 
may not become like Europe, boundaries will become less significant." 
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and development in the global political economy. More importantly, China's future 
growth depends on reform of its financial and economic systems. In this respect, 
China should actively conduct dialogue with Taiwan to promote financial stability 
and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Applying the economic interdependence factors of cross-strait relations into the 
evolution of the global political economy, it is a simple but essential foundation to 
sense what may be difficult but not impossible to generate a qualitative "parallel 
engagement" with both parts of divided China under the inter-governmental 
arrangement for both the ROC and the PRC by an interim de facto confederative 
system. Under this system, the two sides may arrange for an agreement among 
high-ranking government of officials of both sides to define their relations with each 
other and thus, the arrangement may facilitate a regularized ad hoc committee, 
composed of the leaders of economic and financial affairs from both sides, to 
coordinate economic issues of economic reform and transition in efforts to develop a 
Chinese community market between the two sides of the Strait(including the Hong 
Kong SAR). 
§ 5-21 Establishment ofthe Chinese Community Market 
As mechanisms for implementing and enforcing the related policies of the 
economic community would face the obstacles of sovereignty issues, as long as both 
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sides agree to respect the political reality of the two sides across the Taiwan Strait, a 
flexible approach allowing each side to retain full political sovereignty is also 
advocated such as the EU member states for example. Although the transition of both 
sides of the Strait to a common economic community may raise many political 
disputes, the case of the EU has already provided such a very good experience that the 
common economic community's main goals of legalizing foundations for a market 
economy would require both sides to refrain from exercising their full sovereignty in 
economic matters such as free movement of goods, services, and labor; a common 
monetary and banking system; a unified tax system and a common price policy. If 
analyzed from the evolutionary manner of the EU model that renders boundaries less 
significant and nationalism more blurred, such a procedure of integrating the 
Taiwan-China economies is quite available for settling nationality disputes between 
the Taiwanese and the Chinese. 
The breakthrough of both sides(Taiwan and China) to enter the WTO 
simultaneously can be expected to lead to an acceleration of the establishment process 
for the Chinese Community Market. At least, there is no way either side can avoid 
some form of official contact. By joining the WTO, based on the premise for creating 
an equal status with China(independent customs territory vs. independent customs 
territory), each side of the Strait has committed itself to complying with the rule of 
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free trade, which includes requirements for market opening and removal of tariff and 
non-tariff trade barriers. As with other WTO members, Taiwan and China are surely 
to benefit from each other in their simultaneous WTO accession. At this point, it is a 
crucial step to start using the systemic mechanism provided by the WTO so as to 
build up a process of finding a consensus on a joint economic framework by 
democratic participation. This will lead the two sides of the Strait to overcome the 
barriers and reach a favorable balance regarding the integrating issues by democratic 
manners. Following both sides' WTO accession, the timing provides a good 
opportunity for the two longtime political rivals to adopt the successful model of the 
European Community to propose the creation of the Chinese community market. 
More importantly, such a creation of common community across the Taiwan Strait 
will enable the two independent sovereign ethnic Chinese nations, with their own 
political, social, and cultural identities, to find enough common ground and then to 
pave a positive way for the efficient integration of economies, trade and culture. This 
integration under the form of the common market can be the basis for a new 
framework of permanent peace and political integration between them. Absolutely, it 
will be one of the region's great success stories: a prosperous, stable and modem 
community that capitalizes on its human resource to become a global financial and 
commercial hub. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: PLAYING FOR TIME 
Taiwan's current economic prosperity coupled with its relations with the PRC 
and the US make peaceful reunification under democratic rule more likely to occur 
than other formulas in the future for the reason that it could stabilize the status quo of 
peaceful cross-strait relations, especially, from the viewpoint of Chinese nationalism. 
More importantly, as Taiwan has a very central and valuable role to play in cross-strait 
historic development, both as a model and a resource for China's development, it is 
noted that Taiwan can therefore become China's very example for economic 
modernization and rapid democratization through increased trade, cultural exchanges, 
and other meaningful contacts. As it is the case of North and South Korea, after half a 
century's confrontation, the leaders of North and South Korea made history with a 
handshake that seemingly serves as a model for the two sides of the Taiwan Straits to 
follow. If North and South Korea could do it, why cannot the two sides? 
§ 5-22 The Importance of Continuing the Policy of Institutionalized Communication 
Observing that a quasi-official institutionalized system -- the Taipei-based Strait 
Exchange Foundation(SEF) and the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across 
the Taiwan Strait(ARATS) -- for cross-strait consultations was set up by the two sides 
in 1992 and 1993 respectively, coupled with the increasing cross-strait trade and 
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economic exchange708 between both sides of the Taiwan Straits has turned Taiwan 
into China's second largest source of investment capital/o9 it is noted that both 
sides do have common interests with each other. Although Taiwan's future status 
vis-a.-vis the PRC IS uncertain since the institutionalized communication channels 
between the two sides do not function well,7l0 its superior economic and democratic 
development vis-a.-vis the PRC is apparent. 
The discussion above outlines that both sides of the Strait may first cooperate 
economically, and then, move on to political dialogue to build mutual understanding. 
Political differences should not interfere with economic and trade relations between 
the two sides of the Strait. By so doing, Taiwan's successful economic and democratic 
development may offer the PRC a powerful incentive to fundamentally reform its 
communist system. This, in turn, will improve the cross-strait relations and help the 
two sides of the Strait to promote an acceptable integration politically. To improve the 
functioning of an already existing institutionalized communication arrangement 
would certainly fall within such a scope. In this regards, as being consultative 
708 In order to achieve its economic and political goal, China has been successful in attracting investors 
from Taiwan by regulating a series of policies to provide some preferential treatments. Due to the 
similar customs and common language as well as kinship ties, those investors found it easy to set up 
business there. Gradually Chinese mainland became the most favorite place for Taiwan's outbound 
investment. 
709 According the survey released in 1998, Taiwan was China's second largest source of investment 
capital, after Hong Kong. China is also one of Taiwan's biggest export markets. See John F. Copper, 
TAIWAN: NATIONS-STATE OR PROVINCE, SMC Publishing Inc., 1994, p.167. 
710 See STATEMENT ON MAINLAND CHINA'S WHITE PAPER, Mainland Affairs Council of the 
ROC, Feb. 25, 2000(www.mac.gov.tw)(Noting that until today, Beijing has not followed the terms of 
agreements to meet with each other once every season, to proceed with the second Koo-Wang Talks, 
and to fulfill the promise of sending Mr. Wang Dao-han, the ARATS chairman and Chain's top 
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agencies to both governments of the Strait currently, the Taiwan-based SEF and the 
China-based ARATS can serve as the best channels for conducting dialogue between 
the two sides ofthe Strait. 
§ 5-23 Peaceful Treaty and Zone of Peace 
Although the PRC's "one China" policy has been accepted by the majority of 
the world community, it is based on the precondition that China not use force to settle 
the Taiwan issue in order not to endanger regional stability.711 This is not to mention 
the fact that the military capacity would make it very costly for the PRC were China 
to mount an invasion of Taiwan. Even though China's repeated vow to end its 
separation from Taiwan by force if necessary is nothing new and it is gradually 
becoming the dominant regional power, the mission of China's being a great power 
requires the capability and intention of playing a constructive and stabilizing role in 
the regional order. Hence, the meaningful mission for China to play its role as a 
dominant regional power is to maintain non-hostile ties with Taiwan by working out a 
peaceful settlement of the decades long cross-strait conflict through negotiation with 
Taiwan. This is also a key to Asian stability and prosperity that would benefit both 
Taiwan and China. 
negotiator in handling ties with Taiwan, to visit Taiwan for a constructive dialogue). 
711 See David Shambaugh, TWO CHINAS, BUT ONLY ONE ANSWER, the China Post, July, 21, 
1999, Taiwan(Noting that despite the profound difference between Beijing and Taipei and complexities 
of the situation, the "one China" framework has served for more than two decades as the principal basis 
for stability in an inherently volatile environment). 
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To maintain peace IS a fundamental purpose of international law and is 
specifically a common interest of the international community, especially considering 
that the institutionalized systems for cross-strait consultations were suspended years 
ago.712 In efforts to stabilize such a common interest in the Taiwan Strait, the 
international community should help facilitate cross-strait dialogue between China 
and Taiwan by returning to their institutional track on the basis of previous contacts, 
so that the two sides can sign a bilateral treaty of non-aggression to formally end 
hostilit/13 and create a zone of peace in sensitive areas of the Taiwan Strait by 
gradually demilitarizing the region of the Strait. This is a short-term goal in the 
~ long-term process of the cross-strait reconciliation, which would serve the people and 
interest of Taiwan better than any further consensus on defining the ultimate status of 
Taiwan. 
§ 5-24 China's Progress Towards Democratization 
To reunify the two sides of the Taiwan Strait into a political unit(a new free 
China) is a historical process, meaning that it is not something the two sides can 
achieve overnight. Following its continuous modernization economically, China is 
712 See Marta Weidenhiller, PRC TAKES LONG-TERM VIEW ON ROC, the China Post, Oct. 23, 
1999, Taiwan(Noting that what Taiwan wants is a resumption of the dialogue which began with great 
difficulty in 1993 but came to an immediate halt when Taiwan President Lee traveled to the United 
States in 1995). 
713 See Chang Yan-ting, WHAT THE PENTAGON'S CHINA REPORT TELL US, Taipei Times, July 
30, 2002, Taiwan(Noting that, according to the U.S. Pentagon's recent annual report, the PRC has at 
least 300 medium-range ballistic missiles deployed on China's southeast coast, aimed at major 
Taiwanese cities and landmarks, and the number of missiles increases every year). 
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gammg opportunities for political refonn as economIC freedom creates habits of 
liberty, and habits of liberty create expectations of democracy.714 In this respect, 
Taiwan is in a good position as a very good example to prove this point. 
To date, as a result of avoiding unexpected threats of political instability, 
democracies have replaced autocratic regimes in virtually every region of the world. 
Apparently, with popular demands for more transparency and freedom, the political 
and economic evolution in China will sustain a favorable balance in such a new 
scenario that does not allow the arbitrary decisions of officials to override national 
interests. Instead, democratization is of great importance to China to retain its 
long-tern national interests. As the China becomes more democratized, sooner or later, 
it is inevitable that the Chinese people can tum the Government of China from an 
authoritarian dictatorship into a full-fledged democracy along with a steady high 
growth Chinese economy. In tum, the cross-strait issues would be smoothly resolved 
by a democratic consensus under the best fonnula which is not "one country, two 
systems" but "one country, one system of democracy." Following a better 
understanding of the general political and social situation with each other during such 
an evolutionary and cooperative process, then, not surprisingly, both sides can reach a 
714 For example, see Jane Rickards, ACROSS THE STRAIT: WHAT IS THE FUTURE?, the China 
Post, Dec. 27, 1999, Taiwan(Noting that Beijing's WTO entry would lead to more imports of foreign 
information, technology and culture that would change the people's thinking through exposure to new 
ideas). 
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peaceful settlement on the sovereignty dispute regarding the issue of Taiwan's status 
in a democratic fashion. In the meantime, the goal of unification, namely a future 
one-China remains possible in the process, which is still available as a free option to 
each side ofthe Strait. 
§ 5-25 An Association of Chinese Nations 
As a compromIse due to Taiwan's aspiration for full sovereignty and the 
increased need to preserve the benefits from the cross-strait economIC 
interdependence, and following the successful creation of the Chinese Community 
Market, both sides of the Strait can further map out an association of Chinese 
nations(which is similar to a confederal system), namely, for example, a "Chinese 
Union," so as to contribute to political stability across the Taiwan Strait. Actually, a 
confederal system rather than the federal system715 would be more qualified to apply 
for the present political reality of the Taiwan-China ties because, through such an 
association of the two Chinese nations based on international agreements concluded 
to institutionalize cooperation and coordination in various areas of common concern, 
715 The distinction between federations and confederations is crucial, since the world community and 
intemationallaw treat the two legal entities differently. See Urs W. Saxer, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE SOVIET UNION: FROM A SOCIALIST FEDERATION TO A COMMONWEALTH OF 
INDEPENDENT STATES, 14 Loy. L. A. Int'l & Compo L. J. 581, 605(Noting that, in theory, the major 
distinction between a federation and a confederation is sovereignty, as sovereignty is the decisive 
criterion for determining a state's existence in the world community. In a confederation, the members 
retain their capacity to act as sovereign entities. Thus, according to intemationallaw they continue to 
be states, while in a federation they merge to form a new state. As a legal entity, a confederation lacks 
genuine sovereignty - independent power - aspect, due to its complete dependence on the will of its 
sovereign member states, which are free in all other aspects, including that of determining the future of 
the confederation). 
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each side can retain its own political system independently but at the same time 
continuously strengthen their economic interdependence with each other. 
In such an association case, both the ROC and the PRC can be continuously 
identified as two separate sovereignties that have already been such for decades. In 
tum, by acting together through the democratic framework, each side would hold 
similar sovereign authority without damaging the evolution of external policies and 
the legal framework of the association of Chinese nations and interfering with each 
side's domestic normative framework. 
The most fundamental purposes of creating the association of Chinese nations, 
with the existence of divided state sovereignty and territory by the two sides of the 
Strait, would be to develop the best possible political integration for both the ROC 
and the PRe. As the evolution of economic integration and political integration would 
be compatible with the process of a great integrated China, once both member states 
of the association of Chinese nations simultaneously benefit from such an association 
system, striving toward peaceful reunification through transformation from "two 
separate Chinese nations" to "a China Union" would be a simple goal with a simple 
solution to the longtime existence of the two Chinese governments without the need 
to clamor for the US to broker a grand settlement of the Taiwan issue. It is rather 
extraordinary, but also predictable. 
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